Re: [tor-bugs] #23359 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebExtensions icons are not shown on first start but on restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23359: WebExtensions icons are not shown on first start but on restart
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 #28975 was closed as a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28975 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere missing icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28975: HTTPS Everywhere missing icon
--+---
 Reporter:  siketa|  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arma):

 * version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9 =>
 * component:  HTTPS Everywhere => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 Given the latest information from traumschule, I have more doubts that the
 comment:3 theory is what's causing the issue here.

 Here is another theory from combining the two log files:

 0) Everything was going great with Tor. It was connecting to a few HSes
 (both v2 and v3s) just fine until 14:04:28.000. And then the clock skew
 happened: `Dec 29 00:10:43.000 [notice] Your system clock just jumped
 36372 seconds forward; assuming established circuits no longer work.`.

 1) After the clock skew, Tor no longer has a live consensus, but it still
 wants to connect to the HSv3s it has the descriptors for.

 2) However, `hs_cache_lookup_as_client()` **cannot see** the cached
 descriptors because it calls `cached_client_descriptor_has_expired` which
 claims that the **descriptor is expired if there is no live consensus**!
 `[info] can_client_refetch_desc(): Can't fetch descriptor for service
 $onion_service. Stalling connection`

 2) The SOCKS connection is now stalled with `AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT`
 because of (1).

 4) Then after a bit we get a live consensus and
 `retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()` gets called, this brings up the
 SOCKS connection from (2) which is still blocked at
 `AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT`. However, now the descriptor is no longer
 expired because we have a live consensus, and hence there is a valid HS
 desc in the cache and hence the bug triggers.

 

 The same issue which is ''that a descriptor cannot be seen when the
 consensus is not live'', is probably also the issue of the original
 poster, so perhaps we can simplify David's patch by not introducing
 `mark_conn_as_waiting_for_circuit()` and calling it when this branch
 triggers. But we still want to remove the Bug() from there.

 Or is there something more **elegant** to do here?

 Removing from needs_revision to figure out next steps.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment "info.log.5.scrubbed.log.xz" added.

 Dec 28

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment "info.log.5.scrubbed.log.xz" added.

 Dec 28

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Given the latest information from traumschule, I have more doubts that the
 comment:3 theory is what's causing the issue here.

 Here is another theory:

 0) The logs start with a HUPed Tor with no live consensus.

 1) Tor wants to reach an HSv3 but could not fetch HS desc because of lack
 of live consensus: `[info] can_client_refetch_desc(): Can't fetch
 descriptor for service $onion_service. Stalling connection.` (log msg is
 stripped because of a wide regexp).

 2) The SOCKS connection is now stalled with `AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT`
 because of (1).

 3) My theory is that Tor **had the HS desc all along** (from before the
 HUP) but still `hs_cache_lookup_as_client()` **could not see it** because
 it calls `cached_client_descriptor_has_expired` which claims that the
 **descriptor is expired if there is no live consensus!

 4) Then after a bit we get a consensus and
 `retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()` gets called, this brings up the
 SOCKS connection from (2) which is still blocked at
 `AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT`. However, now the descriptor is no longer
 expired because we have a live consensus, and hence there is a valid HS
 desc in the cache and hence the bug triggers.

 

 The same issue (where Tor could not see the cached HS desc because of no
 live consensus) was also probably the issue of the original poster with
 the clock skew, so perhaps we can simplify David's patch by not
 introducing `mark_conn_as_waiting_for_circuit()` and calling it when this
 branch triggers. But we might still want to remove the Bug() from there.

 Or is there something more elegant to do here?

 Removing from needs_revision to figure out next steps.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by traumschule):

