Re: [tor-bugs] #20134 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Nightly jobs don't run every night

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20134: Nightly jobs don't run every night
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a
 |  bug
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Wouldn't it be better to drop the nightly part then?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20123 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider blocking remote jar files at Low Security

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20123: consider blocking remote jar files at Low Security
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-security-slider  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ff52-esr, tbb-security-slider


Comment:

 Sounds good to me. I guess we can consider it already for 6.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20134 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Nightly jobs don't run every night

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20134: Nightly jobs don't run every night
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a
 |  bug
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 We could, but it's not final releases from those trees, it's snapshots.
 And changing it now seems to have little value for the effort involved.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20094 [Core Tor/Tor]: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20094: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, rsos, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  CoreTorTeam201609, torspec |
Parent ID:  #17178   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Changed the option names to the latest from #17178 in:

 [feature-17178 2ca085c] fixup! fixup! Add a NonAnonymous flag to ADD_ONION
 in control-spec

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201609, |  Actual Points:  14
  review-group-5, review-group-8 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:
 rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5,
 review-group-8
 => rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review-group-8
 * actualpoints:  13.5 => 14


Comment:

 I have made the changes nickm requested in his gitlab review, and added
 comments on gitlab with those commits.

 The changes in my [comment:84 comment:84] are in:
 [feature-17178-v7 16c1a3a] Refactor Single Onion code to improve
 consistency

 The changes in dgoulet's [comment:88 comment:88] are in:
 [feature-17178-v7 f4d938c] Replace OnionService* with HiddenService* in
 option names

 So I think this is it. lgtm?
 I am happy to do a not-so-auto-squash once everyone is happy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17622 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17622: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #17178| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 Updated the branch with the latest option names from #17178.
 The first commit will need to be squashed and rewritten, as it is now
 quite out of date.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18342 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo has poor reverse DNS results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18342: onionoo has poor reverse DNS results
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:   => Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0


Comment:

 Planned to be part of the first Onionoo release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19420 [Metrics/Onionoo]: No AS data for some relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19420: No AS data for some relays
-+---
 Reporter:  twim |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  as, asn, geoip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:   => Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0


Comment:

 Planned to be part of the first Onionoo release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Two circuits for one domain (Circuit visualizer sometimes shows the "wrong" exit node)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18138: Two circuits for one domain (Circuit visualizer sometimes shows the 
"wrong"
exit node)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 So, what is the bug about now, after the log got pasted? Originally, I
 assumed this bug is about the circuit display not getting updated properly
 (the description goes basically to https://i.stack.imgur.com/uRiTV.png).
 But the `tbb-circuit-display` keyword got removed with the log. So, if the
 issue is a different one now, why got this bug hjiacked?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10474 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser 3.5.1 launch tasks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10474: TorBrowser 3.5.1 launch tasks
--+--
 Reporter:  phobos|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Tor Browser 3.5 got out years ago. Nothing to do for it anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9117 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove startpage.com from TBB 3.0 branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9117: Remove startpage.com from TBB 3.0 branch
--+--
 Reporter:  phobos|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Startpage is not on `about:tor` anymore, so we are good here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9572 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB opens link in firefox about upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9572: TBB opens link in firefox about upgrade
--+
 Reporter:  vikinggod |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 I think this is working at least in current Tor Browser versions. If not,
 please reopen this bug with steps to reproduce your problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20113 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: New mailinglist for Tor+Cloudflare+other CDN coordination

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20113: New mailinglist for Tor+Cloudflare+other CDN coordination
---+
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I  created the mailing list and made you the listowner. You mentioned a
 list of mail addresses. However I couldn't find that thread in my archive.
 So either point me to some message ID, send me the list via encrypted mail
 or add the people for yourself.

