Re: [tor-bugs] #32938 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32938: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension, ux-team, |  Actual Points:  3
  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31109   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The refactoring in proxy-go, allowing proxy-go to treat the broker and the
 bridgestrap mostly equivalently, looks reasonable. I don't see this as
 something meant to be secure against adversarial proxies, only
 psychological reassurance for honest proxy operators. I really don't think
 this function should be rolled into the broker; actually I think the
 broker should be more compartmentalized overall. Even if it's running on
 the same host, I feel it should be a separate process.

 I'm having trouble understanding the control flow between `Snowflake` and
 `ThroughputLogger` in bridgestrap. `Snowflake.runTest` calls
 `Snowflake.MarkWritten` to store a timestamp in `ThroughputLogger`, then
 does `Snowflake.Write` which results in calls to `Snowflake.dc.OnMessage`,
 which calls `ThroughputLogger.AddBytes`, which writes into a channel read
 by `Snowflake.Log`, which then looks at the previously stored timestamp. I
 wonder if there's more of a straight-line way to write it.

 The high latency you mentioned in comment:9 seems to be a bug. Even in my
 localhost test, I get a latency of around 5 seconds. In the
 `time.Since(start)` computation, `time.Now()` is increasing faster than
 `start` is. In my local test, the difference increased smoothly and
 monotonically from 0.04 to 9.66 seconds over 940 iterations in `runTest`.
 Maybe there is some kind of buffering happening where packets are "sent"
 much faster than they are received; like maybe I can send in 10,000
 iterations almost instantly, while really those are being buffered by the
 OS and not really sent immediately.

 
https://gitlab.torproject.org/cohosh/bridgestrap/blob/c76fb1c24eacdeefddab699aa7ac2bf111c5e63f/snowflake.go#L153-160
 `AverageLatency` will panic with a division by zero if for whatever reason
 `count` is 0 (if there were no messages received). Why round the average
 latency to 1 second?

 
https://gitlab.torproject.org/cohosh/bridgestrap/blob/c76fb1c24eacdeefddab699aa7ac2bf111c5e63f/snowflake.go#L59
 The `OnMessage` callback assumes it has at least 4 bytes to work with and
 will panic if it does not. The design relies on the blocks sent by
 `runTest` retaining message boundaries when they come back into
 `OnMessage`, which isn't guaranteed. It's worth thinking about what a
 malicious proxy could do by falsifying the `count` value at the beginning
 of each buffer. It may be better to do something simpler like: send 10 KB,
 receive 10 KB, and only do another iteration once you've received the same
 number of bytes that you sent.

 I think there's a memory leak in `idToSnowflake` if the test never
 completes. A proxy could hit the /api/snowflake-poll route to add entries
 to the map and never hit /api/snowflake-test to remove them.

 
https://gitlab.torproject.org/cohosh/bridgestrap/blob/c76fb1c24eacdeefddab699aa7ac2bf111c5e63f/snowflake.go#L192
 [https://golang.org/pkg/math/rand/#Read Rand.Read] is documented never to
 return an error, so I would prefer a panic rather than an error return
 here.

 `APISnowflakeRequest` and `APISnowflakeTest` need a byte limit to prevent
 someone sending an infinite JSON object and using up all memory. A read
 deadline would make sense, too.

 An alternative design would be to reverse the direction of traffic flow.
 Let the proxy send data and bridgestrap reflect it. The proxy can compute
 its own throughput and latency locally. The bridgestrap part could then be
 made stateless except for the offer–answer matching.

 Like you, I'm not sure of the long-term utility of the throughput test
 feature. Maybe we'll soon see enough organic client use to cause proxies
 to actually be used, but that's hard to predict. "Give me a fake client on
 demand" could be a useful diagnostic feature to have. Conceivably we could
 do the same thing probabilistically in the normal course of operation of
 proxies: sometimes you get a real client, sometimes you get a "canary"
 client whose only purpose is to allow the proxy to assess its own health.

--
Ticket URL: 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-client, easy,|  Actual Points:
  intro, outreachy-ipv6  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by MrSquanchee):

 Hii mentors,

 You can check my pull request associated to this ticket here on github
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1795 .

 And thanks for your suggestions.

 P.S. This would be my first PR for torproject. Optimistic for the future
 :)

 Thanks,
 Suraj.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33195 [Core Tor/Tor]: Require IPv6 tests in Travis CI

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33195: Require IPv6 tests in Travis CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  consider-backport-immediately, tor-  |  Actual Points:  0.7
  ci, chutney, ipv6  |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * keywords:  consider-backport-after-0433, tor-ci, chutney, ipv6 =>
 consider-backport-immediately, tor-ci, chutney, ipv6
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.3.5 and later, because I need it for #33048.

 We also want to have consistent tor-chutney CI, particularly now that
 #33232 is merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33050 [Core Tor/Tor]: O1.3 - Integration test Tor relays over IPv6 using chutney

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33050: O1.3 - Integration test Tor relays over IPv6 using chutney
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33045| Points:  8
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Status update:

 We have implemented the first stage of this objective:
 * require chutney nodes to bootstrap
 * perform relay IPv4 reachability self-checks in chutney

 As we work on O1.1: Relay IPv6 Reachability Self-Checks, chutney should
 automatically test the new IPv6 reachability code.

 I'll leave #33228 open, in case we need to fix bugs in chutney, or add
 better chutney diagnostics.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33232 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Test IPv4 Reachability using Chutney

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33232: Test IPv4 Reachability using Chutney
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We implemented this feature in #33583, #33379, and #33378.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #33232 => #33050


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33598 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney does not fail on some SOCKS errors

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33598: chutney does not fail on some SOCKS errors
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: teor (removed)
 * parent:  #33232 => #33050


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: teor (removed)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33595 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Stop waiting for unchecked directory info

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33595: Stop waiting for unchecked directory info
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * parent:  #33232 => #33050


Old description:

> Once we've fixed #33428, we might be able to remove
> WAIT_FOR_UNCHECKED_DIR_INFO in chutney's TorNet.py.
>
> But we might still need to wait for:
> * onion service descriptors
> * internal tor state changes, in response to downloading descriptors
>
> So we will need to make this change, then test it on Tor 0.3.5 and
> master.

New description:

 Once we've fixed #33428 (microdescs), #33582 (bridges), and #33609 (onion
 services), we might be able to remove WAIT_FOR_UNCHECKED_DIR_INFO in
 chutney's TorNet.py.

 But we might still need to wait for:
 * internal tor state changes, in response to downloading descriptors.

