[tor-bugs] #21586 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion my_rsa_cert failed in sr_generate_our_commit when BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21586: Assertion my_rsa_cert failed in sr_generate_our_commit when
BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Running Tor 0.2.9.9:
 {{{
 $ src/or/tor BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1
 Mar 01 01:09:03.633 [notice] Tor 0.2.9.9 (git-56788a2489127072) running on
 Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t and Zlib 1.2.8.
 Mar 01 01:09:03.634 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Mar 01 01:09:03.634 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc".
 Mar 01 01:09:03.638 [warn] ControlPort is open, but no authentication
 method has been configured.  This means that any program on your computer
 can reconfigure your Tor.  That's bad!  You should upgrade your Tor
 controller as soon as possible.
 Mar 01 01:09:03.639 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
 Mar 01 01:09:03.639 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051
 Mar 01 01:09:03.639 [notice] Opening Control listener on
 /home/arma/.tor/control
 Mar 01 01:09:03.639 [warn] Your log may contain sensitive information -
 you disabled SafeLogging, and you're logging more than "notice". Don't log
 unless it serves an important reason. Overwrite the log afterwards.
 Mar 01 01:09:03.647 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for
 the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24
 hours from now.
 Mar 01 01:09:03.715 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Mar 01 01:09:04.220 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network
 Mar 01 01:09:04.220 [err] tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
 src/or/shared_random.c:908: sr_generate_our_commit: Assertion my_rsa_cert
 failed; aborting. (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: Assertion my_rsa_cert failed in
 sr_generate_our_commit at src/or/shared_random.c:908. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x7f6fab7a1442] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(tor_assertion_failed_+0x8c)
 [0x7f6fab7b917c] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug:
 src/or/tor(sr_generate_our_commit+0x2ce) [0x7f6fab6b251e] (on Tor 0.2.9.9
 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(sr_state_update+0x239)
 [0x7f6fab6b4e49] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(sr_state_init+0x8c)
 [0x7f6fab6b531c] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(do_main_loop+0x486)
 [0x7f6fab69ea16] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
 [0x7f6fab6a1ee5] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(main+0x19) [0x7f6fab69a179]
 (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7f6fa9c8db45] (on Tor 0.2.9.9
 56788a2489127072)
 Mar 01 01:09:04.221 [err] Bug: src/or/tor(+0x401c9) [0x7f6fab69a1c9]
 (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Aborted
 }}}

 Probably we want to handle this weird error case more gracefully.

 Pointed out by a user on #tor who seemed to be confused and enabling all
 sorts of config options.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21406 [Core Tor/Tor]: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21406: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.23
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.4.23
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Please see my branch connection-with-client-v2.

 The flag in or_connection_t was unused (there wasn't even an accessor), so
 I removed it with a note about how to get the channel value.

 I added a comment noting that CREATE_FAST is a legacy mechanism for
 checking for clients.

 We can create an accessor for this flag from an or_connection_t when we
 need it. (I suspect that the traffic padding code and custom measurement
 code might be interested in this flag from an or_connection.)

 I also opened another ticket to check for places where we're identifying
 clients by their absence from the consensus: #21585.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21585 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check code that uses consensus membership to find clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21585: Check code that uses consensus membership to find clients
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #21406, we identify clients by checking peer authentication
 information, as CREATE_FAST has been phased out.

 Most code that needs to know if the other end of a connection is a client
 uses membership in the consensus, but this is unreliable, as relays drop
 out of the consensus.

 So we should check code that uses node_t to identify clients, and switch
 it over to using this flag instead.

 This might mean creating an accessor function that takes an
 or_connection_t and returns whether the channel is a client.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21584 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create ldap account for jgay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21584: Please create ldap account for jgay
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Josh is leading our press / outreach work, and we should give him a
 torproject.org address so he can log in to ldap machines like extra and
 the irc server.

 First name: Josh
 Last name: Gay
 Desired uid: jgay
 Forwarding address: joshua...@riseup.net

 $ gpg --fingerprint e92209e1
 pub   2048R/52115F6FE92209E1 2017-01-23
   Key fingerprint = 59F4 F183 7CC2 7193 3850  21A9 5211 5F6F E922 09E1
 uid  Joshua Gay 
 uid  Joshua Gay 
 uid  [jpeg image of size 22333]
 sub   2048R/3DA9E3BAC262FD56 2017-01-23

