Re: [tor-bugs] #24312 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update DirCache Warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24312: Update DirCache Warning
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-log, easy, intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


Comment:

 I've marked this as "needs review", someone will review the ticket in the
 next week or two.
 It's up to you if you want to revise the message before then.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25207 [Community/Relays]: Mentioning Snowflake in the TorRelayGuide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25207: Mentioning Snowflake in the TorRelayGuide
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 snowflake is not yet supported by Torbrowser, right? #19001

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24312 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update DirCache Warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24312: Update DirCache Warning
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-log, easy, intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 you use:
 "Many client versions will not choose us as a guard. "

 I'd say that operator mostly do not care about how many different versions
 of client
 will not choose us as a guard but how many of the overall clients (client
 fraction),
 so maybe lets use:

 "Most tor clients will not us as a guard."
 What do you think?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24312 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update DirCache Warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24312: Update DirCache Warning
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-log, easy, intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by minik):

 I think I created the patch correctly. Please let me know if this looks
 right. I pulled down my own repo and just added a patch like before... so
 hopefully the version of tor I did the patch on was the most recent.

 https://github.com/ingoglia/tor_tickets/tree/bug24312

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22739 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make routerinfo_t and routerstatus_t addresses immutable; store overrides in node_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22739: Make routerinfo_t and routerstatus_t addresses immutable; store 
overrides
in node_t
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-31  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I think the overall approach, in these two patches, is sensible and should
 clean-up this code a lot. The removed code in the first patch is quite
 some spaghetti.

 Small nit:

 {{{
 tor_addr_port_t override_orport;
 }}}

 in `or.h` is missing a documentation string.

 I think this code is good, but I'm marking this ticket as needing revision
 because of the many XXX's in the second patch.

 Maybe Teor have some additional feedback here too?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17228 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consideration for disabling referrers within TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17228: Consideration for disabling referrers within TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 @ gk

 cane recommends setting network.http.referer.XOriginPolicy=2. Why don't
 you agree on his recommendation? The current state means that Tor/Tails
 users are easily identified as such simply by the referer (e.g. by coming
 from the Tails startpage). I know Tor users can also be identified as such
 by looking up the IP addresses of the exit nodes. But storing and
 analyzing referers should be more common for website operators than cross-
 referencing website visitors' IP addresses with the publicy known Tor exit
 nodes addresses. There should be no obvious flag like 'Hey! I'm just
 arriving on your website, coming from Tails' startpage! I'm a Tor/Tails
 user! Now you know, without any sophisticated effort!'.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25201 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Attention. Yet another exit node redirecting URL. Scan Tor now.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25201: Attention. Yet another exit node redirecting URL. Scan Tor now.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Here is information on how to report a bad relay.
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReportingBadRelays

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25208 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays can upload a new descriptor every 2 minutes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25208: Relays can upload a new descriptor every 2 minutes
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos-related? crash?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Old description:

> Two relays started publishing descriptors every 2 minutes, and this
> caused issues for Metrics-lib:
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-
> team/2018-February/000661.html
>
> Maybe it's a crashing bug in 0.3.3.1-alpha?
>
> In any case, we should probably restrict relays to a few (~6?)
> descriptors per hour, and enforce this limit using the state file.

New description:

 Two relays started publishing descriptors every 2 minutes, and this caused
 issues for Metrics-lib:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-
 team/2018-February/000661.html

 Maybe it's a crashing bug in 0.3.3.1-alpha?

 In any case, we should probably restrict relays to a few (~6?) descriptors
 per ~~hour~~ consensus interval, and enforce this limit using the state
 file.

--

Comment (by teor):

 In test networks, we should use the consensus interval, and not hard-code
 one hour.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11301 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor does not reconnect after network loss with guards used as bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11301: Tor does not reconnect after network loss with guards used as bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridges, tor-client, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability, flashproxy, sponsor8-maybe  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25208 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays can upload a new descriptor every 2 minutes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25208: Relays can upload a new descriptor every 2 minutes
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-dos-related? crash?
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Two relays started publishing descriptors every 2 minutes, and this caused
 issues for Metrics-lib:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-
 team/2018-February/000661.html

 Maybe it's a crashing bug in 0.3.3.1-alpha?

