Sorry to run on, a correction is needed. A much better approximation
requires that the rule-following minority finds the next TWO blocks, so
the cost is
(total miner revenue of block)*(fraction of hashpower following the rule)^2
So the lower bound cost in this very pessimistic scenario is .002
Christophe Biocca wrote:
> The problem is that since the rule
> isn't enforceable, no miner will wait before mining on the longest
> chain (which is the rational move), and you're back to where we are
> now.
Back up to the miner who decided to include a "seasoned" double-spend in
his block. Let
Christophe Biocca wrote:
> it becomes trivial with a few tries to split the network into two
> halves: (tx1 before tx2, tx2 before tx1).
"before" implies T=0. That is a much too optimistic choice for T; 50%
of nodes would misidentify the respend.
> Tom Harding wrote:
>>- Eventually, node
Unfortunately this could fork the network permanently, which is much
worse than a double spend. There's no magic way to have a consensus,
so it becomes trivial with a few tries to split the network into two
halves: (tx1 before tx2, tx2 before tx1). Some nodes in the middle
will accept either block,
This idea was suggested by "Joe" on 2011-02-14
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3441.msg48484#msg48484 . It
deserves another look.
Nodes today make a judgment regarding which of several conflicting
spends to accept, and which is a double-spend. But there is no
incorporation of these c
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