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v1

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJYti30AAoJEMIYUlgZ94RRfMgP/jFdI1iq9HEJcnYUm3T2Ub1A
 PIFLiYxaLWzXU8+seekR0NclgdzHBSX6tWtuBMwaoXkq4xRvbbrMTdLc5tVrhjW7
 WES6fMyfsaJCyBIBz/43JteYvIacHTbez2x1OllxpTJc4WzLkv86NPnwGz+1oTUN
 lrEQusbK9f5dUURhuhJd3760nYEjI1951aYYDWaKI0KvWZ9GRuxnhGH6C36LSKuS
 L+I6gy003iae3djJZwLyiLX29LP3mXi+z176lxvfhhGQWEshSUNVlo3ZQhJrM8Z2
 GgBTnLQuLdXPPUkP3UKBXvQF6omM1roF8HZJ1zVwHhnVd+yLMj/BqeLi+xcQUhdg
 GuTSywBYETyufe3PhDpHjgwZFiVXfPxeKsEPDbh2fsyJwyGixuNhVSJ14nznMeyc
 Nzdi2ikVp6cPHRlzj/nkFneM3gtCCRaZPJKxSsYv0rL4L+s8q2mbUyla8qWp43Pv
 AMMhMxRuR/4jVT1uqnX/LrE/Lx33Kybry/3wCbrbXQ+BswmVu57I8aBd6j9rAVD9
 NGO5CSKsGMgDEx/tu+/fjfEjluVIzRNQaHyW0lSVrLYojDlDyU17Vu5BnaRo4vzn
 t4d7dV8hzWL6W+9KwfvsDh0SsahdOvVkalDYzB4a2SRvvajmPHJiQ7SYcGSDtyO4
 4qA1Nz1wnMEZp7HWlzl2
 =7KE0
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

 (there was a previous ticket for this, called #21481, but we redirected
 that one into "just make an email alias" -- I think that means we should
 remove the email alias when making the ldap account.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19699 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove almost all functionality from Tor's test-network.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19699: Remove almost all functionality from Tor's test-network.sh
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed,|  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * points:  0.1 => 0.3


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug19699.

 If CHUTNEY_PATH is set, and chutney's tools/test-network.sh exists, tor's
 src/test/test-network.sh calls it using "$@" to preserve arguments with
 spaces.

 Otherwise, tor's src/test/test-network.sh parses the arguments, and calls
 chutney's tools/test-network.sh using the resulting CHUTNEY_PATH. (Parsing
 the arguments breaks any arguments that contain spaces, because it's not
 possible to save shell arguments in a portable way.)

 I don't think we'll restore the "upgrade chutney" reminder. It's annoying.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21581 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21581: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bsd, 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  reopened => merge_ready


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21581 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21581: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bsd, 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Sorry, missed one fix on this branch:
 778d704908 removes the space between #! and /bin/sh, which apparently some
 unixes don't like.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21581 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21581: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bsd, 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 030 and forward.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21575 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney scripts use generic sh to support BSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21575: Make chutney scripts use generic sh to support BSD
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 This is fixed in my branch back-to-sh-v2, which has been merged to chutney
 master.
 It requires the corresponding tor changes in #21581.

 This is a bugfix on #21563.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21581 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21581: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bsd, 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:   => bsd, 030-backport


Comment:

 This is fixed in my branch bug21581-030.
 It requires the corresponding chutney changes in #21575, which have been
 merged to chutney master.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21583 [Core Tor/Stem]: Crypto nonce must be bytes instead of string for python3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21583: Crypto nonce must be bytes instead of string for python3
---+
 Reporter:  feignix|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 {{{
 File "stem/stem/descriptor/hidden_service_descriptor.py", line 329, in
 _decrypt_basic_auth
 cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(authentication_cookie),
 modes.CTR('\x00' * len(iv)), default_backend())
   File "/usr/lib/python3.5/site-
 packages/cryptography/hazmat/primitives/ciphers/modes.py", line 139, in
 __init__
 raise TypeError("nonce must be bytes")
 TypeError: nonce must be bytescipher =
 Cipher(algorithms.AES(authentication_cookie), modes.CTR('\x00' * len(iv)),
 default_backend())

   File "/usr/lib/python3.5/site-
 packages/cryptography/hazmat/primitives/ciphers/modes.py", line 139, in
 !__init!__
 raise !TypeError("nonce must be bytes")

 !TypeError: nonce must be bytes
 }}}

 The above error shows up in python3.
 Most likely it is due to the recent migration from pycrypto to
 cryptography.

