Re: [tor-bugs] #27232 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27232: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again
--+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #27221. Note that, surprisingly, does not happen with an
 update from a new 8.0a9 to 8.0a10.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: sysrqb (added)


Comment:

 #27232 is a duplicate. sysrqb noted in it:
 {{{
 `browser.startup.homepage_override.torbrowser.version` and
 `extensions.lastTorBrowserVersion` are both `8.0a9`

 while

 `extensions.torbutton.lastBrowserVersion` and `torbrowser.version` are
 `8.0a10`.

 On my TB 7.5 installation, I see all four of these are currently `7.5.6`.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11289 [Webpages/Website]: FAQ entry for where Tor's data directory is

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11289: FAQ entry for where Tor's data directory is
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  mttp
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 I created a PR with a sentence in the #torrc section:
 https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/23

 It is also mentioned under #ConfigureRelayOrBridge:
 > Second (complex option), you can edit your torrc file (in
 Data/Tor/torrc)
 And #torrc had:
 > If you installed Tor Browser on Windows or Linux, look for
 Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc inside your Tor Browser
 directory.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27227 [Webpages/Website]: Please remove both PM positions from the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27227: Please remove both PM positions from the website
--+--
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/22

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27228 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27228: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted
--+---
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by traumschule):

 The bug did not reappear since. Will observe it further, could it be
 related to the choosen guard?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13843 [Webpages/Website]: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering and exiting from the same country."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13843: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering 
and
exiting from the same country."
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25385 [Webpages/Website]: update chroot howtos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25385: update chroot howtos
-+--
 Reporter:  gman999  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  chroot openbsd tor, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22958 [Webpages/Website]: Update website FAQ about padding defenses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22958: Update website FAQ about padding defenses
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  website
   |  redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website, website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/21

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13843 [Webpages/Website]: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering and exiting from the same country."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13843: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering 
and
exiting from the same country."
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks for the fast reply!

 I create a PR to add this under {{{Alternate designs that we don't do
 (yet)}}}: https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/20

 Might however also fit in any of:
 - Tor Browser (general)
 - Advanced Tor usage
 - Anonymity and Security

 The comment arma mentioned was:
 > I really like the new feature that allows us to see where the used
 relays are located.
 > That made me see a security threat - sometimes all three relays are
 based in the same country or the entry and exit. I think there should be
 additional code added to make sure this never happens, imagine the chaos
 when exit and entry node is from the USA and controlled by NSA. Overall
 the Tor Browser 4.5-alpha-1 is great.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27232 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27232: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Something else I should note. After updating:

 `browser.startup.homepage_override.torbrowser.version` and
 `extensions.lastTorBrowserVersion` are both `8.0a9`

 while

 `extensions.torbutton.lastBrowserVersion` and `torbrowser.version` are
 `8.0a10`.

 On my TB 7.5 installation, I see all four of these are currently `7.5.6`.

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[tor-bugs] #27233 [Webpages/Blog]: Blog: Jump to correct page when a linked comment is not on the first page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27233: Blog: Jump to correct page when a linked comment is not on the first 
page
---+--
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Direct links to comments on another page than the first do not work.

 Instead it should jump to the correct comments page to make the comment
 link work.

 The comment for this link is on page 3: https://blog.torproject.org/blog
 /tor-browser-45-alpha-1-released#comment-79839

 (Unfortunately this is quite hard to implement.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27232 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27232: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:2 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 sysrqb]:
 > > ...
 > > `%VERSION%` is compile-time hard-coded as the original version number.
 I think we want the `torbrowser.version` pref?
 >
 > The torbrowser.version value should be the same as the compile time
 define TOR_BROWSER_VERSION. We had to define TOR_BROWSER_VERSION because
 there are some places in the update code where we cannot access the prefs
 (at least that is what I remember). In any case, after the browser is
 updated to 8.0a10, %VERSION% should be formatted using the new version
 number. Or am I missing something?
 >

 Nope, that sure does make sense.

 > This is a dumb question, but are you sure the update succeeded? With one
 of my copies of 8.0a9 on macOS, the update does not want to apply. I am
 not yet sure why not though.

 After restarting, torbrowser.version is set a 8.0a10, and I also have the
 new `about:tor` (and onboarding), so the update did apply. So I'm not sure
 what's going on here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22958 [Webpages/Website]: Update website FAQ about padding defenses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22958: Update website FAQ about padding defenses
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  website
   |  redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website, website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => traumschule
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I am about to create a PR based on below information, please tell if
 relevant info is missing.

 The FAQ mentions padding at two locations and needs to be updated:
 - You should split each connection over many paths.
 - You should send padding so it's more secure.

 The blog post mentions:
 - "As part of the security discussion, we talked about the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/251-netflow-
 padding.txt new padding defenses] that were recently added to Tor and
 provide cover to Tor circuits against traffic analysis. We made plans for
 future padding techniques and defenses."
 A comment clarifies:
 - Note that it's just netflow padding to collapse netflow records, it's
 not the type of expensive padding that the FAQ addresses, but yes the FAQ
 should be tweaked a bit.
 It was also announced on tor-dev: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
 /tor-dev/2015-August/009326.html


 Trying to summarize ticket #16861 linked in the blog:
 - Now tor "sends padding on a client's Tor connection bidirectionally at a
 random interval that we can control from the consensus, with a default of
 4s-14s."
 - "padding approaches, with the goal of stymying some of the potential
 traffic analysis attacks out there -- website fingerprinting, end-to-end
 correlation, and the things in between. Padding between the guard and the
 client is especially appealing because a) it looks like it can provide
 pretty good mileage, and also b) I expect that we'd have an easier time
 raising more capacity at guards (compared to exits) if we publicize the
 reason why we need it." (comment:6:ticket:16861)
 - send at least one cell on a connection every 15s
 - the netflow defense only sends padding if the connection is idle

 I stopped digging deeper but it might be enough to add this to the faq.