 As requested every member has the moderation flag on by default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20113 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: New mailinglist for Tor+Cloudflare+other CDN coordination

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20113: New mailinglist for Tor+Cloudflare+other CDN coordination
---+
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by qbi):

 GeKo pointed me to the right MID. The list now has members.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed (was: Audit HTTP/2)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14952: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support SPDY in TBB Alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6101: Support SPDY in TBB Alpha
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * cc: g.koppen@… (removed)
 * cc: gk (added)
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #14952.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support SPDY in TBB Alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6101: Support SPDY in TBB Alpha
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19998 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop allowing 3DES in TLS ciphersuites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19998: Stop allowing 3DES in TLS ciphersuites
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Both torspec and tor branches look good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1877 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create repository and package signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1877: Create repository and package signing keys
--+--
 Reporter:  erinn |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18867| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done. We have such nightlies by now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Review:

 - The following change is wrong and probably accidental:
 {{{
 -rs->is_flagged_running = 1;
 +rs->is_flagged_running = 1 *;
 }}}

   Also please squash both commits as they are overwriting each other.

 - I don't see the `MIN_METHOD_FOR_EXCLUDING_INVALID_NODES` consensus
 method defined anywhere. However, it seems like it's included in the
 #20002 branch so this is just a rebase issue.

 - As a step further, does this mean that we can eventually deprecate the
 `is_valid` and `is_flagged_running` flags, and assume that they are set?
 When can this be done? I guess we can already do this for `is_valid` but
 we need to wait till `MIN_METHOD_FOR_EXCLUDING_INVALID_NODES` becomes
 standard to remove `is_flagged_running`.

 Marking this as `needs_revision` for the fist comment.

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[tor-bugs] #20138 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Add constified getters to trunnel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20138: Add constified getters to trunnel
--+-
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Trunnel  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  trunnel
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Here is a feature request for trunnel. Let me know if it does not make
 sense.

 It might be useful to introduce constified versions of getters in trunnel.

 As an example, consider the following getter:
 {{{
 /** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field body of 'inp'.
  */
 uint8_t * certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
 }}}

 In that spot, we could also additionally add the following getter:
 {{{
 /** Return a const pointer to the variable-length array field body of
 'inp'.
  */
 const uint8_t * certs_cell_cert_getarray_body_immutable(const
 certs_cell_cert_t *inp);
 }}}

 which would be more suitable for the following code at
 `channel_tls_process_certs_cell()`:
 {{{
 ...
 uint8_t *cert_body = certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(c);

 if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED)
   continue;

 tor_x509_cert_t *cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len);
 ...
 }}}

 Basically, everytime you use a getter to get a signature/mac/cert field,
 you probably want it constified as you dont need to change it when
 verifying. This occurs quite frequently in the prop224 cells we've been
 implementing, hence this ticket.

 This feature might make some parts of the code more
 readable/understandable, but at the cost of increasing trunnel's
 complexity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17879 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activating the Flash Player is not working anymore since Tor Browser 5.0.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17879: Activating the Flash Player is not working anymore since Tor Browser 
5.0.5
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201512   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Maybe file a different bug (although the description of your issue could
 be a bit more specific then)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1877 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create repository and package signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1877: Create repository and package signing keys
--+--
 Reporter:  erinn |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18867| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by adrelanos):

 Which (Debian?) repository / package contains the signing keys for
 nightly/weekly package builds?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1877 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create repository and package signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1877: Create repository and package signing keys
--+--
 Reporter:  erinn |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18867| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 adrelanos]:
 > Which (Debian?) repository / package contains the signing keys for
 nightly/weekly package builds?

 None. The description of the ticket shows that creating such a thing was
 not the intention.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20122 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create VM for Tor Browser tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20122: Create VM for Tor Browser tests
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 I'm unclear what the requirements are, really.  Just a place to distribute
 static web content from?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser keeps crashing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20120: TorBrowser keeps crashing
--+---
 Reporter:  Verhoeff  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade, arthuredelsteins (added)


Comment:

 Could you test the following build:

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/TorBrowser-tbb-nightly-
 osx64_ALL.dmg
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/TorBrowser-tbb-nightly-
 osx64_ALL.dmg.asc

 and see whether it still crashes for you?

