to find them
(and other 3G documents that are relevant to them). This page
can be found at
http://www.research.att.com/~janos/3gpp.html
Thank you for your attention!
Janos A. Csirik.
--
Janos A. Csirik, Mathematics Cryptography, ATT Labs - Research
Greg Rose
security. The OTP
is just the simplest realisation of this.
Greg.
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are
special in that sense. I have often seen the claim that "only one time pads
are provably secure", and this bugs me.
Greg Rose wrote:
At 11:01 PM 1/3/2001 +, someone wrote:
Don't you think that's a pretty good reason for singling it out? Is
there any additional merit in the mo
definitions of modular arithmetic.
So long as both ends use the broken method, or you aren't terribly unlucky
(since only about 1 in 2^121 calculations will hit this case), it will all
still work.
Greg.
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the Qsec-800 CDMA mobile from Qualcomm, but that won't work in
England I don't think. See http://www.qualcomm.com/govsys/qsec.html .
Disclaimer: I work for one and invest in both, so I'm biased.
Greg.
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mobilise the public, and I *do* use it a lot. But it hasn't
really succeeded either. There is a lot more work to be done yet. I blame
it on PKI.
Greg.
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they are used to create the
public key from the private key. Except for creating a very big target,
there's no real reason why eveyone shouldn't share the same prime and
generator; IPSec standardises a couple (of different sizes).
Greg.
Greg Rose INTERNET
products.
I use Hal Finney's "secsplit". Google found it in a couple of places; it
doesn't seem to have been updated since 1993. It doesn't do the more
complicated schemes, just straight (m, k) splitting.
regards,
Greg.
Greg Rose INTERNET: [EMAIL
y,
called "1". If you calculate its additive inverse, which is surely
tractable as a one-time computation, then additive inverses generally can
be computed as x*-1, which you postulate to be easy.
Greg.
Greg Rose INTERNET: [EMAIL PROTECTED
, what guarantees does one have about the provenance of the
code? --Perry]
regards,
Greg.
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.
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for a beginner. I rarely recommend
the encyclopaedia as a starting point for anything. (I apologise again.)]
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he default changed when you installed it.
As for signing the .sig, that is definitely considered a feature not a bug.
If you clearsign the message, it shows through... if it is encrypted, it
shouldn't. C'est la Guerre.
regards,
Greg.
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.
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to the incident where someone mounted a password sniffer at a major
network hub (MAE-West?) a couple of years ago. But I haven't turned up
anything useful in a Web search. I didn't dream this incident, did I?
Does anyone have any references?
thanks,
Greg.
Greg Rose
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