Re: [cryptography] openssl on git

2013-01-27 Thread Eitan Adler
On 27 January 2013 21:34, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote: > I don't understand how you can accidentally check in ~/.ssh to your > repository, or at least not notice afterwards. Hopefully the OpenSSL authors > won't do that! If you keep ~ in a git repo it is surprisingly easy ;) -- Eitan Adler __

Re: [cryptography] openssl on git

2013-01-27 Thread Patrick Mylund Nielsen
I don't understand how you can accidentally check in ~/.ssh to your repository, or at least not notice afterwards. Hopefully the OpenSSL authors won't do that! On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 9:29 PM, wrote: > > offtopic to list purpose, but perhaps timely to this thread > > > http://www.webmonkey.com/

Re: [cryptography] openssl on git

2013-01-27 Thread dan
offtopic to list purpose, but perhaps timely to this thread http://www.webmonkey.com/2013/01/users-scramble-as-github-search-exposes-passwords-security-details/ --dan ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net

Re: [cryptography] OAEP for RSA signatures?

2013-01-27 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ryan Sleevi writes: >Did you just suggest that the timing channels in PKCS#1 v1.5 are easier to >get right than the timing channels of OAEP? Yup. >The same PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption that's confounding people a decade [1] after >the original attacks [2]? You're confusing two things, an implementa

Re: [cryptography] OAEP for RSA signatures?

2013-01-27 Thread James Muir
On 13-01-26 08:53 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > ianG writes: > >> Could OAEP be considered reasonable for signatures? > > You need to define "appropriate". For example if you mean "interoperable" > then OAEP isn't even appropriate for encryption, let alone signatures. If > you're worried about t

Re: [cryptography] OAEP for RSA signatures?

2013-01-27 Thread Thierry Moreau
James Muir wrote: PSS is similar to OAEP, but is for signatures. If you have OAEP implemented, then it wouldn't take you long to do PSS, which is described in the PKCS-1v2.1 document. This is the answer I suspected in reading the original post question. Hacking OAEP into a signature scheme

[cryptography] blinding to protect against timing-attacks on RSA sigs (Re: OAEP for RSA signatures?)

2013-01-27 Thread Adam Back
The RSA private key timing attack is much more likely than on padding because the cost is so much higher. Bleichenbacher like adaptive attacks are not so much timing as error code attacks (app is too chatty about whether padding was well formed afte decryption), so thats a separate issue. For RS

Re: [cryptography] OAEP for RSA signatures?

2013-01-27 Thread ianG
On 27/01/13 04:53 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: ianG writes: Could OAEP be considered reasonable for signatures? You need to define "appropriate". For example if you mean "interoperable" then OAEP isn't even appropriate for encryption, let alone signatures. Oh, interoperable is not an issue.