 Fix:
 
https://github.com/paraschetal/stem/commit/c09c9c723806d933445c5a33bceb20d31dcb99d3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19699 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove almost all functionality from Tor's test-network.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19699: Remove almost all functionality from Tor's test-network.sh
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed,|  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 When this is implemented, we can also restore these lines from Makefile.am
 that were removed in #21581:
 {{{
 if test $$? -eq 2 ; then \
 echo "Please update your chutney using 'git pull' to see tor
 warnin\
 gs here."; \
 fi; \
 }}}

 But this could be really annoying if we get it wrong, so it might just be
 better to leave them out.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21582 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Stem Jenkins CI only tests against python2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21582: Stem Jenkins CI only tests against python2
-+
 Reporter:  patrickod|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by patrickod):

 @weasel: if this is something that a volunteer other than yourself can
 help fix, and it takes work off your plate feel free to highlight me on
 IRC (same nick)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21582 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Stem Jenkins CI only tests against python2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21582: Stem Jenkins CI only tests against python2
-+
 Reporter:  patrickod|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 It appears that the Stem CI is only configured to run against Python 2.

 I'm unsure how the jenkins instance is configured, but if it's in a git
 repository somewhere such that I can help contribute a patch into fixing
 this I'd be more than happy to :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21581 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21581: Make test-network.sh use sh (or bash when it's available)
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 test-network.sh doesn't work very well with non-bash /bin/sh.
 But we can't do #19699 in 0.3.0, so we need a workaround until then.

 This is a bugfix on #21562.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21580 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_build_needed_circs comment mentions router_have_min_dir_info, which does not exist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21580: circuit_build_needed_circs comment mentions router_have_min_dir_info, 
which
does not exist
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy, comment
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This was introduced somewhere in 0.3.0 with the new guard code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-16  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
 > > Either that, or just adding 1 to num_primary?
 >
 > Circuits can be up to 8 hops long in pathological cases:
 >
 > Having only 2 primary guards with descriptors fails in the scenario
 where we pick one guard as the exit, and the other as the middle.
 >
 > Having only 3 primary guards with descriptors fails in the scenario
 where we cannibalise a circuit, and one guard is the exit, and the others
 are middles.
 >
 > Having only 3 to (max_intro_points + 2) = 12 primary guards with
 descriptors fails in the scenario where a client fails to connect to an
 intro point, and so it extends to the next intro point repeatedly, up to
 10 intro points. Of course, we're only allowed to send 8 RELAY_EARLY
 cells, so this is bounded by the maximum path length.

 These are wrong, we pick exit, guard, middle(s).

 But having only N primary guards with descriptors fails in the scenario
 where all our primary guards are in the exit's IPv4 /16, or the exit's
 family.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-16  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
 > Either that, or just adding 1 to num_primary?

 Circuits can be up to 8 hops long in pathological cases:

 Having only 2 primary guards with descriptors fails in the scenario where
 we pick one guard as the exit, and the other as the middle.

 Having only 3 primary guards with descriptors fails in the scenario where
 we cannibalise a circuit, and one guard is the exit, and the others are
 middles.

 Having only 3 to (max_intro_points + 2) = 12 primary guards with
 descriptors fails in the scenario where a client fails to connect to an
 intro point, and so it extends to the next intro point repeatedly, up to
 10 intro points. Of course, we're only allowed to send 8 RELAY_EARLY
 cells, so this is bounded by the maximum path length.

 Really, we need to check that we have path_length primary guards with
 descriptors available, or if we don't know the path length at this point,
 max_path_length. And we should BUG out if the actual path length is
 greater than this.

 > And in this case, should we leave the BUG() check in for now?

 Oh gosh yes!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21459 [Metrics/Atlas]: Make atlas fingerprint selectable by double-clicking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21459: Make atlas fingerprint selectable by double-clicking
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 RaBe]:
 > > We still need the fingerprint class to adjust the DDs margin, but I
 agree keeping it as a DD might be the better way :) Also I removed the
 trailing spaces.
 > >
 > >
 
https://github.com/RaphaelBergmann/atlas/commit/0a8aefbe54968e2e6aa302ad4dad4762c7ad77f6
 > I don't see why the margins of the fingerprint field should be altered.
 It requires custom code (which need to be maintained) and makes the look
 of the fingerprint inconsistent with other fields that use ``.

 I agree - let's not change the margin.

 >  Trying to get the fingerprint to use a single line is an unreachable
 goal because you don't know the sizes of all the viewports that are used.
 (For instance, on my end your branch still doesn't make the fingerprint
 use a single line because of the viewport i use).

