Am I right in thinking that ElGamal is entirely unencumbered by patents
etc?
Also, is there any good source of info for legal issues pertaining to
distribution of crypto products in the UK?
thanks
si
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/ech/6852/1.html
CUT -
European Parliament will vote in july on inquiry committee on Echelon
Jelle van Buuren 15.06.2000
Internal wrangling about procedural mistakes and rumours about
Does anyone have a Java equivalent of the older version of Serpent found
in serp6f.c
OK, so if I've got a passphrase of arbitrary length, and I wish to
condense it to make a key of length n bits (n 160), what's the
approved method(s) of doing that?
I assume it goes without saying that we wish to preserve as much entropy
as we can, but I'll say it anyway.
Cheers,
Ben.
--
At 09:57 PM 6/18/00 -0400, Dave Emery wrote:
One hopes that the US Customs Service and the other federal
agencies involved in enforcing Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and
Crime Control Act of 1968 (18 USC 2518) covering devices "primarily
useful for the serreptitious
At 05:55 PM 6/19/00 -0400, Lyle Seaman wrote:
What I really want is a keyboard with a slight variation -- not a
KeyGhost but a KeySpook. It's a tamper-evident keyboard with a
built-in password-protected crypto engine, and a corresponding
driver for the OS.
Um, one of those 8-bit stamp cpus
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Ben Laurie wrote:
OK, so if I've got a passphrase of arbitrary length, and I wish to
condense it to make a key of length n bits (n 160), what's the
approved method(s) of doing that?
I assume it goes without saying that we wish to preserve as much
On Tue, 20 Jun 2000, Ben Laurie wrote:
Matt Blaze wrote:
I should point out that this construction is not designed to obscure the
input from the output (especially under differential probing), only
to give you m output bits that depend (each in a different way) on
the entire input.
I should point out that this construction is not designed to obscure the
input from the output (especially under differential probing), only
to give you m output bits that depend (each in a different way) on
the entire input.
OK, so if I've got a passphrase of arbitrary length, and I wish to
OK, so if I've got a passphrase of arbitrary length, and I wish to
condense it to make a key of length n bits (n 160), what's the
approved method(s) of doing that?
I assume it goes without saying that we wish to preserve as much entropy
as we can, but I'll say it anyway.
I've thought
Matt Blaze wrote:
I should point out that this construction is not designed to obscure the
input from the output (especially under differential probing), only
to give you m output bits that depend (each in a different way) on
the entire input.
Perhaps I should add that as a requirement.
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