On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 08:15:01PM +0100, Alan Reiner wrote:
The Bitcoin network achieves something that we didnt' think was possible
10 years ago: a totally trustless, decentralized ledger. The cost? It
takes time for the decentralized network to reach consensus that
transactions happened.
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 07:49:29PM +, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
One challenge is that without rather smart child-pays-for-parent logic
the positive argument for replace by fee doesn't really work.
That's actually incorrect now, as a mechanism for implementing
scorched-earth without
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On 02/12/2015 07:15 PM, Alan Reiner wrote:
I'll add fuel to the fire here, and express that I believe that
replace-by-fee is good in the long-term. Peter is not breaking
the zero-conf, it was already broken, and not admitting it creates
a
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 07:34:22PM +, Justus Ranvier wrote:
In addition, I'll add that there is an assumption that honest actors
can not alter their behavior in response to changing conditions.
Since scorched-earth solutions to problems are apparently acceptable
now, what would stop more
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On 02/12/2015 05:24 PM, Oleg Andreev wrote:
I think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of
replace-by-fee is to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable.
Currently people can get away with 0-confirms but it's only
because most people
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 8:52 PM, Justus Ranvier
justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
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On 02/12/2015 07:47 PM, Allen Piscitello wrote:
Nothing will stop that. Bitcoin needs to deal with those issues,
not stick our heads in the sand and pretend they
On 2/11/2015 10:47 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
... replace-by-fee ...
Replace-by-fee creates the power to repudiate an entire tree of
payments, and hands this power individually to the owner of each input
to the top transaction. Presumably this is why the original replacement
code at least
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On 02/12/2015 07:47 PM, Allen Piscitello wrote:
Nothing will stop that. Bitcoin needs to deal with those issues,
not stick our heads in the sand and pretend they don't exist out of
benevolence. This isn't a pet solution, but the rules of the
You cannot close Pandora's box. Whether or not this type of patch should
exist is irrelevant. It does, and there are incentives to use it by
miners. These are the bounds we have to deal with and the world we must
adapt to.
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 12:11 PM, Justus Ranvier
I'll add fuel to the fire here, and express that I believe that
replace-by-fee is good in the long-term. Peter is not breaking the
zero-conf, it was already broken, and not admitting it creates a false
sense of security. I don't want to see systems that are built on the
assumption that zero-conf
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 1:18 PM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
history. Lots of miners have dropped out due to hardware obsolescence, yet
massive double spending hasn't happened.
How many thousands of BTC must be stolen by miners before you'd agree
that it has, in fact, happened?
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On 02/12/2015 07:45 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
None of those solutions are compatible with decentralized networks
for a lot of reasons. Given the inability to prevent sybil attacks
your suggestions lead to people being unfairly punished for poor
Nothing will stop that. Bitcoin needs to deal with those issues, not stick
our heads in the sand and pretend they don't exist out of benevolence.
This isn't a pet solution, but the rules of the protocol and what is
realistically possible given the nature of distributed consensus. Relying
on
On Feb 12, 2015, at 9:16 AM, Alex Mizrahi alex.mizr...@gmail.com wrote:
Why don't you use getrawmempool RPC call to synchronize mempool contents?
Since RPC interface does not scale to serve a multi user service.
In absence of better alternative, the interfaces used by a proprietary
Probably out of my league, but I will respond here anyway.
I am in favor of replace-by-fee, but only if it were to be applied to a very
limited subset of transactions: namely, transactions that seek to supplement,
not replace, the original transaction.
In other words, a replacement transaction
Not sure what happened there - I'll drop the PGP.
Hi all,
I have drafted a BIP with Jean Pierre and Ruben after the last
discussion, related to a standard for deriving a canonical
pay-to-script-hash address given a set of public keys and the number of
signatures required. There have been two or
Where is the Specification section?? Does this support arbitrary scripts, or
only the simplest CHECKMULTISIG case?
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 9:42:23 PM Thomas Kerin wrote:
Hi all,
I have drafted a BIP with Jean Pierre and Ruben after the last
discussion, related to a standard for
On 2/12/2015 6:25 AM, Tamas Blummer wrote:
Miner will see a mixed picture and will struggle to act “honestly” on
a statistical measure.
The statistics come from the aggregate actions of all nodes, especially
those miners who watch p2p transactions and assemble blocks.
Any one node makes
To remain useful as border router, the replace-by-fee patched core should
only relay double spend if it actually replaces an earlier transaction, as
otherwise the replace logic that is according to your commit more than just
fee comparison, would have to be replicated in the proprietary stack
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 09:27:22AM +0100, Tamas Blummer wrote:
On Feb 12, 2015, at 8:45 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
IOW, assume every transaction your border router gives you is now the
one and only true transaction, and everything conflicting with it must
go.
You are
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Hi all,
I have drafted a BIP with Jean Pierre and Ruben after the last
discussion, related to a standard for deriving a canonical
pay-to-script-hash address given a set of public keys and the number of
signatures required. There have been two or
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 10:13:33PM +, Luke Dashjr wrote:
Where is the Specification section?? Does this support arbitrary scripts, or
only the simplest CHECKMULTISIG case?
It might be enough to rewrite this BIP to basically say all pubkeys
executed by all CHECKMULTISIG opcodes will be in
On 12 Feb 2015, at 13:49, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
If unconfirmed payments become flaky enough that people stop using them, then
a portion of the Bitcoin community will find workarounds like trusted third
parties, trusted hardware, whatever and will just struggle one. Other people
Mike,
You can not consider the outcome resulting by replace-by-fee fraudulent, as it
could be the world as observed by some.
