On Jan 24, 2008 6:30 PM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> That there is some series of instructions, contained presumably in neurons
> (or in a computer) which produces a consistent series of
> movements/thoughts/actions in a family of situations. So when you/I write
> "when" it is almost
> Possible major misunderstanding : I am not in any shape or form a vitalist.
> My argument is solely about whether a thinking machine (brain or computer)
> has to be instructed to think rigidly or freely, with or without prior
> rules - and whether, with the class of problems that come under AG
Theory suggests that such simulations will be possible, but it hasn't been
proved conclusively ... so I guess you can still maintain some kind of
"vitalism"
for a couple decades or so if you really want to ;-)
Possible major misunderstanding : I am not in any shape or form a vitalist.
My argu
If you're asking whether there are accurate complex-systems simulations
of whole animals, there aren't yet ...
At present, we lack instrumentation capable of gathering detailed data about
how animals work; and we lack computers powerful enough to run such
simulations (though some supercomputers ma
I take your general point re how complex systems can produce apparently
spontaneous behaviour.
But to what actual courses of action of actual animals (such as the fly
here) or humans has this theory been successfully applied?
Ben: The question vis-a-vis the fly - or any animal - is whether
> The question vis-a-vis the fly - or any animal - is whether the *whole*
> course of action of the fly in that experiment can be accounted for by one -
> or a set of - programmed routines or programs period. My impression -
> without having studied the experiment in detail - is that it weighs agai
That there is some series of instructions, contained presumably in neurons
(or in a computer) which produces a consistent series of
movements/thoughts/actions in a family of situations. So when you/I write
"when" it is almost certainly a programmed action, which can be and is
automatically vari
- Original Message
From: Bob Mottram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 8:14:09 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Study hints that fruit flies have free will
I don't think anyone with knowledge of insect nervous systems would
argue that they&#
On Jan 24, 2008 5:35 PM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> But perhaps the experiment, in demonstrating spontaneity, does weigh against
> the idea of the fly being programmed?
>
What does this idea state? What do you mean when you say that
something is programmed? Can you provide example
You and others are right in that Brembs was perhaps confused about the
difference between spontaneity and free will.
But perhaps the experiment, in demonstrating spontaneity, does weigh against
the idea of the fly being programmed?
Robert:
1. Brembs and his colleagues reasoned that if frui
> In other words, flies seem to possess the same kind of internal
> spontaneity-generation that we possess, and that we associate with our
> subjectively-experienced feeling of free will.
>
> -- Ben G
To clarify further:
Suppose you are told to sit still for a while, and then move your hand
sudde
>
>
>
> I don't think anyone with knowledge of insect nervous systems would
> argue that they're stateless machines. Even simple invertebrates such
> as slugs can exhibit classical condition effects which means that at
> least some minimal state is retained.
>
> To me the idea of free will suggest
I think a more precise way to phrase what they showed,
philosophically, would be like this:
"
Very likely, to the extent that flies are conscious, then they have a
SUBJECTIVE FEELING of possessing free will.
"
In other words, flies seem to possess the same kind of internal
spontaneity-generation
On Jan 24, 2008 4:14 PM, Bob Mottram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I don't think anyone with knowledge of insect nervous systems would
> argue that they're stateless machines. Even simple invertebrates such
> as slugs can exhibit classical condition effects which means that at
> least some minimal
On 24/01/2008, Robert Wensman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Yes, but no one has ever argued that a flier is a stateless machine. It
> seems like their argument ignores the concept of internal state. If they
> went through all this trouble just to prove that the brain of the flies has
> an internal s
1. Brembs and his colleagues reasoned that if fruit flies (Drosophila
melanogaster) *were simply reactive robots entirely determined by their
environment*, in completely featureless rooms they should move completely
randomly.
Yes, but no one has ever argued that a flier is a stateless machine. It
This is an interesting finding, but not entirely unexpected. For
years I've been reading stuff which promoted the idea that living
systems are often balanced on the edge between order and chaos. It
makes sense to be in such a state, since only a small amount of
cognitive energy is required in ord
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18684016/?GT1=9951
I don't get it. It says that flies movie in accordance with a
non-flat distribution instead of a flat distribution. That has
nothing to do with free will. The writers assume that "non-flat
distribution" = "free will".
You need to read more full
On May 16, 2007 10:05 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Actually, a pretty good article in a very public place
>
> http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18684016/?GT1=9951
I don't get it. It says that flies movie in accordance with a
non-flat distribution instead of a flat distribution. That
Actually, a pretty good article in a very public place
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18684016/?GT1=9951
"Isn't killing people in the name of God a pretty good definition of insanity?"
~ ARTHUR C. CLARK
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