At 04:34 PM 2/27/99 -0800, bram wrote:
Unfortunately, the problems of domain names are really ones of authority,
and the best cryptography can really do is make sure that a reasonable set
of rules are enforced smoothly, it can't fix the rules.
The exception is that there might be a way of using
On Tue, 2 Mar 1999, Bill Stewart wrote:
You can trivially run a namespace under a 2nd-level domain name, e.g.
new-name-format.namegods.com
orfoo.dyn.ml.org - to cite a real example
without having to disrupt the worldwide naming system.
Is there some way you could
I'd look at several pieces of the problem -
- what things need to be known
- who needs to know them, under what conditions
- what needs to be hidden from whom, under what conditions.
Crypto may or may not help.
Let's consider one possible non-crypto solution, and then
see if crypto can help
I've been thinking for a long time about how to
decentralize control over property titles, such
as registries of Internet domain names, addresses,
and ASNs. Some of the results can be found at
http://www.best.com/~szabo/securetitle.html.
My main emphasis is how to make the registries tolerant
As some of you may know, I'm involved in a little brawl about domain
names (details at http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf).
It would be really useful to have a cryptographic solution to a part of
the problem.
Suppose we move to a system of Domain Name registrations in which people
can be
Michael Froomkin writes:
Suppose we move to a system of Domain Name registrations in which people
can be anonymous, or pseudonymous, but at the same time wish to have some
way of identifying the people engaged in large-scale domain name
speculation. Are these ends compatible? In a world
