Status of SRP

2006-06-04 Thread Beryllium Sphere LLC
On 6/3/06, Florian Weimer fw-at-deneb.enyo.de |Perry's Cryptography mailing list| < ...> wrote: We have no real-world studies how users make their day-to-day trust decisions when using the Internet. We do have a beginning, in the study done by Garfinkel, Miller and Wu at MIT (http://g

AES timing attacks, why not "whiten" the implementation?

2005-06-23 Thread Beryllium Sphere LLC
>1) How do you generate this in a way that does not leak information about the permutation generated? >2) How many times can you re-use a single indirection array? >3) How quickly can you generate new indirection arrays? Good questions, which probably require empirical answers. The added cost

AES timing attacks, why not "whiten" the implementation?

2005-06-23 Thread Beryllium Sphere LLC
Can you destroy the relationship between key contents and timing without hurting average run time? Each round of AES has sixteen table lookups. If you permute the order in which the implementation does the lookups, then you get a completely different pattern of cache hits and misses. If you pe