>> This is not possible for rather obvious reasons:
>> 1. transaction sizes cannot be allowed to be unbounded because this
creates denial of service attacks for the broader network
>> 2. if the valid certificate set is not unbounded, then centralization
pressure will mount on the bound between the
Good morning Michael,
> Am 17.05.2021 um 04:58 schrieb Luke Dashjr:
>
> > It increases security, and is unavoidable anyway.
> > You can't.
>
> There must be a way. dRNG + universal clock + cryptographical magic?!
Proof-of-work **is** the cryptographic magic that creates a universal clock.
In
Good morning Anton,
> >> 4. My counter-proposal to the community to address energy consumption
> >> problems would be *to encourage users to allow only 'green miners'
> >> process>> their transaction.* In particular:
> >>...
> >> (b) Should there be some non-profit organization(s) certifying
Am 17.05.2021 um 04:58 schrieb Luke Dashjr:
It increases security, and is unavoidable anyway.
You can't.
There must be a way. dRNG + universal clock + cryptographical magic?!
I'll think about more. Because if there is a safe way of knowing when a
block was mined then this can work and no
In principle the idea of making your transactions not mineable except by
miners who follow some particular practice is something that can and should
be discussed. For instance, it could help give economic signals for future
soft forks such that users can declare preference in a costly, sybil
Hello, list
>Hello centralisation. Might as well just have someone sign miner keys, and
get
>rid of PoW entirely...
>No, it is not centralization -
No, it is not centralization, as:
(a) different miners could use different standards / certifications for
'green' status, there are many already;
Hello list,
>>Hello centralisation. Might as well just have someone sign miner keys, and get
>>rid of PoW entirely...
>>No, it is not centralization -
>
> No, it is not centralization, as:
>
> (a) different miners could use different standards / certifications for
> 'green' status, there are
>> 2. I am not a huge data-center specialist, but it was my understanding
that they charge per unit of installed (maximum) electricity consumption.
It would mean that if the miner needs X kilowatts-hour within that 1 minute
when they are allowed to mine, he/she will have to pay for the same X for
>
>
> Are there people who can freely produce new mining equipment to an
> arbitrary degree?
>
Close. Bitmain for example produces their own ASICs and rigs which they
mine with. Antpool is controlled by Bitmain and has a significant amount of
the hash power. The marginal cost of an ASIC chip or
This is silly, but I'll add my take:
This would create the incentive to have chips that are idle 50% of the
time and work harder 50% of the time. This means miners would buy twice
the chips to use the same amount of power, for example.
This in turn means a greater portion of your operational
On 5/16/21, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Efficiency-Paradox
> https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Proof-of-Memory-Fallacy
The chain security actually reduces by 10% in this proposal. So the
efficiency paradox is not
On Friday 14 May 2021 21:41:23 Michael Fuhrmann via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Bitcoin should create blocks every 10 minutes in average. So why do
> miners need to mine the 9 minutes after the last block was found? It's
> not necessary.
It increases security, and is unavoidable anyway.
> Problem: How
> 1. Has anyone considered that it might be technically not possible to
> completely 'power down' mining rigs during this 'cool-down' period of time?
> While modern CPUs have power-saving modes, I am not sure about ASICs used for
> mining.
Sounds like a point to consider, note the economic
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Efficiency-Paradox
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Proof-of-Memory-Fallacy
___
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> if energy is only expended for 10% of the same duration, this money must
now be spent on hardware.
More equipment obviously increases the total energy usage.
You correctly point out that the total expenses of a miner are not just
energy but include capital expenses for equipment and
1. Has anyone considered that it might be technically not possible to
completely 'power down' mining rigs during this 'cool-down' period of time?
While modern CPUs have power-saving modes, I am not sure about ASICs used
for mining.
2. I am not a huge data-center specialist, but it was my
[sorry if I haven't replied to the other thread on this, I get swamped
by email and don't catch them all]
This solution is workable but it seems somewhat difficult to me at this time.
The clock might be implementable on a peer network level by requiring
inclusion of a transaction that was
Hi Michael,
Your proposal won’t save any energy because it does nothing to decrease the
budget available to mine a block (being the block reward).
Even if it were technically possible to find a way for nodes to somehow
reach consensus on a hash that gets generated after 9 minutes, all it
Hey Michael,
First I think the idea of "do nothing in the first 9 minutes" will
unfortunately not be useful as the computed work is mainly there to prevent
miners from altering the history of previous blocks. Thus following your
suggesting would probably drastically decease the security of the
Please read the Bitcoin whitepaper. It's a very interesting read.
--
Best Regards / S pozdravom,
Pavol "stick" Rusnak
Co-founder and CTO, SatoshiLabs
On Sat, May 15, 2021, 23:57 Michael Fuhrmann via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Bitcoin should create
20 matches
Mail list logo
