Re: [tor-bugs] #24031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Protover.rs could use a better algorithm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24031: Protover.rs could use a better algorithm
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust 033-must protover security  |  Actual Points:  5
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorM-
 |  can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 5
 * priority:  High => Very High
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.3.1-alpha
 * sponsor:   => SponsorM-can
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
 * keywords:  rust 033-must protover => rust 033-must protover security


Comment:

 I've cleaned up (mostly! sorry sorry!) my code into more understandable
 commits in my `bug24031_r4` branch.

 The changes to the unittests might be a little hard to follow, that commit
 is not quite pleasant (although the integration test changes in that same
 commit should be simple to follow to see where/where behaviour has
 changed, so I'd argue that the internal unittests changing precariously
 isn't as much of an issue?).  If test changes (or any changes) are
 difficult for the reviewer to understand, please feel free to ask
 questions, or make me split that commit up better.

 The other thing is that one test I've added intentionally fails:
 `protover_all_supported_should_include_version_we_actually_do_support`.
 The behavioural difference is this: if we take a protover string
 `"Link=3-999"` and ask if it is supported, when `"Link=1-5"` ''is''
 supported:

  * the C version returns `"Link=3-999"` (which is, IMHO, wrong, since we
 ''do'' support 3, 4, and 5.
  * the Rust version returns `"Link=6-999"`, which I believe to be the
 correct implementation of the spec?

 Upping the priority because potential DoS.

 Upping the actual points to 5, although only ~3 were spent on this ticket,
 and another 2 finding/fixing related bugs elsewhere.

 Marking as SponsorM-can, although that may be wrong; feel free to correct.

 Changing the version to reflect inclusion in 0.3.3, along with the
 appropriate keywords.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19675 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19675: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:  #5709| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Excellent! Opened #25562 for additional discussion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25562 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Hacking page with Orfox instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25562: Update Tor Browser Hacking page with Orfox instructions
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 While we maintain Orfox, we should decide:
  1) Do we use openjdk-7 or openjdk-8?
  2) build-tools-23.0.3 is not available with the hardcoded SDK `mach
 bootstrap` downloads, should we patch bootstrap so it downloads/expects
 23.0.1 or should we bump the SDK tarball it downloads?

 I wonder if Mozilla corrected the build-tools issues in Firefox 52+, I'll
 take a look at that and see if we can backport an easy patch (we can
 easily write our own patch, too).

 For the JDK version, I have a slight preference for using openjdk-8
 because it's supported, while openjdk-7 is EOL.

 I'll open tickets for anything needing a tor-browser patch, but we may
 choose simply documenting workarounds until we start following Mozilla
 releases.

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[tor-bugs] #25562 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Hacking page with Orfox instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25562: Update Tor Browser Hacking page with Orfox instructions
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Following #19675, we should update the build/hacking instructions for
 Orfox. We already have some information igt0 added, but now we can say
 "build TB alpha" (tor-browser-52.7.2esr-8.0-1). Unfortunately, it's not
 really that simple.

 {{{
 I wonder if we should amend the "Building Orfox" part on our Hacking
 document a
 bit to reflect the new situation. FWIW: I needed to spent quite some time
 to
 get the Android SDK thing to do what it was supposed to do, even after
 calling
 ./mach bootstrap. It seems to be the case that the bootstrap thing is
 downloading the r24 SDK, however at the end the build-tools r23.0.3 are
 missing. Trying to install them fails even with the SDK manager because I
 only
 got offered r23.0.1 and the build system is insisting that it needs
 r23.0.3.
 So, I ended up just sim-linking 23.0.1 -> 23.0.3 and that worked smoothly.
 :) I
 wonder though whether there is something more straightforward we can
 suggest on
 the doc...
 }}}
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19675#comment:21

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Memory and file descriptor leaks in programs that use go-webrtc (was: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: Memory and file descriptor leaks in programs that use go-webrtc
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25560 [Core Tor/Tor]: test all rust crates for realsies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25560: test all rust crates for realsies
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-testing, rust, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
-+-

Comment (by Hello71):

 that won't fix it; the *output* of `find` will still contain spaces. the
 pure POSIX solution would be to use `find -exec cargo ...`. as an aside,
 {{{``}}} is obsolete, you should use `$()`. that doesn't fix the
 whitespace issue though.

 in terms of the actual bug here, though, as I said on IRC, it seems like
 it would be easier to just use `--all` as I do in #25386.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 These went it as,
 https://github.com/keroserene/go-
 webrtc/commit/90ac15ae07cc6e820cd922a239dd892598986622
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=1114acbcb4acb82174b293983ced8afcaf9e2a93

 Thanks everyone!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox's UserAgent different than other TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18854: Orfox's UserAgent different than other TBB
--+---
 Reporter:  ikurua22  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  Orfox => tbb-mobile
 * status:  assigned => new
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Adjusting this because it is for Orfox, not Orbot.

 I think aligning the "Desktop Site" UAS with TBD (Tor Browser for Desktop)
 seems reasonable, we should consider doing this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:58 arlolra]:
 > Attached is a patch that hopefully addresses the review in [comment:55]
 and [comment:56].

