Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin Core to disable Bloom-based Filtering by default

2019-07-24 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 7/23/19 9:47 AM, Andreas Schildbach via bitcoin-dev wrote: > BIP 157/158 is not an alternative to BIP 37: They complement each other pretty well though. Wallets can save the deterministic GCS filters in the same way as headers, which means blocks can be re-scanned if necessary (importing new k

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin Core to disable Bloom-based Filtering by default

2019-07-22 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 7/22/19 12:01 AM, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Finally, regarding alternatives, the filter-generation code for BIP > 157/158 has been in Bitcoin Core for some time, though the P2P serving > side of things appears to have lost any champions working on it. I > presume one of the Lightning

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size: It's economics & user preparation & moral hazard

2015-12-26 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 12/26/2015 06:13 PM, Bryan Bishop wrote: > I think you'll find that there hasn't been stalling regarding an > uncontroversial hard-fork deployment. You might be confusing an > uncontroversial hard-fork decision instead with how developers have > brought up many issues about various (hard-forking

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size: It's economics & user preparation & moral hazard

2015-12-26 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 12/26/2015 05:01 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I think the shortest reasonable timeframe for an uncontroversial > hardfork is somewhere in the range between 6 and 12 months. This argument would hold more weight if it didn't looks like a stalling tactic in context. 6 months ago, th

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capacity increases for the Bitcoin system.

2015-12-20 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 12/20/2015 10:33 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Solve several unrelated problems at the same time (fraud proofs, script > extensibility, malleability, ...). By "solve" do you mean, "actually implement", or do you mean "make future implementation theoretically possible?" In other wo

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Segregated witness softfork with moderate adoption has very small block size effect

2015-12-19 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 12/19/2015 10:49 AM, jl2012 via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I am not convinced that SW softfork should be the *only* short term > scalability solution I don't think SW is relevant at all with respect to scalability. Fraud proofs are extremely important from a security perspective. The network as it e

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capacity increases for the Bitcoin system.

2015-12-08 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 12/08/2015 11:41 AM, Mark Friedenbach wrote: > A far better place than the generation transaction (which I assume means > coinbase transaction?) is the last transaction in the block. That allows > you to save, on average, half of the hashes in the Merkle tree. I don't care what color that bikes

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capacity increases for the Bitcoin system.

2015-12-08 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 12/08/2015 09:12 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Stuffing the segwitness merkle tree in the coinbase If such a change is going to be deployed via a soft fork instead of a hard fork, then the coinbase is the worst place to put the segwitness merkle root. Instead, put it in the first

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Compatibility requirements for hard or soft forks

2015-11-02 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 02/11/15 14:33, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I like those guidelines, although I'm sure there may be lots of arguing > over what fits under "protects the integrity of the network" or what > constitutes "reasonable notice" (publish a BIP at least 30 days before > rolling out a change?

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Compatibility requirements for hard or soft forks

2015-11-01 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 11/01/2015 07:30 PM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev wrote: > If at least one year's notice was given, then people aren't going to > lose their money, since they have notice. So after realizing that I misread substantial portions of this thread due to a lack of attention to detail I'd like to point

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Compatibility requirements for hard or soft forks

2015-11-01 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
I guess by "locked transaction" you must mean a P2SH output? If so, that's a rather bizarre use of terms since outputs and transactions are very different things. 0xEAD9E623.asc Description: application/pgp-keys signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Compatibility requirements for hard or soft forks

2015-11-01 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 11/01/2015 05:46 PM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev wrote: > An OP_CAT script that requires TBs of RAM to validate crosses the > threshold of reasonableness. Are there actually any OP_CAT scripts currently in the utxo set? It's one thing to have a theoretical scripting ability that gets removed b

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Compatibility requirements for hard or soft forks

2015-11-01 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 10/30/2015 10:43 PM, Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev wrote: > By that benchmark, we should aim for "reasonable certainty". A > transaction which would never have been generated by any known software > is the minimum bar. Adding "...which would have to be deliberately > stupid with many redundant

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Bitcoin-development] Reusable payment codes

2015-10-23 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 22/10/15 20:22, Peter Todd wrote: > FWIW multi-push OP_RETURN outputs will be standard in v0.12.0: > > https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6424 > As I said before, once the prerequisites for a better notification method are usable in the network, I'd love to define a version 2 payment cod

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Bitcoin-development] Reusable payment codes

