Re: The problem with Steganography

At 07:20 PM 01/25/2000 -, lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote: >Steganography is successful if the attacker can't distinguish >message-holding data from ordinary data without the key. Ideally, he >can't guess whether a message is present any better upon inspecting the >cover data than he could with

stego

At 06:14 PM 1/25/00 -, Russell Nelson wrote: >The problem with Steganography is that there's basically no way to >clue people in to it's location without clueing everyone into it. Well, yeah, that's sorta the point. To 'everyone' it looks like a webcam from columbia; lots of people check it

Re: The problem with Steganography

At 03:20 PM 1/25/00 -0500, Russell Nelson wrote: > >I'm trying to do forward stego -- that is, publish some encrypted >steganographic document, with the idea that, once everyone has a copy, >*then* you reveal the key. Fascinating, captain. Canna imagine why. > Problem is, how do you convince t

RE: DeCSS author Jon Johansen charged--more from WIRED

http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,33889,00.html -Kristen > -Original Message- > From: Harald Hanche-Olsen [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2000 9:30 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: DeCSS author Jon Johansen charged > > According to the Norwegia

Re: The problem with Steganography

lcs Mixmaster Remailer writes: > > The problem with Steganography is that there's basically no way to > > clue people in to it's location without clueing everyone into it. > > Encryption is successful if the attacker can't find information about the > plaintext without the key. Ideally, he

Re: The problem with Steganography

I think this is a security model issue. Steganography is useful if there is some out of band communication ahead of time. If there is no way to let the receiving party know that he or she will be receiving a hidden message, and how to retreive it, then steganography isn't useful. Without the k

Re: The problem with Steganography

> The problem with Steganography is that there's basically no way to > clue people in to it's location without clueing everyone into it. That's not a problem. By definition, successful steganography is undetectable even when you know where to look. Otherwise the steaganography has failed. Encr

legal status of RC4?

Does anyone know the legal status of RC4 in the US? I know that a cipher purporting to be RC4 was published on Cypherpunks by Anonymous, and that various crypto packages have RC4 or "EC4". My question is, has RSA taken anyone to court in the US for using RC4 without buying a license from RSA?

China To Require Encryption Information (was Re: NewsScan Daily, 25 January 2000 ("Above The Fold"))

At 8:18 AM -0700 on 1/25/00, NewsScan wrote: > CHINA TO REQUIRE ENCRYPTION INFORMATION > Next Monday China's government plans to institute a rule requiring foreign > firms in China to disclose what type of software they use for encrypting > their electronic messages. Eventually, the companies mu

The problem with Steganography

The problem with Steganography is that there's basically no way to clue people in to it's location without clueing everyone into it. For any kind of public-key type stego to work, stego has to be 1) standardized, 2) people have to be looking for that form of stego in all the standard places, 3) i

DeCSS author Jon Johansen charged

According to the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten ( for those who can read Norwegian) the 16 year old author of DeCSS, Jon Johansen, is being charged under Norwegian anti-piracy laws. His father, who owns the web site from which DeCSS is (or was?) made available is bein