 Looks good to me. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:57 dcf]:
 > The patches from comment:54 have stopped the frequent crashes. Now the
 process is restarting according to schedule.
 > Here are the fd and memory graphs. Now we see memory slowly increasing
 over time--hard to say at this point whether it's just normal elevated
 usage or a leak. I'll leave the monitor running.

 Updates. Restarts are stable, memory and file descriptions seem fine.

 I'm thinking about losing the periodic restarts, and just putting a memory
 ulimit on the processes (just in case).

 [[Image(proxy-go-starting.20180320.png)]]

 [[Image(proxy-go-fd.20180320.png)]]

 [[Image(proxy-go-mem.20180320.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25560 [Core Tor/Tor]: test all rust crates for realsies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25560: test all rust crates for realsies
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-testing, rust, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:3 isis]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > > 2) Will the "find" line give us correct results when there are spaces
 in abs_top_srcdir?
 >
 > Oh nope, that'll probably fail miserably, good catch.

 Okay, should be fixed with some double-quotes now; same branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "proxy-go-fd.20180320.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "proxy-go-starting.20180320.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "proxy-go-mem.20180320.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "proxy-go-log.20180320.zip" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25560 [Core Tor/Tor]: test all rust crates for realsies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25560: test all rust crates for realsies
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-testing, rust, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > This looks plausible to me.  Two issues to check, and I'll be happy.
 >
 > 1) Is this happy under travis, or will we have failures?  (I'm checking
 this now.)

 It's [https://travis-ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/builds/356057847 failing
 Clang builds] but it looks like it's for the same reason as #23881.

 > 2) Will the "find" line give us correct results when there are spaces in
 abs_top_srcdir?

 Oh nope, that'll probably fail miserably, good catch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25310 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document our policy for Rust dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25310: Document our policy for Rust dependencies
+--
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-doc, review-group-35  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorM
+--

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:9 isis]:
 > Updated versions which do not delete older dependencies are in my
 `bug25310_r1` and `update/libc-0.2.39_r1` branches respectively.

 Err, to be more specific, `bug25310_r1` should be merged into
 `maint-0.3.3` and `master` in tor.git, and `update/libc-0.2.39_r1` should
 get merged into `master` in tor-rust-dependencies.git.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25561 [Applications/Tor Check]: Update TBB User Agent String for detecting Orfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25561: Update TBB User Agent String for detecting Orfox
+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Orfox should have a new release coming out soon, so ideally Check will
 correctly detect it. Originally I wrote a patch that only detects the new
 Orfox UAS, but this version is nicer and detects both the old version and
 the new version. Someone (maybe me) should file a new ticket in a few
 weeks (or sooner) for ripping out the old Orfox-specific pattern.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24759 [Core Tor/Tor]: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall socket)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24759: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall socket)
-+-
 Reporter:  mig5 |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, 033-must, crash,|  worksforme
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Huh, that's sure weird.  I'm glad it's working for you now, but please
 reopen if this ever comes back. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25560 [Core Tor/Tor]: test all rust crates for realsies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25560: test all rust crates for realsies
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-testing, rust, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 This looks plausible to me.  Two issues to check, and I'll be happy.

 1) Is this happy under travis, or will we have failures?  (I'm checking
 this now.)

 2) Will the "find" line give us correct results when there are spaces in
 abs_top_srcdir?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25561 [Applications/Tor Check]: Update TBB User Agent String for detecting Orfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25561: Update TBB User Agent String for detecting Orfox
+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * Attachment "0001-Match-Tor-Browser-and-new-Orfox-UAS-together.patch"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24795 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24795: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, osx, tests, 032-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:
 rust, osx, tests, 032-backport, 033-triage-20180320,
     033-removed-20180320
 => rust, osx, tests, 032-backport, 033-triage-20180320, fast-fix


Comment:

 Marking fast-fix as per Nick's recommendation.

 Waiting on info from teor for bug reproduceability.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24903 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at pathbias_should_count at src/or/circpathbias.c:372

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24903: Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at pathbias_should_count at
src/or/circpathbias.c:372
-+-
 Reporter:  starlight|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-assert-nonfatal, regression?,|  Actual Points:
  033-must, 033-triage-20180320, |
  033-included-20180320  |
Parent ID:  #24907   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Mike suggests that clearing the onehop_tunnel flag might be smart, since
 other places in the codebase look at it too.  I should check.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test all rust functions' behavior when called from C with bad UTF8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24029: Test all rust functions' behavior when called from C with bad UTF8
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 |  chelseakomlo
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a
 Keywords:  rust, 033-triage-20180320,   |  bug
  033-removed-20180320   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24265   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 No, I think we can close this ticket if that's how it works.  Thanks for
 the analysis!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25310 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document our policy for Rust dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25310: Document our policy for Rust dependencies
+--
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-doc, review-group-35  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorM
+--

Comment (by isis):

 Updated versions which do not delete older dependencies are in my
 `bug25310_r1` and `update/libc-0.2.39_r1` branches respectively.

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[tor-bugs] #25561 [Applications/Tor Check]: Update TBB User Agent String for detecting Orfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25561: Update TBB User Agent String for detecting Orfox
+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 A few years ago, Check began detecting Orfox via its User Agent String
 with [0] and then [1]. As it turns out, now we want the logic in [0]
 again.

