[tor-bugs] #31842 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: new forwarding address for will shackleton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31842: new forwarding address for will shackleton
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Will is a new core contributor, and so it's time to make an @tpo email
 address for him.

 I talked to him about "ldap account vs line in postfix", and we decided
 that "line in postfix" will do the job for the forseeable future.

 I am going to create the alias w.shackleton@tpo and it will fwd to his
 shackleton.io domain.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31842 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: new forwarding address for will shackleton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31842: new forwarding address for will shackleton
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It is done (and will take effect in 0-4 hours).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31685 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31685: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-ux |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by IPv7):

 Replying to [comment:5 antonela]:
 > Major design systems recommend avoiding using OFF/ON in the switcher
 since the UI component already reflects that status, especially for
 preventing this kind of confusion.
 >
 > We can use a label that doesn't describe the values of a switch: what if
 we use `Status` or something close to it?
 >
 > https://material.io/components/selection-controls/#switches
 > https://developer.apple.com/design/human-interface-
 guidelines/ios/controls/switches/


 Status would be perfect

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28764: OpenSSL Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Android

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31564 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31564: Android bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909, GeorgKoppen201909|
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by eighthave):

 Building gradle from source might not be so bad, if you don't mind using
 gradle binaries to build it.  Maybe the Debian patch for 4.4.1 will work
 for 4.10.2. Gradle Android Plugin newer than 2.2.2 requires Java and
 Kotlin, so its a beast.  Kotlin is close to being packaged in Debian, but
 not there yet.

 I should also say, if you decide you want to build a piece from source,
 please check in with the Debian Android Tools Team, since we've been
 working on that for years.  We can give you a quick assessment of how hard
 it would be.  For example, building Gradle Android Plugin v2.2.2 from
 source is not bad, anything newer is much harder, and what makes it hard
 changes every other minor release (new libs, different build tools, etc).
 You can reach us on #debian-mobile on OFTC and android-tools-
 de...@lists.alioth.debian.org (no subscrition necessary to post)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31564 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31564: Android bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909, GeorgKoppen201909|
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by eighthave):

 Also, openjdk-8 from sid/unstable is meant to run on buster, since it is
 there so we can bootstrap Kotlin:
 https://packages.debian.org/source/sid/openjdk-8  That might not be there
 forever, but at least a year.

 You could probably build gradle 4.10.2 using Debian/buster's gradle 4.4.1,
 if you want to avoid gradle binaries.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19327 [Core Tor/Tor]: controller: expose fine-grained circuit detail.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19327: controller: expose fine-grained circuit detail.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control isolation test-support   |  Actual Points:
  intro  |
Parent ID:  #17284   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by aveuiller):

 Thanks for the detailed answer!

 I'll work on a first round of integration on the specs, implementation,
 and tests for a few  fields and I'll come back to you.

 In the meantime, I'll also do the same specification work on the
 `circuit_t` structure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31293 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service gradle failure when probing network interfaces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31293: tor-android-service gradle failure when probing network interfaces
---+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201908  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by eighthave):

 For ensuring --no-daemon is set, I think that the `GRADLE_OPTS` env var
 takes precedence over everything else.
 
https://docs.gradle.org/current/userguide/gradle_daemon.html#sec:ways_to_disable_gradle_daemon

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17440 [Applications/Orbot]: Please help: Orbot not working on CyanogenMod 12.1 (Lollipop)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17440: Please help: Orbot not working on CyanogenMod 12.1 (Lollipop)
-+
 Reporter:  ezehoffner   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  lollipop cm12.1 cyanogenmod  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by eighthave):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 resovled a while ago

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18502 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot tries to kill Tor processes it doesn't own

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18502: Orbot tries to kill Tor processes it doesn't own
+--
 Reporter:  akwizgran   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  orbot kill briar|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by eighthave):

 Switching tor daemon to a shared library loaded in `TorService` will make
 killing the daemon entirely unnecessary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18502 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot tries to kill Tor processes it doesn't own

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18502: Orbot tries to kill Tor processes it doesn't own
+
 Reporter:  akwizgran   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  orbot kill briar|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by eighthave):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18070 [Applications/Orbot]: Use low priority notification for TorService

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18070: Use low priority notification for TorService
+---
 Reporter:  patcon  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by eighthave):

 https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot is now the canonical location for
 Orbot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18070 [Applications/Orbot]: Use low priority notification for TorService

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18070: Use low priority notification for TorService
+-
 Reporter:  patcon  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by eighthave):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28764: OpenSSL Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Recheck `enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31383 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL CVE-2019-1552

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31383: OpenSSL CVE-2019-1552
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 
https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Compilation_and_Installation#PREFIX_and_OPENSSLDIR

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem [decoding]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem [decoding]
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:15 atagar]:
 > Perfect, thanks asn!
 >
 > > But yes, IMO we should have a generic certificate validate (or
 verify?) function that just verifies that the certificate correctly signs
 the included key using the intended public key
 >
 > Agreed. Thought I just had: lets use isinstance checks here. That is to
 say...
 >
 > {{{
 > def validate(self, descriptor):
 >   if isinstance(descriptor,
 stem.descriptor.server_descriptor.RelayDescriptor):
 > # server descriptor specific things
 >   elif isinstance(descriptor,
 stem.descriptor.hidden_service.HiddenServiceDescriptorV3):
 > # hidden service specific things
 >   else:
 > raise ValueError('ED25519 certificate validation only presently
 supports server and hidden service descriptors, not %s' %
 type(descriptor).__name__)
 > }}}
 >

 I'm fine with doing this if you prefer this approach. That said, IMO it's
 a layer violation: It shouldn't be the certificate's job to validate the
 descriptor; it should be the descriptor's job to validate the certificate.
 So IMO, the certificate codebase should be simple (just validate the sig
 with a public key and make sure it's not expired), and the complicated
 stuff should happen at the HS subsystem.

