Re: [tor-bugs] #21846 [Metrics/Torflow]: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21846: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work
---+--
 Reporter:  davidwf|  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torflow|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  chelseakomlo, tjr  |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * reviewer:  chelseakomlo, teor => chelseakomlo, tjr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by robgjansen):

 Replying to [comment:69 karsten]:

 > robgjansen, any ideas how to fix/work around this?

 It looks like that was a bug:
 
https://github.com/robgjansen/onionperf/commit/e3ea7db4d8b1c3f2f410aa85326177495a7215b1

 I pushed a fix to the OnionPerf repo on GitHub. @hiro Testing would be
 appreciated ;-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Hi Daniel, great that you're still around :) I have a question about the
 unit tests. In the function test_consdiff_calc_changes() in the second
 test, you're calculating the changes between "a\na\na\na\n" and
 "a\nb\na\nb\n" - and then we expect the first bit vector to be marked
 unchanged, changed, changed, unchanged. What am I missing here? According
 to the documentation of calc_changes() I would think that the proper
 result would be unchanged, changed, unchanged, changed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21846 [Metrics/Torflow]: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21846: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work
+--
 Reporter:  davidwf |  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torflow |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  chelseakomlo, teor  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 I will test functionality, it would be good to have teor or someone who
 runs a bwauth to give a second opinion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21846 [Metrics/Torflow]: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21846: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work
+--
 Reporter:  davidwf |  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torflow |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  chelseakomlo, teor  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * reviewer:   => chelseakomlo, teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, intro,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, intro,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  steeve149 => Jigsaw52


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:
 |  steeve149
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, intro,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:
 |  steeve149
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, intro,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 I tried to fix this. Here is my code: https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor/tree
 /remove-padding-fix-7869

 While fixing this issue, I noticed that the function
 curve25519_public_to_base64 does not behave according to its description.
 The description says 'Encode pkey as a base64-encoded string,
 without trailing "=" characters'. However, this function output still had
 the trailing "=".
 I fixed this as well and fixed all the code and tests that used padded
 keys.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 More exit bandwidth is also welcome, no?

 Even if this is implemented (now) it would take a long time until this
 release gets to most tor users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:46 gk]:
 > Thanks, I prepared `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-1` which I am going to
 push once I have proper Internet again (in about 4 hours). I'll add #21849
 as a child ticket as this is rebase related.

 Thanks. Note there is an extra fixup here (thanks to mcs and brade for
 noticing this error):
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-
 browser/commit/3d38cd9dd7596872778c6e6573ac748650e31598

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:4 arma]:
 > Replying to [ticket:21864 isis]:
 > > 1) Warn bridge operators not to include ''other'' bridges in MyFamily,
 but let them know that including relays is fine. We should continue to
 warn them not to list any bridge in the MyFamily of a public relay.
 > > 2) Allow bridges to specify MyFamily.
 >
 > The MyFamily references, as currently designed, need to be
 bidirectional. Otherwise you could set up a bridge and request that
 anybody who uses your bridge should never use the following (innocent,
 unrelated, target) relays in their circuit, and really mess with path
 selection.

 Yes, and there are also other ways to mess with someone's path selection
 if you're their guard/bridge. Not that that means we should make it easier
 for them to do so, but I feel like a malicious bridge is going to behave
 maliciously no matter what we do with the MyFamily setting.

 > See #15060 for more discussion.

 I'm not sure if "Wait for us to do something with a vague, two-years-old
 ticket" is the best response to "We have way more money than we thought
 and we want to give you free bandwidth"?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:47 gk]:
 > Arthur, one thing I forgot: what happend to our DNS leak prevention
 patch? It seems it did not get rebased? Looking above you seem to imply it
 got upstreamed. I found you pointing to bug 751465 but what is the other
 commit you had in mind.

 That is strange, because I can't find that hash either now. I think I
 intended to point to the test for 751465 you provided at
 `ef52c3bbf96f317d461ad652970f817e78923531`. Do these two patches cover the
 problem reported in #5741 or do we need the Tor Browser patch as well?