 [0]
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git/commit/?id=749fd988c32e764e7fc8dde1f59ab7f06a63f0cd
 [1]
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git/commit/?id=644e1c21b682a911acbea567f55d156a084a8c5f

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24795 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24795: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, osx, tests, 032-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  rust, osx, tests, 032-backport, 033-triage-20180320 =>
 rust, osx, tests, 032-backport, 033-triage-20180320,
 033-removed-20180320


Comment:

 Oops, adding the 033-removed-20180320 keyword back in for now, while in
 needs_information, because I'm not sure yet if it's eligible for fast-fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Alright, I did a first review by reading commits without trying them out
 yet. Here's what I found:
  - You should read about "Java diamond operator". In several places you're
 undoing changes that we made quite recently when switching to Java 7. For
 example, we prefer `List aList = new ArrayList<>();` over
 `List aList = new ArrayList();'.
  - Please add a space after the closing bracket in `return (String[])
 this.protocols.toArray()` and related places.
  - I think your code prints a news entry with `start == end` as "start to
 end", whereas the current code would print it as just "start". Can you
 change that back?
  - You picked non-standard Java variable names like `short_desc` and fixed
 them in a later commit. Can you rather make such fixes to your own commits
 as "fixup" or "squash" commits and either squash them yourself or let me
 do that as part of the merge process?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25515 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25515: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-35  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25386 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix rust tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25386: fix rust tests
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-test, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * version:  Tor: 0.3.3.2-alpha => Tor: 0.3.3.1-alpha


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25560 [Core Tor/Tor]: test all rust crates for realsies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25560: test all rust crates for realsies
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-testing, rust, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch in my `bug25560` branch. Bumping priority up a bit because we're not
 actually running tests and so we might not be catching bugs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18342 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Provide more accurate reverse DNS results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18342: Provide more accurate reverse DNS results
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Ok, to summarize what I would like to see:

 * new field: `dns_ptr` Description: DNS PTR record of the relay's primary
 IP address. This field is updated at most once in 12 hours, unless the
 relay's primary IP address changes. Omitted if no lookup request was
 successful yet.

 * change the `host_name` implementation by doing what the current
 description says (#25551)

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[tor-bugs] #25560 [Core Tor/Tor]: test all rust crates for realsies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25560: test all rust crates for realsies
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-testing, rust, 033-must
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  .2|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorM-can  |
--+-
 After we merged #23881, it seems the tests in the `tor_log` crate aren't
 being run because there's an array in `src/test/test_rust.sh` that we
 didn't add the crate name to. I propose making that shell script
 automatically find the crates available and run their tests, e.g.

 {{{#!sh
 manifests=`find ${abs_top_srcdir:-.}/src/rust/ -mindepth 2 -maxdepth 2
 -name 'Cargo.toml'`
 }}}

 (Currently, we're only running tests for `crates="protover tor_util
 smartlist tor_allocate"`.)

 As a side-note, I also think we should be calling cargo with --verbose so
 that our test logs actually tell us when something's wrong, e.g. for
 #24795 it would help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24759 [Core Tor/Tor]: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall socket)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24759: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall socket)
-+-
 Reporter:  mig5 |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, 033-must, crash,|  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mig5):

 The good and bad news is that I can't seem to reproduce this now!

 Still a Fedora 26 AppVM in QubesOS - the only thing that's different is
 newer Tor, so perhaps this bug was somehow fixed in 0.3.1.10.


 {{{
 Mar 21 07:37:13.832 [notice] Tor 0.3.1.10 (git-e3966d47c7252409) running
 on Linux with Libevent 2.0.22-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.0g-fips, Zlib 1.2.11,
 Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 Mar 21 07:37:13.832 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Mar 21 07:37:13.832 [notice] Read configuration file "/home/user/torrc".
 Mar 21 07:37:13.835 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:20315
 Mar 21 07:37:13.835 [notice] Opening Control listener on
 /tmp/tmpvgh5zfbs/control_socket
 Mar 21 07:37:13.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
 Mar 21 07:37:13.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
 /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
 Mar 21 07:37:14.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Mar 21 07:37:14.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
 Mar 21 07:37:15.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 Mar 21 07:37:15.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
 directory server
 Mar 21 07:37:17.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an encrypted
 directory connection
 Mar 21 07:37:17.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus
 consensus
 Mar 21 07:37:18.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
 consensus
 Mar 21 07:37:23.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 Mar 21 07:37:24.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 40%: Loading authority key certs
 Mar 21 07:37:25.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We're missing descriptors for some of
 our primary entry guards
 Mar 21 07:37:29.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 50%: Loading relay descriptors
 Mar 21 07:37:33.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 57%: Loading relay descriptors
 Mar 21 07:37:33.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 65%: Loading relay descriptors
 Mar 21 07:37:34.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 70%: Loading relay descriptors
 Mar 21 07:37:35.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 78%: Loading relay descriptors
 Mar 21 07:37:36.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network
 Mar 21 07:37:37.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
 Mar 21 07:37:39.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks
 like client functionality is working.
 Mar 21 07:37:39.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 }}}