 If you think we should go with this `isintance()` approach anyhow, that's
 fine with me.


 > > Great! I see that you have disabled the checksum verification but this
 actually passes for me.
 >
 > Interesting! Yes, likely is a pysha3 vs python 3.6 difference. I'll look
 into it.
 >
 > > Would you be interested in digging more there; that is parsing the
 middle and inner layers of the descriptor?
 >
 > Yup! At this point I should have everything I need to run with this.
 Many thanks asn!
 >
 > Give me a bit and hopefully I'll have a mergeable branch for you to take
 a peek at.
 >
 > > In the meanwhile, I will be working on the encoding part, if you don't
 think that's too chaotic to do.
 >
 > Nope. Feel free, but I won't be able to give much significant thought to
 it until this end is wrapped up.
 >
 > > Commit 14a44b1c6e1438abdf5687a1c468536d88481f81 killed a few XXXs I
 had added to remind myself in the future (so that we don't forget them
 before merging).
 >
 > If that's the case would you mind this before encoding so we can get
 this branch into a mergeable state?
 >
 > To be clear at this point my plan is...
 >
 > 1. Productionize hsv3_crypto.py. This will probably include some
 refactoring.
 > 2. Add parsing support for the other layers.
 > 3. Unit test decryption and parsing.
 > 4. Consider merging the branch.
 >
 > If there's any additional verifications we'd care to get in prior to
 merging it would be preferable (but not a big whoop) to get them in during
 this.
 >
 > > FYI the encoding methods will also need an extra argument during
 descriptor encoding
 >
 > Gotcha. That's perfectly fine. Descriptor creation can take additional
 arguments. For example server_descriptor.py has...
 >
 > {{{
 > def content(cls, attr = None, exclude = (), sign = False, signing_key =
 None, exit_policy = None):
 > }}}
 >
 > > BTW, any plans on putting this stuff into github so that I can do some
 inline comments?
 >
 > Not at present. I use my personal TPO repo for in flight branches
 (GitHub is simply a mirror of the official repo). That said, I'm leaning
 toward migrating to GitHub when the rest of tor moves to GitLab so in the
 future I'll likely fully be on that platform.
 >
 > > I'm splitting this ticket into two.
 >
 > Perfect! Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31372 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31372: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 CI passed.

 `ticket31372_029` (travis only) with PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1351
 `ticket31372_035` (both platforms) with PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1360
 `ticket31372_040` (small merge conflict) with PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1361
 `ticket31372_041` (clean merge) with PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1362
 `ticket31372_042` (clean merge) with PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1363

 I have also made a branch with a deliberate syntax error in mainloop.c so
 that we can make sure that make -k is working as in tended.  That one has
 a PR at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1364 -- do not merge it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24362 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add logging backend for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24362: Add logging backend for Android
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  s8|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+

Comment (by eighthave):

 FYI, the canonical macro name for Android is `__ANDROID__` like the other
 OS macros.  This merge request used `USE_ANDROID`.  I'll submit a merge
 request to fix this.

 You can get an overview by doing:
 {{{
 grep --no-filename -rF ANDROID /opt/android-sdk/ndk-bundle/ |sort -u|grep
 def
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31810 [Core Tor]: Bug: ../src/lib/process/process_unix.c:265: process_unix_exec: Assertion line should be unreached failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31810: Bug: ../src/lib/process/process_unix.c:265: process_unix_exec: Assertion
line should be unreached failed; aborting.
--+
 Reporter:  Parckwart |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must, 041-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1359 might be a good solution to
 this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31841 [Core Tor/Tor]: test addr/parse takes a long time on master on some machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31841: test addr/parse takes a long time on master on some machines
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unit-tests 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-unit-tests => tor-unit-tests 042-must
 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31614 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31614: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  consider-backport-if-needed, diagnostics,  |
  042-should, 035-backport-maybe, 040-backport-  |
  maybe, 041-backport-maybe, regression, |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Hm. I think we should hold ourselves ready to do a backport, but not do
 one unless we actually run into problems in practice.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test_rebind.py more robust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31837: Make test_rebind.py more robust
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0423,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  BugSmashFund 042-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 consider-backport-after-0423, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 041-backport, BugSmashFund
 =>
 consider-backport-after-0423, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 041-backport, BugSmashFund 042-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31825 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use the full name of optional modules, rather than an abbreviation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31825: Use the full name of optional modules, rather than an abbreviation
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, easy, doc, BugSmashFund|  Actual Points:  0.1
  042-can asn-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  fast-fix, easy, doc, BugSmashFund => fast-fix, easy, doc,
 BugSmashFund 042-can asn-merge
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31825 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use the full name of optional modules, rather than an abbreviation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31825: Use the full name of optional modules, rather than an abbreviation
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, easy, doc, BugSmashFund|  Actual Points:  0.1
  042-can asn-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31835 [Community/Relays]: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31835: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian
--+
 Reporter:  crimson_king  |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ggus):

 * owner:  hiro => Nusenu
 * cc: nusenu (added)
 * component:  Webpages/Support => Community/Relays


Comment:

 Hey Nusenu, any thoughts about this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31836 [Applications]: Idea for the realization of chats via the Tor network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31836: Idea for the realization of chats via the Tor network
--+
 Reporter:  Researching girl  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  Core Tor => Applications


Comment:

 Hi! This looks like more of a design proposal than a feature request or
 bug ticket.  I'd suggest having a look at other systems that have tried to
 implement communications over Tor, including Pond and Ricochet - you might
 be able to take ideas from them, or you might find that one of them is
 close to doing what you want.

