[This is getting tiresome. Unless someone has something *new* to say,
this is the end of the thread. --pm]
On 3 Feb 2000, lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
>
> > > http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
> >
> > The one problem I have with the RNG, based
I'd like to tone this discussion down a bit and get back to basics.
First of all, I am happy to thank Intel for finally releasing the
hardware interface. I hadn't known about its release until this
thread. I'm always grateful when someone does the right thing, even
if it's late. Second, I hav
> What an extraordinary concept. We are supposed to thank manufacturers
> for telling us how to use stuff they want us to use?
Well, if we want to use it too, why not thank them for helping us?
Is help only help if the person giving it has absolutely nothing to
gain in doing so? Don't you than
lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> Note that
> no thanks have been offered to Intel for releasing the spec, clearly
> a step taken in order to facilitate open source development (drivers
> already existed for Windows). Apparently gratitude is too much to ask
> from the open source security community
On Thu, Feb 03, 2000 at 12:19:57AM -0800, Bill Stewart wrote:
> At 09:15 AM 02/02/2000 -0800, Eric Murray wrote:
> >Until Intel releases the design for the RNG, I would treat it the same
> >as any suspect source of entropy- assume that it can contain no
> >entropy. That means that you whiten its
Lucky Green writes:
> Your post is the third or forth post I have seen in the last year that
> claims that Paul concluded that Intel's RNG outputs strong random numbers.
Such as when they said (http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf):
Cryptographically, we believe that the Intel RNG is stro
At 09:15 AM 02/02/2000 -0800, Eric Murray wrote:
>Until Intel releases the design for the RNG, I would treat it the same
>as any suspect source of entropy- assume that it can contain no
>entropy. That means that you whiten its output before mixing it
>together with your other entropy sources (som
Anon wrote:
> As for the concerns about back doors, the best reference on
> the design of the RNG remains cryptography.com's analysis at
> http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf. Paul Kocher and his team
> concluded that the chip was well designed and that the random numbers were
> of good qual
On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
> > http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
>
> The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
> analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
> only the stream after the "digital post-processing" that converts
> the b
-Original Message-
From: Arnold G. Reinhold [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2000 5:14 PM
To: lcs Mixmaster Remailer; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [PGP]: PGP 6.5.2 Random Number Generator (RNG) support
> I respect Paul, but there is a matter of principle h
On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
> > http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
>
> The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
> analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
> only the stream after the "digital post-processing" that converts
> the b
At 9:00 PM + 2/2/2000, lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
>It may not have been mentioned here, but Intel has
>released the programmer interface specs to their RNG, at
>http://developer.intel.com/design/chipsets/manuals/298029.pdf.
>Nothing prevents the device from being used in Linux /dev/random n
lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> As for the concerns about back doors, the best reference on
> the design of the RNG remains cryptography.com's analysis at
> http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
analysis, is that programmers can
It may not have been mentioned here, but Intel has
released the programmer interface specs to their RNG, at
http://developer.intel.com/design/chipsets/manuals/298029.pdf.
Nothing prevents the device from being used in Linux /dev/random now.
As for the concerns about back doors, the best reference
On Wed, Feb 02, 2000 at 03:24:53PM -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
> At 9:15 AM -0800 2/2/2000, Eric Murray wrote:
> >I've also received Intel security info under NDA (and nothing in
> >this post will violate same). I do not think that your point D is
> >fair- even if the Intel RNG is totally a
At 9:15 AM -0800 2/2/2000, Eric Murray wrote:
>On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 09:00:33PM -0800, Dave Del Torto wrote:
> > At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
>...
> >
>> (A) I'm not sanguine about it being a "default" in any version of
>> PGP, knowing what I do and having been told more
On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 09:00:33PM -0800, Dave Del Torto wrote:
> At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
> >Just in case anyone else is interested in my findings on whether I could
> >use the Intel RNG with my Celeron machine:
> >I needed help to find the driver installation file at the De
At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
>Just in case anyone else is interested in my findings on whether I could
>use the Intel RNG with my Celeron machine:
>I needed help to find the driver installation file at the Dell site
>- I had searched for Intel RNG, but it can be found by searchin
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