 {{{
 [user@onionshare ~]$ cat torrc
 Sandbox 1
 DataDirectory /tmp/tmpvgh5zfbs
 SocksPort 20315
 ControlSocket /tmp/tmpvgh5zfbs/control_socket
 CookieAuthentication 1
 CookieAuthFile /tmp/tmpvgh5zfbs/cookie
 AvoidDiskWrites 1
 Log notice stdout
 GeoIPFile /usr/share/tor/geoip
 GeoIPv6File /usr/share/tor/geoip6
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25558 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25558: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:2 irl]:
 > We also don't want to go the other way where relay operators decide to
 add iptables rules to drop traffic to relays running pre-release versions

 Remember also that *users* use atlas to better understand the relays they
 might use. Do you want the people who make relay blacklists to add all of
 the relays-running-new-versions to their lists, because we said they are
 insecure?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test all rust functions' behavior when called from C with bad UTF8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24029: Test all rust functions' behavior when called from C with bad UTF8
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 |  chelseakomlo
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 033-triage-20180320,   |  Actual Points:
  033-removed-20180320   |
Parent ID:  #24265   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Hmmm, none of the functions are taking `&[u8]`s, so invalid UTF-8 string
 will be rejected when the C pointers are read from and converted into
 `String`s.  Unless I misunderstood and you wanted something else, we can
 probably close this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24795 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24795: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, osx, tests, 032-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  accepted => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24795 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24795: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, osx, tests, 032-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * owner:  (none) => isis
 * keywords:
 rust, osx, tests, 032-backport, 033-triage-20180320,
 033-removed-20180320
 => rust, osx, tests, 032-backport, 033-triage-20180320
 * points:   => 1
 * status:  new => accepted
 * sponsor:   => SponsorM-can


Comment:

 It might be something glitchy/weird with your local cargo setup on the
 Mac? Maybe try doing `cargo clean` in the protover directory and running
 `make test-rust` again? Also, possibly your lockfile has something weird
 going on, so maybe if that doesn't fix it, try `rm src/rust/Cargo.lock`
 and running again?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25558 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25558: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > See also #24256 for the bigger ticket.

 I'd say lets close this (#25558) as a duplicate of #24256

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[tor-bugs] #25559 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Miscellaneous security- and privacy-related prefs for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25559: Miscellaneous security- and privacy-related prefs for Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-security,
  |  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 JKT has been working on some prefs he suggested we might consider:
 * Security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content
   * Upgrades passive mixed content to HTTPS transparently
 * Network.ftp.enabled
   * disable FTP
 * security.insecure_connection_icon.enabled and
 security.insecure_connection_icon.pbmode.enabled
 * security.insecure_connection_text.enabled and
 security.insecure_connection_text.pbmode.enabled
   * Both of these mark HTTP connections as insecure. One with a broken
 lock icon, the other with text saying ‘Not Secure’
 * Insecure flash content:
   * security.mixed_content.block_object_subrequest
 * Sensors:
   * device.sensors.*.enabled (motion, proximity, ambientLight and
 orientation) && the Event constructors are now also included in
 device.sensors.enabled
   * `device.sensors.enabled` set to False in RF
 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1369319)
 * dom.registerProtocolHandler.insecure.enabled
 * browser.cache.offline.insecure.enable
 * dom.registerContentHandler.enabled

 Others being pondered:
 * Http-disabled
   * I believe this is to block all HTTP connections.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22874 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22874: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  cmm32
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Sounds good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23439 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Exempt .onion domains from mixed content warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23439: Exempt .onion domains from mixed content warnings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201803R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201803  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:18 arthuredelstein]:
 > As a version of these patches have landed in Mozilla, shall we backport
 them to include in the next Tor Browser alpha?

 I thought of doing this a couple of weeks ago, but I got stuck because the
 automated test fails for a strange reason, at least in my non-rbm macOS
 build. What happens is that an SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED
 error occurs while trying to load
 
https://example.com/browser/browser/base/content/test/siteIdentity/test_no_mcb_for_onions.html

 Manually testing does show that the patch is correct. The main advantage
 over the patches from comment:15 is that pref caching is included. You can
 find the two commits here:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug23439-01

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Attached is a patch that hopefully addresses the review in [comment:55]
 and [comment:56].

 > Now we see memory slowly increasing over time--hard to say at this point
 whether it's just normal elevated usage or a leak. I'll leave the monitor
 running.

 Any update on that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24903 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at pathbias_should_count at src/or/circpathbias.c:372

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24903: Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at pathbias_should_count at
src/or/circpathbias.c:372
-+-
 Reporter:  starlight|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-assert-nonfatal, regression?,|  Actual Points:
  033-must, 033-triage-20180320, |
  033-included-20180320  |
Parent ID:  #24907   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  reopened => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24903 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at pathbias_should_count at src/or/circpathbias.c:372

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24903: Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at pathbias_should_count at
src/or/circpathbias.c:372
-+-
 Reporter:  starlight|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-assert-nonfatal, regression?,|  Actual Points:
  033-must, 033-triage-20180320, |
  033-included-20180320  |
Parent ID:  #24907   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: mikeperry (added)


Comment:

 Hm.  So, the issue here has nothing to do with AllowOneHopExits -- it
 happens when the 'onehop_tunnel' and 'desired_path_len' fields don't match
 each other any more.  Ordinarily, this is always true, UNLESS the
 controller has been messing with things.

