Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-23 Thread Florian Weimer
* Peter Gutmann: Debian seem to be particularly bad for not reporting changes to maintainers, This shouldn't be the case. There's a clear policy that non-packaging changes (basically, anything beyond trivial build fixes and pathname changes for FHS compliance) should be submitted upstream.

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-23 Thread Ben Laurie
Florian Weimer wrote: * Ben Laurie: I must confess that I said that because I did not have the energy to figure out the other routes to adding entropy, such as adding an int (e.g. a PID, which I'm told still makes it in there). The PID dependency is there because of the need for fork

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-23 Thread Florian Weimer
* Ben Laurie: Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote: Ben: I'm idly curious. Was this exceptionally unusual case where use of uninitialized memory was valid properly commented in the code? It's mentioned in the manpage for a function that eventually calls the function that was (correctly) patched--through

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-23 Thread Florian Weimer
* Ben Laurie: I must confess that I said that because I did not have the energy to figure out the other routes to adding entropy, such as adding an int (e.g. a PID, which I'm told still makes it in there). The PID dependency is there because of the need for fork support--obviously, the PRNG

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
On Tue, 13 May 2008 12:10:16 -0400 Jonathan S. Shapiro [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ben's points are well taken, but there is one *small* piece of this where I have some sympathy for the Debian folks: What can we learn from this? Firstly, vendors should not be fixing problems (or, really,

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Ben Laurie
Steven M. Bellovin wrote: On Tue, 13 May 2008 14:10:45 +0100 Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Debian have a stunning example of how blindly fixing problems pointed out by security tools can be disastrous. I've blogged about it here: http://www.links.org/?p=327 Vendors Are Bad For Security

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
On Tue, 13 May 2008 23:00:57 +0100 Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Steven M. Bellovin wrote: On Tue, 13 May 2008 14:10:45 +0100 Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Debian have a stunning example of how blindly fixing problems pointed out by security tools can be disastrous.

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Ben Laurie
Steven M. Bellovin wrote: On Tue, 13 May 2008 23:00:57 +0100 Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Steven M. Bellovin wrote: On Tue, 13 May 2008 14:10:45 +0100 Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Debian have a stunning example of how blindly fixing problems pointed out by security tools can

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Ben Laurie
Steven M. Bellovin wrote: On Tue, 13 May 2008 23:27:52 +0100 Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ben: I haven't looked at the actual code in question -- are you saying that the *only* way to add more entropy is via this pool of uninitialized memory? No. That would be fantastically stupid.

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I must confess that I said that because I did not have the energy to figure out the other routes to adding entropy, such as adding an int (e.g. a PID, which I'm told still makes it in there). So just to clarify, does the Debian patch only remove the ability

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Ben Laurie
Peter Gutmann wrote: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I must confess that I said that because I did not have the energy to figure out the other routes to adding entropy, such as adding an int (e.g. a PID, which I'm told still makes it in there). So just to clarify, does the Debian patch

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Ben Laurie
Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote: Ben: I'm idly curious. Was this exceptionally unusual case where use of uninitialized memory was valid properly commented in the code? Well. Kinda. It didn't really explain why: i=fread(buf,1,n,in); if (i = 0) break;

Re: [ROS] The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Ben Laurie
Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote: On Wed, 2008-05-14 at 10:34 +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote: Ben: I'm idly curious. Was this exceptionally unusual case where use of uninitialized memory was valid properly commented in the code? Well. Kinda. It didn't really explain why... Then