On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 9:57 PM, David Johnston wrote:
> ...
> I've argued in private (and now here) that a large entropy pool is a natural
> response to entropy famine and uneven supply, just like a large grain depot
> guards against food shortages and uneven supply.
this is a good analogy :)
>
On Sep 8, 2013, at 22:10 , coderman wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:05 PM, coderman wrote:
>> ...
>> none of these are compelling reasons to not release raw access to the
>> entropy stream from hardware noise sources.*
>
> * i meant to add, there have been various justifications put forth.
On 8/20/2013 2:33 PM, grarpamp wrote:
The subject thread is covering a lot about OS implementations
and RNG various sources. But what are the short list of open
source tools we should be using to actually test and evaluate
the resulting number streams?
On 8/19/2013 11:45 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
ianG writes:
On a related point, what name do we give to the design/pattern for
entropy sources ==> mix/pool ==> deterministic expansion function
?
"The standard way to do things"? Or "a standard CSPRNG" (continually seeded
PRNG).
Peter.
I
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:05 PM, coderman wrote:
> ...
> none of these are compelling reasons to not release raw access to the
> entropy stream from hardware noise sources.*
* i meant to add, there have been various justifications put forth.
again, none of them compelling. for every potential ris
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 9:26 PM, David Johnston wrote:
> ...
> #1) Maintaining a strong security boundary.
> ...
> #2) FIPS compliance.
> ...
> #3) Robust engineering. [trust us entirely]
> ...
> #4) Software solutions have been a demonstrable failure. [trust us instead]
none of these are compell
On 8/17/2013 9:39 AM, Sandy Harris wrote:
Papers like Yarrow with respected authors argue convincingly that
systems with far smaller state can be secure.
I've argued in private (and now here) that a large entropy pool is a
natural response to entropy famine and uneven supply, just like a large
On 9/7/2013 6:11 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
On 2013-09-07 9:14 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
That's the claimed design, yes. I see no particular reason to believe
that the hardware in my server implements the design. I can't even test
that the AES whitening does what it is documented to do, because I
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:11 AM, ianG wrote:
> ...
> The United States' National Security Agency intelligence-gathering operation
> is capable of accessing user data from smart phones from all leading
> manufacturers...
>
> The documents state that it is possible for the NSA to tap most sensitive
On 2013-09-09 1:54 AM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 03:00:39PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
On 2013-09-08 1:25 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 08:34:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
Well, since you personally did this, would you care to explain t
Forwarded with permission.
So there *is* a BTNS implementation, after all. Albeit
only for OpenBSD -- but this means FreeBSD is next, and
Linux to follow.
- Forwarded message from Andreas Davour -
Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 09:10:44 -0700 (PDT)
From: Andreas Davour
To: Eugen Leitl
Subject
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html
Privacy Scandal: NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data
SPIEGEL has learned from internal NSA documents that the US intelligence
agency has the capability of tapping user data from the iPhone, devi
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 03:00:39PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
> On 2013-09-08 1:25 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> >On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 08:34:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
> >>Well, since you personally did this, would you care to explain the
> >>very strange design decision to whiten
- Forwarded message from Gregory Maxwell -
Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 06:44:57 -0700
From: Gregory Maxwell
To: "This mailing list is for all discussion about theory, design, and
development of Onion Routing."
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] NIST approved crypto in Tor?
Reply-To: tor-t...@li
- Forwarded message from John Young -
Date: Sun, 08 Sep 2013 09:12:25 -0400
From: John Young
To: cypherpu...@cpunks.org
Subject: Political Cypherpunks Trumps Apolitical Cryptography
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9
What is striking about discussion on the two cryptograp
Hi David,
>>> Most private keys are issued by, not merely certified by, the CAs.
>> Can you give numerical evidence for this claim?
>>
> Device certificates (those that go into mass manufactured products)
> typically have the CA provide both keys and cert. The back and forth of
> keygen->CSR->Sign
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