 In any case, we should probably restrict relays to a few (~6?) descriptors
 per hour, and enforce this limit using the state file.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11301 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor does not reconnect after network loss with guards used as bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11301: Tor does not reconnect after network loss with guards used as bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridges, tor-client, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability, flashproxy, sponsor8-maybe  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  nickm => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24978 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with enable-tls1_3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24978: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with
enable-tls1_3
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 031-backport,  |  implemented
  032-backport, openssl, review-group-31 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24978 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with enable-tls1_3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24978: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with
enable-tls1_3
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 031-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, openssl, review-group-31 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Thanks for the review!  I've merged this to 0.2.9 and forward.  I'm happy
 to revise the client and server cipher lists however much is requested,
 but I would need a suggested list of what to change to.  That might be
 something to think about on an 0.3.4 timeframe, and backport as
 appropriate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23814: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-31  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn, teor|Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:  asn => asn, teor


Comment:

 Yes, likely towards end of this week. I keep having to do extra features
 for experimental PrivCount.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23814: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-31  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 teor -- still planning to have a look at this? I'm happy to hold off on
 the merge if so; you know a lot about this code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 I use Ricochet on macOS with the embedded 0.2.8 Tor client. I can confirm
 that Ricochet occasionally fails to recover from a suspend/restore, even
 using the legacy guard code. (The latest guard code was introduced in
 0.3.0.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25207 [Community/Relays]: Mentioning Snowflake in the TorRelayGuide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25207: Mentioning Snowflake in the TorRelayGuide
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Please mention and link to the guide on running a Snowflake bridge:

 -
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake#HowtorunaSnowflakeproxy

 In particular, as an alternative to running a relay at home, or as an
 additional alternative to the addition here
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide?action=diff&version=202

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18918: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, code, refactor,   |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt, tor-relay, review-group-31 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Err, no: What I mean is that we should say either "Directory Service" or
 "DirPort" but not "DirDirectory Service".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25206 [Webpages/Website]: improve relay section fo the FAQ

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25206: improve relay section fo the FAQ
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25206 [Webpages/Website]: improve relay section fo the FAQ

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25206: improve relay section fo the FAQ
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 context:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2018-February/014471.html


 find the updates in my branch on gh:
 https://github.com/nusenu/torproject-
 webwml/tree/FAQ_relay_section_improvements

 FAQ (relay section): new entry: Can I used IPv6 on my relay?
 FAQ (relay section): link to new relay guide; link to obfs4 bridge
 guide
 FAQ (relay section): move two questions out of the relay section
 FAQ (relay section): update BadExit question (wiki is obsolete, add
 email address)
 FAQ (relay section): refrase static IP section into a question
 FAQ (relay section): NAT is covered in its own section (this section
 is about stability)
 FAQ (relay section): bw shaping is covered in its own section (this
 section is about stability)
 FAQ (relay section): put most relevant answer in this question at the
 beginning
 FAQ (relay section): dynamic IPs are covered in a dedicated answer
 already
 FAQ (relay section): new entry: most wanted relay type
 FAQ (relay section): increase min. bw from 2 to 8 MBit/s and add
 bridge info

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:72 asn]:
 > Some questions so that I understand the situation a bit better (too many
 cypherpunks in this ticket).
 Just to clarify: the cpunk from comment:65 is a different person with a
 different setup, I'm the one using Ricochet.

 > Did you suspend your box for like an hour (3902 seconds?). Also, are you
 using bridges? I guess they were up at that time, and Tor was confused? Is
 this a ricochet setup?
 Yes to all of your questions. This happens as well with Tor Browser with
 bridges but it gets back to normal after some seconds. So seems that arma
 was right (yet again), it's a problem on the Ricochet side. Sorry then. :(

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18918: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, code, refactor,   |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt, tor-relay, review-group-31 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ffmancera):

 Replying to [comment:14 nickm]:


 > Only one thing I'm seeing here: the log message in
 `router_should_be_directory_server()` will sometimes refer to
 "DirDirectory Service support".

 So should we introduce "Directory/DirDirectory" into log messages? Is
 there any other way to point out when it's each one?.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15019 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15019: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo
descriptors
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay doc easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24256 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Add a new "outdated" field to distinguish between outdated and too new tor versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24256: Add a new "outdated" field to distinguish between outdated and too new 
tor
versions
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:6 karsten]:
 > Setting to needs_information until there's a spec or until somebody
 figures that a spec is not necessary, in which case I'd just read the tor
 code (#24257).