 > I think I am inclined to take that patch again until we can be sure
 Mozilla is taking our proxy bypass safety requirements pretty seriously.

 Here's a rebased version, in case we still need it:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/20680+10_5741

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FYI: NoiseTor does not seem to care about MyFamily on their current relays
 either
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/1A835E3663068222F28F7C5AF3216F4B27B50B57
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/contact:tor.noisebridge.net

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [ticket:21864 isis]:
 > 1) Warn bridge operators not to include ''other'' bridges in MyFamily,
 but let them know that including relays is fine. We should continue to
 warn them not to list any bridge in the MyFamily of a public relay.
 > 2) Allow bridges to specify MyFamily.

 The MyFamily references, as currently designed, need to be bidirectional.
 Otherwise you could set up a bridge and request that anybody who uses your
 bridge should never use the following (innocent, unrelated, target) relays
 in their circuit, and really mess with path selection.

 See #15060 for more discussion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Some more thoughts:

 - Since MyFamily requires mutuality, relays would have to include
 (hashed?) bridge fingerprints in their MyFamily or do you propose an
 exception in the bridge case?

 - If we do not require a mutual MyFamily agreement in the bridge-case.
 This would open a new attack opportunity: Attacker creates a bridge: list
 all exits except those that are operated by himself to force the client
 towards exits that are under his control.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 also relevant for torservers (they run %20 of bridges and ~%10 exit
 capacity)
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-March/012186.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  easy, 15min => intro, 15min


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[tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy, 15min
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 In src/or/config.c:
 {{{
   if (options->MyFamily && options->BridgeRelay) {
 log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Listing a family for a bridge relay is not "
  "supported: it can reveal bridge fingerprints to censors. "
  "You should also make sure you aren't listing this bridge's "
  "fingerprint in any other MyFamily.");
   }
 }}}

 In src/or/router.c, function `router_build_fresh_descriptor`:
 {{{
   if (options->MyFamily && ! options->BridgeRelay) {
 smartlist_t *family;
   […]
 }}}

 I propose instead that we:

 1) Warn bridge operators not to include ''other'' bridges in MyFamily, but
 let them know that including relays is fine. We should continue to warn
 them not to list any bridge in the MyFamily of a public relay.
 2) Allow bridges to specify MyFamily.

 The reasoning for this is that NoiseTor would like to run high-capacity
 default bridges for Tor Browser, but they are nervous about simultaneously
 running exits without being able to direct people not to use both.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21862: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Are you compiling with {{{--enable-rust}}} so that those calls are
 available?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review networking code for Firefox 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21625: Review networking code for Firefox 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201703, ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 mikeperry]:
 > Stuff we should patch/disable:
 >  * FlyWeb (dom/flyweb/FlyWebService.cpp) - This is a mechanism for
 contacting local devices and interacting with them. It may not be fully
 implemented, but networking code is definitely here. Disable it.

 We have #21746 for that.

 >  * dom/presentation/* and nsNetworkInfoService::ListNetworkAddresses -
 the Presentation API (for remote displays - https://developer.mozilla.org
 /en-US/docs/Web/API/Presentation_API). This needs to be disabled even if
 proxied, because it does ICE-style IP address discovery and advertisement.

 #18862

 >  * ./dom/presentation/provider/MulticastDNSDeviceProvider.cpp - used by
 the Presentation API to announce itself (and maybe other stuff?). Make
 sure it gets disabled.
 >  * The Rust URL parser (third_party/rust/url/src/host.rs) has a
 to_socket_addrs and ToSocketAddrs methods. These should be patched out for
 safety and to remind us later, I think.
 >  * netwerk/dns/mdns/libmdns/fallback/MulticastDNS.jsm - more mDNS stuff
 that should be disabled.

 We have #21861 for the mdns stuff and #21862 for the Rust part.