 mcs/brade/arthur: All I did was disabling stripping (on install as well)
 during the Gitian build. I looked at providing good instructions for
 debugging, like how to get a stack trace but I am not sure anymore whether
 I would be in a good position to do so given my outdated 10.6 MacBook.
 Could any of you start with some instructions to get Verhoeff started? I
 think ideally a write-up could get added to
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking#Usinggdb
 or as an own section.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20131 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: webstats transfer for metrics hosts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20131: webstats transfer for metrics hosts
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20136 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please make an ldap account for Linda

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20136: Please make an ldap account for Linda
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Please sign the request with the key we have on file for you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17767 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make it more clear that JavaScript is disabled on security level "high"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17767: Make it more clear that JavaScript is disabled on security level "high"
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Applied to master (commit
 fe6c10c893f3aed2d58e5b0c1b703543d7286f96).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19998 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop allowing 3DES in TLS ciphersuites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19998: Stop allowing 3DES in TLS ciphersuites
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-spec, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged. Thank you for the review!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20081 [Core Tor/Tor]: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c (not exploitable)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20081: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c  (not exploitable)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-bug-bounty,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've updated it, per your comments.  Now it's a branch, with unit tests.
 How do you like `bug20081` in my public repository?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20138 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Add constified getters to trunnel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20138: Add constified getters to trunnel
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Trunnel  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  trunnel   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * points:   => .5


Comment:

 I'd like the suffix to be "_const" rather than immutable, but otherwise I
 think this is an okay idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20138 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Add constified getters to trunnel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20138: Add constified getters to trunnel
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Trunnel  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  trunnel   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by nickm):

 (You would just need to update the AccessorFunctionVisitor class in
 CodeGen.py to create these prototypes and functions.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20063 [Core Tor/Tor]: Permit sched_yield in sandbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20063: Permit sched_yield in sandbox
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by asn):

 Hmm, is there a way to reproduce this problem, so that we can test the
 fix?

 I tried running an unpatched tor (git-6abce601f22) with `--enable-
 expensive-hardening` and `Sandbox 1` and encountered no problems with this
 torrc:
 {{{
 Sandbox 1
 SocksPort auto
 }}}
 Tor bootstrapped to 100% no problem.

 All in all, the patch seems like it's doing what is advertised, but I
 actually don't know anything about the workings of seccomp and our
 sandbox. A review by a more experienced person in this area would be
 appreciated.

 One question: Should we only whitelist those syscalls '''if and only if'''
 ASAN is enabled? Because IIUC, now they are whitelisted for all builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:14 asn]:
 > Review:
  [...]

 Thanks!

 I've fixed the typo issues and squashed the commits in a new branch,
 `ticket20001_v2`.  It has also been rebased to master.  I've added a unit
 test in a second commit.

 > - As a step further, does this mean that we can eventually deprecate the
 `is_valid` and `is_flagged_running` flags, and assume that they are set?
 When can this be done? I guess we can already do this for `is_valid` but
 we need to wait till `MIN_METHOD_FOR_EXCLUDING_INVALID_NODES` becomes
 standard to remove `is_flagged_running`.

 I think you have those backwards, but yeah. We could do that eventually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20063 [Core Tor/Tor]: Permit sched_yield in sandbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20063: Permit sched_yield in sandbox
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 > Hmm, is there a way to reproduce this problem, so that we can test the
 fix?

 That's going to depend on your exact asan implementation; GCC and Clang
 are different a lot, and different versions of each will differ from one
 another.  I think I ran into this problem with the asan from GCC 6.1.1.

 > Should we only whitelist those syscalls if and only if ASAN is enabled?
 Because IIUC, now they are whitelisted for all builds.

 I think the calls are harmless, and we can just whitelist them generally,
 but I wouldn't mind if somebody had a look.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201609, |  Actual Points:  14
  review-group-5, review-group-8 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM.  I actually prefer to do the squashing myself when I can, since that
 lets me make sure I understand the code, and it makes it a little easier
 to make sure that What I Reviewed Is What I Merged.

