nfidentiality)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#49
and other parts of the thread
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#51 Crypto to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#52 Crypto to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn
You can use cryptography to protect IP and to prevent cloning of microchips
even if they get reverse-engineered, but the cipher would have to possess
special properties similar to those of VEST ciphers (see
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/vestp2.html), like support family keying to
make every A
from long ago and far away
From: lynn
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1999 14:13:42 -0800
Subject: Re: a smartcard of a different color
The USB chip is starting to come up higher on peoples' radar ... bunch
of discussion was kicked off by this posting.
the NACHA announcement talks about not absolutely
Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> As Perry said, chip fabs have plenty of diagnostic equipment that
> would extract an RSA private key every bit as easily as it would
> extract a private serial number, which means that the additional cost
> of 20-40 gates, plus IP licensing, plus... for a cryptographic
On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 06:46:54PM -0600, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> >The simple, cost-effective solution, then, would seem to be to generate
> >"static serial numbers" like cipher keys -- with sufficient randomness
> >and length that their sequence cannot be predicte
Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
The simple, cost-effective solution, then, would seem to be to generate
"static serial numbers" like cipher keys -- with sufficient randomness
and length that their sequence cannot be predicted. I still do not see
the advantage (except to Certicom, who would doubtless
On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 03:52:55PM -0600, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> >I don't get it. How is there "no increase in vulnerability and threat"
> >if a manufacturer of counterfeit / copy chips can simply read the already
> >generated private key out of a legitimate chip
rs ...
while you are still stuck with only a single private key. the equation
then is whether "identical effort" divided by one is the same as
"identical effort" divided by a million.
so we could look at it from an additional analogy
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm25.htm#3 C
Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
So, you sign the public key the chip generated, and inject the _signed_
key back into the chip, then package and ship it. This is how the SDK
for IBM's crypto processors determines that it is talking to the genuine
IBM product. It is a good idea, and it also leaves th
ussion:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61
past posts involving this thread:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#49 Crypto to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#51 Crypto to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aads
On Thu, Jul 27, 2006 at 08:53:26PM -0600, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
>
> If you treat it as a real security chip (the kind that goes into
> smartcards and hardware token) ... it eliminates the significant
> post-fab security handling (prior to finished delivery), in part to
> assure that counte
xtremely low power
requires to work in contactless, radio frequency deployments)
as aside, the patents referenced in the original post (and which we
no longer have any relationship)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#49 Crypto to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
allowed for both
On Tue, Jul 25, 2006 at 03:49:11PM -0600, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> >EE Times is carrying the following story:
> >
> >http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=190900759
> >
> >It is about attempts to use cryptography to protect chip designs from
>
a related article (that also mentions certicom crypto):
How Secure Is That Device? As device software joins the larger world,
security becomes ever more vital
http://dso.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=191501076
and some general comments in another thread
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006o.
| EE Times is carrying [a] story ... about attempts to use cryptography
| to protect chip designs from untrustworthy fabrication facilities,
| including a technology from Certicom.
|
| Unlike ordinary DRM, which I think can largely work in so far as it
| merely provides a (low) barrier to stop oth
re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#49 Crypto to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#50 DDA cards may address the UK
Chip&Pin woes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#51 Crypto to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
On Tue, 25 Jul 2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> EE Times is carrying the following story:
> http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=190900759
> [...]
> I'd be interested in other people's thoughts on this. Can you use DRM
> to protect something worth not eight dollars but eigh
"Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I'd be interested in other people's thoughts on this. Can you use DRM to
>protect something worth not eight dollars but eight million?
>From the EETimes article it looks like a really complicated way of
implementing software-controlled antifuses.
I
to defend chip IP:
snake oil or good idea?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#50 DDA cards may address the UK
Chip&Pin woes
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On Tue, 25 Jul 2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
EE Times is carrying the following story:
http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=190900759
It is about attempts to use cryptography to protect chip designs from
untrustworthy fabrication facilities, including a technology fr
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
EE Times is carrying the following story:
http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=190900759
It is about attempts to use cryptography to protect chip designs from
untrustworthy fabrication facilities, including a technology from
Certicom.
Unlike or
EE Times is carrying the following story:
http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=190900759
It is about attempts to use cryptography to protect chip designs from
untrustworthy fabrication facilities, including a technology from
Certicom.
Unlike ordinary DRM, which I think
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