 > Android stuff that definitely leaks that we should fix (missing proxy
 params to HttpUrlConnection - these need to use the buildHttpConnection
 helper to get a proxy):
 >  * mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/feeds/FeedFetcher.java
 >  *
 mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/media/GeckoMediaDrmBridgeV21.java
 >  *
 mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/search/SearchEngineManager.java
 >  * mobile/android/thirdparty/com/keepsafe/switchboard/SwitchBoard.java

 That's #21683.

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[tor-bugs] #21863 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ensure proxy safety on Android when switching to ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21863: Ensure proxy safety on Android when switching to ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-7.0-must
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4 |
-+-
 Mike mentions in #21625:
 {{{
 Android stuff that definitely leaks that we should fix (missing proxy
 params to HttpUrlConnection - these need to use the buildHttpConnection
 helper to get a proxy):
  * mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/feeds/FeedFetcher.java
  *
 mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/media/GeckoMediaDrmBridgeV21.java
  *
 mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/search/SearchEngineManager.java
  * mobile/android/thirdparty/com/keepsafe/switchboard/SwitchBoard.java
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #21862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21862: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff52-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-7.0-must-
 |  alpha
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4 |
-+-
 Even though we don't use any Rust in ESR 52 we should get rid of proxy
 bypassing calls for safety and to remind us for later:

 third_party/rust/url/src/host.rs has a to_socket_addrs and ToSocketAddrs
 methods.

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[tor-bugs] #21861 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure new mDNS code is disabled in ESR 52-based Tor Browsers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21861: Make sure new mDNS code is disabled in ESR 52-based Tor Browsers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff52-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-7.0-must-
 |  alpha
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4 |
-+-
 There is new mDNS code we don't want to have in

 /dom/presentation/provider/MulticastDNSDeviceProvider.cpp
 netwerk/dns/mdns/libmdns/fallback/MulticastDNS.jsm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure the Presentation API is no risk for our users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18862: Make sure the Presentation API is no risk for our users
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201703 => ff52-esr,
 tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704


Comment:

 From Mike's notes in #21625:
 {{{
 This needs to be disabled even if proxied, because it does ICE-style IP
 address discovery and advertisement.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21746 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have a closer eye on FlyWeb regarding proxy bypass

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21746: Have a closer eye on FlyWeb regarding proxy bypass
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-7.0-must-alpha


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Arthur, one thing I forgot: what happend to our DNS leak prevention patch?
 It seems it did not get rebased? Looking above you seem to imply it got
 upstreamed. I found you pointing to bug 751465 but what is the other
 commit you had in mind.

 I think I am inclined to take that patch again until we can be sure
 Mozilla is taking our proxy bypass safety requirements pretty seriously.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review networking code for Firefox 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21625: Review networking code for Firefox 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201703, ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 The full notes are now pushed to https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser-spec.git/tree/audits/FF52_NETWORK_AUDIT

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review networking code for Firefox 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21625: Review networking code for Firefox 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201703, ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Components that could probably use another review:
  * The NetworkInfoService (./netwerk/base/NetworkInfoServiceCocoa.cpp and
 ./netwerk/base/NetworkInfoServiceLinux.cpp) both collect a list of local
 IP addresses for use in nsNetworkInfoService::ListNetworkAddresses(). This
 is used by mDNS and the Presentation API. Did I miss any uses? Maybe we
 want to patch this out just in case?
  * media/mtransport/nr_socket_prsock.cpp is an alternate non-SOCKS socket
 API. It should be disabled by WebRTC, but if Mozilla removed the compile-
 time WebRTC option, this definitely needs a double-check that it is not
 used.
  * netwerk/base/ThrottleQueue.cpp uses what appear to be local sockets for
 timer notification. Could use a double-check.
  * On Android, the uses of ch.boye.httpclientandroidlib.impl.client.*
 should be verified again.
  * The full git diff from esr45 to esr52 of ./android/ should probably be
 reviewed by someone with more Android development experience than me, for
 additional networking calls.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review networking code for Firefox 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21625: Review networking code for Firefox 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201703, ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Stuff to verify is still patched or disabled (part 2/3)
  * The DNS service was changed a bit for e10s. See
 ./netwerk/dns/ChildDNSService.cpp. Verify our DNS patch still actually
 disables non-SOCKS DNS with e10s.
  * Make sure RTSP is still disabled for desktop and Android
 (netwerk/protocol/rtsp/*)
  * Make sure disabling WebRTC still disables all of the
 ./media/mtransport/* stuff.
  * Verify our defense-in-depth patches to NSS/OCSP still apply (ditto for
 other proxy patches)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6093 [Applications/TorBirdy]: POP account creation impossible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6093: POP account creation impossible
---+-
 Reporter:  proper |  Owner:  ioerror
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by mtravis):