 For details we could also link
 https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html with several publications on
 padding.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27232 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27232: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:1 sysrqb]:
 > ...
 > `%VERSION%` is compile-time hard-coded as the original version number. I
 think we want the `torbrowser.version` pref?

 The torbrowser.version value should be the same as the compile time define
 TOR_BROWSER_VERSION. We had to define TOR_BROWSER_VERSION because there
 are some places in the update code where we cannot access the prefs (at
 least that is what I remember). In any case, after the browser is updated
 to 8.0a10, %VERSION% should be formatted using the new version number. Or
 am I missing something?

 This is a dumb question, but are you sure the update succeeded? With one
 of my copies of 8.0a9 on macOS, the update does not want to apply. I am
 not yet sure why not though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13843 [Webpages/Website]: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering and exiting from the same country."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13843: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering 
and
exiting from the same country."
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:8 traumschule]:
 > Before changing the website I'd like to confirm that Tor's behavior on
 this did not change in the last 4 years.

 Tor's behaviour has not changed.

 > If not what should be added exactly? I was under the impression that
 tor's defaults are sensible and meddling with the circuit path does not
 improve my anonymity / privacy.

 In general, changing Tor's path selection makes your client look different
 from other clients. Picking your entry and exit in different countries is
 not a good defence, because it only defends against adversaries that are
 unable to rent servers in other countries.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27231 [Webpages/Website]: OpenBSD install instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27231: OpenBSD install instructions
--+--
 Reporter:  gman999   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openbsd install   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * component:  Webpages => Webpages/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27231 [Webpages]: OpenBSD install instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27231: OpenBSD install instructions
-+--
 Reporter:  gman999  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  openbsd install  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/19

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27212 [Core Tor/Tor]: Why do bridges run the retry_dns callback?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27212: Why do bridges run the retry_dns callback?
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27080| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #27080


Comment:

 The original ticket was #25762.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17623 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve not-a-server behavior of server-only timer callbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17623: Improve not-a-server behavior of server-only timer callbacks
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-relay mainloop refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This was fixed by #25762.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27080 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27080: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, 035-must, regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-bridge 034-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:14 teor]:
 > This code in router_have_minimum_dir_info() is part of the problem, and
 we should fix it:
 > {{{
 > /* if the consensus has no exits, treat the exit fraction as 100% */
 > if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT) {
 >   f_exit = 1.0;
 > }
 > }}}
 >
 > The code is intended to allow onion service connections in Tor networks
 with no exits.

 Hang on, this code should never trigger in the public network, because its
 consensus always has exits.
 Since it's using consensus flags, I don't think we need to change it.

 > But if Tor actually needs exit circuits, it should keep trying to
 download new descriptors, in case any of them have better exit info.
 >
 > And if we want to use router_have_minimum_dir_info() to delay
 downloading descriptors, we need to check the exit policies in those
 descriptors, not just the flags.

 I think this might be one of the bugs that we're looking for.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27232 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27232: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I think this is because the update URL is formatted here:
 {{{
   async formatUpdateURL(url) {
 const locale = await this.getLocale();

 return url.replace(/%(\w+)%/g, (match, name) => {
   switch (name) {
 case "PRODUCT":
   return Services.appinfo.name;
 case "VERSION":
 #ifdef TOR_BROWSER_UPDATE
   return TOR_BROWSER_VERSION;
 #else
   return Services.appinfo.version;
 #endif
 }}}

 `app.update.url` is:
 
`https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/%CHANNEL%/%BUILD_TARGET%/%VERSION%/%LOCALE%`

 Looking at the update url:
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/alpha/Linux_x86_64-gcc3/8.0a9
 /en-US

 `%VERSION%` is compile-time hard-coded as the original version number. I
 think we want the `torbrowser.version` pref?

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[tor-bugs] #27232 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27232: Updater redowloads and reinstalls update again
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 After updating to 8.0a10 (and restarting), Tor Browser then redownloads
 the update and shows an indicator for restarting the browser and
 installing it. After restarting, this happens again.

 {{{
 [08-21 02:09:13] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/alpha/Linux_x86_64-gcc3/8.0a9
 /en-US via
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #27231 [Webpages]: OpenBSD install instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27231: OpenBSD install instructions
--+-
 Reporter:  gman999   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  openbsd install
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 On https://www.torproject.org/download/download-unix.html.en, the OpenBSD
 install instructions should use the package, as opposed to the port.

 This:

 cd /usr/ports/net/tor && make && make install

 Should be replaced with this:

 pkg_add tor

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27080 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27080: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, 035-must, regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-bridge 034-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 This code in router_have_minimum_dir_info() is part of the problem, and we
 should fix it:
 {{{
 /* if the consensus has no exits, treat the exit fraction as 100% */
 if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT) {
   f_exit = 1.0;
 }
 }}}

 The code is intended to allow onion service connections in Tor networks
 with no exits.

 But if Tor actually needs exit circuits, it should keep trying to download
 new descriptors, in case any of them have better exit info.

 And if we want to use router_have_minimum_dir_info() to delay downloading
 descriptors, we need to check the exit policies in those descriptors, not
 just the flags.

 I also opened a child ticket to remove the chutney PathsNeeded option.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13843 [Webpages/Website]: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering and exiting from the same country."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13843: Add a faq entry for "You should change path selection to avoid entering 
and
exiting from the same country."
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, FAQ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Before changing the website I'd like to confirm that Tor's behavior on
 this did not change in the last 4 years. If not what should be added
 exactly? I was under the impression that tor's defaults are sensible and
 meddling with the circuit path does not improve my anonymity / privacy.

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[tor-bugs] #27230 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Stop setting PathsNeededToBuildCircuits to a low value

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27230: Stop setting PathsNeededToBuildCircuits to a low value
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Chutney|   Keywords:  034-must, 035-must, regression,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tor-bridge 034-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #27080
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 It caused #27080, and it's not a good idea to depart from the Tor
 defaults.

 When we make this change, we need to run "make test-network-all" on all
 supported tor versions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23809 [Community/Relays]: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23809: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  FAQ =>
 * component:  Webpages/Website => Community/Relays


Comment:

 (I realized that my former comment was out of context.)

