Re: [B.A.T.M.A.N.] dublicate HNAs / certificates

2009-01-15 Thread Axel Neumann
Hi, On Dienstag 06 Januar 2009, Alexander Morlang wrote: > Axel Neumann schrieb: > > We wanted batmand (and especially its core routing algorithm) to be > > decentral and simple. So no central point of control/failure and > > therefore also no HNA server. Of course there are many potential attack

Re: [B.A.T.M.A.N.] dublicate HNAs / certificates

2009-01-06 Thread Alexander Morlang
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Axel Neumann schrieb: > HI, > > I like brainstorming like this. > We wanted batmand (and especially its core routing algorithm) to be decentral > and simple. So no central point of control/failure and therefore also no HNA > server. Of course there

Re: [B.A.T.M.A.N.] dublicate HNAs / certificates

2008-12-19 Thread Stephan Enderlein (Freifunk Dresden)
Hi again, is there a way to set a TTL value for each hna that is different from OGM TTL? If I assume that an HNA internet host is reachable via two nodes (e.g. running icvpn - bgp) batmand currently ignores one of this hna and also the node and its traffic (right?). What if we use the ttl valu

Re: [B.A.T.M.A.N.] dublicate HNAs / certificates

2008-12-19 Thread Stephan Enderlein (Freifunk Dresden)
Hi, > I like brainstorming like this. me too. > We wanted batmand (and especially its core routing algorithm) to be decentral > and simple. So no central point of control/failure and therefore also no HNA > server. Perhaps there is a different solution. What if everybody may broadcast their HNA l

Re: [B.A.T.M.A.N.] dublicate HNAs / certificates

2008-12-19 Thread Axel Neumann
HI, I like brainstorming like this. We wanted batmand (and especially its core routing algorithm) to be decentral and simple. So no central point of control/failure and therefore also no HNA server. Of course there are many potential attack vectors in a community mesh and probably there will al