Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by testcy):

 The above bundle seems to be working fine.

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[tor-bugs] #28854 [Core Tor]: Tor file keeps getting quarantined

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28854: Tor file keeps getting quarantined
---+--
 Reporter:  Newbiedoo  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Component:  Core Tor
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Hello,
 My Tor installation(in a windows 10)appears to be uneventful for the
 uninitiated like. When I run the the programme for the first time I am
 able to access the web. However, after I close it and attempt to reopen it
 a file gets quarantined by McAfee with the message:

 Item: FIREFOX.EXE; Threat: Real Protect-LS!/FA7DF%DE780B; Detected: Date &
 Time; Status:Detected

 Also, if I try to use proton VPN, Tor take longer to load and McAfee
 deletes it as well. There is an option within McAfee to restore the file
 but after it get erase it I can never launch Tor again unless I re-
 download it from your site... and the cycle starts all over.

 Anyone willing to give advise please, thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25140: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory
-+-
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've fixed the mentioned issues. Additionally, I've rebased to the current
 master and added support for bool type on the checkSpace.pl script because
 it started complaining when I had functions returning bool.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28682 [- Select a component]: Carml lacks PGP singatures and instructions for secure installation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28682: Carml lacks PGP singatures and instructions for secure installation
--+
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  meejah
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  carml |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by meejah):

 yes, it would be great to have `carml` packaged by a Debian volunteer.
 `txtorcon` is already packaged for Debian. I am not a Debian developer
 however.

 ...and in the above, it appears your version of `pip` is really old. I'm
 not sure how to fix that on Debian jessie (without e.g. `pip install
 --upgrade pip` which will download from PyPI).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28682 [- Select a component]: Carml lacks PGP singatures and instructions for secure installation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28682: Carml lacks PGP singatures and instructions for secure installation
--+
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  meejah
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  carml |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by wagon):

 About new
 [[https://carml.readthedocs.io/en/latest/installation.html|installation]]:

 Since Jessie doesn't have `python3-humanize` and `python3-click`, I tried
 manual installation which fails at this stage:
 {{{
 python3 -m pip install --require-hashes --no-deps --requirements
 requirements.txt

 Usage:
   /usr/bin/python3 -m pip install [options]  ...
   /usr/bin/python3 -m pip install [options] -r  ...
   /usr/bin/python3 -m pip install [options] [-e]  ...
   /usr/bin/python3 -m pip install [options] [-e]  ...
   /usr/bin/python3 -m pip install [options]  ...

 no such option: --require-hashes
 }}}
 Is it because my python3 is too old?
 {{{
 $ python3 --version
 Python 3.4.2
 $ pip3 --version
 pip 1.5.6 from /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages (python 3.4)
 }}}
 In [[https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/news/?highlight=require-hashes|pip
 changelog]] the first mentioning of this option is for 8.1.0 released in
 2016-03-05, while 1.5.6 was released in 2014-05-16. But changelog doesn't
 list added options in detail, so I'm not sure that 8.1.0 is the first
 version that supports it. If `--require-hashes` is deleted, it blames
 another option:
 {{{
 no such option: --requirements
 }}}
 Change of `--requirements` to `-r` leads to python crash.

 To avoid all these troubles it would be good to have Tor-related software
 in Tor Debian repository. Now it shares only last version of Tor itself,
 while it could share also Stem, Nyx, Carml, Onionshare and similar tools.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28853 [Core Tor/Tor]: parse_short_policy() could be faster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28853: parse_short_policy() could be faster
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 My branch `ticket28853` makes parse_short_policy about 84% faster, saving
 about 4% of total startup time for me. PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/592

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28358 [Core Tor/Tor]: Nyx forces Tor error: sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to get address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28358: Nyx forces Tor error: sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to 
get
address
--+
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sandbox   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by wagon):

 > Did some modification to make it work
 Let me ask more. As I see it
 [[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/doc/tor.1.txt|here]],
 > When the `Sandbox` is 1, the following options can not be changed when
 tor is running:
 > ...
 > `ClientOnionAuthDir` (and any files in it won't reload on HUP signal).