 Changing the component to the relay guide because it is not part of the
 website anymore since January (see comment:5:ticket:21519).

 Maybe it is easiest to change {{{Debian/Ubuntu}}} to
 {{{Debian/Ubuntu/Raspbian}}} at
 [[TorRelayGuide#PlatformspecificInstructions]]?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create fuzzing harness to compare C/Rust Functionality

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27229: Create fuzzing harness to compare C/Rust Functionality
---+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover, fuzz,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24265 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * type:  defect => task


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[tor-bugs] #27229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create fuzzing harness to compare C/Rust Functionality

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27229: Create fuzzing harness to compare C/Rust Functionality
--+---
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust, protover, fuzz,
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24265
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 In porting over functionality to Rust, it can be useful to compare
 functionality between C/Rust. While ideally unit tests should catch most
 behavior, having a fuzzer to catch edge cases can be handy.

 We should write a test harness that fuzzes C/Rust similar functions and
 compares their output. Ideally, a test would look something like this:

 1. Setup C test case
 2. Set up Rust test case
 3. Provide both functions with the same generated arbitrary input
 4. Compare results

 It is worth noting that in most cases we will want to improve behavior
 when porting to Rust, but this tool can be useful for small cases where we
 want bitwise identical functions.

 Alex Crichton recommended looking at https://github.com/alexcrichton/ctest
 as one option- it is worth looking at what a simple test harness should be
 and how to have code be reusable between tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26048 [Applications/Tor Browser]: potentially confusing "restart to update" message in ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26048: potentially confusing "restart to update" message in ESR60
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I just saw this when updating to 8.0a10 (I have a screenshot but it's
 basically the same as mcs'). I'm guessing we'll need:

 1. different wording that doesn't imply some tabs will be restored
 1. localization for the new resources

 Anything else?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26561 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion images are not displayed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26561: Onion images are not displayed
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Interesting. Loading this in 8.0a10, I see this over and over again. It
 continuously tries loading this resource and when it fails (with the below
 javascript error, it tries reloading it again.
 {{{
 [08-21 01:54:45] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 20 SUCCEEDED 6
 expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion:80
 JavaScript error: chrome://global/content/browser-child.js, line 447:
 TypeError: req is null
 [08-21 01:54:45] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 http://expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/images/icon-TorBrowser.jpg via
 expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion:cd72a84c3bb37bdd021b0d3d82ab051a
 }}}

 For the non-onion connection, the image successfully loads but, again, it
 continuously refreshes and redownloads the image over and over again:
 {{{
 [08-21 01:58:07] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/icon-TorBrowser.jpg via
torproject.org:d50525c6d67ac7cad3d8d820aac12d95
 [08-21 01:58:07] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/icon-TorBrowser.jpg via
torproject.org:d50525c6d67ac7cad3d8d820aac12d95
 [08-21 01:58:07] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/icon-TorBrowser.jpg via
torproject.org:d50525c6d67ac7cad3d8d820aac12d95
 [08-21 01:58:08] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/icon-TorBrowser.jpg via
torproject.org:d50525c6d67ac7cad3d8d820aac12d95
 [08-21 01:58:08] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/icon-TorBrowser.jpg via
torproject.org:d50525c6d67ac7cad3d8d820aac12d95
 [08-21 01:58:08] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/icon-TorBrowser.jpg via
torproject.org:d50525c6d67ac7cad3d8d820aac12d95
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:8 igt0]:
 > The issue is not about signatures anymore. Looks like there is a race
 condition in the addons code. If i close the browser and open again. The
 addon is loaded.

 Ah, I see, the patch is good. [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/XPIInstall.jsm?h=tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1#n1533 loadManifest()] =>
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/XPIInstall.jsm?h=tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1#n878 loadManifestFromZipReader()] =>
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/XPIInstall.jsm?h=tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1#n1058 verifyZipSignedState()] =>
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/XPIInstall.jsm?h=tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1#n1031 shouldVerifySignedState()].

 `verifyZipSignedState()` sets
 {{{
 signedState: AddonManager.SIGNEDSTATE_NOT_REQUIRED
 }}}
 (where `AddonManager`.`SIGNEDSTATE_NOT_REQUIRED` has value `undefined`),
 so the inner conditional block isn't executed:
 {{{
 if (mustSign(this.addon.type)) {
   if (this.addon.signedState <= AddonManager.SIGNEDSTATE_MISSING) {
 [...]

 if (state == AddonManager.SIGNEDSTATE_MISSING)
   return Promise.reject([AddonManager.ERROR_SIGNEDSTATE_REQUIRED,
  "signature is required but missing"]);

[...]
   }
 }
 }}}

 As for the race condition, I don't think that's true. I think that is
 because torbutton isn't a restartless extension. It requires restarting
 after installation. I don't think there's anyway way we can prevent this.
 I wonder if we can force a restart (semi-transparently) at the end of the
 firstrun onboarding screen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27228 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27228: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted
--+---
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by traumschule):

 At the time these messages appeared first Tor was configured as a system
 daemon to serve onions services only. Some hours ago I enabled
 [[doc/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy]], but below occurrences should be
 unrelated to that because it happened before it being a bridge only used
 as client with onion services:

 {{{
 Aug 17 21:34:59.000 [info] {BUG} pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit 23
 is now being counted despite being ignored in the past. Purpose is
 Measuring circuit timeout, path state is new (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev )
 ...
 Aug 20 03:09:58.000 [info] {BUG} pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit 355
 is now being counted despite being ignored in the past. Purpose is
 Measuring circuit timeout, path state is new (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev )
 ...
 Aug 21 03:24:50.000 [info] {BUG} pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit 867
 is now being counted despite being ignored in the past. Purpose is
 Measuring circuit timeout, path state is new (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev )
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27216 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix spelling error in comment for getinfo_helper_current_time()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27216: Fix spelling error in comment for getinfo_helper_current_time()
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  typo  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => typo
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27215 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Change default HiddenServiceVersion to 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27215: hs: Change default HiddenServiceVersion to 3
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-roadmap-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Here's one way to make Tor smart:
 * if the HiddenServiceDirectory has an existing v2 key, use v2 for that
 service
 * if the HiddenServiceDirectory has an existing v3 key, use v3 for that
 service
 * otherwise, use HiddenServiceVersion for new services

 If we apply the first found version to all other services, there are a lot
 of edge cases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27228 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27228: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted
--+---
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Hi traumschule, what version of Tor are you running?
 Please put it in the "version" field, not the "milestone" field.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27228 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27228: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * cc: mikeperry (added)


Comment:

 Hi traumschule, please tell us what your tor is doing. Is it a relay, a
 bridge, a client, or an onion service? How are you launching it?