 Replying to [comment:3 dgoulet]:
 > I've stated that theory in part in #27410 but now I do think it is
 indeed the code path creating this issue:
 >
 > 1. Tor gets a descriptor and tries to connect to it but intro points all
 fail so the descriptor ends up unusable that is
 `hs_client_any_intro_points_usable()` returns false.
 >
 > 2. A SOCKS request is made to the .onion and because the intro points
 aren't usuable, a refetch is triggered, see `connection_ap_handle_onion()`
 which put the connection in `AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT`
 >
 > 3. While (2) is happening, computer goes in suspend mode for more than
 30 minutes.
 >
 > 4. When waking up, the `rend_cache_failure_clean()` callback is
 triggered which makes all the intro point usable all the sudden.
 >
 > 5. Everything is stalled until we get a live consensus which, when it
 arrives, the HS subsystem is informed with `hs_client_dir_info_changed()`
 that calls `retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()` (from the stacktrace
 we have in the ticket).
 >
 > 6. And boom, for `hs_client_refetch_hsdesc()` to return
 `HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC`, we need a descriptor in the cache with usable
 intro points. We have that because (4) made the intro points usable and
 the descriptor from (1) is still in the cache. The BUG() is hit because we
 still have that pending SOCKS connection that is waiting for its
 descriptor from (2).
 >
 > The solution is that for this particular condition where we do have a
 descriptor in our cache but we have a connection waiting for a descriptor,
 instead of BUG(), we need to mark it as "pending for a circuit" like we do
 in `hs_client_desc_has_arrived()` which will trigger the connection to be
 attached to a circuit and thus the HS dance to start.


 Contrary to above case this one isn't caused by a clock jump but a weak
 connection (#28962) causes Bugs around 00:16:05.000, 00:16:59.000 and
 00:17:22.000.
 {{{can_client_refetch_desc()}}} gives a new hint which additionally
 relates it to #24610 and #23764.
 {{{rend_cache_failure_clean()}}} isn't triggered and
 {{{connection_ap_handle_onion()}}} appears after the first bug at
 00:16:38.000.

 {{{
 Dec 29 00:15:55.000 [info] can_client_refetch_desc(): Can't fetch
 descriptor for service [scrubbed] because we are missing a live consensus.
 Stalling connection.
 ...
 Dec 29 00:15:56.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): No circuits are
 opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit 16132 (a General-purpose client 3-hop
 circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open).
 Dec 29 00:15:56.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): No circuits are
 opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit 16140 (a Hidden service client:
 Establishing rendezvous point 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with
 channel state open).
 ...
 Dec 29 00:16:01.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): No circuits are
 opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit 16123 (a Hidden service client:
 Connecting to intro point 4-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with
 channel state open).
 Dec 29 00:16:01.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): No circuits are
 opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit 16137 (a General-purpose client 3-hop
 circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open).
 Dec 29 00:16:01.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): No circuits are
 opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit 16143 (a Hidden service client:
 Establishing rendezvous point 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with
 channel state open).
 Dec 29 00:16:01.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): No circuits are
 opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit 16144 (a Hidden service client:
 Establishing rendezvous point 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with
 channel state open).
 Dec 29 00:16:01.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): No circuits are
 opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit 16145 (a Hidden service client:
 Establishing rendezvous point 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with
 channel state open).
 ...
 Dec 29 00:16:05.000 [info] can_client_refetch_desc(): We would fetch a v3
 hidden service descriptor but we already have a usable descriptor.
 Dec 29 00:16:05.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc:
 Non-fatal assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed. (on Tor
 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Dec 29 00:16:05.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal 

Re: [tor-bugs] #28954 [Core Tor/Tor]: fuzz-descriptor aborts with a crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28954: fuzz-descriptor aborts with a crash
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 From upstream:
 {{{
 Hi!

 * Toralf Förster , 2019-01-02, 20:14:
 > may I ask you to have a look at
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28954#comment:1 ?

 What "recidivim -u M" prints is the memory use for one input. You
 shouldn't use this number directly for afl-fuzz memory limit, because
 other inputs will almost certainly require more memory. I'd add at least
 50 to this number (possibly more, depending on what the target program
 does).

 --
 Jakub Wilk
 }}}
 So maybe add a hint to the README?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28966 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3 client auth insufficiently documented (was: HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible) (was: HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28966: HSv3 client auth insufficiently documented (was:
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible)
-+
 Reporter:  roo  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs client-auth hsv3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs client-auth hsv3


Comment:

 You are supposed to use the `ClientOnionAuthDir` for the client-side here.

 Our docs are very bad here so this ticket is perfectly valid. We don't
 even mention the client-side in the `Client Authorization` section of the
 man page...

 Also maybe we should give out some friendly information when someone tries
 to use the old client autorization torrc option with v3, so that people
 don't need to guess what they need to do.