 > Launching new Onion Services through the control port is not supported
 with current syscall sandboxing implementation.
 Does it mean that onionshare-like utilities will not work with sandboxed
 Tor? So, users have to choose to either (1) run Tor in insecure way with
 working secure file sharing or (2) run Tor in a secure way without file
 sharing at all. Sounds not good.

 What are the exact restrictions on v3 onions? So, on the fly:
 1. Auth for already existing onion services (added via filesystem) cannot
 be added, deleted or changed through `ControlPort` or through files (both
 on client side and on server side).
 3. New onion service (server side) cannot be added by either method:
 through files or through `Controlport`.
 4. No any means to deactivate already running onion service (on server
 side).
 Is it correct? In other words, no any change to configuration of onion
 service can be done on the fly (both on client side and on server side).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write tool for onion service health assesment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28841: Write tool for onion service health assesment
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs reachability research  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by meejah):

 I assume using `HSFETCH` would be at the core of such a tool .. but also
 that doesn't work with v3 onions. (That would be:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25417)

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[tor-bugs] #28853 [Core Tor/Tor]: parse_short_policy() could be faster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28853: parse_short_policy() could be faster
--+-
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  startup performance
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28481
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+-
 The main loop of parse_short_policy() is needlessly convoluted, and parses
 the same things more than once.  It could be simplified greatly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28835 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Shortcut not moved/removed as McAfee quarantined firefox.exe (was: Tor Shortcut not moved/removed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28835: Tor Shortcut not moved/removed as McAfee quarantined firefox.exe
--+--
 Reporter:  Mummydogg |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 milenk0]:
 > I've been experiencing the same issue for several days.
 > McAfee is to blame, as the executable keeps getting quarantined.
 > Shows the threat as "Real Protect-LS!FA7DF5DE780B"
 > i've submitted it to their system to be reviewed, but I'm not very
 hopefull.

 Ugh. Thanks for figuring that out. There is nothing we can do here, so
 closing as WONTFIX.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28640 [Applications/Tor Browser]: System addon does not override app-profile addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28640: System addon does not override app-profile addon
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201812,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-a3 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. I reverted all of the old commits (commit
 394819bf1afed389183714579d3d7ebafea0c0c0,
 8b78836cdad4d4b81f2b76c5ac4d62c42fda8049,
 955bb4e6e38b83a474600a112182ac64ed6aba56, and
 0b36c3e8a59bf675ac6bd1ae36d38f16c4748884) and applied the new ones (commit
 b2148509da11c2f9188e609edbeca386880f61cc,
 3c43ec1e862040767030bb5104c41265823ec8a5,
 b507541d50f3831c847be2104e5baec3104df2ba, and
 a3754ec3a532e489207ce12781a4b6fb5a1daa37).

 I'll clean that up during the next rebase (if needed).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28835 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Shortcut not moved/removed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28835: Tor Shortcut not moved/removed
--+---
 Reporter:  Mummydogg |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by milenk0):

 I've been experiencing the same issue for several days.
 McAfee is to blame, as the executable keeps getting quarantined.
 Shows the threat as "Real Protect-LS!FA7DF5DE780B"
 i've submitted it to their system to be reviewed, but I'm not very
 hopefull.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28852: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  nick,m => nickm
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28852: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #2878 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't bootstrap from an old consensus if we're about to replace it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2878: Don't bootstrap from an old consensus if we're about to replace it
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, bootstrap, tor-client,  |  Actual Points:
  s8-performance, s8-errors, 040-roadmap-|
  proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23605   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:22 arma]:
 > But here is one concrete issue that I expect still happens (and that is
 the issue in this ticket as originally described): you start your Tor, it
 makes circuits, it declares 100% success, and then it declares un-success
 (because it got the new consensus and that new consensus made us realize
 we don't have a threshold of the right microdescs yet), and it starts
 bootstrapping again. If it finishes bootstrapping right after that, all is
 fine, but what if it fails bootstrapping the second time, like because
 your directory guards don't have the new microdescs you just learned you
 want, or something else has gone wrong? Tor Browser will be happily
 showing you a browser window as if everything is working, when it isn't.
 I think the right thing to do in that case is basically #27691. Maybe we
 should close this as a duplicate, then?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201812,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-a3 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:15 sisbell]:
 > Evaluation:
 >
 >  1. Tor Installation: Tor Onion Proxy library is using tor-android-
 binary - Who is going to install the tor binary? Orbot or Tor Onion Proxy
 Libray. If orbot installs, we will need to configure the onion proxy to
 use those locations for tor files/libraries.