 Hi mikeperry, can you triage this bug? How serious is it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27228 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27228: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted
--+---
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20232 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays get stuck on resolve_my_address() if unable to guess address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20232: Relays get stuck on resolve_my_address() if unable to guess address
-+-
 Reporter:  c4k3 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  host hostname hosts ip resolve tor-  |  Actual Points:
  relay address-guessing self-identification |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)
 * component:  Community/Relays => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 traumschule]:
 > turns out it helps to define {{{Address}}} as described in the comments
 in default torrc. I propose to add this to the platform specific
 instruction pages:
 > {{{
 > # Address [Your Public IP Address] # Uncomment this if you are behind a
 router or your internet is NATed
 > }}}

 Please don't move a ticket that needs a Tor bugfix to the relay guide.

 Instead, open a new ticket about the relay guide as a child of the Tor
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make ExitRelay 0 the default when there is no exit policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21530: Make ExitRelay 0 the default when there is no exit policy
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-exit tor-relay configuration |  Actual Points:
  usability expectations |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make ExitRelay 0 the default when there is no exit policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21530: Make ExitRelay 0 the default when there is no exit policy
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-exit tor-relay configuration |  Actual Points:
  usability expectations |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make ExitRelay 0 the default when there is no exit policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21530: Make ExitRelay 0 the default when there is no exit policy
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-exit tor-relay configuration |  Actual Points:
  usability expectations |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 My PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/283

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23060 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23060: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere | Resolution:  not a
 Severity:  Blocker  |  bug
 Keywords:  https-everywhere |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by legind):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Resolving as "not a bug" since it is in fact no longer a bug.  The problem
 has fixed itself and other resolution statuses don't seem quite correct.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23060 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23060: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  https-everywhere |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by legind):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23060 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23060: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere | Resolution:
 Severity:  Blocker  |  worksforme
 Keywords:  https-everywhere |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by legind):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Thanks teor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23060 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23060: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  https-everywhere |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 legind]:
 > This site is no longer serving valid TLS certificates, and there is no
 ruleset for it in HTTPS Everywhere.
 >
 > For some reason I don't have necessary permissions to close this ticket.

 We had a spammer closing tickets a few weeks back, so we removed most
 permissions from most users.

 I've put you in the developer group, so you should be able to admin
 tickets now.

 I'll leave you to close this ticket, because I don't know the resolution
 you want.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20232 [Community/Relays]: Relays get stuck on resolve_my_address() if unable to guess address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20232: Relays get stuck on resolve_my_address() if unable to guess address
-+-
 Reporter:  c4k3 |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Community/Relays |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  host hostname hosts ip resolve tor-  |  Actual Points:
  relay address-guessing self-identification |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => Nusenu
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Community/Relays


Comment:

 turns out it helps to define {{{Address}}} as described in the comments in
 default torrc. I propose to add this to the platform specific instruction
 pages:
 {{{
 # Address [Your Public IP Address] # Use this if you are behind a router
 or your internet is NATed
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23060 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23060: HTTPS everywhere does not activate on picgur.org
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  https-everywhere |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by legind):

 This site is no longer serving valid TLS certificates, and there is no
 ruleset for it in HTTPS Everywhere.

 For some reason I don't have necessary permissions to close this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27228 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27228: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by traumschule):

 {{{
 $ git log --pretty=oneline -S "is now being counted"
 b4ebf8421ada3edf104ae5fc96d288f11271445b Move pathbias functions into a
 new file.
 6828a19670080a3d19bdddf1e55d53928d81a410 Add a tristate to guard against
 unexpected circ purpose transitions
 $ git checkout b4ebf8421ada3edf104ae5fc96d288f11271445b
 $ rgrep "is now being counted despite being ignored" -n
 src/or/circpathbias.c:335:  "Circuit %d is now being counted
 despite being ignored "
 $ git checkout 6828a19670080a3d19bdddf1e55d53928d81a410
 $ rgrep "is now being counted despite being ignored" -n
 src/or/circuitbuild.c:1414:  "Circuit %d is now being counted
 despite being ignored "
 $ gitk
 }}}
 > Author: Mike Perry   2013-01-30 22:46:25
 > Committer: Nick Mathewson   2013-02-01 23:01:12
 > Parent: 173ed05d2f7233371dfcb1ef32a4d95f5096c435 (Clarify state
 transition and related pathbias comments)
 > Follows: tor-0.2.4.9-alpha
 > Precedes: tor-0.2.4.10-alpha
 {{{
 +/* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a
 + * unexpected purpose change that would affect our results.
 + *
 + * The reason we check the path state too here is because for the
 + * cannibalized versions of these purposes, we count them as
 successful
 + * before their purpose change.
 + */
 +if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED
 +&& circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED) {
 +  log_info(LD_BUG,
 +   "Circuit %d is now being ignored despite being counted "
 +   "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s",
 +   circ->global_identifier,
 +   circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
 +   pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state));
 +}
 +circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED;
  return 0;
}
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add mitigating action to window size warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20260: Add mitigating action to window size warning
-+-
 Reporter:  lunar|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  fingerprinting-resolution  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by huertanix):

 I should point out that in training journalists and others in using Tor
 Browser, almost none notice the current warning when they resize or
 maximize their window.