 I made a squashed `feature17178-v7-squashed-v2`, and used `git diff
 feature-17178-v7 feature-17178-v7-squashed-v2` to make sure that it was
 exactly the same as your branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19958 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19958: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dgoulet):

 See branch `ticket19958_01` with top commit as an attempt at breaking down
 the HS with the current protocol versions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201609, |  Actual Points:  14
  review-group-5, review-group-8 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Merged cleanly. Compiles okay (once I added 223747804568635a9b to bring
 the testing API usage up to date). Tests passed. Tests with expensive
 hardening found a memory leak in the tests (fixed as 831649f56eed00728b5).
 Pushed to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20072 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add chutney's single-onion and single-onion-ipv6 targets to make test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20072: Add chutney's single-onion and single-onion-ipv6 targets to make test-
network-all
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201609, ipv6, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  rsos, 029-proposed |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #17178 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting so I can close #17178.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201609, |  implemented
  review-group-5, review-group-8 |  Actual Points:  14
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser keeps crashing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20120: TorBrowser keeps crashing
--+---
 Reporter:  Verhoeff  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 On OSX, you want to use lldb. If you do not have /usr/bin/lldb on your
 computer, you will need to install Xcode or maybe just the Xcode command
 line tools. Mozilla has some debugging instructions here:
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Mozilla/Debugging/Debugging_Mozilla_with_lldb

 But maybe just start Tor Browser under lldb and see what is shown when it
 crashes. For example:
 {{{
 cd ~/Desktop/TorBrowser.app
 lldb ./Contents/MacOS/firefox
 run
 }}}
 After the crash occurs, a useful command is `bt` (show backtrace).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201609, |  Actual Points:  14
  review-group-5, review-group-8 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (Woohoo!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20094 [Core Tor/Tor]: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20094: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  029-proposed, rsos, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  CoreTorTeam201609, torspec |
Parent ID:  #17178   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17622 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17622: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #17178 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting so I can close #17178

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19919 [Core Tor/Tor]: If ORPort address is publicly routable, use it to guess Address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19919: If ORPort address is publicly routable, use it to guess Address
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by s7r):

 Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > Let's just use ORPort for consistency between IPv4 and IPv6.
 > If the user sets a different DirPort address, #13953 in 0.2.9 will warn
 them.
 > And if they set the same one, that's perfectly ok.
 >
 Agreed.

 > > Also, I think it's fine to also assume `OutboundBindAddress` is the
 same IP address (first publicly routable Advertised ORPort), unless
 otherwise explicitly set in torrc. This can apply to both IPv4 and IPv6
 without any problems.
 >
 > Not when the relay is behind a NAT: OutboundBindAddress is the
 *internal* address.
 > And if we use this default, there's no way to specify "your default
 interface", which is the current default behaviour. Unless there's a
 specific issue here that's causing confusion, let's just leave this alone.
 Or tackle it in a separate ticket.
 >
 Also true. So we need more cases:
 1. Simple ORPort (where user just enters ORPort 9001)
 2. Flagged ORPort (where user enters ORPort 9001 NoListen OR NoAdvertise)
 3. Explicit ORPort (where user enters ORPort public.ip:9001)
 4. Explicit flagged ORPort (where user enters ORPort public.ip:9001
 NoListen OR NoAdvertise)
 5. Explicit NAT ORPort (where user enters ORPort nat.ip:9001)
 6. Explicit flagged NAT ORPort (where user enters ORPort nat.ip:9001
 NoListen or NoAdvertise)

 Obviously for cases 1,2,5,6 and 4 if flagged NoListen we cannot make any
 assumption about `OutboundBindAddress` and that should remain as it is set
 now (equal to `Address` guessed by Tor via current methods).

 But for case 3 and case 4 if it's not NoListen, we can assume that IP
 address is also `Address` and also `OutboundBindAddress` (it's publicly
 routable and it's being listened on).

