Re: [bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-10-31 Thread AdamISZ via bitcoin-dev
Hi Antoine, Zman and list, The whole line of thinking here is interesting but indeed my first question was "who does the penalty of the actuary go to?" and yeah, it seems we're still fairly stuck there. re: > However, the amount of satoshis that should be locked in such fidelity bonds > must

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-10-15 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning list, I have been thinking further on this with regards to BitVM. By my initial analyses, it seems that BitVM *cannot* be used to improve this idea. What we want is to be able to restrict the actuary to only signing for a particular spend exactly once. The mechanism proposed in th

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-10-04 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Zeeman, > Basically, the big issue is that the actuary needs to bond a significant amount of funds to each participant, and that bond is not part of the funding of the construction. > > Other ways of ensuring single-use can be replaced, if that is possible. > Do you know of any? As explained i

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-09-17 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning Dave, Sent with Proton Mail secure email. --- Original Message --- On Monday, September 18th, 2023 at 12:12 AM, David A. Harding wrote: > > On September 8, 2023 3:27:38 PM HST, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote: > > > Now, suppo

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-09-17 Thread David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev
On September 8, 2023 3:27:38 PM HST, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev wrote: >Now, suppose that participant A wants B to be assured that >A will not double-spend the transaction. >Then A solicits a single-spend signature from the actuary, >getting a signature M: > >current state +

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-09-12 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning Antoine, > Hi Zeeman > > > What we can do is to add the actuary to the contract that > > controls the funds, but with the condition that the > > actuary signature has a specific `R`. > > > As we know, `R` reuse --- creating a new signature for a > > different message but the same `

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-09-11 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Zeeman > What we can do is to add the actuary to the contract that > controls the funds, but with the condition that the > actuary signature has a specific `R`. > As we know, `R` reuse --- creating a new signature for a > different message but the same `R` --- will leak the > private key. >

[bitcoin-dev] Actuarial System To Reduce Interactivity In N-of-N (N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms

2023-09-08 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
(N > 2) Multiparticipant Offchain Mechanisms Introduction The blockchain layer of Bitcoin provides an excellent non-interactivity: users can go offline, then come online, synchronize, and broadcast transactions to the mempool. Always-online miners then get the transactions and add