 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 Here is the
 [[https://www.everipedia.com/Mozilla_Thunderbird/|encyclopedia]] entry for
 Thunderbird

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #10369, #21756, #18022, #19783, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #10369, #21756, #18022, #19783, #20683, #20761, #21239, 
#21323, #21328, #21709, #21723, #21754, #21833 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201704R

Comment:
Moving review tickets to April.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix inconsistent generation of MOZ_MACBUNDLE_ID

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21723: Fix inconsistent generation of MOZ_MACBUNDLE_ID
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201703R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17670| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 The changes to tor-browser will appear in commit
 86bf10d413f08592ecbf72c80061e43c8a8e3b73 on `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-1`
 once it is pushed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21724 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Distinguish between Tor Browser and Firefox when macOS opens documents

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21724: Distinguish between Tor Browser and Firefox when macOS opens documents
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201703R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17670| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, this is commit 2ac144743bce9a586b6292c3f9be53de8ed2ef15 on `tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-1` (once it is pushed).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21860 [Applications]: At&t with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21860: At&t with tor
---+---
 Reporter:  River Dweller  |  Owner:
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Thanks for this report. This is a bug tracker to coordinate our
 development. It seems to me one of our mailing lists (e.g. tor-talk) could
 be a better choice to discuss your question. So, please feel free to raise
 it there again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21629 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix broken ASan builds when switching to ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21629: Fix broken ASan builds when switching to ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, ff52-esr, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0   |
  -must-nightly  |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. This is commit 4e4ad8c85da26f6b53d0c88a7e3f733961fae73e on `tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-1`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a rebased patch for #18885

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21849: Create a rebased patch for #18885
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:  #20680   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201704 => ff52-esr,
 tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704
 * parent:   => #20680


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Thanks, I prepared `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-1` which I am going to push
 once I have proper Internet again (in about 4 hours). I'll add #21849 as a
 child ticket as this is rebase related.

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[tor-bugs] #21860 [Applications]: At&t with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21860: At&t with tor
---+-
 Reporter:  River Dweller  |  Owner:
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 I ran into the same problem another user had with AT&T and tor. One day
 everything was connecting fine, the next day, nothing, nada. It took me
 awhile to remember that morning I had checked bridges in settings, so I
 went back and unmarked it, working fine now. This brings up a question,
 now that At&t can sell my information that I pay them to sell, will they
 disable the use of vpm's in order to force us to allow them to track us?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:41 mcs]:
 Sorry, I missed this part:

 > Here are the additional things that we noticed:
 > * The second call to `CanvasPermissionPromptHelper.init();` should be
 `.uninit();`

 Fixed.

 > * In `browser/base/content/browser.xul`, the class `canvas-icon` was
 added but Kathy and I do not see why it is needed.

 Removed.

 > * In `dom/canvas/OffscreenCanvas.cpp`, maybe add a reference to #18599
 and also mention that for now placeholder image data is always returned to
 users of OffscreenCanvas.

 Added.

 These are a fixup patch appended to
 ​https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/20680+10

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[tor-bugs] #21859 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Rendezvous circuit e2e crypto

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21859: prop224: Rendezvous circuit e2e crypto
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #20657
   Points:  3  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 In order to establish an end-to-end crypto channel on a rendezvous
 circuit, we need a new API that setups the `crypt_path_t` object on the
 circuit from the key material computed between the client and service.
 This API has to be for both service and client side.

