Re: Wildcard SRV record?

Yeah, as I said in one of the other emails, I can script something with nsupdate if necessary. I was just hoping there was a way to add a simple record that'd take care of it all, but now I understand that wildcards don't really work that way, so I've scripted something. I don't have separate

RE: Wildcard SRV record?

Correct, wildcards don't work that way; in fact, it would be more accurate to say that _vlmcs._tcp.*.foo. isn't a wildcard at all (it's just a DNS name that happens to have an asterisk as one of its labels). See RFC 4592. - Kevin

Re: Wildcard SRV record?

That doesn't work for me. When machine1.domain1.foo tries to look up the SRV record, it queries for _vlmcs._tcp.domain1.foo. Bind doesn't have that record, so it doesn't work. On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 1:08 PM, Eldridge, Rod A [ITNET] wrote: > > Wouldn't you just need this one

Re: Wildcard SRV record?

Wouldn't you just need this one SRV record: _vlmcs._tcp.foo IN SRV 0 0 1688 ais-dc01.ainfosec.com. [ see https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/odsupport/2011/11/14/how-to-discover-office-and-windows-kms-hosts-via-dns-and-remove-unauthorized-instances/ ] -- Rod Eldridge Networks &

Re: Wildcard SRV record?

Thanks, but the names aren't predictable; they're usernames. I could script something with nsupdate, if necessary, but I'd rather have a simple record than have scripting/cron. On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 12:44 PM, Matthew Pounsett wrote: > > > On 31 October 2016 at 12:35,

Re: Wildcard SRV record?

On 31 October 2016 at 12:35, Stephen Pape wrote: > Is there a better way for me to do this, or do I have to generate a > whole lot of specific CNAME records? > If your subdomains follow a predictable pattern, then this seems like a prime use of the $GENERATE statement. You

Re: The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

I think what we see as a result of this attack is DNS provider diversity being the new buzz phrase. The same as not relying on a single ISP link i see more people using multiple DNS providers. The size of these attacks will grow as IoT continues to grow. It makes sense to have diverse providers to

Re: The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

On 2016/10/31 16:09, Barry Margolin wrote: > I heard that the impact of the attack was even narrower than just the > US, it was mostly eastern US. That suggests some things about the > granularity of Dyn's anycast network and the distribution of the Mirai > botnet. There were actually three

Re: The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

In article , Jim Popovitch wrote: > On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Matthew Seaman > wrote: > > On 2016/10/31 14:53, Jim Popovitch wrote: > >> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew

Re: The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Matthew Seaman wrote: > On 2016/10/31 14:53, Jim Popovitch wrote: >> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew Seaman >> wrote: >>> This despite the fact that Dyn has a global anycast network with

Re: The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

On 2016/10/31 14:53, Jim Popovitch wrote: > On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew Seaman > wrote: >> This despite the fact that Dyn has a global anycast network with >> plenty of bandwidth, points of presence all round the world and >> each POP contains a

Re: The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Matthew Seaman wrote: > This despite the fact that Dyn has a global anycast network with > plenty of bandwidth, points of presence all round the world and > each POP contains a bunch of top-of-the-line servers. It seems to me

Re: The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

On 10/31/16 12:41, MURTARI, JOHN wrote: > God only knows, the DDOS hackers are probably on this listbut I > have to ask what protections DYN had in place before the attack > occurred. RRL has been promoted as some protection against these > types of attacks. If they had it in place, did it

The DDOS attack on DYN & RRL ?

Folks, God only knows, the DDOS hackers are probably on this listbut I have to ask what protections DYN had in place before the attack occurred. RRL has been promoted as some protection against these types of attacks. If they had it in place, did it help or was the pure

lwres - Error codes

Hello folks, i have a question about the error codes returned by lwres_getaddrsbyname and lwres_getrdatabyname functions. lwresd is running and working. These functions return LWRES_R_NOTFOUND 1) if the DNS server can not be reached by the lwresd daemon 2) if the DNS server responds but does

Re: Zone removal messages

Dns Administrator wrote: > > Thought the querying appears to be correct, when I reload the dns server I > get the following message: > > 27-Oct-2016 09:31:29.208 general: info: zone ./IN: (static-stub) removed Yes, this log message is spurious. The reason seems to be that