Re[2]: Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-07 Thread Robert Menschel
Hello Wolfgang,

Monday, December 6, 2004, 7:39:09 AM, you wrote:

LW That's because such a rule won't work.  All manner of real mail ends up
LW sending things that have a real link address different from the one shown 
in
LW the link.  Often it is a very minor difference, like https vs http, but
LW sometimes there are no points of reality at all between them. This shows up
LW a lot in stuff generated from databases.

WH if there is a visible url to a different server than the one in
WH real url, I would not only want to tag that as possible spam, but
WH rather have a nice red 20pt headline added to the mail: WARNING -
WH DO NOT CLICK - THESE LINKS MIGHT BE FORGED

As the current ninja maintaining the SARE URI rules file (though not
the fraud or spoof files), I gladly invite you to develop such a rule.
If you can offer us a rule that does what you want, and in our testing
does not hit excessively on non-spam, we'll gladly include it in our
SARE rules file, and will support your submission of that rule to the
SA developers.

At this point in time, I can't think of a good (efficient) way to do
this that wouldn't also hit huge numbers of non-spam.

Bob Menschel





Re: Re[2]: Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-07 Thread Bill Randle
On Mon, 2004-12-06 at 18:29, Robert Menschel wrote:
 Hello Wolfgang,
 
 Monday, December 6, 2004, 7:39:09 AM, you wrote:
 
 LW That's because such a rule won't work.  All manner of real mail ends up
 LW sending things that have a real link address different from the one 
 shown in
 LW the link.  Often it is a very minor difference, like https vs http, but
 LW sometimes there are no points of reality at all between them. This shows 
 up
 LW a lot in stuff generated from databases.
 
 WH if there is a visible url to a different server than the one in
 WH real url, I would not only want to tag that as possible spam, but
 WH rather have a nice red 20pt headline added to the mail: WARNING -
 WH DO NOT CLICK - THESE LINKS MIGHT BE FORGED
 
 As the current ninja maintaining the SARE URI rules file (though not
 the fraud or spoof files), I gladly invite you to develop such a rule.
 If you can offer us a rule that does what you want, and in our testing
 does not hit excessively on non-spam, we'll gladly include it in our
 SARE rules file, and will support your submission of that rule to the
 SA developers.
 
 At this point in time, I can't think of a good (efficient) way to do
 this that wouldn't also hit huge numbers of non-spam.
 
 Bob Menschel

Just a note of information, for those looking to stop phishing attacks:
the open source anti-virus program ClamAV has added signatures for
several phishing emails. When this is used, they will be blocked
before they ever hit SpamAssassin.

Obviously, these are tailored for each specific message, so it's
not a generic solution, but it can help. Currently, there are
signatures for 18 different banking phish and two auction phish.

http://www.clamav.net/

-Bill




Re: Re[2]: Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-07 Thread Bill Randle
On Mon, 2004-12-06 at 20:00, Kenneth Porter wrote:
 --On Monday, December 06, 2004 6:44 PM -0800 Bill Randle [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 wrote:
 
  Obviously, these are tailored for each specific message, so it's
  not a generic solution, but it can help. Currently, there are
  signatures for 18 different banking phish and two auction phish.
 
 Additionally, if you run SA and Clam from MIMEDefang, you can use the 
 contributed Graphdefang package to serve graphs of your spam, viruses, and 
 phish from your web server, and can see how many phishing attempts of each 
 type were blocked.
 
 http://mimedefang.org/

Good point! I use amavisd-new with postfix and graphdefang for much
the same thing.

-Bill




Re: Re[2]: Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-07 Thread hamann . w
Hello Bob,

thanks for getting back on that.
The problem with these mails - they may not be spam, they may not be fraud 
either,
but they impose a different kind of threat  by lowering recipients' 
thresholds on security.

I have had that argument well, I read that mail, and nothing bad happened 
from users
and dont want to have it again :)
Maybe I should ask these kind of people to sign a paper that they will never 
ask me to
disinfect there systems

We have seen
- banks that invite their custumers to click somewhere for their account 
statement
- banks that suggest to go to the security tab in IE and drag the control to a 
lower setting as
a response to cert wernings
- microsoft generate cert warnings by putting a valid cert onto the wrong server
and now we have legitimate mail with suspicious links
It is all these things together that eventually make people tolerant to phish 
(well, I got this
irritating broken cert thing every day from my bank as well - how should I 
know that their
broken cert was different)

I am also not sure whether anti spam is the proper place to deal with these 
messages - if they
get enough score, recipients will just route them to the trash and later 
complain about the missing
mail. I could even imagine to quarantine these mails and invite recipients to 
complain to the senders.
In the case of the bank mentioned above, a bank smells like phish article in 
a local
computer mag caused them to change the system

Wolfgang Hamann

 Hello Wolfgang,
 
 Monday, December 6, 2004, 7:39:09 AM, you wrote:
 
 LW That's because such a rule won't work.  All manner of real mail ends up
 LW sending things that have a real link address different from the one 
 shown in
 LW the link.  Often it is a very minor difference, like https vs http, but
 LW sometimes there are no points of reality at all between them. This 
 shows up
 LW a lot in stuff generated from databases.
 