 Since browser fingerprinting, as far as I know with my admittedly dusty
 JavaScript knowledge, can happen the moment a browser is resized,
 something more in-your-face might be more appropriate; e.g. a JS prompt
 that intercepts the window resize action and prompts the user to either
 click OK and resize or Cancel and not resize, with a short warning on why
 resizing can be unsafe.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21787 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21787: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff60-esr |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff60-esr TorBrowserTeam201808 => tbb-
 fingerprinting, ff60-esr TorBrowserTeam201808R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Unfortunately I had somehow missed the use of
 `mozIntl.getCalendarInfo(...)` in the date-time picker code. :(

 Here's a patch for review. It uses the "en-US" locale for the date/time
 picker when privacy.spoof_english == 2.

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/21787

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24599 [Webpages/Website]: support.tpo site QA [and language review]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24599: support.tpo site QA [and language review]
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24129| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by ggus):

 Hi! Thanks for your feedback.

 Just to update and document the status of each issue that you brought
 here:

 Replying to [comment:1 boklm]:
 > Some issues I noticed while reading the questions on https://support-
 staging.torproject.org/:
 >
 > The section **Miscellaneus** should be called **Miscellaneous** (an 'o'
 is missing).
 >

 It's fixed.

 > In question **Can I use a VPN with Tor?**: A link is missing on "Learn
 more about combining Tor + VPN".

 It's fixed.

 >This question is also duplicated (in Most Frequently Asked Questions and
 in Miscellaneus).
 >

 I don't know if this was intentional, because there are more duplicated
 questions.

 But, my opinion is that we shouldn't have duplicated questions.


 > In question **My favorite website is blocking access over Tor.**: the
 link "I cannot reach X.onion!" is not working.

 Fixed.

 >
 > The question **Can I make Tor Browser my default browser?** seems to be
 a duplicate of **Can I set Tor Browser as my default browser?**.
 >

 Indeed. See comment above.

 > In question **Why does my Tor Browser say something about Firefox not
 working?**: the link "My antivirus/malware protection is blocking me from
 accessing Tor Browser" is missing.
 >

 Fixed!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27208 [Core Tor/Tor]: add API for allocating aligned memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27208: add API for allocating aligned memory
-+
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust-wants rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23882   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 It might be incorrect to treat malloc(sz) as meaning aligned_malloc(sz,1).
 malloc() is required to return memory that is aligned suitably for any
 built-in type, whereas aligned_malloc(sz,1) doesn't have that requirement,
 FWICT.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26470 [Core Tor/Tor]: WARN: Saying "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n\r\n" WARN: connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at src/or/connection_edge.c:2551) sending two s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26470: WARN: Saying "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n\r\n"  WARN:
connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at
src/or/connection_edge.c:2551) sending two socks replies? (on Tor
0.3.3.5-rc 81d71f0d41adf0d8)
-+-
 Reporter:  Tai683   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 033-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  034-proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #27228 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27228: pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit X is now being counted
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Looking through my tor.log I found 64 lines like this during the last day
 (out of 66 BUG lines):
 {{{
 Aug 20 03:09:58.000 [info] {BUG} pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit 355
 is now being counted despite being ignored in the past. Purpose is
 Measuring circuit timeout, path state is new (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev )
 }}}
 The other BUGs were:
 {{{
 Aug 20 03:19:00.000 [info] {BUG} pathbias_count_build_success(): Bug:
 Succeeded circuit is in strange path state new. Circuit is a Measuring
 circuit timeout currently open. (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev )
 Aug 20 03:19:03.000 [info] {CIRC} extend_info_from_node(): Including
 Ed25519 ID for $name at $address
 }}}

 (Maybe relevant: #24966, #24903, #19535, #8196, #8081)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20232 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays get stuck on resolve_my_address() if unable to guess address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20232: Relays get stuck on resolve_my_address() if unable to guess address
-+-
 Reporter:  c4k3 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  host hostname hosts ip resolve tor-  |  Actual Points:
  relay address-guessing self-identification |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by traumschule):

 Ran into to this as well, let me know if you are interested in info logs.

 If it's a configuration error we should update [[TorRelayGuide]] what
 users should do about
 {{{Address '' resolves to private IP address '192.168.###.###'.
 Tor servers that use the default DirAuthorities must have public IP
 addresses.}}}

 [[TorRelayGuide#PublicIPv4Address]] says
 >  Every relay needs a public IPv4 address - either directly on the host
 (preferred) or via NAT and port forwarding.
 This is not very instructive. Should we recommend to run a
 [[doc/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy]] instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 The issue is not about signatures anymore. Looks like there is a race
 condition in the addons code. If i close the browser and open again. The
 addon is loaded.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in tortls/cert_matches_key with openssl 1.0.2p

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27226: Crash in tortls/cert_matches_key with openssl 1.0.2p
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must 029-backport 032-backport   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch `bug27226_029` in my public repository, PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/282 .

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[tor-bugs] #27227 [Webpages/Website]: Please remove both PM positions from the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27227: Please remove both PM positions from the website
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512


 Please remove both Project Manager job postings from the website. The
 positions have been filled and we will be making an announcement soon.
 Thank you!

