At 02:58 PM 9/14/99 -0700, Eugene Leitl wrote:
>You can't do differential power analysis if you supply power
>photonically to an encapsulated unit.
Interesting. Such supplies have been proposed for medical gear, where you
need absolute isolation. Intense light, reflector,
Si cells. A few cm
Andreas Bogk wrote:
> The usual setup for DPA involves a 10 Ohm resistor which sits in the
> power supply and measuring the voltage across that resistor. The
> countermeasure we're talking about is an on-chip capacitor that
> smoothes the power consumption, [...]
Has this been analyzed? It's got
At 01:35 PM 9/14/99 -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
>
>What are you guys talking about? Differential power analysis doesn't
The power analysis thread mutated into a tamper-react thread
without changing the Subject line.
>> At 10:32 AM -0700 9/13/99, Eugene Leitl wrote:
>> >Why don't you just erase
John Gilmore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> What are you guys talking about? Differential power analysis doesn't
> require any physical attack, nor does it deal with voltage
> variations. (You are probably thinking of Shamir's fault-injection
The usual setup for DPA involves a 10 Ohm resistor w
John Gilmore writes:
> What are you guys talking about? Differential power analysis doesn't
> require any physical attack, nor does it deal with voltage
> variations. (You are probably thinking of Shamir's fault-injection
You can't do differential power analysis if you supply power
photonic
--- begin forwarded text
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1999 07:55:15 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IP: Admin Plans to Loosen Encryption Restrictions
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Status: U
Source: New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99
At 2:01 PM +0200 9/14/99, Kuehn, Ulrich wrote:
>Hi,
>
>please find here included a mail from Holger Klawitter, the author of one of
>the mentioned palm cipher programs... He would have liked to recieve the
>critique himself.
>
>Ulrich
>
>---
>[quoted form Ho
> At 10:32 AM -0700 9/13/99, Eugene Leitl wrote:
> >Why don't you just erase flash when a pressure change (hull breach) is
> >detected. Using double-walled hull, to look for shortcuts. You can
> >also couple this to light detection, and whatnot.
Arnold Reinhold said:
> in several places) that wo
Arnold Reinhold writes:
> A sophisticated attacker could measure the pressure in each
> compartment and work in a pressurized, darkened room.
You don't know the pressure inside, that's the point: it varies among
the units. Whenever there is a (nonthermal) pressure change the thing
nukes itse
At 10:32 AM -0700 9/13/99, Eugene Leitl wrote:
>Why don't you just erase flash when a pressure change (hull breach) is
>detected. Using double-walled hull, to look for shortcuts. You can
>also couple this to light detection, and whatnot.
>
>Andreas Bogk writes:
> > Russell Nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTE
PLEASE CIRCULATE TO THOSE THAT MIGHT BE INTERESTED
(APOLOGIES FOR ANY DUPLICATION)
(Timing and speakers likely to change : please check
http://www.fipr.org/sfs35.html frequently for updates)
Scrambling for Safety 3.5 - Thursday September 23 1999
==
In 1997 I proposed something along these lines. Appended at the end is
the last rev I did of the Internet Draft...
Donald
===
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1 914-276-2668 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
65 Shindegan Hill Rd, RR#1 +1 914-784-7913
>On Sat, Aug 21, 1999 at 10:09:31PM -0400, Russell Nelson wrote:
>> I've been thinking about cryptographic signing of messages at the mail
>> transfer agent level. I can think of how to do it, but I'm not sure
>> what problem it solves. :) Anyone have any ideas?
>
At 12:01 PM 8/22/99 -0700, Er
Hi,
please find here included a mail from Holger Klawitter, the author of one of
the mentioned palm cipher programs... He would have liked to recieve the
critique himself.
Ulrich
---
[quoted form Holger Klawitter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>]
> > http://www.klawi
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