 Repurposing ticket. Thanks for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28851: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #28481 | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Trivial comment fixup in my ticket28851_035

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28851: Do we really need to check our hardwired DH primes at startup?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #28481 | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Let's add a comment explaining why we have disabled this code? Or just
 delete it entirely?
 I'm afraid that just doing `#if 0` like that can be confusing and/or
 dirty.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28838 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make curve25519_basepoint_spot_check() faster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28838: Make curve25519_basepoint_spot_check() faster
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup performance  035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28481 | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM. Maybe we can also consider moving this check on the unittests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28961 [Core Tor/Stem]: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors via orport

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28961: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors 
via
orport
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks again starlight, fix pushed...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=e2d8575

 Honestly I'm not really happy with this solution, but seems to do the
 trick. Patches welcome if there's a smarter approach.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12885: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201812 => tbb-usability,
 TorBrowserTeam201901R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12885: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201812  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Updated patch now explicitly checking for the 'active' pref and deleting
 an existing jumplist if so: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard
 /tor-
 
browser.git/diff/?h=bug_12885_v2=8bc2ca14f51f4b57efcadd6f7405e0a4d48f2204=8=0=0

 This patch should also partially fix the disk leak associated with Jump
 Lists; jump list entries are stored in a binary file in
 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations which contain
 identifying strings. It would seem the existing _deleteActiveJumpList()
 function at least 'clears' the file, and the filename of the store is
 dependent on install location (so there's not a globally unique Tor
 Browser jumplist store file you can look for).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28973: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport 034-backport|  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28616   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:4 ahf]:
 > Code seems to be called correctly when build against OpenSSL 1.1.1a.
 >
 > The patch looks reasonable to me. Only minor nitpick I spot is to maybe
 use `bool` as type for `openssl_bug_7712_is_present` - it is not something
 I have a strong opinion about though.

 I don't think we require stdbool in 0.3.4.

 > Do you think this ticket should become about removing this bugfix at
 some point in the future? Having the checks for the `-2` return value as a
 special case looks a bit funky if seen out of context even with the
 reference to the OpenSSL bug as a comment.

 I think we should have a separate ticket for removing this fix once
 openssl 1.1.1a is long forgotten.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28973: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport 034-backport|  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28616   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Code seems to be called correctly when build against OpenSSL 1.1.1a.

 The patch looks reasonable to me. Only minor nitpick I spot is to maybe
 use `bool` as type for `openssl_bug_7712_is_present` - it is not something
 I have a strong opinion about though.

 Do you think this ticket should become about removing this bugfix at some
 point in the future? Having the checks for the `-2` return value as a
 special case looks a bit funky if seen out of context even with the
 reference to the OpenSSL bug as a comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  android, compile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged to 0.3.5 and forward

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28924 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our make V=1 logs have become too verbose for travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28924: Our make V=1 logs have become too verbose for travis
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  035-backport, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Added a missing changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  android, compile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Patch looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  android, compile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by n8fr8):

 Not yet. Everything builds after that fix, and testing is underway. So far
 so good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28975 [HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS Everywhere missing icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28975: HTTPS Everywhere missing icon
--+--
 Reporter:  siketa|  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by legind):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23359

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26632 [Core Tor/Tor]: Updated version of the WTF-pad proposal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26632: Updated version of the WTF-pad proposal
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  implemented
  in-20180711|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 4
 * actualpoints:   => 4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25501 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ensure WTF-Pad padding comes from the expected hop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25501: Ensure WTF-Pad padding comes from the expected hop
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-flow, tor-circuit, 035   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  -roadmap-master, 035-triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 3
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26633 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solve histogram issues for WTF-Pad

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26633: Solve histogram issues for WTF-Pad
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  Actual Points:  10
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 15
 * actualpoints:   => 10


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28633 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pad on specific circuit purposes + ltups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28633: Pad on specific circuit purposes + ltups
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  10
  padding|
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 10
 * actualpoints:   => 10


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28020 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run another memory profile in late 0.4.0 to figure out how much memory we saved.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28020: Run another memory profile in late 0.4.0 to figure out how much memory 
we
saved.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  Actual Points:  0.5
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26630   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:  0.5 => 1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  android, compile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 See my branch `bug28974_035` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/626 .