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAlt7LiYACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc4OQg//cfxQvY+utjbsm/AQr/y4zQvWaazaQQIqu8L3fzAlV6lQ/mw8yusm+emr
 XDgNLdguVPtlZ49T0g1TFbmDBmYOxjwtvTlduz0tP6bXFfoIEvFtDRMNl92Vb6/h
 0E/I+QCMqgGN/Kg5tKRZMi3uTwtdzDbllJ7y/2kmSZ/V4nIla0h4Wwt6lw3ZbKC6
 pcZnJG/myVuvJr4k/ndzJWWc7QtDHu1NrkmCER5JbeiKlKlCSkFeNW30w3loojiC
 ESP9nvkV6GQUYAiHbn/Xb3OL3vdDmlla6RqVh9ixcOdwRJPSxJBSCS3OWUN6fPIW
 lNEnT3ltnaY2y6Ggovz9VgSRW30nsBEhM7shT8y9Pq5jHk5ygGUEXssio0u4Pc1l
 0iIB3NAog6EBp+3KAz0ap9flQr6ICImFzlyEKgURRenqphhychhYAxC6wklDYJ6I
 IcpiI32srPbAM54k0M9Ump8rXhqBS1oYI8LpmpSCYeMo10eQhaXcYs6N9zLBB1sy
 aERjdCslkiYhf/2/796C6Fiaj4MXSQsjF3a4VdR9lM0uHBLAZuv30Fo9zooSCcg9
 AIG4sY5pFHINu8bJjWf1RvIpB/WVQ0IaUt1l4oO+HjRyrdxQ0CLP02HoFGGE2YMx
 lGjyNP8J/ZIfPSPkXzwjxUWYfkpfTxuu+SpcajVTLpMWYcX+Lqg=
 =vtfs
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in tortls/cert_matches_key with openssl 1.0.2p

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27226: Crash in tortls/cert_matches_key with openssl 1.0.2p
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must 029-backport 032-backport   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  034-must 029- => 034-must 029-backport 032-backport
 033-backport 034-backport
 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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[tor-bugs] #27226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in tortls/cert_matches_key with openssl 1.0.2p

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27226: Crash in tortls/cert_matches_key with openssl 1.0.2p
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  034-must 029-
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Our unit test, `tortls/cert_matches_key`, does some questionable stuff
 that is not compatible with openssl 1.0.2p.

 Namely, it calls `EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(999, 0, NULL, NULL)`, which now
 returns NULL.

 Looking at the test, I'm not sure what it's trying to do with this -- it's
 making a bogus public key method with a "compare" function that will
 always return "1".  Later, it's using this thing to construct bogus PKEY
 objects.

 This, like a lot of other tortls.c tests, is way too tightly coupled to
 openssl internals.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Do we need to change [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/XPIProvider.jsm?h
 =tor-browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1#n241 mustSign()]? I haven't tested this yet,
 but the code path I see will still fail - maybe I'm looking in the wrong
 place. I'll test this, as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Looks good to me. But the security settings are still not enabled by
 default on my phone. I.e. while messing with the `about:config` is not
 necessary anymore, I still need sysrqb's trick in comment:11:ticket:26884.
 The bundle I used is available in comment:23:ticket:26884.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25573 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track half-closed stream IDs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25573: Track half-closed stream IDs
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25574  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
|  SponsorV-can
+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok I have pushed fixup commits for your code review comments and linked
 them in reply on the github pull request review.

 Additionally, I pushed a squashed branch to
 mikeperry/ticket25573-v2-squashed, for reference in backport discussion
 and any fresh review (which I think I'll take up on network-team).

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[tor-bugs] #27225 [Core Tor/Tor]: Perform fewer allocations in summarize_protocol_flags()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27225: Perform fewer allocations in summarize_protocol_flags()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26630
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8   |
-+-
 According to our profiles, summarize_protocol_flags() does a huge number
 of allocations -- probably because it parses the same flags over and over.

 Probably it would be simplest just to memoize the output.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26884 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update preferences.xul to make it work on mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26884: Update preferences.xul to make it work on mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  igt0 |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:22 gk]:
 > Alright, I set the slider to "safest" and went to the test on ip-
 check.info and still, it shows that JavaScript is enabled. Can anyone
 confirm this result?

 I tested with the patch for #27220 and still got the same results. Here is
 the bundle I used:

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/fennec-60.1.0.en-US.android-
 arm.apk
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/fennec-60.1.0.en-US.android-
 arm.apk.asc

 > The second question: What is the planned way to actually deliver this
 feature to users given that we won't send them to `about:config`? It seems
 there is a patch missing for that?

 FWIW, that's #27220.

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[tor-bugs] #27224 [Core Tor/Tor]: Call node_get_all_orports() less from node_is_a_configured_bridge()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27224: Call node_get_all_orports() less from node_is_a_configured_bridge()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26630
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8   |
-+-
 According to our profile, this function accounts for a huge amount of the
 total calls to malloc() that we do. Although I don't think it accounts for
 much allocation at any given time, it is probably slowing us down.

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[tor-bugs] #27223 [Community/Relays]: TorRelayGuide/DebianUbuntu: add link to debian manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27223: TorRelayGuide/DebianUbuntu: add link to debian manual
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 On [[TorRelayGuide/DebianUbuntu]]
 {{{
 Torproject package repository
 }}}
 should be
 {{{
 [https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en Torproject package
 repository]
 }}}
 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 On the browser showing this issue, I also noticed that after the `8.0a9`
 -> `8.0a10` update, the changelog tab was missing (and is also missing in
 the following `8.0a10` -> `8.0a10` updates). However, in the browser that
 does not have this issue, the changelog tab is present after the `8.0a9`
 -> `8.0a10` update.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26050 [Applications/Tor Browser]: achieve update "watershed" for ESR60-based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26050: achieve update "watershed" for ESR60-based Tor Browser
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201809  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 The update "watershed" seems to be working correctly for the alpha. A
 `8.0a8` browser is first being updated to `8.0a9` before being updated to
 `8.0a10`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201808


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


Comment:

 FWIW: I think I saw a similar behavior on my Linux box, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 And I also cannot reproduce the issue when doing a new `8.0a8` install,
 updating it to `8.0a9` and then `8.0a10`.

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[tor-bugs] #27222 [- Select a component]: nasa

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27222: nasa
--+
 Reporter:  masm1958  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 nasa

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:1 boklm]:
 > I can't reproduce the issue with a new `8.0a10` install, so it seems to
 be an issue specific to my `8.0a9` -> `8.0a10` update.

