Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-05 Thread James Ratcliff
BillK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On 12/4/06, Mark Waser wrote: > > Explaining our actions is the reflective part of our minds evaluating the > reflexive part of our mind. The reflexive part of our minds, though, > operates analogously to a machine running on compiled code with the > compilation

Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-05 Thread Mike Dougherty
On 12/5/06, BillK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Your reasoning is getting surreal. You seem to have a real difficulty in admitting that humans behave irrationally for a lot (most?) of the time. Don't you read newspapers? You can redefine rationality if you like to say that all the crazy people are

Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-05 Thread BillK
On 12/4/06, Mark Waser wrote: Explaining our actions is the reflective part of our minds evaluating the reflexive part of our mind. The reflexive part of our minds, though, operates analogously to a machine running on compiled code with the compilation of code being largely *not* under the con

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-04 Thread Ben Goertzel
But I'm not at all sure how important that difference is . . . . With the brain being a massively parallel system, there isn't necessarily a huge advantage in "compiling knowledge" (I can come up with both advantages and disadvantages) and I suspect that there are more than enough surprises that

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-04 Thread Mark Waser
On the other hand, I think that lack of compilation is going to turn out to be a *very* severe problem for non-massively parallel systems - Original Message - From: "Ben Goertzel" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, December 04, 2006 1:00 PM Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re:

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-04 Thread Ben Goertzel
> Well, of course they can be explained by me -- but the acronym for > that sort of explanation is "BS" I take your point with important caveats (that you allude to). Yes, nearly all decisions are made as reflexes or pattern-matchings on what is effectively compiled knowledge; however, it is the

Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-04 Thread Mark Waser
achine is (or, in reverse, no explanation = no intelligence). - Original Message - From: "Ben Goertzel" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, December 04, 2006 12:17 PM Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis >> We're reach

Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-12-04 Thread Ben Goertzel
We're reaching the point of agreeing to disagree except . . . . Are you really saying that nearly all of your decisions can't be explained (by you)? Well, of course they can be explained by me -- but the acronym for that sort of explanation is "BS" One of Nietzsche's many nice quotes is (parap

Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-11-29 Thread Ben Goertzel
On 11/29/06, Philip Goetz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On 11/29/06, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I defy you to show me *any* black-box method that has predictive power > outside the bounds of it's training set. All that the black-box methods are > doing is curve-fitting. If you give t

Re: Re: Re: Re: [agi] A question on the symbol-system hypothesis

2006-11-14 Thread Ben Goertzel
Hi, I would also argue that a large number of weak pieces of evidence also means that Novamente does not *understand* the domain that it is making a judgment in. It is merely totally up weight of evidence. I would say that intuition often consists, internally, in large part, of summing up