 I asked that it work for the default window size in Tor Browser, which
 seems reasonable.
 (And it used to work, but was broken by recent changes.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19679 [Core Tor/Stem]: Collapsible FAQ items

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19679: Collapsible FAQ items
---+--
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by kishansag):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19679 [Core Tor/Stem]: Collapsible FAQ items

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19679: Collapsible FAQ items
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by kishansag):

 Please review this patch https://github.com/kishansag/stem/pull/1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21459 [Metrics/Atlas]: Make atlas fingerprint selectable by double-clicking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21459: Make atlas fingerprint selectable by double-clicking
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 RaBe]:
 > We still need the fingerprint class to adjust the DDs margin, but I
 agree keeping it as a DD might be the better way :) Also I removed the
 trailing spaces.
 >
 >
 
https://github.com/RaphaelBergmann/atlas/commit/0a8aefbe54968e2e6aa302ad4dad4762c7ad77f6
 I don't see why the margins of the fingerprint field should be altered. It
 requires custom code (which need to be maintained) and makes the look of
 the fingerprint inconsistent with other fields that use ``. Trying to
 get the fingerprint to use a single line is an unreachable goal because
 you don't know the sizes of all the viewports that are used. (For
 instance, on my end your branch still doesn't make the fingerprint use a
 single line because of the viewport i use).

 The other changes look good.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21334 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Update prop224 HS desriptor generation code to produce the latest descriptor format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21334: prop224: Update prop224 HS desriptor generation code to produce the 
latest
descriptor format
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-16  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 One more question: is there a unit test that verifies "round trip"
 encoding and decoding of a descriptor?  That is, start with a struct,
 encode it, decode it, and make sure you got what you started with?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21334 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Update prop224 HS desriptor generation code to produce the latest descriptor format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21334: prop224: Update prop224 HS desriptor generation code to produce the 
latest
descriptor format
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-16  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've been over the gitlab branch, and it looks pretty good -- just a few
 minor things.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21406 [Core Tor/Tor]: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21406: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This code looks sensible.  IMO it makes sense for there to be only one
 flag, and have the accessors both look at it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20988 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD-amd64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20988: Test fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD-amd64
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  freebsd, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks good -- needs a changes file though?  Also, is this tested?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21510 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make unit test captured log messages consistent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21510: Make unit test captured log messages consistent
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  test, log |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Indeed so!  Merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21470 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write unit tests for security regressions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21470: Write unit tests for security regressions
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  test 030-backport 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  test => test 030-backport 029-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 I've merged `test21470-029` to master, because #21507 isn't backported
 yet.  Once it's backported, we can consider backporting this to 0.2.9 or
 0.3.0.

 I've added explicit regression-tests for #21278 and #20894 to our fuzzing
 corpora.

 Moving this ticket to 0.3.0 for backport consideration.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject Tor versions that contain non-numeric prefixes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21507: Reject Tor versions that contain non-numeric prefixes
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 030-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to master.  If no problems are encountered, we can backport to
 0.2.9

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the usecreatefast default 0 in tor to match the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21407: Make the usecreatefast default 0 in tor to match the consensus
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.23
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20489 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add tests for CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20489: add tests for CollecTor
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-help   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-16  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Either that, or just adding 1 to num_primary?

 And in this case, should we leave the BUG() check in for now?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 6.5a4 anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20905: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 
6.5a4
anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, |
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-6.5-regression, tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,
 TorBrowserTeam201702R
 =>
 tbb-6.5-regression, tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,
 TorBrowserTeam201702
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've built Linux bundles (and am currently building for other platforms as
 well) and tested the 64bit version on my Linux box. I get the attached
 screen shot on first start (note: the window width is even larger than the
 one of my monitor) and the following error in my terminal
 {{{
 *
 A coding exception was thrown and uncaught in a Task.

 Full message: TypeError: can't access dead object
 Full stack:
 this.PromiseWalker.completePromise@resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm ->
 resource://gre/modules/Promise-backend.js:700:9
 TaskImpl_run@resource://gre/modules/Task.jsm:320:13
 Handler.prototype.process@resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm ->
 resource://gre/modules/Promise-backend.js:933:23
 this.PromiseWalker.walkerLoop@resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm ->
 resource://gre/modules/Promise-backend.js:812:7
 this.PromiseWalker.scheduleWalkerLoop/<@resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm
 -> resource://gre/modules/Promise-backend.js:746:1

 *
 }}}
 Let me know what you need from me to track this issue down.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20546 [Metrics/CollecTor]: implement CleanUtils

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20546: implement CleanUtils
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20518 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * owner:  aegis2501 => iwakeh
 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * keywords:  metrics-help =>


Comment:

 Removed metrics-help tag, as this is already implemented.