 Generally that way I would proceed from there is to try to write up a
 complete protocol description, explaining all the messages, formats, and
 cryptography.  That way you can get closer review on the system's security
 before you get too far into the implementation.

 From your writing above, I can't tell whether you're proposing to do this
 with changes in Tor itself. I'd suggest that if possible you try to do it
 without, since adding features to Tor is generally tougher than writing an
 application that uses tor.  If it can't be done without changes to Tor,
 that's interesting, and we should look at the question of what minimal set
 of Tor features would let it support this kind of application.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve logging documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31839: Improve logging documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, fast-fix 042-can  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy, doc, fast-fix => easy, doc, fast-fix 042-can
 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve logging documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31839: Improve logging documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, fast-fix 042-can asn- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy, doc, fast-fix 042-can => easy, doc, fast-fix 042-can
 asn-merge
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks okay to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29846 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fstrim script makes noises on some servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29846: fstrim script makes noises on some servers
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 tired of getting that spam, taking a look

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31838 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a typo in the practracker usage message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31838: Fix a typo in the practracker usage message
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix asn-merge 042-can  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  fast-fix => fast-fix asn-merge 042-can
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor some control error-handling code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31840: Refactor some control error-handling code
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt 042-can  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  technical-debt, BugSmashFund => technical-debt 042-can
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


Comment:

 Adding 042-can; removing bugsquashfund; adding sponsor31-can.  (My
 understanding is that the bugsquashfund keyword should be reserved for
 user-visible bugs.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31584 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up mingw-w64 project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31584: Clean up mingw-w64 project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:  2
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909R,  |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Clean up mingw-w64 project some more:
 > Note, we might bump the GCC version to something supported while we are
 at it.
 What prevents you to bump GCC to 9.2 everywhere?
 > The pthread situation is a bit unfortunate.
 It doesn't seem that Rust depends on winpthread: https://github.com/rust-
 lang/rust/issues/13501
 Have you changed `--enable-threads=posix` to `--enable-threads=win32`?
 Also you can remove old `--with-gnu-ld --with-gnu-as`.
 > # LDFLAGS_FOR_TARGET does not work for some reason. Thus, we take
 > # CFLAGS_FOR_TARGET.
 It didn't work, because linker didn't want to eat `-specs`. Try now.
 Also where are `--no-seh`, `--large-address-aware` for x86 and `--high-
 entropy-va`, `--image-base` for x64?
 > - libmpc-dev
 What about bumping GMP, MPFR, MPC with GCC?
 > `--enable-sdk=all --enable-secure-api`
 They are no longer needed (set by default).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30009 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: consider trocla for secrets management in puppet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30009: consider trocla for secrets management in puppet
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29387   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 trocla's puppet module (https://github.com/duritong/puppet-trocla) has
 been merged into our infrastructure and is being tested for grafana
 authentication (#30023).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30023 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: improve grafana authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30023: improve grafana authentication
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 grafana now has a standard 'basic access authentication' layer from the
 Apache proxy, using the common 'tor-guest' account. configuration has been
 done with triocla as per #30009, so i think this is all done...

 ... *except* that we still have that pesky third-party prometheus/grafana
 server out there that *does* have those requirements. so the trocla()
 stuff will need some refactoring to cover for that use case. maybe we'll
 need some hiera integration here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29846 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fstrim script makes noises on some servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29846: fstrim script makes noises on some servers
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 somehow that noise went away on bungei, it was only left on archive-01. i
 fixed it there by activating the fstrim.timer that seems to be disabled by
 default, and only available on buster, and removed the cronjob we were
 deploying.

 hopefully this will go away next night. the service runs weekly so worst
 case we'll get 6 less warnings per week. :p

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31091 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug stracktrace when pluggable transport cannot bind to port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31091: Bug stracktrace when pluggable transport cannot bind to port
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by ahf):

 Created PR here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1365 -- waiting to
 see what Travis and Appveyor says.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31794 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Errors swallowed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31794: Errors swallowed
-+
 Reporter:  sah  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for working on this! I have a few comments below for fixes. In
 general, it's easier for us to compare all the changes at once if you put
 your changes in a separate branch from master. That way (since this isn't
 a forked repo) we can compare your PR branch to the master branch and
 leave comments there.

 - A more informative error message
 [https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/blob/master/server-
 webrtc/snowflake.go#L33 here] would be useful. `a` is always the WebRTC
 connection and `b` is the ORPort. I would change this to be more like the
 error message in `server.go`
 [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/master/server/server.go#L118
 here]

 - Similarly we can have a more informative error message
 [https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/blob/master/server-
 webrtc/snowflake.go#L256 here]. Maybe
  {{{log.Printf("error copying from os.Stdin to ioutil.Discard: %v",
 err)}}}

  Same with
 [https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/blob/master/server/server.go#L403
 here],
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/99a0fdfe88a10ec1bca04b99501080a2f4e43ad7
 #diff-227e0da595ae35c9cef78b0e687e78f3R64 here], and
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/2cf9f239820653b56b48b5f33b127ab8cfc39738
 #diff-ba4bd8a4477426567c409d66c2cf8a28R236 here]

 - As mentioned above,
 [https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/blob/master/broker/broker.go#L384
 this] geoip reload should log a Fatal error. See the call to the same
 function earlier in the code to see how to do it.