 We'd use this instead of Orbot. This library would completely replace our
 Orbot implementation.

 >  1. Settings Screen: there is no settings screen: configure ports,
 delete/add onion addresses [these features need to be defined]

 Right. We'll need to create our own UI for Orbot and TOPL, so I don't
 consider this a blocker.

 >  1. Starting Proxy: This is a simple operation to start but we need to
 display the startup logs to the user. We also need to define UI to handle
 things like restart or shutdown.
 >  1. Stability: Its workable for an alpha, but we should cleanup up the
 threading and socket connections
 >

 This is what I'm primarily worried about. Is the code quality where we
 need it. Is it tested? Is the code safe (for some value of safe)? With
 Orbot, we weren't exposing our users to new code (because Orbot was
 previously a dependency). If we use TOPL then we should be confident this
 won't be worse.

 > In summary: this is not a simply a drop-in. It will need a UI defined
 and built but core functionality is all there. Suggest cleanup of
 threading before a production release.

 Can you estimate how much time this will require? Would we need to re-
 write much of the code and redesign it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28843 [Core Tor/Tor]: DROPOWNERSHIP command

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28843: DROPOWNERSHIP command
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks Nick! Pushed a prospective spec patch to my 'dropownership' branch.
 I wasn't quite sure what to cite for the version or if the characteristics
 I describe are accurate so feedback welcome.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/atagar/torspec.git/commit/?h=dropownership

 When merged I'll follow this feature up with a few stem integ tests to
 check for some of these characteristics (idempotenticy and re-establishing
 ownership).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28852: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nick,m
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Branch is `ticket28852`; PR is https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/591

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[tor-bugs] #28852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28852: Remove memset() from get_token_arguments.
--+-
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nick,m
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  startup performance
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28481
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+-
 After other changes in the parent ticket, about 2% of our startup time is
 calling memset() in get_token_arguments.  This memset() is completely
 unnecessary if the rest of the function is written correctly (which it
 is).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28640 [Applications/Tor Browser]: System addon does not override app-profile addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28640: System addon does not override app-profile addon
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201812,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-a3 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:17 gk]:
 > 515703b72ff3136777287eb9a5cfa52439e1 -- s/it is install in/it is
 installed in/ ("installed" was good :) )

 Done. I also s/Skip/Uninstall/

 >
 > 4b767e2fcee7cabd76e9a637d1cd9e624b2ec953 -- Could we do something
 shorter for commit message summary, like "Bug 28640 - Reload distribution
 preferences on update"?
 >
 > 4653a4acc0871a77ccfd7f087de1eadc1d4c013c -- okay
 >
 > dfe597ec6adb7ab8344fc2032f97dcb14a173882 -- okay

 I changed the commit message on this commit, too.

 Branch `28640_5`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28851: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #28481 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Branch is `ticket28851_035`; PR is
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/590

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28851: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28481 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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[tor-bugs] #28851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28851: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
  Tor/Tor  |
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  startup performance  035-backport
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #28481
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
  Sponsor8-can |
---+---
 After the #28837, #28838, and #28839, I note that we're now spending about
 24% of our of our startup time in crypto_validate_dh_params().

 Since our diffie hellman parameters are hardcoded, maybe we don't actually
 need to validate them on every startup, especially on clients?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27167 [Core Tor/Tor]: track "first" OR_CONN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27167: track "first" OR_CONN
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap,   |  Actual Points:
  035-roadmap-subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap, 035-deferred-20180930,   |
  s8-errors  |
Parent ID:  #27103   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  (none) => catalyst
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28844 [Core Tor/Stem]: relax bootstrap percentage regex

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28844: relax bootstrap percentage regex
---+--
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks catalyst! Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Speed up parsing RSA onion keys from microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28839: Speed up parsing RSA onion keys from microdescriptors
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Branch is `ticket28839_v2` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/589 .