 One fix here would be to set a flag on a circuit when the controller has
 extended it, and ignore all circuits with this flag in
 pathbias_should_count().

 Another fix here would be to clear onehop_tunnel when a controller has
 extended a circuit that previously had it.  I don't know the implication
 there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * Attachment "0001-Add-synchronization-around-destroying-
 DataChannels-a.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18342 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Provide more accurate reverse DNS results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18342: Provide more accurate reverse DNS results
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * owner:  metrics-team => irl
 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 Some relevant discussion happened at #25551.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25551 [Metrics/Onionoo]: host_name field does not match spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25551: host_name field does not match spec
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > For someone just interested in the PTR record this complicates things.
 If you name it dns_ptr you could always include it no matter if it PTR+A
 matches.

 There will be other things that look for a forward record before giving a
 PTR, and so a misconfigured forward or reverse zone may result in others
 finding no result when they make a query. I wouldn't want to not have some
 sort of clear distinction between a properly configured DNS setup and a
 not properly configured setup, especially when this could be the
 difference between an exit operator being harassed or not.

 Let's call this a duplicate of #18342 and discuss this further there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23785 [Core Tor/Tor]: [HELP!] 7.5a5's(IIRC) Tor cause DNS disruption!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23785: [HELP!] 7.5a5's(IIRC) Tor cause DNS disruption!
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:  user
 Keywords:  033-triage-20180320, |  disappeared
  033-removed-20180320   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25409 [Core Tor/Tor]: rip out PortForwarding options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25409: rip out PortForwarding options
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23545 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UX improvement: Tor Browser should handle bogus HSv3 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23545: UX improvement: Tor Browser should handle bogus HSv3 addresses
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > deferring to 0.3.4 on Tor's; this will need feature design.  TB folks --
 how should Tor tell you about this?  With HTTP CONNECT tunneling it would
 be trivial, but for SOCKS we are pretty limited.

 What options could you think of (not sure what "limited" means here)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25226: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-relay, tor-dos,|  Actual Points:
  033-must, review-group-34, security,   |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  armadev  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => armadev


Comment:

 As an attempt, see branch: `bug25226_033_01`.

 I think we still need to figure out possibly a better default value or at
 the very least a consensus parameter that makes sense.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25558 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25558: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 I think we probably do want the average relay operator to be scared to run
 pre-release software, still maybe the phrasing is a little too much. We
 also don't want to go the other way where relay operators decide to add
 iptables rules to drop traffic to relays running pre-release versions
 (I've seen similar things happen).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review my branch [[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/irl/metrics-
 web.git/log/?h=task/23854|task/23854]]. It has been rebased onto master
 just now, and the feed tested in Firefox/Thunderbird. Don't forget to make
 sure I haven't broken NewsServlet or GraphServlet's existing functionality
 (I don't think I have).

 Note that for the JSTL rendering the table rows in the news and graph
 JSPs, this is a static include to have it happen at translation time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20212: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion 
resources
-+-
 Reporter:  gacar|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > After some more discussion happened, let's try to fix that on the
 browser side (first). mcs/brade: can you look into it?

 Yes, we can take a look. It would be helpful to develop a better
 understanding of what kind of attack(s) we are trying to prevent. That
 might lead to a better design. For example, do we want to limit the rate
 at which new circuits can be opened or do we just want to refuse to open
 more than N circuits per site? Unfortunately, Kathy and I don't really
 know enough about `tor` and the Tor Network to do that kind of analysis,
 so hints about what should be done would be greatly appreciated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25558 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25558: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 See also #24256 for the bigger ticket.

 I'd be a bit sad to tell people that our new versions are "likely to
 contain unknown bugs" -- that is a bit too scary sounding, right? :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16472 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16472: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803R,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:  #12968   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 After bisecting binutils, it seems
 ca6f2be7f6bc638fd4fad48def1fae4ae4d7906e is the first bad commit:
 https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-
 gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=ca6f2be7f6bc638fd4fad48def1fae4ae4d7906e

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22874 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22874: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  cmm32
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:6 dcf]:
 > I think now we just need https://snowflake-reg.appspot.com/ to upload
 the code from [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/appengine?id=36debdfdd24e978fc323ec352852fc4af0bc4ae5
 appengine] so that clients start communicating with the standalone broker.

 I think we're not going to regain access to https://snowflake-
 reg.appspot.com/. I think the way forward is to do #23947; i.e., move the
 proxy-hosting page away from keroserene.net, and then we configure the
 proxy on the new host to use the new broker.

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[tor-bugs] #25558 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25558: Warning on Relay Search about outdated Tor is misleading
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Relay Search currently gives the same warning for all relays that don't
 have a version recommended by the directory authorities. The message
 assumes no one is running super-mega-alpha Tor versions that are too
 bleeding edge (and buggy).

