On Fri, 14 Jul 2006, Travis H. wrote:
Absent other protections, one could simply write a new WORM media with
falsified information.
I can see two ways of dealing with this:
1) Some kind of physical authenticity, such as signing one's name on
the media as they are produced (this assumes the
From: Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Jul 14, 2006 11:22 PM
To: David Mercer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Re: Interesting bit of a quote
...
The problem with this is determining if the media has been replaced.
Absent other protections, one could simply write a new
On 7/15/06, John Kelsey [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Another solution is to use cryptographic audit logs. Bruce Schneier
and I did some work on this several years ago, using a MAC to
authenticate the current record as it's written, and a one-way
function to derive the next key. (This idea was
Travis H. wrote:
1) Some kind of physical authenticity, such as signing one's name on
the media as they are produced (this assumes the signer is not
corruptible), or applying a frangible difficult-to-duplicate seal of
some kind (this assumes access controls on the seals).
2) Some kind of hash
On 7/13/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Phenomenon 1:
Computerized records are malleable, and it's in general impossible
to
determine if someone has changed them, when they changed them, what
the previous value was, and so on. Further, changing computer
John Kelsey wrote:
From: Anne Lynn Wheeler [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Jul 11, 2006 6:45 PM
Subject: Re: Interesting bit of a quote
..
my slightly different perspective is that audits in the past have
somewhat been looking for inconsistencies from independent sources. this
worked in the days
On 7/14/06, David Mercer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
WORM drives (and WORM tapes)
are used by organizations that need to prove that things weren't
altered (or to be able to audit when they are).
The problem with this is determining if the media has been replaced.
Absent other protections, one
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
* That which was not recorded did not happen.
* That which is not documented does not exist.
* That which has not been audited is vulnerable.
and he did not mean this in the paths to invisibility
sense but rather that you have liability unless
From: Anne Lynn Wheeler [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Jul 11, 2006 6:45 PM
Subject: Re: Interesting bit of a quote
...
my slightly different perspective is that audits in the past have
somewhat been looking for inconsistencies from independent sources. this
worked in the days of paper books from
On Thu, 13 Jul 2006, John Kelsey wrote:
| From: Anne Lynn Wheeler [EMAIL PROTECTED]
| ...
| my slightly different perspective is that audits in the past have
| somewhat been looking for inconsistencies from independent sources. this
| worked in the days of paper books from multiple different
$800k.
misc. past sox references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006h.html#58 Sarbanes-Oxley
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006i.html#1 Sarbanes-Oxley
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#35 Interesting bit of a quote
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#36 Interesting bit of a quote
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I can corroborate the quote in that much of SarbOx and
other recent regs very nearly have a guilty unless proven
innocent quality, that banks (especially) and others are
called upon to prove a negative: X {could,did} not happen.
California SB1386 roughly says the same
You're talking about entirely different stuff, Lynn,
but you are correct that data fusion at IRS and everywhere
else is aided and abetted by substantially increased record
keeping requirements. Remember, Poindexter's TIA thing did
*not* posit new information sources, just fusing existing
sources
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Been with a reasonable number of General Counsels
on this sort of thing. Maybe you can blame them
and not SB1386 for saying that if you cannot prove
the data didn't spill then it is better corporate
risk management to act as if it did spill.
Well, are you sure you haven't
independent sources of
at least some different data ... so the aggregation is more than the
individual parts (as opposed to the same data to corroborate).
ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#35 Interesting bit of a quote
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006h.html#58 Sarbanes-Oxley
http
On 7/11/06, Adam Fields [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:02:27PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
Business ultimately depends on trust. There's some study out there -
Trust is not quite the opposite of security (in the sense of an
action, not as a state of being), but certainly
On Tue, 11 Jul 2006, Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
| ...independent operation/sources/entities have been used for a variety of
| different purposes. however, my claim has been then auditing has been used
to
| look for inconsistencies. this has worked better in situations where there
was
| independent
David Wagner writes:
SB1386 says that if a company conducts business in Caliornia and
has a system that includes personal information stored in unencrypted from
and if that company discovers or is notified of a breach of the security
that system, then the company must notify any California
On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 05:50:06PM -0700, David Wagner wrote:
No, it doesn't. I think you've got it backwards. That's not what SB1386
says. SB1386 says that if a company conducts business in Caliornia and
has a system that includes personal information stored in unencrypted from
and if
...from a round-table discussion on identity theft in the current
Computerworld:
IDGNS: What are the new threats that people aren't thinking
about?
CEO Dean Drako, Sana Security Inc.: There has been a market
change over the last five-to-six years, primarily due to
On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:02:27PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
[...]
Business ultimately depends on trust. There's some study out there -
I don't recall a reference - that basically finds that the level of
trust is directly related to the level of economic success of an
economy. There are
Jerrold,
I can corroborate the quote in that much of SarbOx and
other recent regs very nearly have a guilty unless proven
innocent quality, that banks (especially) and others are
called upon to prove a negative: X {could,did} not happen.
California SB1386 roughly says the same thing: If you
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