SSN, etc infrastructures don't actually exist).
Rich Salz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 01/09/2001 04:20:44 PM
To: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC@FDC
cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Historical PKI resources
Well gee, thanks I guess, but since your baby is explicitly PK no I,
it
tions (e.g.
e-check).
Rich Salz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 01/08/2001 05:39:22 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc: (bcc: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC)
Subject: Re: Historical PKI resources
> Here's the BibTeX entry for the paper that apparently "started it all"..
The D-H
).
"Arnold G. Reinhold" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 11/22/2000 08:00:34 AM
Please respond to "Arnold G. Reinhold" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Bram Cohen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC@FDC,
[EMAIL
we've had some of this discussion related to X9.59, namely that SSL verifies
that the URL used and the certificate DNS info somewhat correspond. one problem
is that many people don't necessarily arrive at a web site by actually typing
the URL ... so provided URLs are one method of attack. The o
& of course there is an ANSI Financial Standards body (X9) which is also chair
of the ISO Financial Standards group.
The electronic commerce payments working group (X9A10) has a draft standard for
all electronic retail payments (debit, credit, pre-paid, electronic cash, etc)
.. X9.59.
misc.
X9.59/AADS press release at smartcard forum, at:
http://www.cybersafe.com/news/pr2223.html
http://www.certicom.com/press/2000/feb2300.htm
http://lists.commerce.net/archives/ansi-epay/22/msg3.html
current magstripe cards in US have names ... whether they are used or not ...
allow relying party to cross-check name on card with forms of identification
hopefully containing the same name.
One economic model has chipcards in europe for offline transactions as being
more cost effective ... v
smu.edu/~jwinn/hedgehogfox.htm
or other papers at her site:
http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn/
Greg Broiles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 01/12/2000 01:47:04 AM
To: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC@FDC, "Bill la Forge" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: "bram" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "P
rust decisions then I've truncated any trust
hierachy (embodied by a CA which then becomes superfulous/redundant).
"Bill la Forge" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 01/11/2000 01:19:34 PM
To: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC@FDC, "bram" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: "P
, [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc:(bcc: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC)
Subject: Re: Killer PKI Applications
The killer app should make somebody very rich.
Perhaps where the consumer can make an online purchase,
same as now with an SSL browser link, but they
accepted ... then the user creates their own table of
acceptable public keys (not relying on the CA/PKI trust infrastructure).
bram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 01/11/2000 10:41:32 AM
To: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC@FDC
cc: Peter Cassidy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[E
n parties with no prior relationship.
Peter Cassidy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 01/10/2000 03:08:00 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] (bcc: Lynn
Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC)
Subject: Killer PKI Applications
Friends,
I am engaged in an expansive and challe
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#bioinfo3
David Honig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 12/13/99 12:12:42 PM
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Steve Reid
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (bcc: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC)
Subject: Re: Debit ca
>a private key to use in generating digital signatures with participating
>nternet merchants. The bank would attach a corresponding public key to the
>person's checking account and store it in a data base. When buying from an
>Internet site, the cardholder would use his ATM card number. Instead
One of the things provided by X9.59 is that it is privacy/anonymous neutral at
point-of-sale &/or merchant webserver ... and in fact, with AADS accounts for
hardgood shipments ... an X9.59-like protocol for address-authorization
transaction... similar to X9.59 for payment-authorization ... not o
Rachel Willmer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 09/23/99 03:27:22 PM
To: "Arnold Reinhold" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: "Robert Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED], "Digital Bearer Settlement List" <[EMAIL PROTECTE
slightly different take on risk management in financial transactions. X9.59
is financial industry draft standard for all retail payments ... and is
based
on an AADS-model.
Account Authority Digital Signature
AADS
AADS is the application of digital signatures to
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