 Instead of

 > This relay is running an outdated Tor version and should be updated to a
 recent release of Tor that may contain important fixes.


 How about "This relay is running a version of Tor that is not recommended.
 It is either too new (likely to contain unknown bugs) or too old (likely
 to be missing important security fixes)."

 Or with a minor variation "This relay is running a version of Tor that is
 not recommended. It is most likely too old (likely to be missing important
 security fixes) but may instead be too new (likely to contain unknown
 bugs)."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25480 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Add Tommy to the giving@ email alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25480: Add Tommy to the giving@ email alias
---+---
 Reporter:  t0mmy  |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
   |  implemented
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It is done!

 (And by 'done' I mean in an hour or so it will take effect.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25480 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Add Tommy to the giving@ email alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25480: Add Tommy to the giving@ email alias
---+--
 Reporter:  t0mmy  |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by jselon):

 Hi!

 Yes, please add Tommy to giving@tpo for triage. Thank you!!!

 -Jon

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23881 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23881: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot, review-group-29,   |  Actual Points:
  review-group-34|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Cool, thanks Nick!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25306 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985: rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25306: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985:
rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, crash, 033-must, |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, review-group-34, |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 Okay, now the branch to backport is called `bug25306_032_01_squashed_v2`.
 It's merged to 0.3.3 and forward.  Possible 0.3.2 backport

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25306 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985: rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25306: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985:
rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, crash, 033-must, |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, review-group-34, |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:26 nickm]:
 > Oh wait.  Not merging yet.  Please write a changes file?

 Pushed in fixup commit `afe0902b1ac32404`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16386 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney generates network with no bandwidth weights

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16386: Chutney generates network with no bandwidth weights
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorS  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13976| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report bandwidth more frequently in test networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17036: Report bandwidth more frequently in test networks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorS-deferred tor-testing tor-   |  Actual Points:
  relay  |
Parent ID:  #16386   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25306 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985: rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25306: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985:
rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, crash, 033-must, |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, review-group-34, |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Oh wait.  Not merging yet.  Please write a changes file?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25306 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985: rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25306: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985:
rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, crash, 033-must, |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, review-group-34, |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 Squashed as bug25306_032_01_squashed and merging to 0.3.3.  If it works
 out there, let's backport to 0.3.2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25557 [- Select a component]: DDOS on HiddenService

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25557: DDOS on HiddenService
--+
 Reporter:  myxaxer   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  DDOS, HiddenService   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by myxaxer):

 * Attachment "ddos_n3.pcap" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25557 [- Select a component]: DDOS on HiddenService

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25557: DDOS on HiddenService
--+-
 Reporter:  myxaxer   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  DDOS, HiddenService
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Hello.
 I installed the torus on my server (debian 8), included in torrc
 HiddenService.
 .onion domains are working. But I ran into the problem, the DDOS attack on
 HiddenService, at this point the TOR process consumes 100% of the
 processor core and the domains stop working.
 NumCPUs does not work, the TOP process still consumes 100% of the kernel.
 Tor version 0.3.3.3-alpha (tried different)
 What options for solving the problem can you advise?
 Dump of traffic http://dropmefiles.com/Vdnu2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25306 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985: rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25306: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_service.c:1985:
rotate_all_descriptors: Assertion service->desc_current failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, crash, 033-must, |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, review-group-34, |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:21 dgoulet]:
 > I kind of think we need to nest the check unfortunately in order to
 catch the bug. There is really only one way this can happen and it is if
 our `valid_after` time is bigger than the service rotation time.
 >
 > If we were to not nest the checks, we would have something like this:
 >
 > {{{
 >if (ns->valid_after >= service->state.next_rotation_time ||
 >BUG(service->desc_current == NULL || service->desc_next == NULL))
 {
 >  goto no_rotation;
 >}
 >if (ns->valid_after >= service->state.next_rotation_time) {
 >  goto rotation;
 >}
 > }}}
 >
 > I'm not super convinced it makes the code simpler? or more trivial?

 Agreed. We can proceed as is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25551 [Metrics/Onionoo]: host_name field does not match spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25551: host_name field does not match spec
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 irl]:
 > Either we should detect cases where a lookup failed and actually omit
 the field, or make clear that an IP address will be returned in the event
 the lookup fails.

 There are cases where you omit the field so I'm not sure what the current
 implementation actually does - that is why I created this ticket.

 > cypherpunks: As you've raised the issue, do you have a preference on
 what we do to fix it?

 I've no strong opinion here but I like the "unverified_host_name" (I would
 name it dns_ptr to be more clear), but that goes in the direction of
 #18342.

 The obvious thing to do would be do implement what the description says.

 > I think I would like to have two fields: "unverified_host_name" and
 "host_name". If the forward lookup fails but we did look up a reverse
 record then we put that in "unverified_host_name". If everything works we
 put it in "hostname" and if no reverse record is found we omit both
 fields. This would be similar to the way we split up alleged family and
 effective family where we still report values even if they cannot be
 confirmed (and can use this information to tell the relay operator how to
 improve their configuration).