 Because the service implementation in #20657 is being done before client,
 setting parent ID to that ticket.

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[tor-bugs] #21858 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Client rendezvous point establishment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21858: prop224: Client rendezvous point establishment
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #17242
   Points:  6  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 Implement the client rendezvous point establishment process and logic for
 proposal 224.

 * Pick RP and establish circuit.
 * Send ESTABLISH_REND cell
 * Handle RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED
 * Handle RENDEZVOUS2 cell

 In legacy code, see `rend_client_rendezvous_acked()`,
 `rend_client_receive_rendezvous()`,
 `rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous()` in '''src/or/rendclient.c'''.

 Some extra logic in `connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit()`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21687 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure prefetch in the network predictor adheres to design guidelines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21687: Make sure prefetch in the network predictor adheres to design guidelines
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 It got disabled on esr52 at least: https://hg.mozilla.org/releases
 /mozilla-esr52/rev/c6897adc4037.

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[tor-bugs] #21857 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Client introduction point establishment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21857: prop224: Client introduction point establishment
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #17242
   Points:  6  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 Implement the client introduction point establishment process and logic
 for proposal 224.

 * Pick IP from descriptor.
 * Use IP failure cache.
 * Open introduction circuit.
 * Setup circuit identifier on intro circuit.
 * Generate/Send INTRODUCE1 cell.
 * Handle INTRODUCE_ACK cell.

 In legacy code, see `rend_client_send_introduction()` and
 `rend_client_introduction_acked()` in '''src/or/rendclient.c'''

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[tor-bugs] #21856 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Client introduction point failure cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21856: prop224: Client introduction point failure cache
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #17242
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 Implement the introduction point failure cache for proposal 224.

 This can be found in the legacy code in '''src/or/rendcache.c'''. See
 `strmap_t *rend_cache_failure` and functions starting with
 `rend_cache_failure_*`.

 We could re-use it but refactoring would be needed since some of the
 functions expects a `rend_service_descriptor_t` and they are indexed by
 `service_id` (onion address).

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[tor-bugs] #21855 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Client descriptor cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21855: prop224: Client descriptor cache
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #17242
   Points:  3  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 Implement the descriptor cache on the client side for proposal 224.

 Legacy code client cache, see `rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client()` and
 `strmap_t *rend_cache` in '''src/or/rendcache.c'''.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21629 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix broken ASan builds when switching to ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21629: Fix broken ASan builds when switching to ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, ff52-esr, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0   |
  -must-nightly  |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=brade, r=mcs
 This looks fine to us.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21848 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor always crashes after a few clicks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21848: Tor always crashes after a few clicks
--+---
 Reporter:  fuze83|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by fuze83):

 After a few clicks on which interface elements?
 - it does not matter. sometimes it is after the first click (on whatever
 element). sometimes i can write something in the adress. but i can not do
 more than three clicks on anything.

 Do you get as far as a web page loading?
 - no.

 Are you using a non-standard system font on your OSX system?
 - No.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21848 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor always crashes after a few clicks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21848: Tor always crashes after a few clicks
--+---
 Reporter:  fuze83|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 This is probably a duplicate of #17395 (the stack looks the same).
 Are you using a non-standard system font on your OSX system?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21848 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor always crashes after a few clicks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21848: Tor always crashes after a few clicks
--+---
 Reporter:  fuze83|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:21848 fuze83]:
 > Tor always crashes after a few clicks.
 > always.

 After a few clicks on which interface elements?
 Do you get as far as a web page loading?

 > Process:   firefox [1118]
 > Path:
 /Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox
 > Identifier:firefox
 > Version:   tbb-nightly (4510.40.10)

 Can you please try to reproduce this with the stable version of Tor
 Browser (currently 6.5.1) and let us know the results?

