Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
Thus there is a need for a short term remedy that can work with the
existing standard.
Maybe the easiest short term remedy that does not require
any changes to hardware is the following:
* Put the wireless network outside your firewall
(or place a firewall
Paul Crowley wrote:
This supports your main point: perfect compression is a *much* less
realistic idea than true randomness!
Yeah.
Now that you mention it, it's not entirely clear what perfect compression
means, but it seems that it would at a minimum require ability to break
every
Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
OpenPGP tries to detect such "wrong key" situations for
symmetrically-encrypted packets in a pretty simplistic way, [...]
The repetition of 16 bits in the 80 bits of random data prefixed to
the message allows the receiver to immediately check whether the
session
William Allen Simpson wrote:
As far as I can tell, the only unique element is the mod 2^128 - 159
function. We just need to use another function.
My own favorite (in CBCS) has been rotation by the population count [...]
The uniquely valuable aspect of Jutla's scheme (and other related
David Honig wrote:
Is there a reason not to use AES block cipher in a hashing mode
if you need a secure digest of some data?
Yes. The standard hashing modes provide only 128-bit hash digests, and
for long-term collision-resistance, we'd probably like longer outputs.
Also, Rijndael has not
In article v04210102b4ca1b7a641f@[24.218.56.92],
Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a
higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by
law enforcement agencies.
Law enforcement friendly is very
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Paul Crowley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ian Goldberg) writes:
The expected number of collisions you get if you sample S items out of
a universe of size U (=2^N in the above case) is about (S^2)/U.
I know this is a month old but I'm only now
prosecutors introduce computer
evidence (obtained, e.g., from wiretaps) without allowing defense
attorneys a chance to review its accuracy or to cross-examine the
prosecution's experts.
In my view, the LA wiretaps are yet another example of why we need
_more_ scrutiny in the courtroom, not less.
-- David
Brute force keysearch is not the best algorithm for cracking A5/1.
Much better is Jovan Golic's technique for breaking A5 with something
like 2^40 steps. (See ``Cryptanalysis of Alleged A5 Stream Cipher'',
EUROCRYPT'97, and http://jya.com/a5-hack.htm.)
The question, as I see it, is how fast you
