[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Glad this is being addressed in coreboot. According to https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/796611 Insyde's UEFI implementation currently has 23 SMM vulnerabilities researched and disclosed by the company binarly.io and there is no telling if and when the vendors downstream apply the fixes and release BIOS

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

The branches for 4.14, .15, and 4.16 are created and ready for patches to be pushed. After the patches are merged, I'll handle the releases. Martin On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 11:54 PM Shawn C wrote: > > Nice hunt, Arthur! The attack surface in coreboot is lesser than UEFI but the > misconfig

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Nice hunt, Arthur! The attack surface in coreboot is lesser than UEFI but the misconfig during the setup will lead to serious issue. This one is neat and worth a CVE. Please use CVE-2022-29264 as record: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-29264 regards Shawn ---

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Apr 12, 2022, 10:25 by insu...@riseup.net: > > On 4/12/22 10:17, Nico Huber wrote: > >> Hello Insurgo, >> >> On 12.04.22 16:01, Insurgo Technologies Libres / Open Technologies wrote: >> >>> On April 12, 2022 8:55:56 AM UTC, Arthur Heymans >>> wrote: >>> > Would it make sense to backport

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

On 4/12/22 10:17, Nico Huber wrote: Hello Insurgo, On 12.04.22 16:01, Insurgo Technologies Libres / Open Technologies wrote: On April 12, 2022 8:55:56 AM UTC, Arthur Heymans wrote: Would it make sense to backport your fix to old releases and bump those release numbers to a .1 on the end?

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Hello Insurgo, On 12.04.22 16:01, Insurgo Technologies Libres / Open Technologies wrote: > On April 12, 2022 8:55:56 AM UTC, Arthur Heymans wrote: >>> Would it make sense to backport your fix to old releases and bump >>> those release numbers to a .1 on the end? >>> >> >> Some see releases as

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

On April 12, 2022 8:55:56 AM UTC, Arthur Heymans wrote: >Hi > >Would it make sense to backport your fix to old releases and bump >> those release numbers to a .1 on the end? >> > >Some see releases as mere synchronization tags & nice PR. >Some releases are also branches in gerrit but there are

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Arthur Heymans wrote: > > Would it make sense to backport your fix to old releases and bump > > those release numbers to a .1 on the end? .. > It's a bit weird to have releases that you'd have to advertise as *don't > use*, but I've seen us do that in the past (because issues are quite often >

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Hi Would it make sense to backport your fix to old releases and bump > those release numbers to a .1 on the end? > Some see releases as mere synchronization tags & nice PR. Some releases are also branches in gerrit but there are none affected by this (latest is 4.12 and it was introduced in

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Arthur Heymans wrote: > I think this issue might affect a lot more systems than I initially thought. Would it make sense to backport your fix to old releases and bump those release numbers to a .1 on the end? //Peter ___ coreboot mailing list --

[coreboot] Re: Security notice: SMM can be hijacked by the OS on APs

Hi I did some testing on real hardware with an Intel Coffeelake system on whether vectoring out of TSEG is prohibited by the hardware, which I assumed would be the case. It's *not* the case! Vectoring out of TSEG does succeed so this issue really affects modern hardware. So I think this issue