 - While I understand the desire to do so,
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/77e1ab458a6a742246cf4f42d7d54b2ea77c2814
 #diff-c8ef7ba143d251e41b143b2ab02f3733L136 this] shouldn't really be in
 this patch set since it has nothing to do with the ticket.
  Same with
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/77e1ab458a6a742246cf4f42d7d54b2ea77c2814
 #diff-345294112d730f1e04b863fb1e5c0981L184 this change]. There are more
 but I'm not going to list them all now.
  What I'm going to recommend is to squash all of the error handling
 changes into a single commit, and then have a separate commit for other
 linting changes.

 - Why did you make the change
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/9d6fabee2c6596fcf72518f31188219b66576525
 #diff-9d5c4d1c03bbea44d537ac915acf610aL65 here]? It changes the
 functionality of the code and should be reverted.

 Another general piece of feedback: your commit messages should be
 structured as follows:
 {{{
 Subject line, capitalized, no period, max 50 chars

 Commit message body, describe the changes exactly here. Use full
 sentences. Wrap the commit message body at 72 characters.
 }}}
 (your editor will probably do the wrapping for you)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31584 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up mingw-w64 project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31584: Clean up mingw-w64 project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:  2
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909R,  |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for the suggestions. It seems there are at least two further
 tickets to file for your suggestions. (Bump GCC to 9.2 everywhere and
 clean the mingw-w64 project further up=). Could you do so? Thanks! I think
 we are done here, though, for the moment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24431 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Provide fallback mirror lists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24431: Provide fallback mirror lists
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24429 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 I started working on a CollecTor module for retrieving and storing
 fallback mirror lists. It uses [https://www.eclipse.org/jgit/ JGit]
 internally. In the first run it clones `tor.git` and copies all versions
 of `fallback_dirs.inc` to the local file system. In subsequent runs it
 fetches `tor.git`, checks for updates to `fallback_dirs.inc`, copies only
 new versions to the local file system, and pulls from origin/master. This
 code is not ready for production yet. I'll resume working on it as time
 permits. If there are questions/comments on the general approach, I'm
 happy to hear those!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
+--
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Sorry about that, I went with the default appended squash messages.

 I applied the changes you mentioned. This should be cleaner:
 https://github.com/cohosh/tor-browser-build/compare/pion_squashedv2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31404 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unsolvable reCAPTCHAs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31404: Unsolvable reCAPTCHAs
--+---
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mikeperry):

 This also happens to me. Seemes independent of security setting.
 https://www.doodle.com/ to test (which now blocks Tor via cloudflare.
 Yay!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: asm.js files should be no linkability risk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19417: asm.js files should be no linkability risk
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609,  |  Actual Points:
  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * points:   => 0.5


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[tor-bugs] #31843 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make safelogger thread safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31843: Make safelogger thread safe
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 It would be nice to pass the output of the safe logger to libraries so
 that we can log errors that occur in library functions. Right now the
 safelogger is not thread safe. Multiple calls to Write from different
 threads results in race conditions.

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[tor-bugs] #31844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31844: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-
 |  alpha
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 According to our nightly builds only linux32 and macOS compilations for
 OpenSSL 1.1.1d succeeded, which is weird. Here is the error for linux
 64bit:
 {{{
 ${LDCMD:-gcc} -pthread -Wa,--noexecstack -Wall -O3 -L.   \
 -o apps/openssl apps/asn1pars.o apps/ca.o apps/ciphers.o
 apps/cms.o apps/crl.o apps/crl2p7.o apps/dgst.o apps/dhparam.o apps/dsa.o
 apps/dsaparam.o apps/ec.o apps/ecparam.o apps/enc.o apps/engine.o
 apps/errstr.o apps/gendsa.o apps/genpkey.o apps/genrsa.o apps/nseq.o
 apps/ocsp.o apps/openssl.o apps/passwd.o apps/pkcs12.o apps/pkcs7.o
 apps/pkcs8.o apps/pkey.o apps/pkeyparam.o apps/pkeyutl.o apps/prime.o
 apps/rand.o apps/rehash.o apps/req.o apps/rsa.o apps/rsautl.o
 apps/s_client.o apps/s_server.o apps/s_time.o apps/sess_id.o apps/smime.o
 apps/speed.o apps/spkac.o apps/srp.o apps/storeutl.o apps/ts.o
 apps/verify.o apps/version.o apps/x509.o \
  apps/libapps.a -lssl -lcrypto -ldl -pthread
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_xts_encrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_cbc_encrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_ecb_encrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_gcm_decrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_gcm_encrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_ocb_decrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `gcm_ghash_avx'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_ocb_encrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_encrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_decrypt'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_set_encrypt_key'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_set_decrypt_key'
 ./libcrypto.so: undefined reference to `aesni_xts_decrypt'
 collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31843 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make safelogger thread safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31843: Make safelogger thread safe
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I'd like to cherry pick this single commit from the pion branch:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/f370a4f296de432c392c6fc2f204fd3877a60429

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30090 [UX]: Make a list of potential .onion errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30090: Make a list of potential .onion errors
+
 Reporter:  pili|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  UX  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19251  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+

Comment (by antonela):

 Hi! We have three ux challenges here:

 1. how to inform the error to users
 2. how we enable users to recover from that error if that is possible
 3. how we encourage users to pick the safer path if an unsafe path is
 available

 Ideally, this approach extends error management that could work in other
 clients and is not a specific feature for Tor Browser. The parent #30025
 ticket will host Tor Browser specifics to this errors.