 So we will need to make this change, then test it on Tor 0.3.5 and master.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33582 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make bridges wait until they have bootstrapped, before publishing their descriptor

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33582: Make bridges wait until they have bootstrapped, before publishing their
descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, tor-relay, prop311,  |  Actual Points:
  outreachy-ipv6 |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #33232 => #33050


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33408 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor versions sortable, by adding the commit number to EXTRA_INFO

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33408: Make tor versions sortable, by adding the commit number to EXTRA_INFO
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop311, needs-version-spec, |  Actual Points:
  outreachy-ipv6 |
Parent ID:  #33582   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #33232 => #33582


Comment:

 We might need this change for #33582.

 If we don't do #33582, it's not an urgent or important change.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33581 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Restore bridge networkstatus checks in chutney

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33581: Restore bridge networkstatus checks in chutney
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33582| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #33232 => #33582


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make chutney bridge authorities publish bridges in their networkstatus-bridges

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33407: Make chutney bridge authorities publish bridges in their networkstatus-
bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, tor-bridge, chutney,  |  Actual Points:
  outreachy-ipv6 |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #33232 => #33050


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33232 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  ipv6, prop311 => ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33428 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney check for relay microdescriptors before verifying

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33428: Make chutney check for relay microdescriptors before verifying
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #33232 => #33050


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ipv6, prop311
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33232
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can |
--+---
 Before verifying, chutney checks that:
 * each relay descriptor is cached at each node
 * each relay is in a consensus, cached at each node
 * each relay is in a microdesc consensus, cached at each node
 * each bridge descriptor is cached at each bridge client

 We have other tickets for checking:
 * microdescriptors
 * cached bridge descriptors at the bridge authority
 * the bridge networkstatus
 That just leaves onion services.

 Onion services are tricky, because they post to some HSDirs in the
 network, but not all. And those HSDirs don't cache the onion service
 descriptors in a file.

 So here is one possible design for this feature:
 * check each onion service log for a successful descriptor post to at
 least one HSDir
 * check v2 and v3 onion services
 * call it an extra 200% "bootstrap" stage (because it's a sender log
 check, not a receiver cached file check)
 * require 200% bootstrap for onion services

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop forcing IPv4 and IPv6 traffic on non-SOCKSPorts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33607: Stop forcing IPv4 and IPv6 traffic on non-SOCKSPorts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> After #32994, the defaults in `port_cfg_new()` will apply to all parsed
> ports. (Not just default ports.)
>
> I am not sure what we should do with the extra settings in
> `connection_listener_new()`:
> {{{
>   if (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) {
> lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1;
> lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 1;
> lis_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = 1;
>   }
> }}}
>
> Here are our options:
> * leave them there: non-SOCKSPorts will always have IPv4, IPv6, and
> prefer IPv6 traffic
> * copy the defaults from port_cfg_new(): non-SOCKSPorts will always have
> DNS, Onion, and prefer IPv6 virtual addresses. Forcing these options on
> might make some configs break.
> * delete them: non-SOCKSPorts can now disable IPv4, IPv6, and prefer IPv4
> traffic. Some rare configs might break, because they relied on the
> options being forced on.
>
> Here's what I think we should do long-term:
> * set reasonable defaults (in #32994)
> * stop forcing options on (this ticket)
> * warn users that some rare configs might break, and they should remove
> NoIPv4Traffic or NoIPv6Traffic as needed (this changes file)
>
> Note that "prefer IPv6 traffic" was added in #32637 in 0.4.3.1-alpha.
> Maybe we don't want to force that option on in this release? I'll open a
> child ticket.

New description:

 After #32994, the defaults in `port_cfg_new()` will apply to all parsed
 ports. (Not just default ports.)

 I am not sure what we should do with the extra settings in
 `connection_listener_new()`:
 {{{
   if (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) {
 lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1;
 lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 1;
 lis_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = 1;
   }
 }}}

 Here are our options:
 * leave them there: non-SOCKSPorts will always have IPv4, IPv6, and prefer
 IPv6 traffic
 * copy the defaults from port_cfg_new(): non-SOCKSPorts will always have
 DNS, Onion, and prefer IPv6 virtual addresses. Forcing these options on
 might make some configs break.
 * delete them: non-SOCKSPorts can now disable IPv4, IPv6, and prefer IPv4
 traffic. Some rare configs might break, because they relied on the options
 being forced on.

 Here's what I think we should do long-term:
 * set reasonable defaults (in #32994)
 * stop forcing options on (this ticket)
 * warn users that some rare configs might break, and they should remove
 NoIPv4Traffic or NoIPv6Traffic as needed (this changes file)

 "prefer IPv6 traffic" was added in #32637 in 0.4.3.1-alpha. We don't want
 to force that option on in 0.4.3, that makes the problem worse, and might
 break some existing configs. See #33608 for a fix.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33608 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop forcing prefer IPv6 on non-SOCKSPorts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33608: Stop forcing prefer IPv6 on non-SOCKSPorts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, 043-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33607| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  043-should => 043-should, 043-backport
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 See my PR:
 * 0.4.3: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1794

 Test branches for 0.4.3 and master are here:
 * https://github.com/teor2345/tor/branches/all?query=33608

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-client, easy,|  Actual Points:
  intro, outreachy-ipv6  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:10 MrSquanchee]:
 > I changed the code of `port_parse_config()` successfully accommodating a
 `port_config_t` object.

 > Suggest me if I should send a PR on github.com.

 Great! Please send PRs whenever you write code.

 We can't give feedback unless we can see the code :-)

 I also noticed one place where you will need to be careful:
 * prefer_ipv6_virtaddr is called prefer_ipv6_automap in
 `port_parse_config()`

 > But still I can't see a necessity of a default `port_config_t` in
 `connection_listener_new()` because it's just memcopying in ln1500
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/core/mainloop/connection.c#n1500

 You're right, these ports come from `get_configured_ports()`, which is set
 in `parse_ports()`, which uses `port_parse_config()`.

 > and setting the traffic values conditionally here at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/core/mainloop/connection.c#n1517
 . So it doesn't seem nice to me to give them defaults without checking the
 condition at line 1517.

 When you update `port_parse_config()` to use `port_cfg_new()`, all the
 defaults will come from the same place.

 So I am not sure what we should do with the extra settings in
 `connection_listener_new()` at line 1517. I think we should delete them
 (stop forcing them on). But that's not a simple refactor, and it needs to
 happen in two different releases. So I opened #33607 and #33608 for that
 change.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33608 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop forcing prefer IPv6 on non-SOCKSPorts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33608: Stop forcing prefer IPv6 on non-SOCKSPorts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  043-should
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33607
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #32637 we forced PreferIPv6 on all non-SOCKSPorts.