 I also cannot reproduce this issue when doing a new `8.0a9` install and
 updating it to `8.0a10`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I can't reproduce the issue with a new `8.0a10` install, so it seems to be
 an issue specific to my `8.0a9` -> `8.0a10` update.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26470 [Core Tor/Tor]: WARN: Saying "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n\r\n" WARN: connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at src/or/connection_edge.c:2551) sending two s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26470: WARN: Saying "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n\r\n"  WARN:
connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug: stream (marked at
src/or/connection_edge.c:2551) sending two socks replies? (on Tor
0.3.3.5-rc 81d71f0d41adf0d8)
-+-
 Reporter:  Tai683   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 033-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  034-proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by traumschule):

 {{{
 $ git log --pretty=oneline -S "sending two socks replies?"
 7a79acd9f6d377533940ee12fcb3afaaa982b04d clean up socks reply stuff more.
 add a few more reasons so we can be more informative.
 $ git checkout 7a79acd9f6d377533940ee12fcb3afaaa982b04d
 $ rgrep "sending two socks replies?"
 src/or/connection_edge.c:  log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Bug: stream (marked at
 %s:%d) sending two socks replies?",
 test.log:Aug 12 19:53:09.000 [warn] connection_mark_unattached_ap_(): Bug:
 stream (marked at ../src/core/or/connection_edge.c:2605) sending two socks
 replies? (on Tor 0.3.5.0-alpha-dev )
 }}}

 7a79acd9f6d377533940ee12fcb3afaaa982b04d is from 2005, looking at the
 first warning:
 {{{
 $ git log --pretty=oneline -S "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed"
 4b30ae158175a3a1cbbed4bb418e8ad9be1ba35e Add support for HTTP Connect
 tunnels
 $ gitk
 }}}
 > Author: Nick Mathewson   2017-08-20 17:59:58
 > Follows: tor-0.3.1.3-alpha
 > Precedes: tor-0.3.2.1-alpha

 {{{
 +  socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
 +  socks->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER;
 +  strlcpy(socks->address, addr, sizeof(socks->address));
 +  socks->port = port;
 +
 +  control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
 +
 +  rv = connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
 +
 +  //  send a "100 Continue" message?
 +
 +  goto done;
 +
 + err:
 +  if (BUG(errmsg == NULL))
 +errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n";
 +  log_warn(LD_EDGE, "Saying %s", escaped(errmsg));
 +  connection_write_to_buf(errmsg, strlen(errmsg), ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
 +  connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
 +END_STREAM_REASON_HTTPPROTOCOL|
 +
 END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #27221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27221: Tor Browser 8.0a10 wants to update to 8.0a10
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 After updating my 8.0a9 browser to 8.0a10, on Linux, the browser still
 thinks that an update is available and will download and update again to
 8.0a10.

 After setting `app.update.log` to `true`, I can see this in the logs:
 {{{
 UTM:SVC TimerManager:registerTimer - id: xpi-signature-verification
 [08-20 19:38:02] TorLauncher INFO: debug output ready
 [08-20 19:38:02] TorLauncher INFO: SOCKS port type: TCP
 [08-20 19:38:02] TorLauncher INFO: SOCKS host: 127.0.0.1
 [08-20 19:38:02] TorLauncher INFO: SOCKS port: 9250
 1534793884386   addons.webextension.https-everywhere-...@eff.org
 WARNPlease specify whether you want browser_style or not in your
 browser_action options.
 1534793884387   addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}
 WARNPlease specify whether you want browser_style or not in your
 browser_action options.
 Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
 Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
 Tor NOTICE: Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client
 functionality is working.
 Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 AUS:SVC Creating UpdateService
 AUS:SVC readStatusFile - status: downloading, path: /home/user/tor-alpha
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/update.status
 [08-20 19:38:07] Torbutton NOTE: Initializing security-prefs.js
 [08-20 19:38:07] Torbutton NOTE: security-prefs.js initialization complete
 Tor NOTICE: New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1. AUS:SVC
 getCanApplyUpdates - testing write access /home/user/tor-alpha/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/update.test
 AUS:SVC getCanApplyUpdates - able to apply updates
 AUS:SVC getCanStageUpdates - staging updates is disabled by preference
 app.update.staging.enabled
 UTM:SVC TimerManager:registerTimer - id: browser-cleanup-thumbnails
 AUS:SVC gCanCheckForUpdates - able to check for updates
 AUS:SVC getCanApplyUpdates - testing write access /home/user/tor-alpha
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/update.test
 AUS:SVC getCanApplyUpdates - able to apply updates
 AUS:SVC readStatusFile - status: downloading, path: /home/user/tor-alpha
 /tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/update.statusAUS:SVC
 UpdateService:_postUpdateProcessing - removing update for older
 application version or same application version with same build ID. update
 application version: 8.0a10, application version: 60.1.0, update build ID:
 20180204020101, application build ID: 20180204020101
 AUS:SVC Checker:getUpdateURL - update URL:
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/alpha/Linux_x86_64-gcc3/8.0a9
 /en-US
 AUS:SVC Checker: checkForUpdates, force: false
 AUS:SVC Checker:getUpdateURL - update URL:
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/alpha/Linux_x86_64-gcc3/8.0a9
 /en-US
 AUS:SVC Checker:checkForUpdates - sending request to:
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/alpha/Linux_x86_64-gcc3/8.0a9
 /en-US
 [08-20 19:38:08] Torbutton WARN: no SOCKS credentials found for current
 document.
 AUS:SVC UpdateManager:_writeUpdatesToXMLFile - no updates to write.
 removing file: /home/user/tor-alpha/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/active-update.xml
 AUS:SVC Checker:onLoad - request completed downloading document
 AUS:SVC Checker:onLoad - number of updates available: 1
 AUS:SVC getCanApplyUpdates - testing write access /home/user/tor-alpha
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/update.test
 AUS:SVC getCanApplyUpdates - able to apply updates
 AUS:SVC UpdateService:_selectAndInstallUpdate - download the update
 AUS:SVC Creating Downloader
 AUS:SVC UpdateService:_downloadUpdate
 AUS:SVC readStringFromFile - file doesn't exist: /home/user/tor-alpha/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/update.status
 AUS:SVC readStatusFile - status: null, path: /home/user/tor-alpha/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/update.status
 AUS:SVC Downloader:downloadUpdate - url:
 https://cdn.torproject.org/aus1/torbrowser/8.0a10/tor-browser-
 linux64-8.0a9-8.0a10_en-US.incremental.mar, path: /home/user/tor-alpha
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/update.mar,
 interval: null
 AUS:SVC Downloader:onStartRequest - original URI spec:
 https://cdn.torproject.org/aus1/torbrowser/8.0a10/tor-browser-
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser (was: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I believe the URL we want is https://newsletter.torproject.org/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-27220-Don-t-verify-signatures-for-tb-tl-and-
 http.2.patch" added.

 r=1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Updated patch.