 For someone just interested in the PTR record this complicates things. If
 you name it dns_ptr you could always include it no matter if it PTR+A
 matches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25226: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-relay, tor-dos,|  Actual Points:
  033-must, review-group-34, security,   |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Datapoint: #9072

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[tor-bugs] #25556 [- Select a component]: tried to establish rendezvous on non-or circuit with purpose acting as rendezvous(pending) (11 duplicates hidden)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25556: tried to establish rendezvous on non-or circuit with purpose acting as
rendezvous(pending) (11 duplicates hidden)
--+
 Reporter:  th1s  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 What is this error, how to solve it?
 tried to establish rendezvous on non-or circuit with purpose acting as
 rendezvous(pending) (11 duplicates hidden)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24544 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24544: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-spec, prop224, 033-triage-20180320, 033-mustfix => tor-
 spec, prop224, 033-triage-20180320, fast-fix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20301 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bumping the compiler version to 6.2.0 breaks 64bit Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20301: Bumping the compiler version to 6.2.0 breaks 64bit Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201610, tbb-rbm,  |  duplicate
  boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25304   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Ok, I think it makes sense to do it in the patch for #25304.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25226: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-relay, tor-dos,|  Actual Points:
  033-must, review-group-34, security,   |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 This has been discussed at the Rome meeting with arma and Robjansen.

 The gist is that tor does keep a rolling count of circuit level SENDMEs at
 each hop on the circuit because the tor protocol allow the client to exit
 at any hop on the circuit.

 However, normal circumstances, it is end-to-end from client to Exit.
 Considering a the top limit of 8 hops per circuits, the circuit cell queue
 should be at most 8000 cells (circ window start * 8 hops).

 I'll submit a new version of the branch for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20301 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bumping the compiler version to 6.2.0 breaks 64bit Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20301: Bumping the compiler version to 6.2.0 breaks 64bit Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201610, tbb-rbm,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803R |
Parent ID:  #25304   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:15 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > > Okay, I bisected the problem (`PIE` enforcement breaks the compiler)
 and pushed a fix for review to bug_20301
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_20301&id=dfa3403825fc315168df3295f6062f5979b0a8a0)
 in my public repo.
 >
 > I applied the same fix, using the same comment, to tor-browser-build in
 branch `bug_20301`:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_20301&id=4e57f8a0780fd9ed9633dc7d2391bf908b74e337

 The comment looks good to me. Although, we won't update GCC to 6.2.0
 anymore. Thus, the commit message is wrong. I think we should just close
 this bug an apply the comment about disabling PIE in the upcoming patch
 for #25304.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24342 [Core Tor]: Various spec fixes to dir-spec, rend-spec-v3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24342: Various spec fixes to dir-spec, rend-spec-v3
-+-
 Reporter:  filippo  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, review-group-26, review-   |  Actual Points:
  group-27, 033-triage-20180320, fast-fix|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:
 tor-spec, review-group-26, review-group-27, 033-triage-20180320,
 033-removed-20180320
 =>
 tor-spec, review-group-26, review-group-27, 033-triage-20180320, fast-
 fix


Comment:

 We have to get this upstream asap.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20301 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bumping the compiler version to 6.2.0 breaks 64bit Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20301: Bumping the compiler version to 6.2.0 breaks 64bit Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201610, tbb-rbm,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803R |
Parent ID:  #25304   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  GeorgKoppen201610, tbb-rbm, boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803
 => GeorgKoppen201610, tbb-rbm, boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Okay, I bisected the problem (`PIE` enforcement breaks the compiler) and
 pushed a fix for review to bug_20301
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_20301&id=dfa3403825fc315168df3295f6062f5979b0a8a0)
 in my public repo.

 I applied the same fix, using the same comment, to tor-browser-build in
 branch `bug_20301`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_20301&id=4e57f8a0780fd9ed9633dc7d2391bf908b74e337

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a guide for groups planning to submit big patches to Tor.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25507: Write a guide for groups planning to submit big patches to Tor.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, 033-triage-20180320  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor3
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  roadmap, 033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320 => roadmap,
 033-triage-20180320
 * owner:  (none) => catalyst
 * status:  new => assigned
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 This is on the roadmap for 034.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25248 [Core Tor/Tor]: DoS mitgation: improve documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25248: DoS mitgation: improve documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, manpage, tor-doc,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-dos, manpage, tor-doc, 033-triage-20180320,
 033-removed-20180320 => tor-dos, manpage, tor-doc,
 033-triage-20180320, fast-fix
 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


Comment:

 This should be done so we improve our DoS documentation. Quick fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24661 [Core Tor/Tor]: accept a reasonably live consensus for guard selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24661: accept a reasonably live consensus for guard selection
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew,   |  Actual Points:
  s8-bootstrap, s8-errors, ux,   |
  033-triage-20180320, 034-roadmap-proposed  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:
 bootstrap, clock-skew, s8-bootstrap, s8-errors, ux,
 033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320
 =>
 bootstrap, clock-skew, s8-bootstrap, s8-errors, ux,
 033-triage-20180320, 034-roadmap-proposed


Comment:

 This is sponsor 8 stuff. It should be a subtasks of a master tasks from
 our roadmap. Maybe 034 or 035, not sure but lets consider it for 034.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5709 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Bundle build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5709: Tor Browser Bundle build for Android
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24544 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24544: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-mustfix   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-spec, prop224, 033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320
 => tor-spec, prop224, 033-triage-20180320, 033-mustfix