 Review assigned to myself.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-16  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by asn):

 I think the bug has been found.

 Here it is:
 {{{
   const int num_primary =
 get_n_primary_guards_to_use(GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC);
 ...
   SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *,
 guard) {
 ...
 n_considered++;
 ...
 if (n_considered >= num_primary)
   break;
   } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
 }}}

 In the above, it seems like `get_n_primary_guards_to_use()` returns 1
 (because of DFLT_N_PRIMARY_GUARDS_TO_USE), and then we only actually check
 the first primary guard for descriptor and `break` after that.

 This way it's possible that the second primary guard actually has no
 descriptor, and if for some reason we end up picking it (e.g. because we
 picked the first primary guard as the exit node) we will get the assert.

 What's the right fix here? Maybe to set `num_primary` to
 `smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)` and test all guards for
 descriptors before proceeding? What else?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21579 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Change 0.2.7 jenkins builders to use maint-0.2.7-redux, release-0.2.7-redux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21579: Change 0.2.7 jenkins builders to use maint-0.2.7-redux, 
release-0.2.7-redux
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 For reasons discussed in #20512, the maint-0.2.7 branch is not where
 future 0.2.7 releases will come from.  Instead of maint-0.2.7, please see
 maint-0.2.7-redux.  Instead of release-0.2.7, please see
 release-0.2.7-redux.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21138, #21370

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21138, #21370 by iwakeh:
milestone to Onionoo-1.3.0

--
Tickets URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a plan on how to deploy e10s in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21432: Make a plan on how to deploy e10s in Tor Browser
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [ticket:21432 gk]:
 > Our current goal is to make Tor Browser based on ESR 52 ready for
 content sandboxing (e10s).
 Content Sandboxing is another task:
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Firefox/AddOns/Status/current#Sandboxing
 To make Tor Browser based on ESR 52 ready for content sandboxing, ESR 52
 should be ready for e10s.
 > While the work is done in different bugs we need to create a plan on how
 we want to deploy it. For that we need to investigate first how Mozilla is
 shipping it in Firefox 52 ESR.
 e10s qualification criteria for ESR52:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329752
 > The goal in 53 is to allow e10s to expand to all users, unless they have
 add-ons marked specifically MPC=False (not multiprocess compatible)
 So, it's a nice thing to investigate on alphas, but not for the stable.

 Also, in order to stop spending time on Mozilla's experiments your effort
 should be targeted to conversion to WebExtensions compatible with e10s-
 multi.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21309: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The reason the Omnibox was redesigned is the Omnibox API riding the trains
 to Firefox 52 which has privacy implications and may be worth
 investigating.
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1166831

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21459 [Metrics/Atlas]: Make atlas fingerprint selectable by double-clicking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21459: Make atlas fingerprint selectable by double-clicking
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by RaBe):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 We still need the fingerprint class to adjust the DDs margin, but I agree
 keeping it as a DD might be the better way :) Also I removed the trailing
 spaces.

 
https://github.com/RaphaelBergmann/atlas/commit/0a8aefbe54968e2e6aa302ad4dad4762c7ad77f6

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #1775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Tor speak UPnP and NAT-PMP for port-forwarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1775: Make Tor speak UPnP and NAT-PMP for port-forwarding
--+
 Reporter:  sjmurdoch |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #1752 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sca1een):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 hey..have your finished developing this project??seems like you didn't but
 the project is closed..did something went sideways??been working for
 [http://acewriters.org/ essay experts] for some time and think i can help
 you out..am interested in this project of yours..let me know if you are

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Looks good to me, thanks!  I'd say let's go ahead and include these
 measurements on Metrics, and if we later find out that there are
 measurement issues, we can still take broken measurements out.  But if
 nobody looks at the data, nobody will spot any issues.

 So, seems like the missing piece is the CollecTor integration.  I'll
 continue working on that.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21007 [Core Tor/Tor]: guard: circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): Bug: 3-hop circuit with purpose 18 has no guard state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21007: guard: circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): Bug: 3-hop circuit  with
purpose 18 has no guard state
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-guard, review-group-16  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merging!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21007 [Core Tor/Tor]: guard: circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): Bug: 3-hop circuit with purpose 18 has no guard state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21007: guard: circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): Bug: 3-hop circuit  with
purpose 18 has no guard state
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, review-group-16  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Patch looks good to me :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21027 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816: entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion !(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (o