 The changes here speed up microdescriptor parsing by around 30%.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28741 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws should send scanner metadata as part of every HTTP request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28741: sbws should send scanner metadata as part of every HTTP request
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 I thought it would be useful to have Tor version and library version in
 the user-agent too.
 I've added a uuid field for now. I can change it to IP address.
 The header would looks like:
 'Tor-Bandwidth-Scanner-UUID': '4c0cf773-46d9-4633-9c3e-57a26b250be1',
 'User-Agent': 'sbws/1.0.3-dev0 (kernel-version-platform-os) Python/x.y.z
 Requests/2.19.1 Stem/1.7.0 Tor/0.x.y.z (git-sha)'
 'Tor-Bandwidth-Scanner-Nickname': 'foo'

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/315

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Speed up parsing RSA onion keys from microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28839: Speed up parsing RSA onion keys from microdescriptors
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28692 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws should set ConnectionPadding 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28692: sbws should set ConnectionPadding 0
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > Are there any options that need to be set at launch, and could fail?

 None of the ones that we currently set had fail. Is there an easy way to
 check that?.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Speed up parsing RSA onion keys from microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28839: Speed up parsing RSA onion keys from microdescriptors
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 testcy]:
 > I can't imagine what might be causing this problem as I have not done
 any changes on my computer and everything else seems to be running fine.

 Well, the weird thing is that you are the only one reporting such issues.
 We'll see if we can find anything. What about the following bundle? It's
 the most basic "Tor"-like one in the sense that it only contains our
 preference changes and our extensions we ship (that start Tor, which we
 ship, too):

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64-tbb-
 nightly_28823_1en-US.exe
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64-tbb-
 nightly_28823_1en-US.exe.asc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28850: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-mobile,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-rbm|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Merged to `master` (commit
 361f30cf97228e232b45ba6ba202242405491e36).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by testcy):

 I can't imagine what might be causing this problem as I have not done any
 changes on my computer and everything else seems to be running fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28850: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-mobile,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-rbm|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm =>
 TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm


Comment:

 A few other URLs are also giving a 404 error. The patch in branch
 `bug_28850_v2` should fix that:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_28850_v2&id=361f30cf97228e232b45ba6ba202242405491e36

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28663 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws stops accumulating, silently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28663: sbws stops accumulating, silently
---+---
 Reporter:  stefani|  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28639 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 The instantiated locks without acquire and release use the context
 manager, so that might not be a failure.
 The point where sbws is stalled is in this loop:
 
https://github.com/torproject/sbws/blob/ee64d76df54ceb3a3c9e1e2a797fd70d68bb0035/sbws/core/scanner.py#L362,
 which was added in #28061 in order to stop measuring the same relay by two
 threads when a new loop starts.
 Turned out that there's 1 thread that is not measuring relays, it's the
 one storing the results, so that could be solved just changing "> 0" to ">
 1", i'll try that.
 However, there's still the mistery about why commenting the lines in
 relaprioritizer solves the problem too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow HeartbeatPeriod of less than 30 minutes in testing Tor networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28840: Allow HeartbeatPeriod of less than 30 minutes in testing Tor networks
--+
 Reporter:  robgjansen|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pastly):

 Changes file included here:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/pastly/tor.git/log/?h=ticket28840

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28789 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop allowing destination serving files without tls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28789: Stop allowing destination serving files without tls
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/314

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28137 [Metrics/Statistics]: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to only include relays that end up in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28137: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to 
only
include relays that end up in the consensus
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Cool, I'll start deploying the change, which requires re-processing quite
 some data. Should be ready early next week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21588 [Metrics/Statistics]: Rewrite the censorship detector used by the Tor Metrics website in Java

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21588: Rewrite the censorship detector used by the Tor Metrics website in Java
+
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by karsten):

 Well, the copyright does include the Java conversion:

 {{{
 +/* Copyright 2011 George Danezis 
 + *
 + * All rights reserved.
 + *
 ...
 + *
 + * (Clear BSD license:
 + * http://labs.metacarta.com/license-explanation.html#license)
 + *
 + * Copyright 2018 The Tor Project
 + * See LICENSE for licensing information */
 }}}

 Can you suggest a better way to do this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28799 [Metrics/Website]: Use R.cache to speed up drawing graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28799: Use R.cache to speed up drawing graphs
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Oh, and last time I looked, readr was not in Debian stable. Looks like
 it's in backports now, which I guess would work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28799 [Metrics/Website]: Use R.cache to speed up drawing graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28799: Use R.cache to speed up drawing graphs
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:2 notirl]:
 > This commit looks OK. I'm not sure about the approach though. We had
 talked about using the same CSVs for these graphs as we make available for
 download so that we don't have two different CSVs and it is easier to plot
 custom graphs using our code as a starting point.
 >
 > For the graphs that I've been making for various requests I've been
 using the readr library which works nicely with the tidyr universe of
 packages. What would the performance impact be of reading the CSVs from a
 ramdisk instead of caching them in R?

 That's an interesting idea. Couple thoughts:

  - Where and when would we write the per-graph CSV files that would then
 become the starting point for graphs and partial CSV file exports?
- If we use R for this, the code will be rather simple, but we'd still
 have an R part in our daily updater which we're currently trying to make
 Java-only.
- We could execute some R code to write per-graph CSV files when
 starting Rserve, but we'd have to re-run it whenever the daily updater has
 finished. Sounds like it could get messy.
- If we move this code to Java, we might want to look into statistics
 libraries to do something similar like what tidyr/dplyr does. The current
 approach with Java Collections classes is a bit limited.
  - The ramdisk sounds like it would be just as fast as the cache I'm
 suggesting. But how would we make sure it always has the most recent data,
 including after reboots?

 Happy to discuss this more!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28353 [Metrics/Website]: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all bandwidth by flag graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28353: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all 
bandwidth
by flag graphs
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:20 notirl]:
 > Can we redirect the old pages to the new bandwidth-flags page?

 Hmm. Or maybe a page with the new link, at least for the next couple
 months? Otherwise people will never update their bookmarks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21588 [Metrics/Statistics]: Rewrite the censorship detector used by the Tor Metrics website in Java

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21588: Rewrite the censorship detector used by the Tor Metrics website in Java
+
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by notirl):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The copyright should be updated to include the conversion to Java.

 Otherwise it looks OK.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28799 [Metrics/Website]: Use R.cache to speed up drawing graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28799: Use R.cache to speed up drawing graphs
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by notirl):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 This commit looks OK. I'm not sure about the approach though. We had
 talked about using the same CSVs for these graphs as we make available for
 download so that we don't have two different CSVs and it is easier to plot
 custom graphs using our code as a starting point.

 For the graphs that I've been making for various requests I've been using
 the readr library which works nicely with the tidyr universe of packages.
 What would the performance impact be of reading the CSVs from a ramdisk
 instead of caching them in R?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28137 [Metrics/Statistics]: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to only include relays that end up in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28137: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to 
only
include relays that end up in the consensus
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by notirl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28353 [Metrics/Website]: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all bandwidth by flag graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28353: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all 
bandwidth
by flag graphs
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by notirl):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Can we redirect the old pages to the new bandwidth-flags page?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28850: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-mobile,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-rbm|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-rbm => TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-
 mobile, tbb-rbm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28850: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 It seems that for some reason it, version 26.0.1 of dvlib has been removed
 from https://jcenter.bintray.com/. However it can still be downloaded from
 https://maven.google.com/:
 https://maven.google.com/com/android/tools/dvlib/26.0.1/dvlib-26.0.1.pom
 https://maven.google.com/com/android/tools/dvlib/26.0.1/dvlib-26.0.1.jar