 WH if there is a visible url to a different server than the one in
 WH real url, I would not only want to tag that as possible spam, but
 WH rather have a nice red 20pt headline added to the mail: WARNING -
 WH DO NOT CLICK - THESE LINKS MIGHT BE FORGED
 
 As the current ninja maintaining the SARE URI rules file (though not
 the fraud or spoof files), I gladly invite you to develop such a rule.
 If you can offer us a rule that does what you want, and in our testing
 does not hit excessively on non-spam, we'll gladly include it in our
 SARE rules file, and will support your submission of that rule to the
 SA developers.
 
 At this point in time, I can't think of a good (efficient) way to do
 this that wouldn't also hit huge numbers of non-spam.
 
 Bob Menschel
 
 
 
 






Re: Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-07 Thread Jeff Chan
On Monday, December 6, 2004, 4:02:59 AM, Eugene Morozov wrote:
 Hello!
 Our customer received email which contained invitation to confirm 
 personal information at the online bank. Link was hidden using following 
 trick:

 A 
 href=http://www.designlaboratory.jp/board/hg.html;https://www.ebank.hsbc.com.hk/servlet/onlinehsbc.jsp/A

 It was a big surprise for me that there're no rules in the stock SA 
 3.0.1 installation to catch such forged links. I was also to unable to 
 find such a rule on Rules Emporium.
 Eugene

In addition to the other suggestions, I'd recommend reporting the
phish to:

  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Doing so will help get some of the destation URIs into
ph.surbl.org, though in this particular case I'm not sure
that we should list designlaboratory.jp since this could
be a Joe Job or hijacked message board.

Jeff C.
-- 
Jeff Chan
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.surbl.org/



Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-06 Thread Eugene Morozov
Hello!
Our customer received email which contained invitation to confirm 
personal information at the online bank. Link was hidden using following 
trick:

A 
href=http://www.designlaboratory.jp/board/hg.html;https://www.ebank.hsbc.com.hk/servlet/onlinehsbc.jsp/A

It was a big surprise for me that there're no rules in the stock SA 
3.0.1 installation to catch such forged links. I was also to unable to 
find such a rule on Rules Emporium.
Eugene


Re: Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-06 Thread Loren Wilton
 Our customer received email which contained invitation to confirm
 personal information at the online bank. Link was hidden using following
 trick:

 A

href=http://www.designlaboratory.jp/board/hg.html;https://www.ebank.hsbc.c
om.hk/servlet/onlinehsbc.jsp/A

 It was a big surprise for me that there're no rules in the stock SA
 3.0.1 installation to catch such forged links. I was also to unable to
 find such a rule on Rules Emporium.

That's because such a rule won't work.  All manner of real mail ends up
sending things that have a real link address different from the one shown in
the link.  Often it is a very minor difference, like https vs http, but
sometimes there are no points of reality at all between them.  This shows up
a lot in stuff generated from databases.

I believe we (SARE) do have a rule that checks for a dotquad link and a link
name that looks like it might be a bank.  However, it is fairly specific to
the more common bank scams, and won't catch the particular case you found.

Loren



Re: Phishing attempt wasn't blocked by SpamAssassin

2004-12-06 Thread hamann . w
 
 That's because such a rule won't work.  All manner of real mail ends up
 sending things that have a real link address different from the one shown in
 the link.  Often it is a very minor difference, like https vs http, but
 sometimes there are no points of reality at all between them.  This shows up
 a lot in stuff generated from databases.
 

Well,

if there is a visible url to a different server than the one in real url, I 
would not only want to tag
that as possible spam, but rather have a nice red 20pt headline added to the 
mail:
WARNING - DO NOT CLICK - THESE LINKS MIGHT BE FORGED
Of course, if the visible url says http://someshopping.com/camera/buy_canon and 
the real link
is http://someshopping.com/cgi-bin/buy.cgi?prod=1381 AND the displayed url 
works too, no
problem.
The widespread use of a markup tool like this might even help to teach mail 
senders that
this kind of mail is not wanted.
To put it in other words: if phishing scam looks like ordinary new products 
from my favourite
bookstore, and produce the same kind of there is something wrong with the 
certificate popup
as my real bank does, it is not only the phishers to blame
Just my 2c

Wolfgang Hamann