 > > If there's no IP address set with ORPort, and Address is not set,
 maintain the current behavior to guess `Address` and build the descriptor
 - the current behavior to guess `Address` is not broken in any way, to the
 contrary it works good, we just need to add this improvement for boxes
 with multiple public IP addresses and/or multiple Tor instances.
 >
 > We can do this, it just involves adding a small amount of code to
 `resolve_my_address()`, right before we use `get_interface_address()` to
 do the guess, we should instead use the first advertised IPv4 ORPort
 address from `get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
 AF_INET);`
 >
 > (There's some duplicate code in `resolve_my_address()`, let's refactor
 it out before changing it.)
 >
 > The code might be similar to
 `router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency()`, but will likely be
 much simpler.
 Neat ! Sounds like a clean and simple approach that will do the job just
 fine. `resolve_my_address()` should check if there's anything publicly
 routable manually configured by user with ORPort before starting the
 current algorithm to guess `Address`, that's all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19958 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19958: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I believe I've responded to your review items.

 I am okay with *changing* these versions, but have a look at this
 paragraph:

 {{{
Because all relays currently on the network are 0.2.4.19 or later, we
can require 0.2.4.19, and use 0.2.4.19 as the minimal version so we
we don't need to do code archaeology to determine how many
no-longer-relevant versions of each protocol once existed.
 }}}

 I like the idea of keeping the versions in sync, but there's not a point
 to giving names for versions that only old clients use.

 What do you think of my torspec changes in `dgoulet_ticket19958_01` ?
 (Based on your branch)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Hooray for unittest.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19958 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19958: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:11 nickm]:
 > What do you think of my torspec changes in `dgoulet_ticket19958_01` ?
 (Based on your branch)

 I like it!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, this can sit in merge_ready till #19958 goes in.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20063 [Core Tor/Tor]: Permit sched_yield in sandbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20063: Permit sched_yield in sandbox
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merging this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-8 => prop272,
 TorCoreTeam201608


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20081 [Core Tor/Tor]: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c (not exploitable)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20081: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c  (not exploitable)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-bug-bounty,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => accepted
 * owner:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13827 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13827: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c
---+---
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  pingl
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring, easy, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
   |  small/medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  rl1987 => pingl


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20081 [Core Tor/Tor]: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c (not exploitable)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20081: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c  (not exploitable)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-bug-bounty,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13827 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13827: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c
---+---
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  pingl
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring, easy, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
   |  small/medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15055 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement ed25519 link handshake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15055: Implement ed25519 link handshake
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, prop-220, |  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, |
  201511-deferred, 201512-deferred, tor-crypto-  |
  identity, tor-ed25519-proto,   |
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-9  |
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 tor-relay, prop-220, 027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, 201511-deferred,
 201512-deferred, tor-crypto-identity, tor-ed25519-proto,
 TorCoreTeam201609, nickm-check-done-20160905, review-group-9
 =>
 tor-relay, prop-220, 027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, 201511-deferred,
 201512-deferred, tor-crypto-identity, tor-ed25519-proto,
 TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19297 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have tor-guts cover string-related util functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19297: Have tor-guts cover string-related util functions
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-docs-dev, tor-doc-lowlevel,  |  implemented
  nickm-check-done-20160905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17294   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 covered the most important parts here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17294 [Core Tor/Tor]: Complete users manuals for low-level layers in tor-guts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17294: Complete users manuals for low-level layers in tor-guts
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-docs-dev, tor-doc-lowlevel,  |  implemented
  nickm-check-done-20160905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Done

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17292 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-guts documentation should cover all modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17292: tor-guts documentation should cover all modules
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-docs-dev, tor-doc-modules,   |  implemented
  nickm-check-done-20160905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Yes, we do have a breakdown here.

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[tor-bugs] #20139 [- Select a component]: 8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20139: 8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support
--+-
 Reporter:  sagepeachties |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support   8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7
 turbotax tech support   8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support 8.6.6
 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support 8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech
 support 8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support 8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7
 turbotax tech support 8.6.6 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support 8.6.6
 .7.69. 8.I.2. 7 turbotax tech support

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[tor-bugs] #20140 [Core Tor]: 866 769 8127 skype tech support number @@@@skype