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[tor-bugs] #28850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28850: Error downloading dvlib-26.0.1.pom and dvlib-26.0.1.jar
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201812,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Marcus Hoffmann from f-droid told me that his build of Tor Browser for
 Android failed with:
 {{{
 --2018-12-13 23:25:22--
 https://jcenter.bintray.com/com/android/tools/dvlib/26.0.1/dvlib-26.0.1.pom
 Resolving jcenter.bintray.com (jcenter.bintray.com)... 159.122.18.156
 Connecting to jcenter.bintray.com
 (jcenter.bintray.com)|159.122.18.156|:443... connected.
 HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302
 Location:
 https://repo.jfrog.org/artifactory/libs-release-
 bintray/com/android/tools/dvlib/26.0.1/dvlib-26.0.1.pom?referrer
 [following]
 --2018-12-13 23:25:22--
 https://repo.jfrog.org/artifactory/libs-release-
 bintray/com/android/tools/dvlib/26.0.1/dvlib-26.0.1.pom?referrer
 Resolving repo.jfrog.org (repo.jfrog.org)... 52.7.30.14, 34.231.202.145
 Connecting to repo.jfrog.org (repo.jfrog.org)|52.7.30.14|:443...
 connected.
 HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 404
 2018-12-13 23:25:23 ERROR 404: (no description).

 Error: Error creating gradle-dependencies-3
 Makefile:33: recipe for target 'alpha-android-armv7' failed
 make: *** [alpha-android-armv7] Error 1
 }}}

 It seems that the URLs for `dvlib-26.0.1.pom` and `dvlib-26.0.1.jar` in
 `projects/firefox/gradle-dependencies-list.txt` and `projects/orbot
 /gradle-dependencies-list.txt` need to be updated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28481 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor's startup time is getting slower on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28481: Tor's startup time is getting slower on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  akwizgran|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android startup performance  |  Actual Points:
  controller |
Parent ID:  #26630   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by akwizgran):

 I'm not at work today, but I'll post the scripts and build instructions on
 Monday. I'm afraid my script is based on a headless version of Briar with
 the Tor binary embedded in the JAR, so it will take some setup, but Gradle
 should download everything you need except the JDK.

 I re-ran the experiments last night, deleting the cache-* files before
 each run. That reduces the min startup time by a factor of 10 and seems to
 eliminate the difference between Tor versions, or at least push it down
 into the noise. I haven't analysed the results properly yet though; I'll
 post them on Monday.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12885: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201812  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201812R => tbb-usability,
 TorBrowserTeam201812


Comment:

 Clearing review state for now to get more info.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201812,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-a3 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 Let's add some evaluation as well for what we need to do to get Pluggable
 Transports integrated and running with this library.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28640 [Applications/Tor Browser]: System addon does not override app-profile addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28640: System addon does not override app-profile addon
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201812,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-a3 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201812R, TBA-a3 => tbb-mobile,
 TorBrowserTeam201812, TBA-a3


Comment:

 515703b72ff3136777287eb9a5cfa52439e1 -- s/it is install in/it is
 installed in/ ("installed" was good :) )

 4b767e2fcee7cabd76e9a637d1cd9e624b2ec953 -- Could we do something shorter
 for commit message summary, like "Bug 28640 - Reload distribution
 preferences on update"?

 4653a4acc0871a77ccfd7f087de1eadc1d4c013c -- okay

 dfe597ec6adb7ab8344fc2032f97dcb14a173882 -- okay

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:6 testcy]:
 > https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/27503_test.zip
 >
 > The above seems to be working (by unzipping to Browser folder and
 running firefox.exe) with No proxy in Connection Settings.

 Great, please stick around to track this down. I'll start creating bundles
 for you to test to figure out what commit is breaking you (in case this is
 really related to our patches).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22343: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |
  regression, tbb-7.0-frequent,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201811R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: pf.team (added)


Comment:

 #28791 is a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28791 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 cannot download images protected by basic auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28791: Tor Browser 8 cannot download images protected by basic auth
--+---
 Reporter:  pf.team   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Thanks, closing this as a duplicate of #22343 then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28835 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Shortcut not moved/removed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28835: Tor Shortcut not moved/removed
--+---
 Reporter:  Mummydogg |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 For cross-referencing this got mentioned on our blog, too:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/278935#comment-278935.

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