Comment:

 This is really quick. We just need to go over the proposed fixes. It is
 very important that we have rend-spec-v3.txt reflecting the implementation
 perfectly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25551 [Metrics/Onionoo]: host_name field does not match spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25551: host_name field does not match spec
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  accepted => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25551 [Metrics/Onionoo]: host_name field does not match spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25551: host_name field does not match spec
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 Either we should detect cases where a lookup failed and actually omit the
 field, or make clear that an IP address will be returned in the event the
 lookup fails. I agree that currently we do not implement what we said we
 implement in the spec.

 cypherpunks: As you've raised the issue, do you have a preference on what
 we do to fix it?

 I think I would like to have two fields: "unverified_host_name" and
 "host_name". If the forward lookup fails but we did look up a reverse
 record then we put that in "unverified_host_name". If everything works we
 put it in "hostname" and if no reverse record is found we omit both
 fields. This would be similar to the way we split up alleged family and
 effective family where we still report values even if they cannot be
 confirmed (and can use this information to tell the relay operator how to
 improve their configuration).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 Cool. (:

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Alright, please go ahead. (Nothing else consumes `news.json` than the two
 classes you mention.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client intro performance |  Actual Points:
  application experiment |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client intro performance application experiment, tbb-wants
 => tor-client intro performance application experiment
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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[tor-bugs] #25555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reimplement Optimistic SOCKS feature

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2: Reimplement Optimistic SOCKS feature
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-preformance,
 Severity:  Normal   |  ff60-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We had to rip out the Optimistic SOCKS feature to get Moat working in Tor
 Browser (see: #24432) but we want it back for performance reasons

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25065 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: goptlib doesn't allow optimistic SOCKS data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25065: goptlib doesn't allow optimistic SOCKS data
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  goptlib  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 We actually think we want to redo the optimistic SOCKS patch in Firefox
 code.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23756, #24868, #22717, #24029, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23756, #24868, #22717, #24029, #24342, #24423, #24544, 
#24661, #14006, #21311, #21425, #23250, #23785, #24303, #24897, #24968, #25173, 
#7164, #9390, #11966, #22689, #22817, #22926, #23168, #23357, #24905, #24910, 
#24911, #11301, #23116, #24821, #17145, #18480, #18580, #21358, #21676, #22310, 
#22355, #23234, #23613, #23620, #23815, #24044, #24110, #24308, #24367, #24377, 
#24453, #24455, #24546, #24795, #24841, #25248, #25507, #24238 by nickm:


Comment:
Mark all not-already-included tickets as pending review for removal from 0.3.3 
milestone.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client intro performance |  Actual Points:
  application experiment, tbb-wants  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: There were some reasonable arguments to not try this at the tor
 level for Tor Browser. Instead we think we should fix the Firefox code to
 do the right thing for us. I'll leave this ticket open for the original
 idea.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21394, #24456, #24658

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21394, #24456, #24658 by nickm:


Comment:
Mark needs_review tickets as included for 033.

We can revisit this if they turn out to need much more review and/or revision 
than expected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23411 [Webpages]: Creating a live style guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23411: Creating a live style guide
--+
 Reporter:  hiro  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by antonela):

 Our first version is living at styleguide.torproject.org

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6767, #24454, #25208, #25226, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6767, #24454, #25208, #25226, #25306, #3940, #25316, 
#25380, #24759, #24775, #24782, #24767, #25036, #25055, #25313, #24904, #25245, 
#25061, #25213, #25347, #25517, #24903 by nickm:


Comment:
Mark 033-must tickets as triaged-in for 0.3.3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23411 [Webpages]: Creating a live style guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23411: Creating a live style guide
--+-
 Reporter:  hiro  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6767, #23756, #24454, #25208, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6767, #23756, #24454, #25208, #24868, #22717, #24029, 
#24342, #24423, #24544, #24661, #25226, #25306, #3940, #25316, #25380, #14006, 
#21311, #21425, #23250, #23785, #24303, #24759, #24775, #24782, #24897, #24968, 
#25173, #21394, #24767, #25036, #24456, #24658, #25055, #25313, #7164, #9390, 
#11966, #22689, #22817, #22926, #23168, #23357, #24904, #24905, #24910, #24911, 
#25245, #11301, #23116, #24821, #17145, #18480, #18580, #21358, #21676, #22310, 
#22355, #23234, #23613, #23620, #23815, #24044, #24110, #24308, #24367, #24377, 
#24453, #24455, #24546, #24795, #24841, #25061, #25213, #25248, #25347, #25507, 
#25517, #24238, #24903 by nickm:


Comment:
Marking all tickets reached by current round of 033 triage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23545 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UX improvement: Tor Browser should handle bogus HSv3 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23545: UX improvement: Tor Browser should handle bogus HSv3 addresses
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 deferring to 0.3.4 on Tor's; this will need feature design.  TB folks --
 how should Tor tell you about this?  With HTTP CONNECT tunneling it would
 be trivial, but for SOCKS we are pretty limited.

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