 Can you reproduce this problem using Firefox 45.8.0 ESR? Maybe Firefox
 (and Tor Browser) there is something on your system that causes Firefox
 (and Tor Browser) to crash.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21825 [Core Tor/Tor]: no symbol warning for hs_service.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21825: no symbol warning for hs_service.c
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21854 [User Experience/Website]: Create new job post at the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21854: Create new job post at the website
-+
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is now online.

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[tor-bugs] #21854 [User Experience/Website]: Create new job post at the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21854: Create new job post at the website
-+--
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Please add this job post to the website:

 Title: Experienced Writer/Editor Sought for Internet Freedom Nonprofit

 The Tor Project, Inc., a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that provides
 technical infrastructure for privacy protection over the Internet, is
 seeking a strong writer/editor to help us tell the world about our
 important work. The ideal candidate will be familiar with issues involving
 high tech freedom and can make a compelling case about why our work is so
 important to current and potential funders. This person must be able to
 write clearly and provide context for the Tor Project’s complicated
 technology and activism projects. The ability to explain technical
 concepts to non-technical audiences is essential.

 [[BR]]The writer/editor is responsible for researching grant
 opportunities, sending out letters of inquiry and proposals to
 foundations, keeping track of dates and deadlines, and submitting reports
 at the end of the grant periods. The Tor Project consists of six teams
 that each own multiple sub-projects with different needs and priorities.
 The writer/editor will need to build a grant proposal pipeline by
 organizing our ideas and needs into a database that can be accessed as
 opportunities present themselves while coordinating prioritization with
 our leadership team.

 [[BR]]This person is also responsible for additional writing and editing
 related to other development functions, such as updating the "one-pagers"
 we distribute at conferences, editing membership emails that go out to our
 constituents, and writing our annual report. The Tor Project works on
 Internet freedom issues, and in many ways, our grant proposals and reports
 are more like activism pieces than traditional pleas for funding, so a
 background in writing about these issues would be ideal.

 [[BR]]Qualifications:

  * Excellent verbal, written, and editing skills in English; fluency in
 other languages is a plus.



  * Comfortable with highly technical topics and ability to explain them
 clearly and accurately to non-technical audiences.


  * Knowledge of and appreciation for the free and open source software
 movement.


  * Strong generalist understanding of the basic mechanics of how the
 Internet works, as well as issues related to privacy, security,
 censorship, and surveillance.


  * Experience with, or willingness to learn how to use, communications and
 collaboration technologies such as PGP, IRC, Jitsi, !WordPress, and
 etherpads.


  * Hard working and highly organized with superior attention to detail.


  * Highly collaborative with experience working with and as part of remote
 teams.


  * Self-starter who thrives on working independently with a dispersed
 workforce.


  * Experience working or living outside the United States is a plus.


  * Fundraising and fundraising communications experience is a plus.


  * Willingness to travel to international meetings twice a year.


  * Excellent social skills and a sense of humor.



 [[BR]]The ideal candidate will be energetic, unflappable and flexible, and
 will thrive in a highly-technical collaborative environment.

 The Tor Project's workforce is smart and committed. Experience working
 with open source communities and/or a dedication to Internet freedom are
 added pluses.  The Tor Project currently has a paid and contract staff of
 around 25 developers and operational support staff, plus many thousands of
 volunteers who contribute to our work. The Tor Project is funded in part
 by government research and development grants, and in part by individual,
 foundation and corporate donations.

 Flexible salary, depending on experience. The Tor Project has a
 competitive benefits package, including a generous PTO policy; 13 paid
 holidays per year (including the week between Christmas and New Year's,
 when the office is closed); health, vision, dental, disability, and life
 insurance paid in full for employee; flexible work schedule; and
 occasional travel opportunities.

 This is a full-time position. The Tor Project’s main office is in Seattle,
 and we’d be delighted to supply a desk for this position there, however,
 this job can be done remotely.