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21027: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816:
entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion
!(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.0.0
-alpha-dev 8b75261b6dc341de)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-guards-revamp,|  Actual Points:
  regression, review-group-16|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for all the reviews!  Squashed as bug21027_v2_squashed and merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21578 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Resolve deprecation warnings after upgrading to metrics-lib 1.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21578: Resolve deprecation warnings after upgrading to metrics-lib 1.6.0
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21578=199f5959095d97f6fc3a286079e193d03ddf7341
 commit 199f595 in my task-21578 branch].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-16  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:10 nickm]:
 > `bug21415_030` is the fix I suggested above, of which asn said:
 >
 > > Your fix suggestion seems plausible here, but I'd like some more
 confidence that we have found the right bug.
 >
 > Asn: Based on Teor's logs, do you think this is the right fix?

 Ugh, I've been digging in the logs for at least an hour trying to verify
 our theory, but it doesn't seem to apply straightforwardly.

 Here is the primary guard list from `info.2.log`:
 {{{
 Feb 27 05:21:23.000 [info] entry_guards_update_primary(): Primary entry
 guards have changed. New primary guard list is:
 Feb 27 05:21:23.000 [info] entry_guards_update_primary():   1/3: test004r
 ($A92594E93FEE5D83D12D977460B1DA47916B28A6) (confirmed)
 Feb 27 05:21:23.000 [info] entry_guards_update_primary():   2/3: test005r
 ($EF23A3601B2234F32EF6673DDCD4ECE6040327B7) (confirmed)
 Feb 27 05:21:23.000 [info] entry_guards_update_primary():   3/3: test006r
 ($3AF6D56A2B57BE95F4D097035473E06109E426D4)
 }}}

 Here are guard successes for all the primaries:
 {{{
 Feb 27 05:21:29.000 [info] entry_guards_note_guard_success(): Recorded
 success for primary confirmed guard test004r
 ($A92594E93FEE5D83D12D977460B1DA47916B28A6)
 ...
 Feb 27 05:21:34.000 [info] entry_guards_note_guard_success(): Recorded
 success for primary confirmed guard test005r
 ($EF23A3601B2234F32EF6673DDCD4ECE6040327B7)
 ...
 Feb 27 05:21:34.000 [info] entry_guards_note_guard_success(): Recorded
 success for primary confirmed guard test006r
 ($3AF6D56A2B57BE95F4D097035473E06109E426D4)
 }}}

 and then here is the assert a few seconds afterwards:
 {{{
 Feb 27 05:21:40.000 [info] choose_good_exit_server_general(): Chose exit
 server '$A92594E93FEE5D83D12D977460B1DA47916B28A6~test004r at 127.0.0.1'
 Feb 27 05:21:40.000 [info] extend_info_from_node(): Including Ed25519 ID
 for $A92594E93FEE5D83D12D977460B1DA47916B28A6~test004r at 127.0.0.1
 Feb 27 05:21:40.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal
 assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.1.0-alpha-
 dev efa5bbaba07d20d1)
 [snip]
 Feb 27 05:21:40.000 [info] select_entry_guard_for_circuit(): Selected
 primary guard test006r ($3AF6D56A2B57BE95F4D097035473E06109E426D4) for
 circuit.
 }}}
 which I assume was generated because of `test005r` missing a descriptor,
 since we chose `test004r` (our first primary) as an exit node, and then we
 ended up choosing `test006r` (our last primary) as the entry node after
 the assert triggered...

 But then how come a circuit to `test005r` succeeded just 6 seconds before
 the assert triggered? Why didnt we get the assert at that point (maybe it
 was a directory circuit?)? But then how did we get past
 `entry_guards_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits()`? I don't see
 `test005r` being marked as unreachable anywhere before that.

 Could this be called by some bridge weirdness? But then how come it was
 reproduced in `hs-ipv6` network?

 Some more digging is required.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21578 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Resolve deprecation warnings after upgrading to metrics-lib 1.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21578: Resolve deprecation warnings after upgrading to metrics-lib 1.6.0
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 See summary, will attach branch in a minute.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in connection_ap_handshake_send_begin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21576: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin
-+
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:   => teor
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in connection_ap_handshake_send_begin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21576: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin
-+
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => crash, 029-backport
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 (Fixing the accidental reverts caused by the last update.)

 Marking for possible backport to 0.2.9: this crash bug causes denial-of-
 service, so it may qualify as a security issue.

 A simple fix for 0.2.9 is to `BUG()` and `return -1` rather than crashing
 when either of the relevant pair of assertions fail.