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20140: 866 769 8127 skype tech support number skype
---+--
 Reporter:  sagepeachties  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Deliverable-December2010
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical   |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 866 769 8127 skype tech support number skype  866 769 8127 skype tech
 support number skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number
 skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number skype866 769 8127
 skype tech support number skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number
 skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number skype866 769 8127
 skype tech support number skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number
 skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number skype866 769 8127
 skype tech support number skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number
 skype866 769 8127 skype tech support number skype866 769 8127
 skype tech support number skype

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20010 [Core Tor/Tor]: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20010: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist
-+
 Reporter:  niij |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, whitelist  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #18828   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by niij):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Hey Teor,

 Sorry to bring up this low-priority ticket again, but I just spoke with my
 host and they said that IPv6 addresses are not reserved per-account,
 meaning that mine can (and have) changed from what is in the fallback
 directory.  IPv4 addresses are permanent, though, so my relays will remain
 on these stable IPv4 addresses for the foreseeable future.

 To reduce any problems, I have disabled IPv6 on my servers.  Could you
 remove the IPv6 entries for niij01, niij02, and niij03 from the fallback
 whitelist?

 Thank you
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 wsFcBAEBCAAQBQJX2HAoCRAdSJS4jbcqPQAA9boQAIDJXIzMcj6JyY/KCjsRN2hR
 Wb9b2+UKK+ZiRobLSLLsFBkC7UMbKdZVQbeOLfXrOH50jd/GVDOs14rrUnlbckcJ
 ai5K8l5x2CpmI2femJqu+n3TgRDkBlKv6huxsytf1QZFMwdlXg8FwWPZq7KJjl1H
 WC3eJ9F1KNFDxzTcHFL5CJ8wnbAgqHIFe1TNPmYqJQS3M5m/FehHg6ravU/ySv/U
 OJ/fhlAra/SggJL/gnUzEZmr6cR/jad/ySoq7GDtbkldZEpN1RYPUt+Z5zb0P4Ed
 v+WM/7u7FA6a+oBdyOYgYUArj+FhxG/Niesr0ylhelTeSsMKmjkHLzhJr+VfML0m
 01NcCw8xBzKlz3FoDwPIki9OtM8WqvTbT3oBfJ9Gy08J5AzufBabyHIlN+NeZIIB
 F3/VhMlBq4KAnri/Gv6mhxsGNk+TvALg72djWd6uc1t74xQ1lKwldBskauDH+yj/
 3FWrJVUO+/a95CTUlL34gRD2qJ9HZxJuuKMs20xEaPj2hS5Q/jHjEVqoCT3+AfxD
 dUAOIPBkEaOlvm3tzrUy5KiDPN1ZWco9UEVD7kphPfzFfvOtIM2TUAA+AKaqBKZL
 Wz5YSQM6wAvljRNmbwG3BNV3ijt6HiH+JelOG22RM450v4RPteSE3CS324TOtAze
 OpawUVs0MPudV9oNAJhD
 =I+IO
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19162, #20081

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19162, #20081 by nickm:
keywords to 029-proposed

Comment:
That which is already in 0.2.9 cannot be 029-proposed.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19487, #20070

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19487, #20070 by nickm:
keywords to review-group-9
milestone to Tor: 0.2.9.x-final