 To apply, send a cover letter and your resume to h...@torproject.org with
 the subject "Writer/Editor." Tell us why you think you're the right person
 for this job, and please include links to writing

Re: [tor-bugs] #21825 [Core Tor/Tor]: no symbol warning for hs_service.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21825: no symbol warning for hs_service.c
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => merge_ready
 * points:   => 0.1


Comment:

 See branch: `bug21825_030_01`

 Exposing the symbols was the shortest solution. Moving to `merge_ready`
 because this is a trivial change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1922 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc.d-style configuration directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1922: torrc.d-style configuration directories
-+-
 Reporter:  aa138346 |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, intro,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * priority:  High => Low
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #21853 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Give jgay push access to project/web/webwml.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21853: Give jgay push access to project/web/webwml.git
-+
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Hi,

 Jgay would like to have push access to our tpo website to help maintain
 the website and content.

 I am creating this ticket to track the request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21629 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix broken ASan builds when switching to ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21629: Fix broken ASan builds when switching to ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, ff52-esr, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0   |
  -must-nightly  |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 TorBrowserTeam201703, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201703,
 tbb-7.0-must-nightly
 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201704R, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201703,
 tbb-7.0-must-nightly
 * cc: mcs, brade (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See `bug_21629` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_21629&id=04d950dae5d6ef17c01c12e66538bc8e5236e473)
 in my public repo.

 mcs/brade could you have a quick look?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21201 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21201: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff52-esr, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0|
  -must-nightly  |
Parent ID:  #20680   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, all the child tickets are resolved. I added the
 `multiprocessCompatible` flag in 7c8c20ff3b4f6747d57c259407a55194ffb62374.
 That might help us with our testing. We can revert that later if we think
 we found blockers and can't fix them until a release has to get out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Catch-all circuits are not working properly in ESR 52 based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21745: Catch-all circuits are not working properly in ESR 52 based Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-7.0-must, |  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201703R, tbb-7.0   |
  -must-nightly  |
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me and is commit 1324e306018779166674e9bc6101ddb9e2bbc68b on
 torbutton `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21747 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requesting a new circuit for a site is not working in ESR 52 based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21747: Requesting a new circuit for a site is not working in ESR 52 based Tor
Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff52-esr, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201703R, tbb-7.0   |
  -must-nightly  |
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is cfa9229fddb79067ebd3a0a6d8d0a10ab1bffc02 on torbutton `master`,
 thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21547 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s and 52esr compatibility for tor circuit display

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21547: e10s and 52esr compatibility for tor circuit display
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703R, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must  |
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Looking over that patch it seems to me we only care about HTTP traffic
 nowadays at least if the circuit display concerned. Am I correct? While I
 am not a big fan of FTP, showing the corresponding circuit still works in
 current Tor Browser versions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21267 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21267: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff52-esr, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201703R|
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 We need to reset `extensions.torbutton.maximize_warnings_remaining` to `3`
 as well. I pushed a fixup for that:
 eadfd9622fc7a15aad5200e11a35a4f558ae5743.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:34 gk]:
 > Let's start the review:
 >
 > `aacb4ae907f93c8ad07b4ac5141a181348a2530c`:
 > 1) There is "Bug 18884: Disable Loop extension" mentioned in the commit
 message but there is no sign of that one in the `.mozconfig files anymore

 "Reworded."

 > 2) f161c394e049a440637f06ba87dd6be6f73479bb should get merged keeping
 the bug 17858... in the commit message

 Squashed.

 > 3) I cleaned up my extension signing patch a bit and moved the ICU
 support for Windows out; it should be in the `.mozconfig-mingw` directly
 (I have no clue which I thought that would be a good idea to add that
 piece to the extension signing patch, it is not); see my
 `bug_20680_icu_fixup` branch (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_20680_icu_fixup) for splitting up that patch

 I have cherry-picked these patches.

 > `7a2928fb53ee51714a825cdcadc749274495a9ab`:
 > 1) Merge e44e6f529e10468c2694b889a70b9b85f109f949 + mention bug in
 commit message

 Squashed.

