Hi there,
I'd like to start a discussion on periodic rotation of outbound connections.
E.g. every 2-10 minutes an outbound connections is dropped and replaced
by a new one.
Motivation:
Each bitcoin non-UPnP client behind NAT has 8 outbound connections
which change only rarely (due to occasional
Simply by observing timing from sufficiently geo-graphically and
network-ly dispersed nodes, you may deduce the original broadcaster of
a transaction. Rotating peers doesn't help.
That said, periodic rotation can be helpful. Every 2-10 minutes is excessive.
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 12:46 PM,
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Ivan Pustogarov ivan.pustoga...@uni.lu wrote:
Hi there,
I'd like to start a discussion on periodic rotation of outbound connections.
E.g. every 2-10 minutes an outbound connections is dropped and replaced
by a new one.
Connection rotation would be fine for
Connection rotation would be fine for improving a node's knoweldge
about available peers and making the network stronger against
partitioning.
It's also the first/next step towards decentralising the DNS seeds (for SPV
clients), as it'd allow each node to explore the network and return
Yes, I believe peer rotation is useful, but not for privacy - just for
improving the network's internal knowledge.
I haven't looked at the implementation yet, but how I imagined it would be
every X minutes you attempt a new outgoing connection, even if you're
already at the outbound limit. Then,
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Ivan Pustogarov
ivan.pustoga...@uni.lu wrote:
the same for a long time, an attacker which does not have any peers at all
but just listens the Bitcoin network can link together differed BC addresses
and learn the IP of the client.
I don't understand what you're
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 1:33 PM, Ivan Pustogarov ivan.pustoga...@uni.lu wrote:
The attack I'm trying to address is described here:
https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Bitcoin
It was discussed here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=632124.0
It uses the following observation. Each NATed
For each neighbour, a Bitcoin peer keeps the history of addresses that
it forwarded to the neighbour. If an address was already forwarded
to a neighbour it is not retransmitted again.
An attacker can make a list of potential IP addresses of clients (say
an IP range of an ISP, or listen for
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:02 PM, Ivan Pustogarov ivan.pustoga...@uni.lu wrote:
For each neighbour, a Bitcoin peer keeps the history of addresses that
it forwarded to the neighbour. If an address was already forwarded
to a neighbour it is not retransmitted again.
Okay, sorry, I thought you were
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