 Looks like #24257 got closed. There is a new Section 3, "Version status",
 in
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/version-spec.txt

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24256 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Add a new "outdated" field to distinguish between outdated and too new tor versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24256: Add a new "outdated" field to distinguish between outdated and too new 
tor
versions
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by arma):

 The atlas side has opened #25199 as a related ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25199 [Metrics/Relay Search]: have a distinct banner for relays running versions newer than what is recommended

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25199: have a distinct banner for relays running versions newer than what is
recommended
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 See also #24256 for the onionoo side of this idea.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15019 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15019: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo
descriptors
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay doc easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by aruna1234):

 * Attachment "0004-PaddingStatistics-documented-properly.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15019 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15019: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo
descriptors
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay doc easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by aruna1234):

 Adding -"If ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are
 further published to the directory authorities. (Default: 0)" in the
 Padding Statistics would be correct, I guess?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25205 [Webpages/Website]: fix broken youtube URL on website (trivial)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25205: fix broken youtube URL on website (trivial)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25205 [Webpages/Website]: fix broken youtube URL on website (trivial)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25205: fix broken youtube URL on website (trivial)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en

 links to
 https://www.youtube.com/c/thetorproject

 which says:
 This channel does not exist.

 fix:
 https://github.com/nusenu/torproject-
 webwml/commit/498ff4bb436df033145ab02d55837e8b163ed56d

 branch:
 https://github.com/nusenu/torproject-webwml/tree/fix_youtube_url

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24632 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update macOS toolchain for ESR 60 (was: Update macOS toolchain for ESR 59)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24632: Update macOS toolchain for ESR 60
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24631| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser toolchains for ESR 60 (was: Update Tor Browser toolchains for ESR 59)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24631: Update Tor Browser toolchains for ESR 60
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23805 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable dom.enable_performance_navigation_timing in ESR 60 (was: Disable dom.enable_performance_navigation_timing in ESR 59)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23805: Disable dom.enable_performance_navigation_timing in ESR 60
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23547 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Delete flexible space around address bar for FF60 esr (was: Delete flexible space around address bar for FF59 esr)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23547: Delete flexible space around address bar for FF60 esr
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, ff60-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23392 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable preloading of URLs in ESR60 since it's useless in Tor Browser context (was: Disable preloading of URLs in ESR59 since it's useless in Tor Brow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23392: Disable preloading of URLs in ESR60 since it's useless in Tor Browser
context
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider performing network operations in a dedicated process for ESR60 (was: consider performing network operations in a dedicated process for ESR59)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23362: consider performing network operations in a dedicated process for ESR60
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, ff60-esr|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16149 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The newChannel() API is deprecated and broken in Tor Browser based on ESR 60 (was: The newChannel() API is deprecated and broken in Tor Browser based

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16149: The newChannel() API is deprecated and broken in Tor Browser based on 
ESR
60
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Firefox 60 is the new ESR.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Switch security.insecure_connection_* prefs to warn users about insecure HTTP in FF60-esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25204: Switch security.insecure_connection_* prefs to warn users about insecure
HTTP in FF60-esr
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr => ff60-esr, ux-team


Comment:

 Good idea! Putting ux-team to know what they think.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25114 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add hiro as a git maintainer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25114: Please add hiro as a git maintainer
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Switch security.insecure_connection_* prefs to warn users about insecure HTTP in FF60-esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25204: Switch security.insecure_connection_* prefs to warn users about insecure
HTTP in FF60-esr
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 These prefs are much more eye grabbing as they display both the broken
 padlock and the "Not Secure" text, which is really important in TB
 context:

 
[[Image(https://web.archive.org/web/20180210095051if_/https://i.stack.imgur.com/lY6e4.jpg)]]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25203 [Core Tor/Tor]: document max. value of SigningKeyLifetime

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25203: document max. value of SigningKeyLifetime
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  easy, tor-doc
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 tor's manpage says:

 > SigningKeyLifetime N days|weeks|months
 > For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a
 permanent master identity key that can be kept
 > offline, and periodically generates new "signing" keys that it uses
 online. This option configures their lifetime.
 > (Default: 30 days)

 It does not include information about what is the biggest acceptable
 value. Tor simply fails to start if the given value is to big:
 {{{
 [warn] Interval 'XX months' is too long
 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Interval 'SigningKeyLifetime XX
 months' is malformed or out of bounds.
 }}}

 Please also mention if there is a value for SigningKeyLifetime where it is
 actually less safe than running in non-OfflineMasterKey mode (maybe it is
 less safe to set it to 10y in OfflineMasterKey mode than to run in non-
 OfflineMasterKey mode?) and if it makes any sense to modify this value in
 non-OfflineMasterKey mode (because that is apparently possible).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs