A few things jump out at me as I read this proposal
First, deriving the hardness from capex as opposed to opex switches the
privilege from those who have cheap electricity to those who have access to
chip manufacturers/foundries. While this is similarly the case for Bitcoin
ASICS today, the
Hi Bitcoin Devs,
We would like to share with you a draft proposal for a durable, low
energy Bitcoin proof of work.
BIP: ?
Title: Durable, Low Energy Bitcoin PoW
Author: Michael Dubrovsky , Bogdan Penkovsky
Discussions-To:
Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
Comments-URI:
Am 17.05.2021 um 04:58 schrieb Luke Dashjr:
It increases security, and is unavoidable anyway.
You can't.
There must be a way. dRNG + universal clock + cryptographical magic?!
I'll think about more. Because if there is a safe way of knowing when a
block was mined then this can work and no
In principle the idea of making your transactions not mineable except by
miners who follow some particular practice is something that can and should
be discussed. For instance, it could help give economic signals for future
soft forks such that users can declare preference in a costly, sybil
Verifiable Delay Functions involve active participation of a single
verifier. Without this a VDF decays into a proof-of-work (multiple
verifiers === parallelism).
The verifier, in this case is "the bitcoin network" taken as a whole.
I think it is reasonable to consider that some
Hello, list
>Hello centralisation. Might as well just have someone sign miner keys, and
get
>rid of PoW entirely...
>No, it is not centralization -
No, it is not centralization, as:
(a) different miners could use different standards / certifications for
'green' status, there are many already;
Hello list,
>>Hello centralisation. Might as well just have someone sign miner keys, and get
>>rid of PoW entirely...
>>No, it is not centralization -
>
> No, it is not centralization, as:
>
> (a) different miners could use different standards / certifications for
> 'green' status, there are
>> 2. I am not a huge data-center specialist, but it was my understanding
that they charge per unit of installed (maximum) electricity consumption.
It would mean that if the miner needs X kilowatts-hour within that 1 minute
when they are allowed to mine, he/she will have to pay for the same X for
>
>
> Are there people who can freely produce new mining equipment to an
> arbitrary degree?
>
Close. Bitmain for example produces their own ASICs and rigs which they
mine with. Antpool is controlled by Bitmain and has a significant amount of
the hash power. The marginal cost of an ASIC chip or
This is silly, but I'll add my take:
This would create the incentive to have chips that are idle 50% of the
time and work harder 50% of the time. This means miners would buy twice
the chips to use the same amount of power, for example.
This in turn means a greater portion of your operational
On 5/16/21, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Efficiency-Paradox
> https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Proof-of-Memory-Fallacy
The chain security actually reduces by 10% in this proposal. So the
efficiency paradox is not
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