 Proposal 304 has already some errors.

 ||Code || Type of Error || Error Page Copy || Recovery || Unsafe path ||
 ||XF0  || Descriptor Can Not be Found || Onion Not Found|| No || No ||
 ||XF1  || Descriptor Is Invalid || ? || Yes? || No ||
 ||XF2  || Introduction Failed || ? || ? || No ||
 ||XF3  || Rendezvous Failed || ? || Yes? ||  No ||

 Do we want to extend this list? Could you help me to fill the table?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30090 [UX]: Make a list of potential .onion errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30090: Make a list of potential .onion errors
+
 Reporter:  pili|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  UX  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19251  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+

Comment (by antonela):

 Should we list #30022 typo errors here too? Do we want to support this
 feedback in Tor? Or is it something the client will figure out?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31844: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 lolwut
 {{{
 *** Installing runtime programs
 install apps/openssl.exe -> /var/tmp/dist/openssl/bin/openssl.exe
 install ./tools/c_rehash -> /var/tmp/dist/openssl/bin/c_rehash
 /bin/sh: 1: Syntax error: "(" unexpected
 make: *** [install_ssldirs] Error 2
 Makefile:297: recipe for target 'install_ssldirs' failed
 }}}
 That's for Windows i686.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26491 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion+cert UI text is black with Tor Browser 8.0a9 - it should be green

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26491: Onion+cert UI text is black with Tor Browser 8.0a9 - it should be green
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by antonela):

 Firefox disabled EV Indicators since Firefox 70. Do we want to keep it?

 https://groups.google.com/forum/m/?fromgroups&hl=en#!topic/firefox-
 dev/6wAg_PpnlY4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31844: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > lolwut
 This? https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/wat
 > That's for Windows i686.
 #31383 included.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide stack smashing protection for mingw-clang builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29013: Provide stack smashing protection for mingw-clang builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201908,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-alpha   |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW, starting from GCC 8, there is `--disable-libssp` configure time
 option, because "On many targets library support is provided by the C
 library instead."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27657 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show .onion icon on Identity drop down?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27657: Show .onion icon on Identity drop down?
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "O2A4 - 27657.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27657 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show .onion icon on Identity drop down?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27657: Show .onion icon on Identity drop down?
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "O2A4 - 27657.2.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #31845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump GCC to 9.2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31845: Bump GCC to 9.2
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|
  TorBrowserTeam201909,  |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 GCC depends on MPC which depends on MPFR which depends on GMP.
 Please, update GCC with dependencies everywhere.

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[tor-bugs] #31846 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up mingw-w64 project to make it clean

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31846: Clean up mingw-w64 project to make it clean
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|
  TorBrowserTeam201909,  |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 > The pthread situation is a bit unfortunate.
 It doesn't seem that Rust depends on winpthread: ​https://github.com/rust-
 lang/rust/issues/13501
 Have you changed `--enable-threads=posix` to `--enable-threads=win32`?
 Also you can remove old `--with-gnu-ld --with-gnu-as`.
 > # LDFLAGS_FOR_TARGET does not work for some reason. Thus, we take
 > # CFLAGS_FOR_TARGET.
 It didn't work, because linker didn't want to eat `-specs`. Try now.
 Also where are `--no-seh`, `--large-address-aware` for x86 and `--high-
 entropy-va`, `--image-base` for x64?
 > `--enable-sdk=all --enable-secure-api`
 They are no longer needed (set by default).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27657 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show .onion icon on Identity drop down?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27657: Show .onion icon on Identity drop down?
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by antonela):

 hi! Is hard for me to find a ticket that holds all these issues
 holistically, so I'll make my best try here:

 We can unify the way we visually intent to associate the onion routing,
 the tor network, and the onionsite. I'm iterating our v1 version of onion
 security indicators (#23247) using a plain-color version of the new Tor
 Browser icon.

 Since EV certificates indicators are going to be removed from the URL bar,
 major browsers are using the identity dropdown to show certificates
 related nformation.

 If we decide to remove the EV certificate name in #26491, I'm suggesting
 to keep the known lock for onions with issued certificates. In that case,
 the Tor Browser URL bar will have a [Lock] + [onion] icon. Self-signed
 certificates are being discussed at #13410.

 I think Onionsites with mixed-content scenarios should follow Firefox
 treatment on HTTPS with mixed-content scenarios.

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30025/O2A4.jpg, 700px)]]

 That said, Tor Browser identity dropdown could look like:

 1/
 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/27657/O2A4%20-%2027657.png, 700px)]]

 2/
 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/27657/O2A4%20-%2027657.2.png, 700px)]]

 Is redundant having both sections at the identity dropdown with the same
 icon? What do you think?

 


 PS > Do we have a list of onions for testing like
 [https://testsafebrowsing.appspot.com/, this]?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31584 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up mingw-w64 project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31584: Clean up mingw-w64 project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:  2
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909R,  |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hah, #31845 and #31846 are waiting for you :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31372 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31372: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 CI for the real branches has passed.  For the intended-to-fail branch, I
 have confirmed that the build continues after the first failure, and
 generates more output (which is what we wanted make -k to do).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump GCC to 9.2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31845: Bump GCC to 9.2
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909,
 GeorgKoppen201909
 => tbb-rbm
 * parent:  #30320 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31846 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up mingw-w64 project to make it clean

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31846: Clean up mingw-w64 project to make it clean
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909,
 GeorgKoppen201909
 => tbb-rbm
 * parent:  #30322 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30025 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 4: Better client-side errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30025: Objective 2, Activity 4: Better client-side errors
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:  21
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30022 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 2: Notify users about typo errors when entering .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30022: Objective 2, Activity 2: Notify users about typo errors when entering
.onion addresses
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26491 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion+cert UI text is black with Tor Browser 8.0a9 - it should be green

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26491: Onion+cert UI text is black with Tor Browser 8.0a9 - it should be green
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:6 antonela]:
 > Firefox disabled EV Indicators since Firefox 70. Do we want to keep it?
 >
 > https://groups.google.com/forum/m/?fromgroups&hl=en#!topic/firefox-
 dev/6wAg_PpnlY4

