From: Jerrold Leichter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Aug 24, 2004 7:18 AM
To: Joseph Ashwood [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: On hash breaks, was Re: First quantum crypto bank transfer
[[Note: I've tried to sort out who wrote what, but something odd was
going on in the quoting
| ... the comments I've seen on this list and elsewhere have been much
| broader, and amount to QM secure bit distribution is dumb, it solves
| no problem we haven't already solved better with classical
| techniques.
|
| Most of the comments on this list are more nuanced than that.
Perhaps we
Jerrold Leichter wrote:
... the comments I've seen on this list and elsewhere have been much
broader, and amount to QM secure bit distribution is dumb, it solves
no problem we haven't already solved better with classical
techniques.
Most of the comments on this list are more nuanced than that.
At 02:02 AM 8/23/2004, Florian Weimer wrote:
* Bill Stewart:
I agree that it doesn't look useful, but lawful intercept is harder,
if you're defining that as undetected eavesdropping with
possible cooperation of the telco in the middle,
because quantum crypto needs end-to-end fiber so there's
| Alternatively, how anyone can have absolute confidence in conventional
| crypto
| in a week when a surprise attack appears against a widely-fielded
| primitive
| like MD5 is beyond me. Is our certainty about AES's security really any
| better today than was our certainty about RIPEM - or
Joe Ashwood writes:
Except for RIPEM there were known to be reasons for this, MD5 was
known to be flawed, SHA-0 was replaced because it was flawed (although
knowledge of the nature of the flaw was hidden). Even with RIPEM (and SHA-1
for the same reason) I have plans in place (and have had
- Original Message -
From: Jerrold Leichter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: On hash breaks, was Re: First quantum crypto bank transfer
| (they all have backup
| plans that involve the rest of the SHA series and at the very least
| Whirlpool).
Moving to a larger hash function
* Bill Stewart:
I agree that it doesn't look useful, but lawful intercept is harder,
if you're defining that as undetected eavesdropping with
possible cooperation of the telco in the middle,
because quantum crypto needs end-to-end fiber so there's
nothing the telco can help with except
| However, I still don't believe that quantum cryptography can buy you
| anything but research funding (and probably easier lawful intercept
| because end-to-end encryption is so much harder).
Not to attack you personally - I've heard the same comments from many
other
people - but this is a
At 01:00 PM 8/21/2004, Florian Weimer wrote:
However, I still don't believe that quantum cryptography can buy you
anything but research funding (and probably easier lawful intercept
because end-to-end encryption is so much harder).
I agree that it doesn't look useful, but lawful intercept is
* Jerrold Leichter:
| Not quite correct, the first bank transfer occurred earlier this year,
| in a PR event arranged by the same group:
|
| http://www.quantenkryptographie.at/rathaus_press.html
|
| However, I still don't believe that quantum cryptography can buy you
| anything but
--- begin forwarded text
From: Andrew Thomas [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: First quantum crypto bank transfer
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2004 09:05:58 +0200
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cryptography system goes underground (Aug 19)
http://physicsweb.org/article/news/8/8/13
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