Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-09-16 Thread Baron Fujimoto
That works, mahalo! Aloha. -baron On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 07:10:53AM +0200, Jérôme LELEU wrote: Hi, Yes, for CAS server version 4.0, the filter will wrongfully block multi-attributes service setup. The documentation was updated: https://github.com/Jasig/cas-server-security-filter to explain

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-09-15 Thread Baron Fujimoto
On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 12:03:48PM -0400, Marvin Addison wrote: [...] Mitigation The CAS Service Management facility [1], which is enabled by default, can be used to restrict services that are permitted to use CAS (i.e. allowed to request tickets).

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-09-15 Thread Jérôme LELEU
Hi, Yes, for CAS server version 4.0, the filter will wrongfully block multi-attributes service setup. The documentation was updated: https://github.com/Jasig/cas-server-security-filter to explain that explicit mappings are required in that case. Best regards, Jérôme LELEU Founder of CAS in

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-19 Thread Andrew Petro
AP developed a no-dependencies just-add-a-Filter solution This Filter is now described in this blog post, with instructions for patching-in-place existing old Java CAS client usages, and with a compiled .class file ready to download and apply.

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-18 Thread Andrew Petro
MA we will consider providing official patches for [Java CAS Client 3.2 and 3.1] lines if there is interest. I'm still interested in a patch fixing this issue for the Java CAS Client 3.2 line specifically, since that's the CAS client version used in uPortal 4.0 and 4.1. However, I've also

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-12 Thread Marvin Addison
Yes, it would ease patching. I'm finding getting a uPortal 4.0 release squared away jumping from a Java CAS Client 3.2 version to 3.3.2 to be substantially unpleasant. Ok. Here's the catch. Some of the integration modules, cas-client-integration-atlassian comes to mind, have dependencies in

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-12 Thread Andrew Petro
Okay. So, a cas-client-core-3.2.1.1 that 1) Fixes cas-client-core , and 2) drops whatever integration modules cannot be built ? And then many folks can bop to 3.2.1.1, ignore the missing integration modules they aren't using anyway, and be happy. And folks who are using those modules can

RE: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-12 Thread Misagh Moayyed
: Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172 Okay. So, a cas-client-core-3.2.1.1 that 1) Fixes cas-client-core , and 2) drops whatever integration modules cannot be built ? And then many folks can bop to 3.2.1.1, ignore the missing integration modules they aren't using

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-12 Thread Andrew Petro
This set of transitive dependency exclusions *might* allow bumping from Java CAS Client 3.2.1 to 3.3.2: https://github.com/Jasig/uPortal/pull/404 I'm concerned about potentially losing Tomcat 6 support (needs testing?) and about how fragile this solution may be. Still feeling like a bump to a

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-12 Thread Scott Battaglia
That exclusion list is alarming. Not that this is great solution, but I wonder if most of those would be excluded automatically by excluding the SAML jar. Nonetheless we should definitely look at the effort involved in a 3.2.1.1 release as we want to maximize the number of people who upgrade.

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-12 Thread Waldbieser, Carl
Can someone explain to me how #2 is not a CAS *server* issue? There weren't any examples given. For #1, I can see how if you are running CAS open to all services you could trick someone into using the wrong service. However, for #2, I have a hard time seeing how the server would allow you to

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-12 Thread Marvin Addison
However, for #2, I have a hard time seeing how the server would allow you to request a ticket for A and then use it for B. Both attacks are really the same with different origins. While it's not appropriate to provide an attack sequence here, I encourage you to continue thinking about this

re:[cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Chad Killingsworth
I actually stumbled across similar behavior last week. In my case the CAS Server issued a ticket for service: https://mydomain.com/path And the successfully validated the ticket against service: http://mydomain.com/path Even though both services had different configurations. Shouldn't this

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Marvin Addison
I actually stumbled across similar behavior last week. In my case the CAS Server issued a ticket for service: https://mydomain.com/path And the successfully validated the ticket against service: http://mydomain.com/path That's unlikely related to the client security vulnerability. We would

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Scott Battaglia
We would need logs to confirm this. The service should be doing an extract string match. Cheers, Scott On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 12:40 PM, Chad Killingsworth chadkillingswo...@missouristate.edu wrote: I actually stumbled across similar behavior last week. In my case the CAS Server issued a

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Tim McLaughlin
Does this affect ALL versions of the Java client prior to 3.3.2? For example, I have an application that is using 3.1.8. It's not in the 3.3.x version. Also, is there a way to get the 3.3.2 jar without having to do a Maven build? Latest on the downloads site is 3.2.x. Thanks, Tim On

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Marvin Addison
Does this affect ALL versions of the Java client prior to 3.3.2? I did code review of the latest 3.2 and 3.1 versions and they were both vulnerable. I built one-off patches for my institution, but we will consider providing official patches for those lines if there is interest. Also, is there

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Tim McLaughlin
On 2014/08/11, 12:46 PM, Marvin Addison marvin.addi...@gmail.com wrote: Does this affect ALL versions of the Java client prior to 3.3.2? I did code review of the latest 3.2 and 3.1 versions and they were both vulnerable. I built one-off patches for my institution, but we will consider providing

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Ed Hillis
I see directories leading to the various jars at http://search.maven.org/#browse%7C-1210596150. Hopefully these are the right ones to use! Ed On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Tim McLaughlin tim.mclaugh...@wwu.edu wrote: On 2014/08/11, 12:46 PM, Marvin Addison marvin.addi...@gmail.com wrote:

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Scott Battaglia
If by magically appear, you mean hours later, then yes :-) http://downloads.jasig.org/cas-clients/ On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Marvin Addison marvin.addi...@gmail.com wrote: Does this affect ALL versions of the Java client prior to 3.3.2? I did code review of the latest 3.2 and 3.1

Re: [cas-user] CAS Client Security Vulnerability CVE-2014-4172

2014-08-11 Thread Andrew Petro
MA we will consider providing official patches for [Java CAS Client 3.2 and 3.1] lines if there is interest. TM if [fixed versions of 3.2 and 3.1 Java CAS client versions] were available that would ease the patching, I'm sure. Yes, it would ease patching. I'm finding getting a uPortal 4.0