 That could be a breaking change for some users, and they will have no way
 to recover. We should just set a sensible default, and let users tweak it
 if it doesn't work for them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop forcing IPv4 and IPv6 traffic on non-SOCKSPorts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33607: Stop forcing IPv4 and IPv6 traffic on non-SOCKSPorts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  044-should
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 After #32994, the defaults in `port_cfg_new()` will apply to all parsed
 ports. (Not just default ports.)

 I am not sure what we should do with the extra settings in
 `connection_listener_new()`:
 {{{
   if (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) {
 lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1;
 lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 1;
 lis_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = 1;
   }
 }}}

 Here are our options:
 * leave them there: non-SOCKSPorts will always have IPv4, IPv6, and prefer
 IPv6 traffic
 * copy the defaults from port_cfg_new(): non-SOCKSPorts will always have
 DNS, Onion, and prefer IPv6 virtual addresses. Forcing these options on
 might make some configs break.
 * delete them: non-SOCKSPorts can now disable IPv4, IPv6, and prefer IPv4
 traffic. Some rare configs might break, because they relied on the options
 being forced on.

 Here's what I think we should do long-term:
 * set reasonable defaults (in #32994)
 * stop forcing options on (this ticket)
 * warn users that some rare configs might break, and they should remove
 NoIPv4Traffic or NoIPv6Traffic as needed (this changes file)

 Note that "prefer IPv6 traffic" was added in #32637 in 0.4.3.1-alpha.
 Maybe we don't want to force that option on in this release? I'll open a
 child ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33448 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33448: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 two problems were signaled about the migration. one was reported about a
 sync problem around 1700 EDT, but that was due to the downtime during the
 migration.

 the other was real, and was me forgetting to do a sweep of the IP address
 in our DNS records. i had forgotten to changes the
 `bridges.torproject.org` record. this was resolved in:

 {{{
 commit 033d55f41c9aa366f6eb4d3400b9b87fcf89c33f (HEAD -> master,
 origin/master, origin/HEAD)
 Author: Antoine Beaupré 
 Date:   Thu Mar 12 20:27:00 2020 -0400

 move polyanthum to gnt-fsn cluster (#33448)

 diff --git a/torproject.org b/torproject.org
 index cc9b935..f7a40ca 100644
 --- a/torproject.org
 +++ b/torproject.org
 @@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ cache IN  MX  0 .
 IN  
 2a01:4f8:fff0:4f:266:37ff:fe26:d6e1 ; cache01
 IN  A   78.47.61.104 ; cache-02
 IN  2a01:4f8:c010:25ff::1 ; cache-02
 -bridgesIN  A   78.47.38.229
 ; polyanthum
 -   IN  2a01:4f8:211:6e8:0:823:5:1  ;
 polyanthum
 +bridgesIN  A   116.202.120.184
 ; polyanthum
 +   IN  
 2a01:4f8:fff0:4f:266:37ff:fef9:f825 ; polyanthum
 IN  MX  0 polyanthum
  ;cdn-fastlyIN  CNAME   global.prod.fastly.net.
  ;cdn-fastlyIN  CNAME   l.ssl.fastly.net.   ;
 US/EU Network (United States and Europe)
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-client, easy,|  Actual Points:
  intro, outreachy-ipv6  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by MrSquanchee):

 I changed the code of `port_parse_config()` successfully accommodating a
 `port_config_t` object.
 But still I can't see a necessity of a default `port_config_t` in
 `connection_listener_new()` because it's just memcopying in ln1500
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/core/mainloop/connection.c#n1500
 and setting the traffic values conditionally here at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/core/mainloop/connection.c#n1517
 . So it doesn't seem nice to me to give them defaults without checking the
 condition at line 1517. Suggest me if I should send a PR on github.com.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33451 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a script to install git tools and hooks

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33451: Write a script to install git tools and hooks
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Squashed and merged to master.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33583 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Stop setting AssumeReachable on chutney relays and bridges

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33583: Stop setting AssumeReachable on chutney relays and bridges
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311 |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:  #33232 => #33050
 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.3


Comment:

 Merged to chutney master.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33379 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney wait for all relays in the consensus before verifying

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33379: Make chutney wait for all relays in the consensus before verifying
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311 |  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:  #33232 => #33050


Comment:

 Merged #33583 to chutney master.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33361 [Core Tor/Tor]: relay: Warn about the lack of ContactInfo and the consequence

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33361: relay: Warn about the lack of ContactInfo and the consequence
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  042-backport, 043-backport, consider-  |
  backport-after-0433, network-health|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  035-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport, 043-backport,
 network-health =>
 035-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport, 043-backport, consider-
 backport-after-0433, network-health


Comment:

 It looks like Nick has merged the CI fix.

 Scheduling for backport after the next alpha.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33029 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or other dir auths

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33029: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or
other dir auths
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth 043-must 042-backport|  Actual Points:  1
  consider-backport-after-0433   |
Parent ID:  #33018   | Points:  0.4
 Reviewer:  nickm, armadev   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth 043-must 042-backport => tor-dirauth 043-must
 042-backport consider-backport-after-0433


Comment:

 Nick, I'm not sure exactly what timeframe you had in mind here.

 Do you want to merge it before or after 0.4.3.3-alpha?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32672 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32672: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  041-backport, 042-backport, consider-  |
  backport-after-authority-test, fast-fix,   |
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 So just to confirm, we're waiting for phw to reach out to bridge
 operators, before merging this change?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31614 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31614: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  diagnostics, 042-should, 041-backport-maybe,   |
  regression, BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 consider-backport-after-042-stable, consider-backport-if-needed,
 diagnostics, 042-should, 035-backport-maybe, 040-backport-maybe, 041
 -backport-maybe, regression, BugSmashFund
 =>
 consider-backport-after-042-stable, diagnostics, 042-should, 041
 -backport-maybe, regression, BugSmashFund
 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Similar code has caused some bugs, and 0.4.0 is obsolete, so I'm going to
 close these tickets without backport.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31736 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using mutex_destroy(), when multiple threads can still access the mutex

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31736: Stop using mutex_destroy(), when multiple threads can still access the
mutex
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  diagnostics, 042-should, 041-backport-maybe,   |
  regression, BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:  #31614   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 consider-backport-after-042-stable, consider-backport-if-needed,
 diagnostics, 042-should, 035-backport-maybe, 040-backport-maybe, 041
 -backport-maybe, regression, BugSmashFund
 =>
 consider-backport-after-042-stable, diagnostics, 042-should, 041
 -backport-maybe, regression, BugSmashFund
 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Similar code has caused some bugs, and 0.4.0 is obsolete, so I'm going to
 close these tickets without backport.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33460 [Core Tor/Tor]: confmgt: include variable name in all complaints.