Some other’s might have seen the replaced transaction, but that only indicates
for sure that the signer is fraudulent.
What should a node do that really cares of good
Your scorched earth plan is aptly named, as it's guaranteed to make
unconfirmed payments useless.
Scorched earth makes no sense by itself. However, it can be a part of a
bigger picture. Imagine an insurance service which will make sure that
merchants are compensated for every scorched-earth or
You can not consider the outcome resulting by replace-by-fee fraudulent,
as it could be the world as observed by some.
Fraudulent in what sense?
If you mean the legal term, then you'd use the legal beyond reasonable
doubt test. You mined a double spend that ~everyone thinks came 5 minutes
On Feb 12, 2015, at 3:16 PM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
You can not consider the outcome resulting by replace-by-fee fraudulent, as
it could be the world as observed by some.
Fraudulent in what sense?
Assume a wallet that sends double spend of the coin spent for services with
The approach is how Bitcoin has always worked.
Mike, you're making it worked before, and thus it will work in future
kind of an argument.
It is an extremely shitty kind of an argument. And it can be used to
justify any kind of bullshit.
E.g. any scamcoin which haven't yet collapsed will work
Den 12 feb 2015 14:44 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting
transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a
proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism.
There have been lots of e-cash
Den 12 feb 2015 13:49 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
It makes unconfirmed transactions useless in the classical Bitcoin model.
Obviously if you introduce a trusted third party
1. They won't be attacking Bitcoin, they will attack merchants who accept
payments with 0 confirmations.
Which is basically all of them other than exchanges. Any merchant that uses
BitPay or Coinbase, for instance, or any physical shop.
If you want to play word games and redefine Bitcoin to
Miners are *not* incentivised to earn the most money in the next block
possible. They are incentivised to maximise their return on investment.
This would be right if you assume that all Bitcoin miners act as a single
entity. In that case it is true that that entity's goal is to maximize
You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting
transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a
proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism.
There have been lots of e-cash schemes proposed in the academic literature
that work
But, let's say, 5 years from now, some faction of miners who own
soon-to-be-obsolete equipment will decide to boost their profits with a
replace-by-fee pool and a corresponding wallet. They can market it as 1 of
10 hamburgers are free if they have 10% of the total hashpower.
Yes, like any
A similar idea was proposed by Sirer and me as a part of two-phase proof of
work (2P-PoW) [1]. In 2P-PoW the first phase is Bitcoin's standard PoW and
the second phase requires the signature. This way Bitcoin doesn't lose its
mining power (read: security) in one day, but rather it is possible to
Den 12 feb 2015 12:58 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
[...]
Your scorched earth plan is aptly named, as it's guaranteed to make
unconfirmed payments useless.
Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
NoRiskWallet:
Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
It makes unconfirmed transactions useless in the classical Bitcoin model.
Obviously if you introduce a trusted third party you can fix things, but
then you're back to having the
Mike,
Peter’s pull request might be a foot gun, but we are here to find out. One
can’t claim Bitcoin core code is there to fork and then be disappointed if some
really do it.
I am not sure protecting unconfirmed transactions ranks higher than fostering
innovation not to depend on the same.
So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, without
spelling out exactly why.
I'm afraid I still don't understand why you think notaries would build long
term businesses but miners wouldn't, in this model.
I think you are saying because notaries have identity, brand
So anyway, in my opinion, it is actually great that Bitcoin is still
relatively small: we have an opportunity to analyze and improve things.
But you seem to be hostile to people who do that (and who do not share
your opinion), which is kinda uncool.
To clarify once more, I'm all for people
Den 12 feb 2015 15:53 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, without
spelling out exactly why.
I'm afraid I still don't understand why you think notaries would build
long term businesses but miners wouldn't, in this model.
I think you
Repeating past statements, it is acknowledged that Peter's scorched
earth replace-by-fee proposal is aptly named, and would be widely
anti-social on the current network.
At a high level, we can see that this thread is contentious because
this covers _what we want bitcoin to be_, and that is an
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On 02/12/2015 03:20 PM, Natanael wrote:
Multisignature notaries need to convince people to select them.
They want to know that even with collateral, their funds won't be
temporarily locked up and unspendable for days at a time.
What services
Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
The first is that this setup means miners can steal arbitrary payments if
they work together with the sender of the money. The model assumes this
collaboration won't happen, but it will. Because no existing wallet has a
double spend this
I think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of replace-by-fee is
to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable. Currently people can get away with
0-confirms but it's only because most people arent actively double spending,
and when they do it is for higher value targets. Double spend
Den 12 feb 2015 16:42 skrev Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net:
Remember that you aren't paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you.
Whichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick an
address out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and
pay that.
My
I see no fundamental difference in outcome from miner collusion in
scorched-fee (which isn't guaranteed to pay the right pool!) and miner
collusion in knowingly mining a doublespend transaction.
Well, they're the same thing. Replace-by-fee *is* miner collusion in
knowingly mining a double
On Feb 12, 2015, at 9:49 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
How does my replace-by-fee patch *not* do that?
Does it broadcast a double spend only if it IS replacing an earlier? If yes, I
am fine with it.
Tamas Blummer
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