 Any other bugs of this kind?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  android, compile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  android, compile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28020 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run another memory profile in late 0.4.0 to figure out how much memory we saved.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28020: Run another memory profile in late 0.4.0 to figure out how much memory 
we
saved.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26630   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by gaba):

 We can close this one. Right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28973: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport 034-backport|  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28616   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've tested this with chutney, openssl 1.1.1a, and git master, confirming
 that with this patch, chutney succeeds with openssl 1.1.1a, but fails
 without it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers about bootstrap status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28018: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers
about bootstrap status
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ex-sponsor8   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19-must
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  sponsor19-also => ex-sponsor8
 * sponsor:  Sponsor8-must => Sponsor19-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers about bootstrap status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28018: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers
about bootstrap status
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ex-sponsor8   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19-must
--+

Comment (by gaba):

 Moving it to sponsor19. Let's talk about which part of this can be done
 for s19.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28616 [Core Tor/Tor]: TLS internal error running Tor 0.3.4.9 on Debian Buster (OpenSSL 1.1.1a)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28616: TLS internal error running Tor 0.3.4.9 on Debian Buster (OpenSSL 1.1.1a)
--+
 Reporter:  filippo   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:11 nickm]:
 > I've asked on the ticket, but I don't have a great sense of when it will
 happen.

 They are not sure; it will either happen when the next major security fix
 happens, or probably 3-4 months after OpenSSL 1.1.1a.

 > One possibility might be to write a patch to detect this issue and
 disable TLS 1.3 when it happens.

 I've done a minimal patch for this as #28973, but it needs testing,
 especially with OpenSSL 1.1.1a.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28973: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport 034-backport|  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28616   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * keywords:   => 033-backport 034-backport 035-backport


Comment:

 I made branch `ticket28973_033` to test a fix here; it should also merge
 cleanly into 0.3.4, 0.3.5, and 0.4.0.

 I expect that a few warnings will still happen with this branch: it waits
 for the bug to happen once before disabling TLS 1.3, by which point other
 TLS 1.3 connections may already be in progress.

 I have tested this branch with a good OpenSSL version, but not with
 openssl 1.1.1a: I hope somebody else can do that.

 Only servers will encounter this issue.

 There is a github PR at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/625 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28973: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28616| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * priority:  Medium => High


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[tor-bugs] #28975 [HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS Everywhere missing icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28975: HTTPS Everywhere missing icon
--+--
 Reporter:  siketa|  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  HTTPS Everywhere
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Hi!
 I apologize if this has already been reported.
 On Tor's first run, only NoScript add-on icon is shown.
 HTTPS Everywhere add-on is active but its icon is not visible.
 Workaround is to open Customize and drag an icon to wanted position.

 I think that all active add-ons should be shown.

 Tor browser 8.0.4 on Windows 7 HomePremium SP1 64-bit

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+-
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  android, compile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by n8fr8):

 Adding:
  #include "errno.h"
 into freespace.c
 seems to fix this

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[tor-bugs] #28974 [Core Tor]: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28974: android compiling error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this function)
--+--
 Reporter:  n8fr8 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  android, compile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 make  all-am
 make[1]: Entering directory '/home/n8fr8/dev/repos/tor-
 android/external/tor'
   CC   src/lib/fs/freespace.o
 src/lib/fs/freespace.c: In function 'tor_get_avail_disk_space':
 src/lib/fs/freespace.c:59:3: error: 'errno' undeclared (first use in this
 function)
errno = ENOSYS;
^
 src/lib/fs/freespace.c:59:3: note: each undeclared identifier is reported
 only once for each function it appears in
 src/lib/fs/freespace.c:59:11: error: 'ENOSYS' undeclared (first use in
 this function)
errno = ENOSYS;
^
 Makefile:9083: recipe for target 'src/lib/fs/freespace.o' failed
 make[1]: *** [src/lib/fs/freespace.o] Error 1
 make[1]: Leaving directory '/home/n8fr8/dev/repos/tor-
 android/external/tor'
 Makefile:5000: recipe for target 'all' failed
 make: *** [all] Error 2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28962 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28962: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Old description:

> My Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev client shows {{{circuits are not both ready.
> Stalling conn.}}} and most connections hang for some minutes until it
> let‘s through a bunch and hangs again.
>
> It‘s confusing to see netflow padding while waiting for connections,
> looks like an instance of #23681. Maybe it just means that the guard is
> under load?
>
> Relevant code is around src/core/or/circuituse.c:3025.
> Log shows a lot of timeouts like:
> {{{
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #0: 325
> 75
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #1: 375
> 47
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #2: 325
> 75
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] circuit_build_times_set_timeout_worker():
> Circuit build measurement period of 1337373ms is more than twice the
> maximum build time we have ever observed. Capping it to 1143450ms.
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] circuit_build_times_set_timeout(): Set circuit
> build timeout to 29s (28864.874645ms, 1143450.00ms, Xm: 336, a:
> 0.361406, r: 0.282000) based on 1000 circuit times
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] entry_guards_note_guard_success(): Recorded
> success for primary confirmed guard 
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] circuit_build_no_more_hops(): circuit built!
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] pathbias_count_build_success(): Got success
> count 209.532891/219.352138 for guard 
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> Intro circ 4177057486 (id: 2028) present and awaiting ACK. Rend circuit
> 3511196698 (id: 2011). Stalling. (stream 41 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] or_state_save(): Saved state to
> "/var/lib/tor/state"
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] rend_client_introduction_acked(): Got nack for
> [scrubbed] from [scrubbed]...
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(): 5
> options left for [scrubbed].
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] hs_client_reextend_intro_circuit(): Re-
> extending circ 4177057486, this time to [scrubbed].
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin():
> Sending extend relay cell.
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> ready rend circ 3511196698 (id: 2011) already here. Nointro-ack yet on
> intro 4177057486 (id: 2028). (stream 41 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:48:14.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> Intro 4177057486 (id: 2028) and rend circuit 3511196698 (id: 2011)
> circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn. (41 sec old)
> ...
> Dec 30 10:49:01.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> Intro 4177057486 (id: 2028) and rend circuit 3511196698 (id: 2011)
> circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn. (88 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:02.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> ready rend circ 3511196698 (id: 2011) already here. Nointro-ack yet on
> intro 4177057486 (id: 2028). (stream 89 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:02.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> Intro 4177057486 (id: 2028) and rend circuit 3511196698 (id: 2011)
> circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn. (89 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:03.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> ready rend circ 3511196698 (id: 2011) already here. Nointro-ack yet on
> intro 4177057486 (id: 2028). (stream 90 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:03.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> Intro 4177057486 (id: 2028) and rend circuit 3511196698 (id: 2011)
> circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn. (90 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:04.000 [info]
> channelpadding_send_padding_cell_for_callback(): Sending netflow
> keepalive on 608 to [scrubbed] ([scrubbed]) after 8689 ms. Delta 1ms
> Dec 30 10:49:04.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> ready rend circ 3511196698 (id: 2011) already here. Nointro-ack yet on
> intro 4177057486 (id: 2028). (stream 91 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:04.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> Intro 4177057486 (id: 2028) and rend circuit 3511196698 (id: 2011)
> circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn. (91 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:05.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> ready rend circ 3511196698 (id: 2011) already here. Nointro-ack yet on
> intro 4177057486 (id: 2028). (stream 92 sec old)
> Dec 30 10:49:05.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
> Intro 4177057486 (id: 2028) and rend circuit 3511196698 (id: 2011)
> circuits are 

Re: [tor-bugs] #28962 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28962: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment "info.scrubbed.log.xz" added.

