Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-14 Thread Kevin W. Wall
[Note to moderator: May be slightly OT. Unfortunately, Gmail web interface won't allow me to alter the Subject: to mention it there.] On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 5:52 PM, Seth David Schoen wrote: > More fundamentally, as Peter Biddle points out, trust isn't > transitive. Suppose we think that a par

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-14 Thread Marsh Ray
On 09/14/2011 09:34 PM, Arshad Noor wrote: On 9/14/2011 2:52 PM, Seth David Schoen wrote: Arshad Noor writes: I'm not sure I understand why it would be helpful to know all (or any) intermediate CA ahead of time. If you trust the self-signed Root CA, then, by definition, you've decided to trust

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-14 Thread Arshad Noor
On 9/14/2011 2:52 PM, Seth David Schoen wrote: Arshad Noor writes: I'm not sure I understand why it would be helpful to know all (or any) intermediate CA ahead of time. If you trust the self-signed Root CA, then, by definition, you've decided to trust everything that CA (and subordinate CA) is

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-14 Thread dan
*not* nitpicking... > ...as Peter Biddle points out, trust isn't transitive. as an engineer, I feel compelled to add that security is not composable, either (joining two secure systems does not necessarily result in a secure composite) *not* nitpicking. --dan

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-14 Thread Seth David Schoen
Arshad Noor writes: > I'm not sure I understand why it would be helpful to know all (or any) > intermediate CA ahead of time. If you trust the self-signed Root CA, > then, by definition, you've decided to trust everything that CA (and > subordinate CA) issues, with the exception of revoked certif

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-14 Thread Warren Kumari
On Sep 13, 2011, at 7:14 PM, Ralph Holz wrote: > Hi, > HTTPS Everywhere makes users encounter this situation more than they otherwise might. >>> >>> A week or three ago, I got cert warnings - from gmail's page. (Yes, I'm >>> using HTTPS Everywhere). >> >> When _that_ happens, pleas

[cryptography] Covergence as multiple concurrent, alternate PKIs; also, Convergence business models, privacy, and DNSSEC (not that long)

2011-09-14 Thread Nico Williams
I recently caught up with the rest of you and saw Moxie's Convergence presentation [on youtube]. I truly hesitate to post here; there have been so many long posts, that any additional ones are likely to result in "tl;dr". I believe Convergence is... just another PKI, or set of PKIs, with some twi

[cryptography] Fwd: The Magic Inside Bunnie’s New NeTV « root labs rdist

2011-09-14 Thread David Koontz
http://rdist.root.org/2011/09/13/the-magic-inside-bunnies-new-netv/ A year ago, what was probably the most important Pastebin posting ever was released by an anonymous hacker. The HDCP master key gave the ability for anyone to derive the keys protecting the link between DVD players and TVs. T

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-14 Thread Ralph Holz
Hi, >> Well, yes, but it is the Alexa Top 1 million list that is scanned. I can >> give you a few numbers for the Top 1K or so, too, but it does remain a >> relative "popularity". > > How many of those sites ever "advertise" an HTTPS end-point though? > Maybe users are extremely unlikely to ever