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33460: confmgt: include variable name in all complaints.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ui, ux, ui-regression 043-may??  |  implemented
  043-backport   |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #33014   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33583 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Stop setting AssumeReachable on chutney relays and bridges

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33583: Stop setting AssumeReachable on chutney relays and bridges
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311 |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #33232| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 CI failed due to a macOS hang, I restarted it, and it passed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31634 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check .may_include order and tor subsystem init order are compatible

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31634: Check .may_include order and tor subsystem init order are compatible
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, practracker  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Sorry it's taken me a while to review this, I've been busy with some
 urgent things the past few weeks.

 The code looks good, I added comments about a few typos and tweaks.

 There are a few conflicts between this PR and master.

 I think I ran `tor --dbg-dump-subsystem-list` and `practracker/includes.py
 --check-subsystem-order` the way you expect, and got the expected results.
 But I'm not sure.

 Can we add the relevant commands to `make check`?
 Then I can run it locally, and in CI, and confirm we got the expected
 results.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30917 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and rename the file

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30917: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and
rename the file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor31-maybe, 043-should, |  Actual Points:  .1
  postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for updating this document. Sorry it took me a while to get to it,
 I have been a bit busy with Sponsor 55, Outreachy, GSOC, and feedback the
 past few weeks.

 I have asked for a bunch of tweaks to the doc. I'm also happy to make
 those changes myself, and get you to review them?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update EndOfLifeTor.md with our latest end of life process

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30839: Update EndOfLifeTor.md with our latest end of life process
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  044-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30917| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:   => #30917


Comment:

 Done in #30917.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update EndOfLifeTor.md with our latest end of life process

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30839: Update EndOfLifeTor.md with our latest end of life process
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #30835 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30917 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and rename the file

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30917: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and
rename the file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor31-maybe, 043-should, |  Actual Points:  .1
  postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #30839 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30835 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor's maint-0.3.4 branch is deprecated, and maint-0.4.1 has been created

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30835: Tor's maint-0.3.4 branch is deprecated, and maint-0.4.1 has been created
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  041-deferred-20190719  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30838 [Webpages/Website]: Update the Debian instructions for experimental-0.4.1

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30838: Update the Debian instructions for experimental-0.4.1
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  041-deferred-20190719  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30835 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33451 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a script to install git tools and hooks

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33451: Write a script to install git tools and hooks
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I didn't run it, but it looks fine to me.

 I opened #33603 to follow up the comment about bash "unofficial strict
 mode". (Shellcheck already gets us some of these things, but runtime
 checks are also helpful.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Catch common errors in tor bash scripts (was: Catch common errors in bash scripts)

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33603: Catch common errors in tor bash scripts
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  enhancement => task


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33604 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Catch common bash runtime errors in chutney scripts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33604: Catch common bash runtime errors in chutney scripts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  enhancement => task


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33605 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Catch common bash runtime errors in fallback scripts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33605: Catch common bash runtime errors in fallback scripts
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => task


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33606 [Core Tor/sbws]: Catch common bash errors in sbws scripts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33606: Catch common bash errors in sbws scripts
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 We're going to gradually update tor, chutney, and fallback-scripts bash
 scripts to catch more errors. sbws might also want to make similar
 changes.

 I'm not sure if sbws uses shellcheck already. Shellcheck helps catch
 errors while writing scripts.

 To catch more runtime failures, set these options at the start of each
 script:
 {{{
 set -e
 set -u
 set -o pipefail
 }}}

 You might also want to set:
 {{{
 IFS=$'\n\t'
 }}}
 But it can change how lists are processed.

 These settings help catch common errors in bash scripts at runtime:
 http://redsymbol.net/articles/unofficial-bash-strict-mode/

 But they can cause scripts to fail, so you should have good unit tests and
 CI for all your scripts, before making these changes.

 Follow-up to #33451.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33605 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Catch common bash runtime errors in fallback scripts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33605: Catch common bash runtime errors in fallback scripts
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Let's gradually convert our scripts to use:
 {{{
 set -e
 set -u
 set -o pipefail
 }}}

 And maybe:
 {{{
 IFS=$'\n\t'
 }}}

 These settings help catch common errors in bash scripts at runtime:
 http://redsymbol.net/articles/unofficial-bash-strict-mode/

 (Shellcheck helps us catch errors while writing scripts, but it can't help
 with runtime failures.)

 Follow-up to #33451.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33604 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Catch common bash runtime errors in chutney scripts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33604: Catch common bash runtime errors in chutney scripts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Let's gradually convert our scripts to use:
 {{{
 set -e
 set -u
 set -o pipefail
 }}}

 And maybe:
 {{{
 IFS=$'\n\t'
 }}}

 These settings help catch common errors in bash scripts at runtime:
 http://redsymbol.net/articles/unofficial-bash-strict-mode/

 (Shellcheck helps us catch errors while writing scripts, but it can't help
 with runtime failures.)

 Follow-up to #33451.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Catch common errors in bash scripts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33603: Catch common errors in bash scripts
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> Let's gradually convert our scripts to use:
> {{{
> set -e
> set -u
> set -o pipefail
> }}}
>
> And maybe:
> {{{
> IFS=$'\n\t'
> }}
>
> These settings help catch common errors in bash scripts at runtime:
> http://redsymbol.net/articles/unofficial-bash-strict-mode/
>
> (Shellcheck helps us catch errors while writing scripts, but it can't
> help with runtime failures.)
>
> Follow-up to #33451.

New description:

 Let's gradually convert our scripts to use:
 {{{
 set -e
 set -u
 set -o pipefail
 }}}

 And maybe:
 {{{
 IFS=$'\n\t'
 }}}

 These settings help catch common errors in bash scripts at runtime:
 http://redsymbol.net/articles/unofficial-bash-strict-mode/

 (Shellcheck helps us catch errors while writing scripts, but it can't help
 with runtime failures.)