 Earlier in the function, we should probably `BUG()` and `return -1` if the
 stream is marked for close. (Or is in an inconsistent state: there should
 be no way that a `linked` connection has a NULL `linked_conn`.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21027 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816: entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion !(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (o

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21027: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816:
entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion
!(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.0.0
-alpha-dev 8b75261b6dc341de)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-guards-revamp,|  Actual Points:
  regression, review-group-16|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:26 nickm]:
 > Thanks for the reviews! I've tried to improve the documentation and
 function name in a fixup commit.

 Looks good to me. Let's get this merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20657 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement service support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20657: prop224: Implement service support.
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+

Comment (by asn):

 OK, I pushed my ntor branch at `prop224-ntor`. I also made a gitlab merge
 request here:
 https://gitlab.com/asn/tor/merge_requests/13

 Please check it out, and let me know what needs to be fixed before it's
 merged in the rest of the service-side branch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21577 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: packages needed on papillare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21577: packages needed on papillare
-+-
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Hi,
 I need the following packages installed on papillare to run onionperf:

 gcc g++ automake cmake make libglib2.0 libglib2.0-dev libigraph0
 libigraph0-dev libevent-dev openssl libssl-dev python python-dev libxml2
 libxml2-dev libxslt1-dev libpng-dev libfreetype6 pip virtualenv

 Please let me know if is there anything I can help with.

 Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21576 [Core Tor]: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in connection_ap_handshake_send_begin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21576: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by alecmuffett):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final =>


Comment:

 For reference, in case it's relevant, the worker onions for OnionBalance
 all have configs that look something like this.

 @asn: If it continues, this fatally blocks my ability to use and deploy
 OnionBalance into corporate environments.  That would be somewhat
 deleterious.

 {{{
 # -*- conf -*-
 # eotk (c) 2017 Alec Muffett

 # template note: here we use TOR_DIR not PROJECT_DIR because of the
 # relocation of Tor directories under `softmap`
 DataDirectory /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/wiki.d/hs-1.d
 ControlPort unix:/home/pi/eotk/projects.d/wiki.d/hs-1.d/tor-control.sock
 PidFile /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/wiki.d/hs-1.d/tor.pid
 Log notice file /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/wiki.d/hs-1.d/tor.log
 SafeLogging 1
 HeartbeatPeriod 60 minutes
 LongLivedPorts 80,443
 RunAsDaemon 1

 # use single onions
 SocksPort 0 # have to disable this for single onions
 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1 # yep, i want single onions
 HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1 # yes, really, honest, i swear

 # softmap
 HiddenServiceDir /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/wiki.d/hs-1.d
 HiddenServicePort 80
 unix:/home/pi/eotk/projects.d/wiki.d/hs-1.d/port-80.sock
 HiddenServicePort 443
 unix:/home/pi/eotk/projects.d/wiki.d/hs-1.d/port-443.sock
 HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 3
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18530: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 As the majority of users prefer to stay in the
 dark/silence/unawareness/etc, the most effective way to research the
 impact of what this ticket about is to add a warning message to the stable
 release of Tor Browser, e.g. something scary like "Your OS is unsupported.
 OK", and see the reaction of users on available communication channels.
 Otherwise, their installations will be silently ruined by the automatic
 update to 7.0.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14862 [Metrics/Metrics website]: agregate *BSD in relays by platform (and future bandwidth by platform)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14862: agregate *BSD in relays by platform (and future bandwidth by platform)
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I believe this is not an issue (anymore).  See
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?id=b7704a6ace20c077873c04a744abf94b6dda9730 commit
 b7704a6] from over a year ago.  Closing as not-a-bug.  Please reopen if
 this was wrong.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in connection_ap_handshake_send_begin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21576: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin
--+
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 Triaging this in 0.3.0 given that it's an assert bug. We can consider
 moving to 0.3.1 if we feel like it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21576 [Core Tor]: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in connection_ap_handshake_send_begin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21576: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 It turns out that this is repeatable; logfiles to come.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21576 [Core Tor]: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in connection_ap_handshake_send_begin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21576: Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 I am using Tor for Onionbalance.  Uploading descriptors for a large
 OnionBalance config, I crashed Tor with this message:

 {{{
 ...
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] connection_free_(): Freeing linked Directory
 connection [client reading] with 0 bytes on inbuf, 0 on outbuf.
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] circuit_finish_handshake(): Finished building
 circuit hop:
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] internal circ (length 4, last hop kouettland):
 $566D30FF44DFBB163F632C439A86CC5B1431EC7C(open)
 $254EB51B0B85B2FB8A70997875DA493420A30458(open)
 $9844B981A80B3E4B50897098E2D65167E6AEF127(open)
 $B9FB493DC3CAC92A1F923DC05A251DCF3F4A4410(open)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): circuit built!
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] pathbias_count_build_success(): Got success
 count 273.152447/280.411541 for guard Unnamed
 ($566D30FF44DFBB163F632C439A86CC5B1431EC7C)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] internal circ (length 4):
 $566D30FF44DFBB163F632C439A86CC5B1431EC7C(open)
 $254EB51B0B85B2FB8A70997875DA493420A30458(open)
 $9844B981A80B3E4B50897098E2D65167E6AEF127(open)
 $B9FB493DC3CAC92A1F923DC05A251DCF3F4A4410(open)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] link_apconn_to_circ(): Looks like completed
 circuit to [scrubbed] does allow optimistic data for connection to
 [scrubbed]
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(): Sending
 relay cell 1 on circ 3620016270 to begin stream 11043.
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
 src/or/connection_edge.c:2443: connection_ap_handshake_send_begin:
 Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed; aborting. (on Tor 0.2.9.9
 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: Assertion linked_dir_conn_base failed in
 connection_ap_handshake_send_begin at src/or/connection_edge.c:2443. Stack
 trace: (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(log_backtrace+0x4c) [0x54c0ea48]
 (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(tor_assertion_failed_+0x90)
 [0x54c2a0f0] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug:
 tor(connection_ap_handshake_send_begin+0x574) [0x54bbce5c] (on Tor 0.2.9.9
 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug:
 tor(connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit+0xf4) [0x54b94438] (on
 Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug:
 tor(connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit+0x2ec) [0x54b96ed4] (on Tor
 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(connection_ap_attach_pending+0x198)
 [0x54bbc02c] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(circuit_try_attaching_streams+0x2c)
 [0x54b93c04] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(circuit_send_next_onion_skin+0x2c8)
 [0x54b7fe70] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(+0x5c470) [0x54b19470] (on Tor
 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(circuit_receive_relay_cell+0x2c8)
 [0x54b1b8e8] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(command_process_cell+0x324)
 [0x54b984a8] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(channel_tls_handle_cell+0x238)
 [0x54b774d8] (on Tor 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(+0x104ad0) [0x54bc1ad0] (on Tor
 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(+0xfb40c) [0x54bb840c] (on Tor
 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 Feb 28 09:59:44.000 [err] Bug: tor(+0x3293c) [0x54aef93c] (on Tor
 0.2.9.9 56788a2489127072)
 }}}

 OnionBalance and other log/config files available as desired.  Config file
 as follows:

 {{{
 DataDirectory /home/pi/eotk/onionbalance.d
 ControlPort unix:/home/pi/eotk/onionbalance.d/tor-control.sock
 PidFile /home/pi/eotk/onionbalance.d/tor.pid
 Log info file /home/pi/eotk/onionbalance.d/tor.log
 SafeLogging 1
 HeartbeatPeriod 60 minutes
 RunAsDaemon 1
 # onionbalance
 SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9055
 CookieAuthentication 1
 MaxClientCircuitsPending 1024
 }}}

 - alec

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21559 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser deanonymization/fingerprinting via cached intermediate CAs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21559: Tor browser deanonymization/fingerprinting via cached intermediate CAs
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW:
 1) It's not an ordinary cache, but just a fallback for misconfigured
 servers made for "fixing" issues like #2167, #9479, #18218, #19371, but
 doesn't work as you see, because it's useless for stateless browser and
 should be disabled.
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1334485#c11
 2) Mozilla urgently disabled SHA-1 and removed WoSign busters from the
 root.
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1311824#c1
 3) PoC successfully stress-tested the network subsystem of Firefox leading
 to potentially exploitable crash. Cache should be disabled to reduce the
 surface and check whether it's the root cause.
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1334485#c21

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21575 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney scripts use generic sh to support BSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21575: Make chutney scripts use generic sh to support BSD
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ln5):

 * cc: ln5 (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean-up system extensions shipped in Firefox 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21431: Clean-up system extensions shipped in Firefox 52
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > webcompat
 > Empty / stub extension to allow webcompat fixes to be deployed via the
 add-on update mechanism.
 Of course, it's easier to disable this system add-ons update mechanism
 entirely, but it is inconsistent with other add-ons update policy.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16552 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Don't require searches by IPv6 address to start with [

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16552: Don't require searches by IPv6 address to start with [
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Pushed to master, now preparing the release for later today.  Closing.
 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs