On Tue, 02 Jan 2001 12:03:40 -0800 David Honig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> At 10:27 PM 1/1/01 +0530, Udhay Shankar N wrote:
> >Did this slip between the cracks in holiday season or has it already been
> >discussed here ?
> >
> >Udhay
>
> Its just yet another 'secure' scheme that uses quantum t
Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote:
>
> On Tue, 02 Jan 2001 12:03:40 -0800 David Honig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > At 10:27 PM 1/1/01 +0530, Udhay Shankar N wrote:
> > >Did this slip between the cracks in holiday season or has it already been
> > >discussed here ?
> > >
> > >Udhay
> >
> > Its just yet a
Last summer, at a workshop on "Security Metrics," conducted
by NIST's Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory
Board, Landgrave Smith, Institute of Defense Analysis, reported
on a pilot study of "the metrics used for determining the
strength of cryptography."
http://csrc.nist.gov/csspab/j
John Young asks:
Smith stated: "A cipher is Unconditionally Secure (US)
if no matter how much ciphertext is intercepted, there
is not enough information in the ciphertext to
determine the plaintext uniquely."
No examples for this strength were given, and it was
not clear
As I suppose others on the list have pointed out by now, he is just
plain wrong about DES.
DES is not computationally secure in this terminology. It is either
Conditionally Computationally Secure or Weak.
Bear
On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, John Young wrote:
>Last
John Young wrote:
>
> Last summer, at a workshop on "Security Metrics," conducted
> by NIST's Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory
> Board, Landgrave Smith, Institute of Defense Analysis, reported
> on a pilot study of "the metrics used for determining the
> strength of cryptography."
>
On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Ben Laurie wrote:
> > A cipher is Conditionally Computationally Secure
> > (CCS) if the cipher could be implemented with keys
> > that are not quite "long enough" or with not quite
> > "enough" rounds to warrant a CS rating. Examples:
> > SKIPJACK and RSA.
This seems a bit
Yes, the one-time pad. However, I wondered if Smith
was hinting at another cipher(s) not yet publicized,
perhaps computational -- or more exotic technology
such as quantum, DNA, ultra-spectral and beyond.
The workshop's purpose was to discuss what security
standards might be established to assure
dmolnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> > > A cipher is Conditionally Computationally Secure
> > > (CCS) if the cipher could be implemented with keys
> > > that are not quite "long enough" or with not quite
> > > "enough" rounds to warrant a CS rating. Exa
On 3 Jan 2001, Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote:
> Except that eavesdropping on the quantum key distribution channel is _always_
> detected (by `laws of nature'), which is not true for these pressure-monitored
> cables.
It's not true here anymore either. Last year there was at least one group
that demo
At 03:06 PM 1/3/2001 -0500, John Young wrote:
>Yes, the one-time pad. However, I wondered if Smith
>was hinting at another cipher(s) not yet publicized,
>perhaps computational -- or more exotic technology
>such as quantum, DNA, ultra-spectral and beyond.
It always amazes me that people single out
on 3/1/01 9:25 pm, Greg Rose at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> At 03:06 PM 1/3/2001 -0500, John Young wrote:
>> Yes, the one-time pad. However, I wondered if Smith
>> was hinting at another cipher(s) not yet publicized,
>> perhaps computational -- or more exotic technology
>> such as quantum, DNA, ul
Greg Rose wrote:
>
> At 03:06 PM 1/3/2001 -0500, John Young wrote:
> >Yes, the one-time pad. However, I wondered if Smith
> >was hinting at another cipher(s) not yet publicized,
> >perhaps computational -- or more exotic technology
> >such as quantum, DNA, ultra-spectral and beyond.
>
> It alway
Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> > At Crypto a
> > couple of years ago the invited lecture gave some very general results
> > about unconditionally secure ciphers... unfortunately I can't remember
> > exactly who gave the lecture, but I think it might have been Oded
> > Goldreich... forgive me if I'm wr
On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>on 3/1/01 9:25 pm, Greg Rose at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Goldreich... forgive me if I'm wrong. The important result, though, was
>> that you need truly random input to the algorithm in an amount equal to the
>> stuff being protected, or you cann
Peter Fairbrother <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Not so. Perfect compression with encryption works too.
Er, does it? I get a 1k message from you, perfectly compressed and
then encrypted with some strong algorithm and a 128-bit key. As a
godlike being unhindered by constraints of computational po
Finally catching up on some email...
I didn't write the article; it was published in the National Review, a
weekly conservative newspaper
(http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel121500.shtml). I assume they
do at least rudimentary fact checking, and I believe David Kopel, the
author, to be a ca
A couple of people have taken me to task for complicating the question
about One Time Pads. The purpose of my original text was just to say that
yes, there are other useful and deployed algorithms out there that have
unconditional security, and that it is not the case that One Time Pads are
sp
At 10:38 PM + 1/3/2001, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
>on 3/1/01 9:25 pm, Greg Rose at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > At Crypto a
>> couple of years ago the invited lecture gave some very general results
>> about unconditionally secure ciphers... unfortunately I can't remember
>> exactly who gave t
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