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/27220/0001-Bug-27220-Don-t
 -verify-signatures-for-tb-tl-and-http.2.patch

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3799 [Community/Translations]: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3799: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts
+-
 Reporter:  rransom |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #3799 [Community/Translations]: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3799: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts
+-
 Reporter:  rransom |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * owner:  (none) => traumschule
 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: emmapeel (added)


Comment:

 It would be great if you can help on this, traumschule. I am not sure
 about how to go in the code, though, maybe there are some rules etc.

 I add tbb-team here in cc in case they have a say on the way to go.

 Also, if this is part of the TB, it would be great to have this new
 sentences added to an already existing translation file, if possible. But
 this is not a blocker.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26878 [Community/Translations]: translation bot publishes uncompleted translations on the translation_completed branches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26878: translation bot publishes uncompleted translations on the
translation_completed branches
+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel|  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 maybe with a prefix like {{{backup_}}} and adding it to .gitignore? i am
 up for testing it, but the script probably needs credentials?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27080 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27080: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, 035-must, regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-bridge 034-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Ah.  And the reason that router_have_minimum_dir_info() is returning 1
 here is twofold: It thinks that we have 44% of paths available (which
 seems suspect), and we have set `PathsNeededToBuildCircuits 0.25` in the
 chutney torrc.

 As an experiment, I tried increasing PathsNeededToBuildCircuits to .75 in
 common.i.  With that change, the bridge-min chutney test passes on master.

 Now, here's the question: what did we change in 0.3.4 that broke this?

 And is it truly affecting real bridges?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 sysrqb]:
 > We don't modify https-everywhere, so it shouldn't fail the signing
 requirement. Maybe we can only add the exception for torbutton and tor-
 launcher?

 Agreed. I think it's worth being even more conservative and add only
 exceptions for things we actually need, meaning only Torbutton for the
 alpha for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 We don't modify https-everywhere, so it shouldn't fail the signing
 requirement. Maybe we can only add the exception for torbutton and tor-
 launcher?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3799 [Community/Translations]: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3799: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts
+
 Reporter:  rransom |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by traumschule):

 If you think this is a good idea, feel free to assign me:
 [http://mywiki.wooledge.org/BashFAQ/098 How to add localization support to
 your bash scripts]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Sarah, Arthur
 Since we are going to launch this before TB8, I made some mocks with
 current stable UI.
 Do we want something more noticeable? Or keeping the same white containers
 is ok?
 Please, check the attachments and let me know what do you think

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "27097-4.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "27097-2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "27097-3.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: "Join the Tor email list!" link in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "27097-1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20463 [Community/Translations]: Translate the download page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20463: Translate the download page
+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by traumschule):

 Seems like (#14569) there was a translation of download-easy. If others
 agree I'd like to merge download and download-easy
 (comment:14:ticket:14686) to make them easier maintainable.
 To understand how those strings end up at transifex i looked at the
 translation.git and wonder how {{{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20463#comment:5>
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Re: [tor-bugs] #27083 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Window size rounding isn't used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27083: TBA: Window size rounding isn't used
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25703| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27080 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27080: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, 035-must, regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-bridge 034-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I found one issue, which might or might not be a complete explanation
 here.  This is from a client in the bridges-min network:
 {{{
 Aug 20 13:35:57.787 [notice] No Tor server allows exit to 127.0.0.1:4747.
 Rejecting.
 }}}

 Looking at the cached-microdescs in the authority's directory, I saw that
 there is one with a correct policy line `p accept 1-65535` --
 corresponding to the network's exit, 002r.  But the client did not have
 that microdescriptor cached: it had an older one one.

 Digging deeper, it appears that the client is receiving new conensuses,
 but it is not re-launching microdescriptor downloads fast enough.  The
 router_have_minimum_dir_info() function is returning 1, so
 directory_info_has_arrived() is not launching any new descriptor downloads
 here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option for firefox incremental builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27045: Add option for firefox incremental builds
---+---
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808R => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201808


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 boklm]:
 > Can you post the logs from the console too (not the log files)?

 What is needed is the lines before the error, such as for example:
 {{{
 Building project firefox - firefox-a0efd2fcd6e9-linux-i686-fc70a8
 Tag tor-browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1-build2 is signed with key
 35CD74C24A9B15A19E1A81A194373AA94B7C3223
 Created /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/tmp/rbm-ecVkd/firefox-
 a0efd2fcd6e9.tar.gz
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/container-image/container-
 image_wheezy-i386-279bd3a261cd.tar.gz
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/gcc/gcc-6.4.0-5d1aa7.tar.gz
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/projects/firefox/get-moz-build-
 date
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/projects/firefox/mozconfig-
 linux-i686
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-
 build/out/binutils/binutils-2.26.1-914171.tar.gz
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-
 build/out/rust/rust-1.26.1-linux-i686-0ce4aa.tar.gz
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/llvm/llvm-3.9.1-93f4ef.tar.gz
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/projects/firefox/abicheck.cc
 }}}

 This should show where exactly the error is happening (not knowing where
 exactly the error is happening makes it difficult to debug).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27216 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix spelling error in comment for getinfo_helper_current_time()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27216: Fix spelling error in comment for getinfo_helper_current_time()
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow TBA to install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere extensions without signatures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27220: Allow TBA to  install tor button, tor launcher and https everywhere
extensions without signatures
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * cc: sysrqb, gk (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


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