 IIRC they don't disable it for ESR 68 and as Tor Browser is built on that
 series we should keep it until we switch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31844: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 And here we have the error for 64bit Windows
 {{{
 *** Installing runtime programs
 install apps/openssl.exe -> /var/tmp/dist/openssl/bin/openssl.exe
 install ./tools/c_rehash -> /var/tmp/dist/openssl/bin/c_rehash
 created directory `C:'
 created directory `C:/Program'
 created directory `Files'
 created directory `Files/Common'
 created directory `Files/SSL'
 created directory `Files/SSL/certs'
 created directory `Files/SSL/private'
 created directory `Files/SSL/misc'
 install ./apps/CA.pl -> C:/Program Files/Common Files/SSL/misc/CA.pl
 cp: target 'Files/SSL/misc/CA.pl.new' is not a directory
 Makefile:297: recipe for target 'install_ssldirs' failed
 make: *** [install_ssldirs] Error 1
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #31847 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Expand contribution guidelines for snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31847: Expand contribution guidelines for snowflake
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 We're getting more contributors to the project, we should expand
 CONTRIBUTING.md with some more basic guidelines like
 - formatting of commit messages
 - creating tickets for each pull request
 - make sure the changes in the commit adhere to the commit message and the
 corresponding ticket

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 is `update_tor_version` the branch we should review?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909 =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixed in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commits/30429+11. I
 also changed the last check for the `.onion` case to `if ((mState &
 STATE_IS_SECURE) == 0) {`, because I think the previous `if (mState !=
 STATE_IS_INSECURE) {` may have erased some flags in case of a https onion.

 I changed the comment, but not completely sure if you meant that or
 something else :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31844: OpenSSL 1.1.1d fails to compile for some platforms/architectures
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by eighthave):

 I don't know if it is useful to you, but I'm building for Android using
 openssl v1.1.1d for all 4 supported arches:
 https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/pull/19

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31822 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots in the menu)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31822: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots 
in
the menu)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Interesting. This is a rendering bug in fennec. I created a test page and
 it renders correctly on desktop but not Android (neither Fennec or Tor
 Browser).

 http://sbe5fi5cka5l3fqe.onion/~sysrqb/31822/test.html
 https://people.torproject.org/~sysrqb/31822/test.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31822 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots in the menu)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31822: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots 
in
the menu)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This broke in the 2018-11-16 nightly build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31614 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31614: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  consider-backport-if-needed, diagnostics,  |
  042-should, 035-backport-maybe, 040-backport-  |
  maybe, 041-backport-maybe, regression, |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Sure. Apparently that was my opinion about this whole branch 2 weeks ago:
 consider-backport-if-needed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31372 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31372: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I like this idea, but is there a way to summarise the errors at the end of
 the CI output?
 Otherwise, we have to search through thousands of lines of output for the
 error.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31759 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make "annotate_ifdef_directives" script comply with line-width limits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31759: Make "annotate_ifdef_directives" script comply with line-width limits
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #31713| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > Branch at `ticket31759`; also fixes #31779.  PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1339 ; this can become needs_review
 once CI has passed.
 Thanks! This mostly looks good by inspection. I manually ran the script
 and verified that it produces the claimed result in the `make autostyle`
 commit.

 I did make a comment on the pull request about how our stated (and
 enforced) limit seems to be 79 characters. Which one is correct? (I would
 say that 79 characters is better than 80, because of diff line prefixes,
 etc.)

 (Also there seem to be multiple problems with running the `make` targets
 for various maintainer scripts from a separate build directory, but I
 should probably open new ticket(s) for that.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31822 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots in the menu)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31822: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots 
in
the menu)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay, probably either Bug 1317870 or Bug 1481593. I'm going to open a
 geckoview bug for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem [decoding]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem [decoding]
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
-+

Comment (by atagar):

 > If you think we should go with this isintance() approach anyhow, that's
 fine with me.

 Yup, I do.

 > What do you mean with this? I'm fine with not having the XXXs in the
 code for now, but we should not forget about them.

 I mean lets either do those 'XXX' things or not. I'm unsure what I should
 do with those 'XXX' on my end so as I productionize the branch we need to
 either drop them, do them, or change them into a 'TODO' item for me.

 > It would also be very very useful to me if we split hidden_service.py to
 an hsv2 and an hsv3 module.

 We might end up going this route. Please give me a while to refactor this
 branch - when I'm done rejiggering it I'd be delighted to chat about if
 this would be better as one module or two.

 > Perhaps we can do them after the MVP of decoding/encoding is done?

 Certainly, sounds good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31091 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug stracktrace when pluggable transport cannot bind to port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31091: Bug stracktrace when pluggable transport cannot bind to port
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Looks like CI is happy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31794 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Errors swallowed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31794: Errors swallowed
-+
 Reporter:  sah  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by sah):

 Thanks for your feedback.

 WRT informative error messages, I wholeheartedly agree, they'll get fixed
 later on today.

 WRT "As mentioned above,
 [https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/blob/master/broker/broker.go#L384
 ​this] geoip reload should log a Fatal error. See the call to the same
 function earlier in the code to see how to do it." Because this failure is
 inside an anonymous function inside a goroutine I actually feel that the
 whole error handling inside there needs attention. (The earlier call is in
 the 'main' thread). A log.Fatal here would end the goroutine, but it's
 going to end there anyway, and has no effect on the functionality of the
 code in either case.