 Follow-up to #33451.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Catch common errors in bash scripts

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33603: Catch common errors in bash scripts
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Let's gradually convert our scripts to use:
 {{{
 set -e
 set -u
 set -o pipefail
 }}}

 And maybe:
 {{{
 IFS=$'\n\t'
 }}

 These settings help catch common errors in bash scripts at runtime:
 http://redsymbol.net/articles/unofficial-bash-strict-mode/

 (Shellcheck helps us catch errors while writing scripts, but it can't help
 with runtime failures.)

 Follow-up to #33451.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33131 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fffffff

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33131: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fff
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Redid the branch a bit. Not sure how to test it.

 Replying to [comment:8 nickm]:

 Yeah, the logging shouldn't be in the final version. It would just help to
 confirm which number is the one that's extremely high: at_most, or
 buf->datalen.

 Logging would definitely be too loud, considering #31036 and #32022.

 (Historical note, this
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=ee5471f9aab55269c8c480f1f90dfeb08803ac15
 particular check] was added in #21369.)

 So the high burst value, which becomes `at_most` later, is set in
 `connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper`. Doesn't it comes from the
 `BandwidthBurst` option, not `BandwidthRate`?

 As long as we add this sanity check, is there a problem with keeping this
 behavior of using that high value from the user's configuration? `at_most`
 serves as an upper bound on what can be read from the socket in one go, so
 it has to be limited by something like `BUF_MAX_LEN`, but the burst limit
 in the token bucket doesn't have to be limited by that. The burst limit
 persists across multiple calls to `connection_handle_read()` (and any
 draining of `inbuf` in between calls).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33008 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Display a bridge's distribution bucket

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33008: Display a bridge's distribution bucket
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o24a1, anti-censorship-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  2020Q1 metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31281   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Okay, I agree that we should distinguish five bridge distribution
 mechanisms in Relay Search with links to BridgeDB's information page:

  - "HTTPS", "Email", and "Moat";

  - "Reserved": also known as "unallocated" in bridge pool assignment files
 which most bridge operators will never hear about; and

  - "None": either not distributed by BridgeDB as requested by the bridge
 operator, or distributed via one of the four other mechanisms but too new
 for Relay Search to know. (The info page should probably mention both
 possibilities.)

 If this makes sense, we can tell Relay Search to display these terms
 (using this capitalization) rather than the raw strings it receives from
 bridge pool assignment files.

 Regarding a possible change to BridgeDB to actually rename these strings
 in bridge pool assignment files, I'd rather want to avoid that. There's
 not really a spec for bridge pool assignment files where we could write
 down when we changed "unallocated" to "reserved" and why. Soon we'd forgot
 why we renamed this string and whether "unallocated" and "reserved" are
 actually the same thing or not. It's a bit like onion service directories
 still using relay flag "HSDir" rather than "OSDir". Historically,
 "unallocated" was the correct term when the only alternatives were to
 allocate a bridge to the HTTPS or Email distributor. It's just a bit less
 correct since there's now another alternative to really not assign a
 bridge to any distributor and instead drop it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33090 [Metrics/Library]: Make all Descriptor implementors serializable

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33090: Make all Descriptor implementors serializable
-+--
 Reporter:  notirl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * cc: metrics-team (added)
 * reviewer:   => irl


Comment:

 Alright, I have a branch that I tested with CollecTor's `recent/`
 directory and which might also work for your use case. (The trick with
 that TreeMap was to turn the lambda comparator into its own serializable
 `Comparator` class. It's not that all TreeMaps are non-serializable,
 AFAIK.)

 Can you give this branch a try? The patch is
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/commit/?h=task-33090=e2fc2cb14dbd2ff6db0a062cdec2c9815b7f
 commit e2fc2cb in my task-33090 branch].

 We should soon decide about revising/merging this branch, because it has
 high potential of creating merge conflicts with all the files it touches.
 Setting priority to high for that reason.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33085 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decomission unifolium/kvm2, 6 VMs to migrate

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33085: decomission unifolium/kvm2, 6 VMs to migrate
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> * [x] cupani.torproject.org (git-rw) migrated in #33446
>  * [ ] polyanthum.torproject.org (bridges) #33448
>  * [ ] omeiense.torproject.org (onionoo.torproject.org) (possibly to
> decom? see #32268) #33447
>  * [x] savii.torproject.org (static content backend) retired in #33441
>  * [x] build-x86-07.torproject.org (buildbox) retired in #33442)
>  * [x] bracteata.torproject.org (sandstorm) retired in #32390
>
> Requires a new gnt node (#33081).

New description:

 * [x] cupani.torproject.org (git-rw) migrated in #33446
  * [x] polyanthum.torproject.org (bridges) #33448
  * [x] omeiense.torproject.org (onionoo.torproject.org) (possibly to
 decom? see #32268) #33447
  * [x] savii.torproject.org (static content backend) retired in #33441
  * [x] build-x86-07.torproject.org (buildbox) retired in #33442)
  * [x] bracteata.torproject.org (sandstorm) retired in #32390

 Requires a new gnt node (#33081).

--

Comment (by anarcat):

 all vms moved, now i just need to retire unifolium!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33448 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33448: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 host removal scheduled from unifolium in 7 days (but by then the kvm host
 will be retired anyways). all done here.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33448 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33448: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 ldap: check
 puppet: check (no change needed)
 nagios: check
 host check: done
 drbd: in progress

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33448 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33448: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 in progress. machine shutdown on unifolium and successfully migrated on
 gnt-fsn.

 ip address diff:

 {{{
 --- /mnt/etc/network/interfaces.bak 2016-06-15 18:41:17.071301302
 +
 +++ /mnt/etc/network/interfaces 2020-03-12 21:07:38.549359710 +
 @@ -6,11 +6,11 @@
  iface lo inet loopback

  # The primary network interface
 -allow-hotplug eth0
 +auto eth0
  iface eth0 inet static
 -address 78.47.38.229/28
 -gateway 78.47.38.225
 +address 116.202.120.184/27
 +gateway 116.202.120.161
  iface eth0 inet6 static
  accept_ra 0
 -address 2a01:4f8:211:6e8:0:823:5:1/96
 -gateway 2a01:4f8:211:6e8:0:823:0:1
 +address 2a01:4f8:fff0:4f:266:37ff:fef9:f825/64
 +gateway 2a01:4f8:fff0:4f::1
 }}}

 doing final renumbering

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33590 [Core Tor/sbws]: total consensus weight too high (was: SBWS maatuska is broken)

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33590: total consensus weight too high
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * version:  sbws: unspecified => sbws: 1.1.0
 * milestone:   => sbws: unspecified


Comment:

 Thanks starlight for reporting the bug.
 maatuska is running sbws from git, some commit after v1.1.0 release
 (confirming which).
 This is probably a duplicate of #33350 or related too.
 I suspect is again some unit conversion but haven't check.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33447 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: migrate omeiense to the ganeti cluster, triggering an IP change

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33447: migrate omeiense to the ganeti cluster, triggering an IP change
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 the host was retired from unifolium. the only remaining match for the ip
 address is in the nagios check, and i think that will go away by itself
 after a while.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33447 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: migrate omeiense to the ganeti cluster, triggering an IP change

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33447: migrate omeiense to the ganeti cluster, triggering an IP change
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 host migrated, ip address changed:

 {{{
 --- /mnt/etc/network/interfaces.bak 2016-06-10 15:14:57.382544239
 +
 +++ /mnt/etc/network/interfaces 2020-03-12 19:25:30.423758502 +
 @@ -6,11 +6,11 @@
  iface lo inet loopback

  # The primary network interface
 -allow-hotplug eth0
 +auto eth0
  iface eth0 inet static
 -address 78.47.38.227/28
 -gateway 78.47.38.225
 +address 116.202.120.183/27
 +gateway 116.202.120.161
  iface eth0 inet6 static
  accept_ra 0
 -address 2a01:4f8:211:6e8:0:823:3:1/96
 -gateway 2a01:4f8:211:6e8:0:823:0:1
 +address 2a01:4f8:fff0:4f:266:37ff:fe77:1ad8/64
 +gateway 2a01:4f8:fff0:4f::1
 }}}

 LDAP and Nagios changed, remaining:

  10. DRBD
  11. Puppet, DNS, reverse DNS
  12. retirement

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33602 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: monitor certificate transparency log

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33602: monitor certificate transparency log
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by anarcat:

Old description:

> we should use something like SSLMate.com or certspotter to monitor
> certificates issued in our place.
>
> https://github.com/SSLMate/certspotter
>
> this could be ran on nevii, nagios or pauli. it's unclear what we should
> do with the output, there will be possibly be lots of false positive, as
> the certificates will appear in our logs every time one of our cert is
> (legitimitely) renewed.
>
> it's a debian package since buster. i ran a test locally, and it's
> basically:
>
> {{{
> sed 's/ /\n/g;/^#/d;/^ *$/d' letsencryt-domains/domains  | sort |
> certspotter -watchlist -
> }}}

New description:

 we should use something like SSLMate.com or certspotter to monitor
 certificates issued in our place.

 https://github.com/SSLMate/certspotter

 this could be ran on nevii, nagios or pauli. it's unclear what we should
 do with the output, there will be possibly be lots of false positive, as
 the certificates will appear in our logs every time one of our cert is
 (legitimitely) renewed.

 it's a debian package since buster. i ran a test locally, and it's
 basically:

 {{{
 sed 's/ /\n/g;/^#/d;/^ *$/d' letsencryt-domains/domains  | sort |
 certspotter -watchlist -
 }}}

 the key trick however, is to *not* warn *when* a new cert is renewed.
 therefore we would need to be somewhat clever and recognize our own
 certificates in there and filter those out.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33602 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: monitor certificate transparency log

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33602: monitor certificate transparency log
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services   |Version:
  Admin Team |
 Severity:  Major|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 we should use something like SSLMate.com or certspotter to monitor
 certificates issued in our place.

 https://github.com/SSLMate/certspotter

 this could be ran on nevii, nagios or pauli. it's unclear what we should
 do with the output, there will be possibly be lots of false positive, as
 the certificates will appear in our logs every time one of our cert is
 (legitimitely) renewed.

 it's a debian package since buster. i ran a test locally, and it's
 basically:

 {{{
 sed 's/ /\n/g;/^#/d;/^ *$/d' letsencryt-domains/domains  | sort |
 certspotter -watchlist -
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33593 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33593: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19409   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33593 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33593: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19409   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 We discussed in the anti-censorship meeting today how to handle this. My
 proposal for this would be to:
 1) split up the Snowflake mono repo into two repositories: one for the
 browser-based Snowflake proxy code (written in JavaScript), and one for
 the main Go Snowflake components (client, server, proxy-go, and broker
 code)

 2) Each of these repos have a repo-wide version. So we'll keep doing
 webextension versioning as before (though maybe remove the `webext` prefix
 since it applies to the badge as well), and then have a version for all Go
 Snowflake components (this ties in with the recent move to Go modules in
 #0 as well).

 Full meeting logs are available here: http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-
 meeting/2020/tor-meeting.2020-03-12-17.59.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33594 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fenix Use of Glean

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33594: Fenix Use of Glean
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33184| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:3 boklm]:
 > > (2) also seems a bit of a pain because the android-components is going
 through heavy development would require redoing the patches each time.
 >
 > Could we add a configure flag to disable this, and submit the patch to
 Mozilla so we don't have to redo the patch for each release?
 That's a good idea, let me see how feasible this looks in the code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31201 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Allow webextension users to specify how many resources it uses

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31201: Allow webextension users to specify how many resources it uses
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---
Changes (by arlolra):

 * owner:  (none) => arlolra
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33594 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fenix Use of Glean

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33594: Fenix Use of Glean
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33184| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 > (2) also seems a bit of a pain because the android-components is going
 through heavy development would require redoing the patches each time.

 Could we add a configure flag to disable this, and submit the patch to
 Mozilla so we don't have to redo the patch for each release?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31701 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31701: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability, measurement,   |  Actual Points:
  s30-o23a2  |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  reachability, measurement, s30-o23a3 => reachability,
 measurement, s30-o23a2


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31701 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31701: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability, measurement,   |  Actual Points:
  s30-o23a3  |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  reachability, measurement => reachability, measurement,
 s30-o23a3
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor30-can
 * parent:   => #31280


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33578 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump Snowflake version to 58b52eb9f7

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33578: Bump Snowflake version to 58b52eb9f7
+--
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202003R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33361 [Core Tor/Tor]: relay: Warn about the lack of ContactInfo and the consequence

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33361: relay: Warn about the lack of ContactInfo and the consequence
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  042-backport, 043-backport, network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've added another commit to the branch , to make the unit tests pass.
 I'm testing it on 0.4.3, and if it passes, I'll merge it to 0.4.3 and
 forward.