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19487, #20070

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19487, #20070 by nickm:
keywords to 029-proposed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19487 [Core Tor/Tor]: Meek and ReachableAddresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19487: Meek and ReachableAddresses
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, bridges, pluggable-|  Actual Points:
  transports, regression, CoreTorTeam201609, |
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: isis (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20117 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update PathsNeededToBuildCircuits man page entry with actual default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20117: Update PathsNeededToBuildCircuits man page entry with actual default
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc CoreTorTeam201609 review-   |  Actual Points:
  group-9|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy doc 029-proposed CoreTorTeam201609 => easy doc
 CoreTorTeam201609 review-group-9
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19919 [Core Tor/Tor]: If ORPort address is publicly routable, use it to guess Address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19919: If ORPort address is publicly routable, use it to guess Address
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 s7r]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > > > Also, I think it's fine to also assume `OutboundBindAddress` is the
 same IP address (first publicly routable Advertised ORPort), unless
 otherwise explicitly set in torrc. This can apply to both IPv4 and IPv6
 without any problems.
 > >
 > > Not when the relay is behind a NAT: OutboundBindAddress is the
 *internal* address.
 > > And if we use this default, there's no way to specify "your default
 interface", which is the current default behaviour. Unless there's a
 specific issue here that's causing confusion, let's just leave this alone.
 Or tackle it in a separate ticket.
 > >
 > Also true. So we need more cases:
 > 1. Simple ORPort (where user just enters ORPort 9001)
 > 2. Flagged ORPort (where user enters ORPort 9001 NoListen OR
 NoAdvertise)
 > 3. Explicit ORPort (where user enters ORPort public.ip:9001)
 > 4. Explicit flagged ORPort (where user enters ORPort public.ip:9001
 NoListen OR NoAdvertise)
 > 5. Explicit NAT ORPort (where user enters ORPort nat.ip:9001)
 > 6. Explicit flagged NAT ORPort (where user enters ORPort nat.ip:9001
 NoListen or NoAdvertise)
 >
 > Obviously for cases 1,2,5,6 and 4 if flagged NoListen we cannot make any
 assumption about `OutboundBindAddress` and that should remain as it is set
 now (equal to `Address` guessed by Tor via current methods).
 >
 > But for case 3 and case 4 if it's not NoListen, we can assume that IP
 address is also `Address` and also `OutboundBindAddress` (it's publicly
 routable and it's being listened on).

 Have there ever been any issues reported by relay operators about
 `OutboundBindAddress` being wrong? If not, let's leave it as an advanced
 option - the default seems fine for almost all relay operators. And
 there's the risk that any automatic guessing gets it wrong, causing
 inexplicable failures for some operators, where before it worked for them.

 Otherwise, I'm all for changing `Address` selection to be more robust.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13081, #19254

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13081, #19254 by nickm:
keywords to 029-nickm-says-no

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17945, #18823, #19179, #19647, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17945, #18823, #19179, #19647, #19871, #19931 by nickm:
keywords to 029-nickm-says-no

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19570 [Core Tor/Tor]: Shared random round gets out of sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19570: Shared random round gets out of sync
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-sr, 029-proposed => tor-sr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19570 [Core Tor/Tor]: Shared random round gets out of sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19570: Shared random round gets out of sync
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Please re-add this to 0.2.9 if you're going to have time to do it. :)

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18828, #20010

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18828, #20010 by nickm:


Action: reassign

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19025 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit relays always return DNS TTL 60 to tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19025: Exit relays always return DNS TTL 60 to tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, TorCoreTeam201607,  |  Actual Points:
  029-proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I think we should just continue with the TTL 60 behaviour for all clients,
 until we're sure what we want to do about #19769

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[tor-bugs] #20141 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extra closing bracket in non-gcc IF_BUG_ONCE_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20141: Extra closing bracket in non-gcc IF_BUG_ONCE_
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  029-proposed, backport
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The 'IF_BUG_ONCE__' for non-gcc is wrong. A simple patch:

 {{{
 --- a/util_bug.h 2016-09-13 10:44:59
 +++ b/util_bug.h 2016-09-08 20:24:45
 @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
  #else
  #define IF_BUG_ONCE__(cond,var) \
static int var = 0;   \
 -  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(cond)) ? \
 +  if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(cond) ?  \
(var ? 1 :\
 (var=1,  \
  tor_bug_occurred_(SHORT_FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, \
 }}}

 Credit to Gisle Vanem, from this tor-dev post:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-September/011393.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20141 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extra closing bracket in non-gcc IF_BUG_ONCE_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20141: Extra closing bracket in non-gcc IF_BUG_ONCE_
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  029-proposed, backport => backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20127 [Core Tor/Tor]: hidden service won't work with local ipv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20127: hidden service won't work with local ipv6 address
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-hs, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:   => tor-hs, ipv6
 * points:   => 1
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #18357 in 0.2.6.10, moving that ticket to 0.2.9.
 It appears IPv6 HiddenServicePort was never implemented correctly.

