Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-10 Thread Michael Richardson
Brian E Carpenter wrote: >> Confused about this last comment. MichaelR pointed out the case of a >> legacy network management platform, where you can easily add GRASP, >> but not ACP support. I concur with this view: We saw this a lot in >> customer deployment discussions. >>

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-10 Thread Brian E Carpenter
On 10/03/2017 22:39, Michael H. Behringer wrote: > On 09/03/2017 20:37, Brian E Carpenter wrote: >> On 10/03/2017 05:53, Barry Leiba wrote: > Personal opinion: encryption should be a MUST. I believe that we will have situations where we have a secured ACP into a NOC (

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-10 Thread Barry Leiba
> Barry, is there a way to say, "UTF-8 without all the confusing parts"? > Is that what IDN is all about? Kinda-sorta, but it won't quite work for this. The high-order answer is to reference IDNA 2008 (RFC 5892 will do) and say that characters that are PVALID are acceptable here. The trouble

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-10 Thread Michael Richardson
Brian E Carpenter wrote: >> NEW In some cases there will be a transition period, in which it might >> not be practical to run with strong encryption right away. It's >> important to keep this period as short as possible, and to upgrade to >> a fully encrypted setup as soon as pos

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-10 Thread Michael H. Behringer
On 09/03/2017 20:37, Brian E Carpenter wrote: On 10/03/2017 05:53, Barry Leiba wrote: > Personal opinion: encryption should be a MUST. I believe that we will have situations where we have a secured ACP into a NOC (to an edge router or VM hypervisor), and then we will have some unencrypted,

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-09 Thread Barry Leiba
>> This brings up a common rant that I have: >> We should be putting into our protocol specs what we want the protocol >> to be, not some compromise that comes from knowing that not everyone >> will comply with everything from the start. >> >> If the right thing is to say "MUST encrypt", but we kno

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-09 Thread Brian E Carpenter
On 10/03/2017 05:53, Barry Leiba wrote: >> > Personal opinion: encryption should be a MUST. >> >> I believe that we will have situations where we have a secured ACP into a NOC >> (to an edge router or VM hypervisor), and then we will have some unencrypted, >> but secured links to platforms in t

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-09 Thread Barry Leiba
> > Personal opinion: encryption should be a MUST. > > I believe that we will have situations where we have a secured ACP into a NOC > (to an edge router or VM hypervisor), and then we will have some unencrypted, > but secured links to platforms in transition. > > It will be easy to add the GRA

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-09 Thread Michael Richardson
Brian E Carpenter wrote: >> Both here and in 3.5.2.1: Why is encryption SHOULD, and not MUST? >> Looking ahead to 3.5.2.1, how could it be considered safe to use a >> network configuration protocol across administrative boundaries >> without encryption? > Input please, or els

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-07 Thread Brian E Carpenter
Well, I take that back. I think all these points can be slipped into this week's update of the draft (I plan to submit that on Friday NZ time). Two points for the WG: > > — Section 3.5.1 — > >If there is no ACP, the protocol MUST use another form of strong >authentication and SHOULD use

Re: [Anima] SecDir review of draft-ietf-anima-grasp-09

2017-03-07 Thread Brian E Carpenter
Thanks Barry. Good comments, but we have to get a new draft out before the deadline, so I'm not sure these will all make it in until the one after. Regards Brian On 08/03/2017 15:43, Barry Leiba wrote: > I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's > ongoing effort to re