Brands credentials use this single show, and multiple show
credentials. It's based on the representation problem which is the
generalisation to multiple bases where Schnorr is one base, Pedersen
Commitments are two bases, Representation problem is n>2 bases.
The method used would work for Schnorr
How could you prove the private key is in the burning transaction?
On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 11:56 AM Satoshin via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This could could be a viable option. I think this is the right approach.
>
> Any downside to this and how much does this a
Wouldn’t a revealed private key for time locked funds create a race to
spend? I imagine miners who are paying attention would have the advantage
but it would still just be a race.
Would be nice to have the funds destroyed or sent somewhere specific. Like
if somehow the revealed key was actually it
This could could be a viable option. I think this is the right approach.
Any downside to this and how much does this add to the blockweight if anything
at all.
Anonymouse
> On Jan 22, 2019, at 4:19 AM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
> Good Morning Matt,
>
>> ### ZmnSCPxj,
>>
>> I'm in
Good Morning Matt,
> ### ZmnSCPxj,
>
> I'm intrigued by this mechanism of using fixed R values to prevent multiple
> signatures, but how do we derive the R values in a way where they are
unique for each blockheight but still can be used to create signatures or
verify?
One possibility is to deri