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[tor-bugs] #20142 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney IPv6 HiddenServicePort tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20142: chutney IPv6 HiddenServicePort tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #18357
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should test #18357 once it's implemented to make sure we don't
 accidentally break it.

 This requires teaching chutney to listen on IPv6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18357 [Core Tor/Tor]: HiddenServicePort IPv6 broken (was: HiddenServicePort IPv6 broken on FreeBSD)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18357: HiddenServicePort IPv6 broken
--+
 Reporter:  sega01|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
 * points:  small/medium => 0.5


Comment:

 This doesn't work on any tor version I've tried on OS X or Linux.
 I suspect IPv6 HiddenServicePort was never implemented correctly.

 I can confirm that IPv6 HiddenServicePort doesn't work on 0.2.8.7 when the
 backend server is:
 {{{
 nc -l ::1 1234
 }}}

 But it does work when the HiddenServicePort is explicit or implicit IPv4
 127.0.0.1, and the backend server is:
 {{{
 nc -l 127.0.0.1 1234
 }}}

 I also tested this with Tor 0.2.7.6, and it doesn't work.
 I suspect it's likely this has never worked as documented, and that a good
 workaround is to use an IPv4 or unix socket HiddenServicePort.

 We should add a chutney test for this when we fix it, so it doesn't break
 and remain unnoticed, see #20142.

 Moving to 0.2.9 as the duplicate #20127 was in 0.2.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20010 [Core Tor/Tor]: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20010: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist
-+
 Reporter:  niij |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback, whitelist  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #18828   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for keeping us up to date.

 Fixed in my branch fallbacks-201607 on github.

 [fallbacks-201607 1e73e13] fixup! fixup! Update fallback addresses based
 on operator emails and tickets

 To be merged when we update the fallbacks for 0.2.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20010 [Core Tor/Tor]: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20010: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist
-+
 Reporter:  niij |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, whitelist  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #18828   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Hang on, I see that IPv6 has been removed on niij03, but not on the other
 two.
 Did you reload their configs?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20081 [Core Tor/Tor]: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c (not exploitable)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20081: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c  (not exploitable)
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks great!
 Tests work for me, and I'm happy that MAX is a true maximum.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19699 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove almost all functionality from Tor's test-network.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19699: Remove almost all functionality from Tor's test-network.sh
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorS-can
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 We could do this in 0.3.0 if we want. It is in no way urgent, the latest
 tor test-network.sh calls chutney/tools/test-network.sh if present, with
 its original argument list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update longclaw's hard-coded IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19760: Update longclaw's hard-coded IPv6 address
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  dir-auth, ipv6, 029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  dir-auth, ipv6, 029-proposed, must-fix-before-028,
 TorCoreTeam201609 => dir-auth, ipv6, 029-proposed


Comment:

 We can do this whenever micah is ready, and it will get backported if
 needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19769: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, dns,   |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201609  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 It would be nice to fix this, but we need to decide what to do first.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20007 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox causing crash when setting HidServAuth when there is a hidden service running

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20007: Sandbox causing crash when setting HidServAuth when there is a hidden
service running
-+-
 Reporter:  segfault |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, crash, tor-hs,   |  Actual Points:
  029-proposed, TorCoreTeam201609|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19931 [Core Tor/Tor]: curve25519-donna runtime math errors on armhf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19931: curve25519-donna runtime math errors on armhf
-+-
 Reporter:  chadmiller   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, integer-overflow,|  Actual Points:
  029-proposed, 029-nickm-says-no|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17622 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17622: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  rsos  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 All 5 new network flavours succeed on master.
 Merged the rewritten branch feature-17178-v5 to chutney master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20072 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add chutney's single-onion and single-onion-ipv6 targets to make test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20072: Add chutney's single-onion and single-onion-ipv6 targets to make test-
network-all
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201609, ipv6, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  rsos, 029-proposed |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please merge my github branch:
 [feature20072 16085a8] Add some chutney single onion networks to make
 test-network-all

 The relevant branches have been merged to tor master and chutney.

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