 (Please remember to check CI, folks!)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23225 [Applications/GetTor]: GetTor should ignore quoted keywords in email replies that quote the help message

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23225: GetTor should ignore quoted keywords in email replies that quote the 
help
message
+
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9036   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  phw |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged at
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/gettor.git/commit/?id=0cd6443cdd8964fbfad00010d2cd0220f31e18f0
 f31e18f0]

 Deployed to `gettor-01`
 {{{
 2020-03-12T17:18:05+ [gettor#info] Starting services.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33008 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Display a bridge's distribution bucket

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33008: Display a bridge's distribution bucket
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o24a1, anti-censorship-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  2020Q1 metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31281   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:20 karsten]:
 > But I think we need to consider something else here. Bridge operators
 can request in their torrc file how their bridge is going to be
 distributed. [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-
 spec.txt#n655 Recognized methods are: "none", "any", "https", "email",
 "moat".]
 [[br]]
 If a bridge sets `BridgeDistribution none` in its config file, BridgeDB
 will
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/tree/bridgedb/Bridges.py?id=1f614896ed3442c8758e7ea10bef0c1fc366a4c1#n508
 discard the bridge's descriptor]. Bridges may end up in the "unallocated"
 bucket if they set `BridgeDistribution any` (which is the default), in
 which case BridgeDB ''may'' toss them into "unallocated".
 [[br]]
 > But I'm not yet sure why those 76 bridges are not included in any
 distributor, not even the "unallocated" distributor. It could be that
 they're too new (bridge pool assignment files are only synced once per day
 at UTC midnight). It could have other reasons like older tor versions.
 [[br]]
 We encourage people to set `BridgeDistribution none` if they want their
 bridge to show up on Relay Search, but don't want BridgeDB to distribute
 it. Most of our default bridges fall into that category.
 [[br]]
 > In any case it seems possible that a bridge will show up with "none" in
 Relay Search, and we might have to provide information on BridgeDB's
 information page what that means. In a way these bridges are truly
 unallocated.
 [[br]]
 Oh,
 
[https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/53ABAB9A45134DD1D3B3DCF53BFA35BE4E856EC2
 you are right]. That's a great point that I had not considered. Now that
 we have both "unallocated" and "none", it seems more important to rename
 "unallocated" to "reserved". It doesn't seem too difficult to change every
 occurrence of "unallocated" in BridgeDB. How is the Metrics side looking?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33464 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: ed25519 has been removed by maintainer, breaking obfs4 builds and go gets

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33464: ed25519 has been removed by maintainer, breaking obfs4 builds and go 
gets
-+--
 Reporter:  markness@…   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Old description:

> As of 2020-02-26 the maintainer of https://github.com/agl/ed25519/ has
> removed all their code, their releases, and everything to do with their
> ed25519 project.
>
> This means building projects that import that module, without having the
> module in an old go `vendor` directory fail.
>
>go get -v git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfs4.git/obfs4proxy
>package github.com/agl/ed25519/extra25519: cannot find package
> "github.com/agl/ed25519/extra25519"
>
> As such this project cannot be built or included by anything that fetches
> it with `go get`
>
> I'm not sure if this library is imported anywhere else, but it certainly
> is used in obfs4

New description:

 As of 2020-02-26 the maintainer of https://github.com/agl/ed25519/ has
 removed all their code, their releases, and everything to do with their
 ed25519 project.

 This means building projects that import that module, without having the
 module in an old go `vendor` directory fail.

 {{{
 go get -v git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfs4.git/obfs4proxy
 package github.com/agl/ed25519/extra25519: cannot find package
 "github.com/agl/ed25519/extra25519"
 }}}

 As such this project cannot be built or included by anything that fetches
 it with `go get`

 I'm not sure if this library is imported anywhere else, but it certainly
 is used in obfs4

--

Comment (by dcf):

 markness, what version of go are you using? (Run `go version`.)

 Current versions of go using [https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/Modules
 go.mod] should be able to access the older commit where extra25519 is
 still available. github.com/agl/ed25519 hasn't been completely deleted,
 only deprecated, and all the code is still present in commit
 [https://github.com/agl/ed25519/tree/5312a61534124124185d41f09206b9fef1d88403
 5312a6153412] which is what
 
[https://gitlab.com/yawning/obfs4/-/blob/c357dd56dfa63add9eca7ed9d7de11c69c2a66f1/go.mod
 obfs4's go.mod] specifies:
 {{{
 require(
 github.com/agl/ed25519 v0.0.0-20170116200512-5312a6153412
 )
 }}}

 I can imagine this would cause problems with the Tor Browser nightly
 build, which ignores go.mod and uses master of most dependencies, but I
 haven't heard of any problems there yet.

 BTW the upstream of obfs4 is gitlab.com/yawning/obfs4, not
 git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfs4.git.

 So putting aside the possible implementation issues in comment:1, it
 should still be possible to build obfs4. With an older version of go, you
 can probably do
 {{{
 go get github.com/agl/ed25519
 cd $GOPATH/src/github.com/agl/ed25519
 git reset --hard 5312a6153412
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add the tor version key to the bandwidth file specification

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33572: Add the tor version key to the bandwidth file specification
--+--
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  assigne
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap, bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33576 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update pion-webrtc version to 2.2.3

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33576: Update pion-webrtc version to 2.2.3
--+--
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Here's a patch that updates it using the script method from #28942:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/cohosh/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug/33576=282f699cd4079a8f6947876e1005b318a3349fb8

 I had to make a few modifications to the script to account for new patters
 in the output of `go mod graph`, I've attached the script to this ticket.
 I'm going to take a look and see if we can prune some of the dependencies.
 dcf pointed out in #0 that some of the dependencies are only needed
 for tests.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33576 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update pion-webrtc version to 2.2.3

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33576: Update pion-webrtc version to 2.2.3
--+--
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "gomodtorbm" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33361 [Core Tor/Tor]: relay: Warn about the lack of ContactInfo and the consequence

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33361: relay: Warn about the lack of ContactInfo and the consequence
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  042-backport, 043-backport, network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 I've squashed the branch as ticket33361_035_01_squashed with a PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1793 .