 > 2) Merge c7113c8588eba3de80819090c38145d08d9eea0a + mention bug in
 commit message

 Squashed.

 > 3) Merge f3ec07bff9a96ffbfe9c3d03c1725a557097cc61 + mention bug in
 commit message

 Squashed.

 > 4) `pref("gfx.xrender.enabled",false);` is already included in ESR52, no
 need to set it again

 Fixed.

 > `e0213fac01fb1fc9f0949490d652c6ae979d6bd4`: not needed anymore

 Removed.

 > `046b74f2dfd53b29b3e4515c2533244b6924f69e`: good
 > `0bd71cd9f84185c71d91784467293585d46e6367`: good
 > `0eb5695b4a48b94ac98c076d4640fcfa64fdc832`: good
 > `44755f47a01eb3623227df9124a93226d034b75e`: good
 > `746cfdbfabce6ed31bbd58d46deaefa0ccabd1fd`: looks okay; I was wondering
 what to do with the remaining `COMPONENTS_SHIM_ACCESSED_BY_CONTENT`
 places. I guess keeping them is fine as this is Telemetry related which we
 disable anyway?

 Yeah, I'd be inclined to leave this out. And I wonder again if we should
 remove this patch entirely.

 Replying to [comment:35 gk]:
 > Here is the next batch:
 >
 > `43d4fc730a6216433c059345111c5fe9d11deae6`: looks good to me. mcs/brade
 could you have a second look?
 > `2b52030695f445b2f924a4442efeb6d49ee9fde2`: good
 > `8faf75d71705cdf891e6bedfc10ef8e93429d7fa`: good
 > `88e6c45cd16afdc26c1ec0ed7c887e5844c0374e`: good
 > `7ba9b10dab17c534933ec3441ff646b236445fbf`: good
 > `e8503c86d6ce4c286f54488b95f63447f9184c97`: good
 >
 > `1f1afb99079173c4ceff978cdb17ec74e8c39af4`:
 >
 > 1) the last bit in setLoginSavingEnabled() seems to be missing?

 Fixed.

 > `facd4d52edcbe48478f4b27f8f59b6579b02cc67`:
 >
 > 1) Why do we have:
 >
 > {{{
 > +nsCOMPtr profile;
 > +rv = aProfileSvc->GetProfileByName(nsDependentCString(arg),
 > +   getter_AddRefs(profile));
 > +if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 > +  ProfileStatus status = CheckProfileWriteAccess(profile);
 > +  if (PROFILE_STATUS_OK != status)
 > +return ProfileErrorDialog(profile, status, nullptr, aNative,
 aResult);
 > +}
 > }}}
 >
 > now? It seems the relevant code around it does not have changed enough
 that this is self-explaining to me.

 Nothing much has changed here except that the code for declaring and
 instantiating `profile` had been removed in ESR52, so I had to restore it
 in order to pass it to `CheckProfileWriteAccess()`.

 > `800a82cf4133635e6b709013bbb95ccc3ae1a5e7`:
 >
 > 1) Why is MOZ_UTF16() not good enough anymore? Does the code not build
 with it anymore?

 Yes, this macro was removed from the codebase in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1277106

 Replying to [comment:36 gk]:
 > Here comes another batch:
 >
 > `2c0fdc9fb55dc4f28edb96c2a69a1451bcf8dcf3`: good
 > `1e1736ebc1a35427d1c1738d199b9c2ecca6373e`: good
 > `0e58aa9e4028085038827a583f12ea943fa2405e`: good
 > `8de96436b99518e947c6dedf3019d1df83714985`: good
 > `230c803c10f8c0aedc8beaaf18d13e92e5d95259`: good
 > `22508fe47768201b37ae86b2d995b14394727882`: good
 > `414a6ce893d50c1374968e485113ac21dfb0b5dd`: good
 > `85311e454060b97bc83494e6b59fb99e42b5f778`: good
 > `1985add6bc2fcc8d3167b1381b985d543bd80998`: good