Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-06 Thread Bill Stewart
At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: What we need is a minimum of ONE decent quality additional entropy source, one that works for diskless IPSEC boxes. That's unfortunately outside the scope of IPSec :-) If you don't have random number hardware, you can't get hardware random numbers.

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-04 Thread Bill Frantz
At 12:35 PM -0700 8/2/99, John Denker wrote: 2) Network timing may be subject to observation and possibly manipulation by the attacker. My real-time clocks are pretty coarse (10ms resolution). This subthread started with a discussion of software to estimate the entropy of a bitstream, and I

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-04 Thread John Denker
At 10:08 AM 8/4/99 -0400, D. Hugh Redelmeier wrote: I think that this description reflects an inappropriate understanding of entropy. Entropy is in some sense spread throughout the whole output of /dev/urandom. You don't use entropy up, you spread it over more and more bytes of output. This

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread Paul Koning
"John" == John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: John At 10:09 AM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: 1. Estimating entropy. Yes, that's the hard one. It's orthogonal from everything else. /dev/random has a fairly simple approach; Yarrow is more complex. It's not clear which is

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread John Denker
At 10:09 AM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: 1. Estimating entropy. Yes, that's the hard one. It's orthogonal from everything else. /dev/random has a fairly simple approach; Yarrow is more complex. It's not clear which is better. If there's reason to worry about the one in /dev/random, a

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread John Denker
At 01:27 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: we weren't talking about "in principle" or "in general". Sure, given an unspecified process of unknown (to me) properties I cannot make sensible statements about its entropy. That is true but it isn't relevant to the discussion. Instead, we're

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread John Denker
At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: I only remember a few proposals (2 or 3?) and they didn't seem to be [unduly weak]. Or do you feel that what I've proposed is this weak? If so, why? I've seen comments that say "be careful" but I don't remember any comments suggesting that what I

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread Paul Koning
"John" == John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: John At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote: I only remember a few proposals (2 or 3?) and they didn't seem to be [unduly weak]. Or do you feel that what I've proposed is this weak? If so, why? I've seen comments that say "be

Re: linux-ipsec: /dev/random

1999-08-03 Thread Anonymous
John The point is that there are a lot of customers out there who John aren't ready to run out and acquire the well-designed hardware John TRNG that you alluded to. So we need to think carefully about John the gray area between the strong-but-really-expensive solution John and the