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At 04:45 PM 7/17/99 -0400, John Denker wrote:
> Step 2) The attacker endlessly iterates step 1. This is easy.
> AFAIK there is no useful limit on how often new applications can be
> made. This quickly exhausts the entropy pool on Whitney.
The attacker can only "exhaust" the entropy po
> Step 3a) If Whitney is getting key material from /dev/random, the result is
> a denial of service. All the IPsec tunnels will time out and will be
> replaced slowly or not at all, because of the entropy shortage.
seems to me that the reason the denial of service attack works does
not have an
On Sat, 17 Jul 1999, Eugene Leitl wrote:
> Does anybody know how cellular automata perform re cryptographically
> solid random number generators? They can crank out a lot of integers
> with a minimum investment in instructions executed.
Most of the fancy reseedable PRNG schemes people have come
bram writes:
> I'm not sure if anybody's yarrowified /dev/random yet - I think someone
> from coderpunks was working on it.
Does anybody know how cellular automata perform re cryptographically
solid random number generators? They can crank out a lot of integers
with a minimum investment in in
bram writes:
> Most of the fancy reseedable PRNG schemes people have come up with are
> based on using secure hashes.
They are sure validated, but are they the best we can do? MD5, the
nonplusultra, really?
John Denker writes:
> The bad part is that Whitney has already gobbled up quite a few
> bits of entropy from /dev/random before the slightest bit of
> authentication is attempted.
You're presuming that you're using the standard Linux version of
/dev/random. You could quite easily write a driv
On Sat, 17 Jul 1999, John Denker wrote:
> I have a question about various scenarios for an attack against IPsec by way
> of the random number generator. The people on the linux-ipsec mailing list
> suggested I bring it up here.
>
> Step 3a) If Whitney is getting key material from /dev/random,
John Denker wrote:
> I certainly hope these issues have been analyzed and brought under control.
> Can somebody lend me a clue as to the status, and/or where I might read more
> about it? If this list is not the optimal forum for discussing such
> things, could somebody point me to a better one?
For those who care, I've added a little docco to Lucre. Here's the
explanation of the executable demos. Also available is the theory, such
as it is (check out the CVS for that, or shout at me).
bank-new
Create a bank. The stuff you should guard with your life is
added to an
Hi Folks --
I have a question about various scenarios for an attack against IPsec by way
of the random number generator. The people on the linux-ipsec mailing list
suggested I bring it up here.
Specifically: consider a central machine (call it Whitney) that is
implementing many IPsec tunnel
At 4:35 PM -0600 on 7/16/99, EDUCAUSE wrote:
> DRAWING A HARD LINE ON ENCRYPTION
> The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously
> approved a measure to control exports of encryption software and
> provide government access to encrypted data. The committee was
> the fourth Ho
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
[ To: Sandy Harris, Perry's Crypto List ## Date: 07/12/99 ##
Subject: Re: Yet another random number generator ]
>Date: Sun, 11 Jul 1999 13:10:56 +
>From: Sandy Harris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: [long] Yet another random number ge
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