 I've merged it to 0.4.3 and forward, and am marking it as an easy
 backport.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31528 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Get rid of BridgeDB's "chatspeak"

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31528: Get rid of BridgeDB's "chatspeak"
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by agix):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Changed all occurrences of 'Uh oh, spaghettios!' to just simply 'Oh no!'.
 No other obscure references can be found.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31528 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Get rid of BridgeDB's "chatspeak"

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31528: Get rid of BridgeDB's "chatspeak"
+
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by agix):

 * Attachment "0001-Changed-all-occurrences-of-Uh-oh-spaghettios-to-
 just.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33601 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add karsten to check and tordnsel LDAP groups

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33601: Please add karsten to check and tordnsel LDAP groups
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33601 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add karsten to check and tordnsel LDAP groups

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33601: Please add karsten to check and tordnsel LDAP groups
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 done, may take 5 min to propagate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33601 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add karsten to check and tordnsel LDAP groups

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33601: Please add karsten to check and tordnsel LDAP groups
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 For trac.torproject.org on 2020-03-12 after lunch:

 Please add karsten to the check and tordnsel LDAP groups, as discussed
 just now
 in IRC.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/ps4MHN0fw3t6AudF4mIfdjVvF0FAl5qVkIACgkQF4mIfdjV
 vF3vTBAApV6wvzBFPhn/dUjHq/qsIu2sBCKmaGaIkZ75gMHrz2dMej/VdIESM4kR
 p7h918sBC4MMXs5TXlGvBPASWZEmRq4M5ljB8SnYJpDlwSzO9j9RDe67GY7xlyat
 Sn987sMwzvdVISAGqTEyhTpvjPqeVdH+BE0HLPMrLGu/gbC9J4NQwC6O2ZnacUXd
 lXZqKac0470Af7t2zSCXvz22Diq2pLwsGpnYl6YR+OXtGoJ4SLMicyQKQqZKI729
 a+w+lOOdyXV0AgK2nIaaZ+2Pk1xfrIBcjGLyA2Z+saPpat4ysK+C1GiyvDGQoulW
 RBMVYEY+IlCzbMKErfx4ix0HiQU5QcHXr+41ixr5FYbmA3nEk7sUdsnh6W2y8+P8
 G145qxbHkctkwMF4RpRgGzm1+4rSC2NPndMBf+2xs6AzSVv6/Og9Ju+O+l1jiC5r
 77hoG+iGj4dAC1TMhrdpG7/bYXLcn/V5dw3lg1jsEWe6S4jlt6fmBUDd1KFPIMMC
 OoknWqkHhHDU6tgr8d4mFiXpHSd//sRwgyqp3CftEdYaQUn/l+3sVtuBP1bpoDbS
 LOlJqHeVQqdO9pYCuaWPgIydisQHz7c2ewvGNUyjaA9iEwZIiKjxANotfz/X/fY7
 ItTGZ00dC8D5zvNkE0xanv2NYnWys8RoWVgCp7krUcZ1y4O0Noo=
 =chc3
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33510 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Send service change announcement for check/tordnsel

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33510: Send service change announcement for check/tordnsel
--+-
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29399| Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten,anarcat   |Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks irl and steph for writing the blogpost!

 https://blog.torproject.org/changes-tor-exit-list-service

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31848 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading images in Tor Android

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31848: Downloading images in Tor Android
--+---
 Reporter:  LoveFoxesAndSneps132  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by Thorin):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 duplicate of #31013

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Saving images in Tor Browser on Android does not work

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31013: Saving images in Tor Browser on Android does not work
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 #31848 is a duplicate

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31848 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading images in Tor Android

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31848: Downloading images in Tor Android
--+--
 Reporter:  LoveFoxesAndSneps132  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 I'm pretty sure there is already a ticket open for this, if I can find it

 The cause is `browser.download.useDownloadDir` = `false` blocks
 longtapping and saving images

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30751 [Webpages/Website]: why SHA-256 or MD5 not in download section?

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30751: why SHA-256 or MD5 not in download section?
--+--
 Reporter:  m2t   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:   => docshackathon


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31014 [Webpages/Website]: torproject.org is not properly display on mobile devices

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31014: torproject.org is not properly display on mobile devices
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We have made some improvements here and there are still more to do.
 Closing for now and we'll reopen more in gitlab as we find them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30936 [Webpages/Website]: clean up pronoun display in people page

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30936: clean up pronoun display in people page
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31848 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading images in Tor Android

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31848: Downloading images in Tor Android
--+--
 Reporter:  LoveFoxesAndSneps132  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * owner:  hiro => tbb-team
 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * version:  sbws: unspecified =>
 * component:  Webpages/Webtools => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32288 [Webpages/Blog]: https://support.torproject.org/get-in-touch/how-can-i-get-support/ in our "Join the discussion" footer on our blog is giving a 404

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32288: https://support.torproject.org/get-in-touch/how-can-i-get-support/ in 
our
"Join the discussion" footer on our blog is giving a 404
---+
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It seems done.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33431 [Webpages/Support]: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33431: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor
--+--
 Reporter:  myon  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33431 [Webpages/Support]: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33431: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor
--+--
 Reporter:  myon  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 This is done here `0a4dec0418b0c5843ff856dd3bc3a20c62c86f6d` and live here

 https://support.torproject.org/get-in-touch/

 Sorry for the inconvenience, myon!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31965 [Webpages/Webtools]: dev portal git repo and lektor instance

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31965: dev portal git repo and lektor instance
---+--
 Reporter:  pili   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Webtools  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
---+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32127 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32127: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete
-+--
 Reporter:  bluemoon |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  get, tor, gettor, docshackathon  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31982   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:  get, tor, gettor => get, tor, gettor, docshackathon


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33600 [Core Tor/sbws]: max_pending_results is not used in main_loop anymore

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33600: max_pending_results is not used in main_loop anymore
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen202003  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  juga   |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => juga


Comment:

 `bug_33600`
 
(https://gitlab.torproject.org/gk/sbws/commit/6926ce9ea92edcc147e2711c3bb1e8a87304cb02)
 in my gitlab sbws repo has a fix for review.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30203 [Webpages/Website]: The "Download Tor Source Code" page is mixing source code and win32 binaries

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30203: The "Download Tor Source Code" page is mixing source code and win32
binaries
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29901| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 closing for now

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33431 [Webpages/Support]: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33431: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor
--+--
 Reporter:  myon  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * owner:  hiro => antonela
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33008 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Display a bridge's distribution bucket

2020-03-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#33008: Display a bridge's distribution bucket
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o24a1, anti-censorship-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  2020Q1 metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31281   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:19 phw]:
 > To make the review easier, I addressed your feedback in a separate
 patch, which I will later squash:
 >
 
https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/commit/b39e576eff8ac5ea9436fa5239a53f5edac11911

 Thanks, these changes look good to me. As a further suggestion, I'd also
 suggest changing the HTTPS text to be something like:
 "... hands out bridges over this website. To get bridges, go to ,
 enter your preferences, and solve the CAPTCHA."

 this provides some more detail to the HTTPS instructions, and I find "this
 website" to be less ambiguous than "the site you're looking at". Maybe we
 could ask antonela her thoughts on this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

  1   2   >