On Wed, Mar 08, 2006 at 01:55:16PM -0700, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> I never made the strong claim that the federated Jabber network is or
> always will remain spam free, only the weaker claim that its abuse and
> identity problems are and will remain less serious than those of the
> federated ema
On Mon, 6 Mar 2006, Amir Herzberg wrote:
I've summarized the current directions that our group is working on
towards improving security for web users. I'll probably soon post it as
HTML, but I'm terribly busy and so far just posted it in eCrypt as PDF,
see at http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/083.pdf
Victor Duchovni wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 08, 2006 at 12:53:16PM -0700, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>
>>> These are closed systems that compete with each other, once
>>> they become federated, they can no longer compete on end-to-end
>>> security, because that is a property of the interoperability
>>> fra
On Wed, Mar 08, 2006 at 12:53:16PM -0700, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> > These are closed systems that compete with each other, once
> > they become federated, they can no longer compete on end-to-end
> > security, because that is a property of the interoperability
> > framework, not the individual
Anton Stiglic wrote:
>> More strongly, if we've never met, and you are not in the habit of
>> routinely signing email, thereby tying a key to your e-persona, it
>> makes no sense to speak of *secure* communication to *you*.
>
> Regularly signing email is not necessarily a good idea. I like to be
Victor Duchovni wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 01, 2006 at 06:15:36PM +0100, Ian G wrote:
>
Email is hard to get encrypted, but it didn't stop Skype from doing
encryped IMs "easily."
>>>
>>> Likewise I have secured email communications with my wife via a single
>>> key exchange, so what? Skype has
Alex Alten wrote:
> At 05:58 AM 3/3/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Alex Alten wrote:
>> > At 05:12 PM 2/26/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> >> Alex Alten wrote:
>> >>> At 02:59 PM 2/24/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> >>>
I've summarized the current directions that our group is working on
towards improving security for web users. I'll probably soon post it as
HTML, but I'm terribly busy and so far just posted it in eCrypt as PDF,
see at http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/083.pdf.
We hope to soon be able to provide more d
Alex Alten <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>At 03:13 AM 3/6/2006 +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> >Basically our customer required us to encrypt any team communications. So we
>> >used PGP with email. I know the body of the email was encrypted, and I
>> >believe attachments were too. The certs were use
At 03:13 AM 3/6/2006 +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>Basically our customer required us to encrypt any team communications. So we
>used PGP with email. I know the body of the email was encrypted, and I
>believe attachments were too. The certs were used to "automate" the
>decryption. Basically th
Hi,
>Basically our customer required us to encrypt any team communications. So we
>used PGP with email. I know the body of the email was encrypted, and I
>believe attachments were too. The certs were used to "automate" the
>decryption. Basically the PGP plugin would check the incoming mail's se
At 05:58 AM 3/3/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Alex Alten wrote:
> At 05:12 PM 2/26/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> Alex Alten wrote:
>>> At 02:59 PM 2/24/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote: We have keyserver
* Bill Stewart:
> Or you could try using the Google Keyserver -
> just because there isn't one
> doesn't mean you can't type in "9E94 4513 3983 5F70"
> or 9383DE06 or [EMAIL PROTECTED] "PGP Key"
> and see what's in Google's cache.
What a peculiar advice. We know for sure that Google logs t
>More strongly, if we've never met, and you are not in the habit of
>routinely signing email, thereby tying a key to your e-persona, it
>makes no sense to speak of *secure* communication to *you*.
Regularly signing email is not necessarily a good idea. I like to be able
to repudiate most emails
Does anyone know of a DTLS implementation for Java? I'd rather avoid
using OpenSSL through JNI if I possibly can.
--
Give a man a fire and he's warm for a day, but set | Tom Weinstein
him on fire and he's warm for the rest of his life.| [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> - Original Message -
>> From: "Ben Laurie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Subject: Re: NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use
>> Date: Thu, 02 Mar 2006 10:16:55 +
>>
>>
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Alex Alten wrote:
> At 05:12 P
Hey,
In Maurer's paper, which is the last link here on the following page,
he proposes to use a public random "pad" to encrypt the plaintext
based on bits selected by a key. What I'm wondering is why he chose
the strange construction for encryption; namely, that he uses an
additive (mod 2) cipher
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Alex Alten wrote:
>>> At 05:12 PM 2/26/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
Alex Alten wrote:
> At 02:59 PM 2/24/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> Ed Gerck wrote: We have keyservers for this (my chosen
>> technology was PGP). If you liken their use to looking up
msg.pgp
Description: PGP message
> Alex Alten wrote:
> > At 05:12 PM 2/26/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
> >> Alex Alten wrote:
> >>> At 02:59 PM 2/24/2006 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
> Ed Gerck wrote: We have keyservers for this (my chosen
> technology was PGP). If you liken their use to looking up an
> address in an a
Here's a 1997 paper on "quantum computing in the large" that I had
been asking about:
http://www.media.mit.edu/physics/projects/spins/home.html
"Neil Gershenfeld and Isaac Chuang have developed an entirely new
approach to quantum computation that promises to solve many of these
problems. Instead
--- John W Noerenberg II <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Oh really? Then you should be able to send a note to my gmail
> address.
So I have been reading this thread for the last couple days and the
above comment gives me a chance to voice something that really needs to
be said. Let's face it, a lar
--
Bill Stewart wrote:
> The real question with ECC, other than patents, which don't seem to
> interfere too much right now and will gradually go away, is how long
> the keys need to be, and how long they can be trusted. ~~160-bit
> keys were short enough to be convenient. 256-bit is probably
On 3/1/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Does anyone have an idea of what this is about? (From Computerworld):
>
> -- Jerry
I believe this is the same technology that Bruce Schneier commented on
in his security blog:
http:/
On Wed, Mar 01, 2006 at 06:15:36PM +0100, Ian G wrote:
> >>Email is hard to get encrypted, but it didn't stop Skype from doing
> >>encryped IMs "easily."
> >
> >
> >Likewise I have secured email communications with my wife via a single
> >key exchange, so what? Skype has not "easily" created an in
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