 WRT "While I understand the desire to do so,
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/77e1ab458a6a742246cf4f42d7d54b2ea77c2814
 #diff-c8ef7ba143d251e41b143b2ab02f3733L136 ​this] shouldn't really be in
 this patch set since it has nothing to do with the ticket. Same with
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/77e1ab458a6a742246cf4f42d7d54b2ea77c2814
 #diff-345294112d730f1e04b863fb1e5c0981L184 ​this change]. There are more
 but I'm not going to list them all now. What I'm going to recommend is to
 squash all of the error handling changes into a single commit, and then
 have a separate commit for other linting changes." These are linting
 changes too (Everything I changed is because a linter has complained,
 should I add the linting complaint to the commit message?)


 WRT "Why did you make the change
 
[https://github.com/shaneHowearth/snowflake/commit/9d6fabee2c6596fcf72518f31188219b66576525
 #diff-9d5c4d1c03bbea44d537ac915acf610aL65 ​here]? It changes the
 functionality of the code and should be reverted." This does NOT change
 functionality, you can see that the original code instantiates last with a
 value of time.Now(), then inside the function it reassigns time.Now() to
 last, the only change would be the amount of time it took to compute the
 difference between time.Since(last) and time.Second*!LogTimeInterval

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31822 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots in the menu)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31822: Security slider is not really visible on mobile anymore (just some dots 
in
the menu)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1583660

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[tor-bugs] #31848 [Webpages/Webtools]: Downloading images in Tor Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31848: Downloading images in Tor Android
--+---
 Reporter:  LoveFoxesAndSneps132  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Webpages/Webtools
  Version:  sbws: unspecified |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
 For some reason I can't download an image while I'm in Tor. I long press
 on the image, then I press "save image", and nothing happens. I checked my
 gallery app on my device and the "Downloads" tab in Tor under "Tools" and
 the image is not there. I'm using Tor Browser version 60.9.0 on my Android
 phone, which is running Android 9.0

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[tor-bugs] #31849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31849: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,
 Severity:  Normal   |  s31-docs
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29214
   Points:  .2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 We have some software architecture documentation in tor-guts.git.  Let's
 move it into doc/hacking/design so we can start editing it.

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[tor-bugs] #31850 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate tor-guts Makefile into tor's build process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31850: Integrate tor-guts Makefile into tor's build process
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,
 Severity:  Normal   |  s31-docs
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29214
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31703 [Internal Services/Service - dist]: Downloading Tor Browser from 2620:0:6b0:b:225:dada:19:1 is painfully slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31703: Downloading Tor Browser from 2620:0:6b0:b:225:dada:19:1 is painfully 
slow
--+-
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - dist  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "traffic-per-class.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31703 [Internal Services/Service - dist]: Downloading Tor Browser from 2620:0:6b0:b:225:dada:19:1 is painfully slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31703: Downloading Tor Browser from 2620:0:6b0:b:225:dada:19:1 is painfully 
slow
--+-
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - dist  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 proof there was network saturation and it is solved:

 [[Image(traffic-per-class.png​,600)]]

 pretty clear, no? :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31849: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Branch is `bug31849`; PR is https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1366 .

 This does the bare minimum to copy the files over; further work can be
 done in other tickets.

 I'll put this in needs_review once CI passes.

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[tor-bugs] #31851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement some more optional modules in Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31851: Implement some more optional modules in Tor
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-design
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  5  |   Reviewer:  nickm
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 Let's make some more optional modules.

 Our target set of modules might include:
 * dirauth - the code only used by directory authorities (including bridge
 authorities)
 * dircache - the code only used by directory caches and directory
 authorities
 * relay - the code only used by relays and directory authorities
 * common - the code used by all roles

 I'll do a design, and a proposed CI build strategy, and then get it
 reviewed.

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[tor-bugs] #31852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename doc/HACKING/design members to reflect current architectural division

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31852: Rename doc/HACKING/design members to reflect current architectural 
division
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,
 Severity:  Normal   |  s31-docs
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29214
   Points:   |   Reviewer:  teor
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The original tor-guts.git document pre-dated the source code re-
 organization when we divided things into src/lib/*, src/core/*,
 src/feature/*, and src/app/*.

 We'll want to edit the documentation to correspond to reality. But before
 we do that, we'll want to rename and divide the modules so that they have
 the right names.  (Git handles edits better if there are no
 edit/split/move conflicts.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31849: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  0
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => teor
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 CI has passed.

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[tor-bugs] #31853 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move this_not_that.md into our coding standards document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31853: Move this_not_that.md into our coding standards document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,
 Severity:  Normal   |  s31-docs
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29214
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 There seems to be some overlap between our coding standards and the advice
 in this_not_that.md.

 We should merge that advice into the coding standards.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename doc/HACKING/design members to reflect current architectural division

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31852: Rename doc/HACKING/design members to reflect current architectural 
division
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think we have the following general headings:

 * Overview
 * Parts of the code
   * Lib
   * Core
   * Features
   * App
 * Data-flow discussion
 * ... ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31372 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31372: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I do not know a way to summarize these errors offhand, without significant
 new coding.

 We could run "make -k" twice, I guess?  That way it will re-build whatever
 failed, thus outputting the errors again.  That's a bit ugly though.

 Usually I grep for "error:" or search for it in my browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31759 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make "annotate_ifdef_directives" script comply with line-width limits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31759: Make "annotate_ifdef_directives" script comply with line-width limits
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #31713| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 > I did make a comment on the pull request about how our stated (and
 enforced) limit seems to be 79 characters. Which one is correct? (I would
 say that 79 characters is better than 80, because of diff line prefixes,
 etc.)

 This is actually a subtle issue in the annotate_ifdef_directives code: our
 lines are 79 characters long, not counting the terminating newline.  The
 `commented_line()` function assumes that it gets a terminating newline in
 its input, and so uses 80 as the max line width.

 But yeah, I agree this is not clear.