2015-10-22 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 22/10/15 16:47, Luke Dashjr wrote: > Well, I strongly disagree with adopting the BIP as it stands. That's fine. Nobody is required to adopt an informational BIP if they do not wish to do so. > No, those are not network-level changes. They are mere software changes that > can be deployed along

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Bitcoin-development] Reusable payment codes

2015-10-22 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 22/10/15 15:43, Luke Dashjr wrote: > BIPs should in general not be > designed around current software I strongly disagree with this statement. There is a version byte in the payment code specification for a reason. Version 1 payment codes are designed to be deployable by wallet implementers

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Bitcoin-development] Reusable payment codes

2015-10-22 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 22/10/15 00:53, Luke Dashjr wrote: > Sorry for the late review. I'm concerned with the "notification address" > requirement, which entails address reuse and blockchain spam. Since it > entails > address reuse, the recipient is forced to either leave them unspent forever > (bloating the UTXO

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposed list moderation policy and conduct

2015-10-14 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 14/10/15 19:02, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote: > *Disclose potential conflicts* > > 1. List discussions often involve interested parties. We expect > participants to be aware when they are conflicted due to employment or > other projects they are involved in, and disclose those interests to

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hash of UTXO set as consensus-critical

2015-09-21 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 19/09/15 15:11, Rune K. Svendsen wrote: > An honest miner is a miner that supports the network by building on top of > the best valid chain. A malicious miner is one who wants to disrupt the > Bitcoin network, not support it, for example by executing a 51% attack which > mines empty blocks on

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hash of UTXO set as consensus-critical

2015-09-19 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 19/09/15 10:45, Rune Kjær Svendsen wrote: > We need to distinguish between two different things here: > > 1) A 51% attack, where the majority of mining power is *malicious* (hence > “attack”) What does "malicious" mean? In other words, If miner A is mining honestly, and miner B is mining mal

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hash of UTXO set as consensus-critical

2015-09-18 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 18/09/15 15:17, Rune Kjær Svendsen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Bitcoin does not function if the majority of mining power is dishonest. There > is no way around that. It’s how proof-of-work functions. None of those statements are true. If a majority of Bitcoin miners are mining invalid blocks, t

Re: [bitcoin-dev] RFC: HD Bitmessage address derivation based on BIP-43

2015-09-04 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 09/04/2015 01:21 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote: > This is not Bitcoin's problem... Polluting the BIP repository with N non- > Bitcoin related specifications would be. HD generation of keypairs from a single seed for many non-conflicting uses is a valuable and useful technique. Intentionally making a u

Re: [bitcoin-dev] RFC: HD Bitmessage address derivation based on BIP-43

2015-09-04 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 09/03/2015 07:06 PM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Since BIP 43 is still a draft, I propose modifying it to refer non- > Bitcoin purpose codes to the SLIP repository: > https://doc.satoshilabs.com/slips/ What benefit is created by delegating the BIP-43 namespace management to that co

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Your Gmaxwell exchange

2015-09-02 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 09/01/2015 03:29 PM, Wladimir J. van der Laan wrote: > On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 01:55:43PM -0500, Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > >> * They should own their bitcoins, meaning that they retain exclusive >> control over their balances. Even more precisely, the n

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Your Gmaxwell exchange

2015-08-31 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 08/31/2015 05:53 PM, Monarch wrote: > > Bitcoin is a decentralized currency which allows any person the > ability to transact in a way that does not require specific trust in > any particular party. Users can independently verify that > transactions they receive are valid and confirmed, with s

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Your Gmaxwell exchange

2015-08-31 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 08/31/2015 04:42 PM, Monarch wrote: > The justification for the existence of Bitcoins hinges on it. What is > described in the whitepaper is a system without the trust of third > parties to process electronic payments, this can not exist without > decentralization. Absent any unforseen revelat

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Your Gmaxwell exchange

2015-08-31 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 08/31/2015 03:06 PM, Monarch via bitcoin-dev wrote: > What is Bitcoin if not decentralized? > > Bitcoin the most awkward, unprivate and damaging currencies ever > created. It is terribly slow for general use, and it is very > difficult for users to get over the technical hurdles required to us

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Your Gmaxwell exchange

2015-08-31 Thread Justus Ranvier via bitcoin-dev
On 08/30/2015 01:38 AM, Adam Ritter via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Still, it doesn't have anything that is practical for me as an user of > the Bitcoin network (I use it for storing long-term purchase value, as > most of the people who I know): it doesn't help me if I still need to > pay transaction fees