 info log for Dec 30 with tweaked scrubbing

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20006 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH fails for hidden services which use client authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20006: HSFETCH fails for hidden services which use client authentication
-+-
 Reporter:  segfault |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-spec, tor-control|  Actual Points:
  missing-feature authentication hs-auth |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28920 [Core Tor/Tor]: rep_hist_log_link_protocol_counts() only knows about 4 link protocols, but Tor has 5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28920: rep_hist_log_link_protocol_counts() only knows about 4 link protocols, 
but
Tor has 5
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28935 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ... on Tor 0.3.4.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28935: [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ... on Tor 0.3.4.9
--+--
 Reporter:  Doemela   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Thanks for the report! This looks like a duplicate of #27750, which should
 be fixed in the next 0.3.4.x release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28962 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28962: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28895 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Your guard" log messages are causing confusion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28895: "Your guard" log messages are causing confusion
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-log, easy,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-guard, tor-log, easy => tor-guard, tor-log, easy,
 035-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28967 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor control command to connect to Onion Service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28967: Tor control command to connect to Onion Service
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs reachability research |  Actual Points:
  network-health spec-needed tor-spec|
Parent ID:  #28841   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Usually connections are launched from a SOCKSPort, or some equivalent
 client port.  What would you want this control command to do?  Once the
 connection was created, how would an application use it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28806 [Core Tor/Tor]: checkIncludes.py does not like code in src/ext/timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28806: checkIncludes.py does not like code in src/ext/timeouts
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Let's clean up the includes in timeouts, so that checkIncludes.py can make
 sure we haven't introduced any circularity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28941 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-spec: Wrong default HiddenServiceVersion value in section 3.27 of control-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28941: tor-spec: Wrong default HiddenServiceVersion value in section 3.27 of
control-spec.txt
+--
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-doc tor-spec easy fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 lgtm; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28954 [Core Tor/Tor]: fuzz-descriptor aborts with a crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28954: fuzz-descriptor aborts with a crash
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Is this a Tor bug or recidivm bug?  It doesn't look like a true Tor bug to
 me, since it's just using a lot of RAM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28939 [Core Tor]: Fix buffer overflow in src/test/test_voting_flags.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28939: Fix buffer overflow in src/test/test_voting_flags.c
--+
 Reporter:  kjak  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me.  Bug not in any released Tor, so no changes/ file is
 required.  Merging!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28966 [Core Tor/Tor]: HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28966: HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible
--+
 Reporter:  roo   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
+
 Reporter:  torcrash|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #28973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28973: Disable TLS1.3 when openssl bug 7712 is present
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28616
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 See #28616 for the impact of the bug in tor; see
 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/7712 for the openssl issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28616 [Core Tor/Tor]: TLS internal error running Tor 0.3.4.9 on Debian Buster (OpenSSL 1.1.1a)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28616: TLS internal error running Tor 0.3.4.9 on Debian Buster (OpenSSL 1.1.1a)
--+
 Reporter:  filippo   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've asked on the ticket, but I don't have a great sense of when it will
 happen.

 One possibility might be to write a patch to detect this issue and disable
 TLS 1.3 when it happens.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28946 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot doesn't work as bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28946: Orbot doesn't work as bridge
+--
 Reporter:  Tobias.Besemer  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by n8fr8):

 This isn't a feature actively tested, but most likely the issue is port
 forwarding. You need your bridge port to be publicly accessible and mapped
 to from your local firewall.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28955 [Applications/Orbot]: should Orbot include DNS forwarder backed by DNS-over-TLS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28955: should Orbot include DNS forwarder backed by DNS-over-TLS
+---
 Reporter:  eighthave   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by n8fr8):

 I think the DNS port is already available for any app. It should be by
 default at 5400.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28805 [Core Tor/Tor]: ControlPort has undocumented behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28805: ControlPort has undocumented behavior
+--
 Reporter:  wagon   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, easy, tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28675 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate standard cookie authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28675: Deprecate standard cookie authentication
+
 Reporter:  wagon   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Marking for 0.4.0, but not 0.3.5: it's too late to deprecate in 0.3.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment "28669-info.scrubbed.log.xz" added.

 It happened again, this time without clock jump. Probably worth to think
 it together with my wifi issues in #28962.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28938 [Core Tor]: Fix incorrect OpenBSD macro tests (fix testsuite failure)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28938: Fix incorrect OpenBSD macro tests (fix testsuite failure)
+
 Reporter:  kjak|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => regression
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28955 [Applications/Orbot]: should Orbot include DNS forwarder backed by DNS-over-TLS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28955: should Orbot include DNS forwarder backed by DNS-over-TLS
+---
 Reporter:  eighthave   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by eighthave):

 One way to start with this would be just to make the DNS server available
 in Orbot, but not force anything to use it.  We're working on a NetCipher
 library that enables ESNI in any Android app.  That library could then be
 configured to always use the Orbot DNS server.

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[tor-bugs] #28972 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: gitlab instance at Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28972: gitlab instance at Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Hey! Can I get access to oniongit.eu or any gitlab instance at Tor ?
 Thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28789 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop allowing destination serving files without tls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28789: Stop allowing destination serving files without tls
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28142 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge original WTF-PAD branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28142: Merge original WTF-PAD branch
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 OK this is now in **merge_ready**!

 Here are the updates:

 The final (squashed) branch is in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/624.
 The identical-but-unsquashed branch is in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/623 (as per mike's post above).
 Nick's last review comments from `PR#461` have been addressed and answered
 by referencing the commits in `PR#623`.

 This branch is ready to be reviewed & merged. It does not actually enable
 any machines atm, but let's see if we can fit something in for 040 after
 we merge this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28932 [Core Tor/sbws]: Detect when sbws stalls and log backtrace

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28932: Detect when sbws stalls and log backtrace
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/321

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