 I could do any of these solutions:
* Document that commented_line() requires a `fmt` that ends with a
 newline, and that LINE_WIDTH includes the newline.
* Change the calls to commented_line() so that they do not have a
 newline in `fmt`, and change LINE_WIDTH to 79.
* ... something else?

 Is there one that you think is best?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31334 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31334: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 042-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31334 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31334: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  BugSmashFund =>


Comment:

 (I don't think this is a BugSmashFund candidate, since it changes no user-
 visible behavior.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31334 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31334: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 Looks good, but should we also fix these instances?

 {{{
 % git grep 'masks' src/test
 src/test/fuzz/fuzzing_common.c:s.masks[LOG_WARN-LOG_ERR] |= LD_BUG;
 src/test/test_logging.c:  no_bug.masks[0] &= ~(LD_BUG|LD_GENERAL);
 src/test/test_options.c:  lst.masks[LOG_ERR - LOG_ERR] = ~0;
 src/test/test_options.c:  lst.masks[LOG_WARN - LOG_ERR] = ~0;
 src/test/test_options.c:  lst.masks[LOG_NOTICE - LOG_ERR] = ~0;
 src/test/testing_common.c:s.masks[LOG_WARN-LOG_ERR] |= LD_BUG;
 src/test/testing_common.c:s.masks[LOG_WARN-LOG_ERR] |= LD_BUG;
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement some more optional modules in Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31851: Implement some more optional modules in Tor
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design|  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:| Points:  5
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Here is my proposed design:

 Existing:
 * --disable-module-dirauth
   * Build tor without the Directory Authority module: tor can not run as a
 directory authority.
   * Disables AuthoritativeDirectory (minimal)

 Partially Implemented:
   * Disables *AuthoritativeDir*, and MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 options
 * Maybe these options should move under Directory Authority Server
 Options in the man page
   * Disables all the options under Directory Authority Server Options

 New:
 * --disable-module-dircache
   * Build tor without the Directory Cache module: tor can not run as a
 directory cache or authority. Implies --disable-module-dirauth.
   * Disables DirPort and DirCache (minimal)
   * Disables all the other options under Directory Server Options
   * Tor can't currently run as a dirauth without a DirPort, so we need the
 dircache to dirauth dependency
 * --disable-module-relay
   * Build tor without the Relay module: tor can not run as a relay,
 bridge, directory cache, or authority. Implies --disable-module-dircache
 and --disable-module-dirauth.
   * Disables ORPort and sets ClientOnly to 1 (minimal)
   * Disables all the other options under Server Options
   * Disables the --list-fingerprint, RelayBandwidth*,
 MaxAdvertisedBandwidth, PerConnBW*, and ServerTransportPlugin options
 * Maybe some of these options should move under Server Options in the
 man page
   * Tor can't currently run as a dircache without an ORPort, so we need
 the relay to dircache dependency

 Out of scope:
 * an onion service module
 * a module for code that is used by clients but not relays (for example,
 address reachability)
 * splitting bridge and non-bridge code

 Here's the CI design:
 * make all the CI jobs explicit using include (rather than the mix of
 matrix and non-matrix jobs we have right now)
   * we might want to backport this change, so future CI backports are
 easier
 * delete one of each pair of similar jobs with no options, rust,
 distcheck, and module-dirauth
 * add dircache and relay jobs

 Here's how I want to proceed:
 0. Make all CI jobs explicit, delete similar jobs, and backport
 1. Implement minimal --disable-module-dircache which disables DirPort and
 DirCache, with CI, but don't disable any code
 2. Implement minimal --disable-module-relay which disables ORPort and sets
 ClientOnly 1, with CI, but don't disable any code
 3. For each source code module, decide if it can be disabled when relay,
 dircache, or dirauth is disabled, and implement that change
 4. Depending on the config or control refactors, also disable the config
 or control for those modules

 Should we avoid confusion by calling these options --disable-relay-mode ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31372 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31372: Appveyor and Travis should use "make -k"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I like `make -k || make -k` and I'm happy with the ugliness, because
 almost no-one will see it.
 (And we can explain it in a comment, and perhaps with `echo "Re-running
 make to show errors"`.)

 But I am also happy to change my process, and do a search.

 What do you think would be easier for us, and for new contributors?
 I'll let you decide?


 It's probably also worth mentioning that this change will slow down
 failures. I think that's ok, but I sent an email to the network team list
 with other ways to speed up CI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename doc/HACKING/design members to reflect current architectural division

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31852: Rename doc/HACKING/design members to reflect current architectural 
division
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I'd like a discussion of data flow and event flow.
 And something about how we test (if that belongs here).
 What's remaining after that?

 Eventually, I'd like an explanation of config and control and how they are
 split between modules. (But that might be our target design.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31849: Move tor-guts.git into tor.git
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  0
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * type:  defect => task


Comment:

 This appears to be the latest version of torguts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31164 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set up default bridge at Karlstad University

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31164: Set up default bridge at Karlstad University
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201909R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201909R => tbb-bridges,
 TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-backport
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Merged to `tor-browser-build`'s `master` (commit
 e5922c8fc4c518112f2b32f57319306770071c3e) and to `tor-android-service`'s
 (commit 8d307a63a95a31d3578715ca407066062f9d7f5e; commit
 f13ad8814b2024c2fe02c8a163534d99c545cf86 on `tor-browser-build`'s `master`
 picks that change up).

 I guess if we make another 8.5 point release we could think about
 backporting the patches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31334 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31334: Use SEVERITY_MASK_IDX() to find the LOG_ERR index in the unit tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Oops yes my original branch was just focused on test_logging.c.

 I fixed all the instances, split into two commits (code movement and
 fixes), and force-pushed.

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