Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-16 Thread william yager
>You do have to wonder if apple backdoored their IM client, I am a little curious about Apple's iMessage encryption system. From the bits and pieces I've picked up across the net, it sounds like Apple holds a keyring containing the public keys of all your iMessage-using devices. When someone wants

Re: [cryptography] Looking for earlier proof: no secure channel without previous secure channel

2013-06-07 Thread William Yager
Precisely. You have no way of knowing anything about the alleged identity behind a key without having some form of interaction through a secure channel (like real-world interaction). On Jun 7, 2013, at 3:53 PM, Florian Weimer wrote: > Practically speaking, this is true. Maybe I'm a bit naïve

Re: [cryptography] Looking for earlier proof: no secure channel without previous secure channel

2013-06-07 Thread William Yager
We're starting to tread into very philosophical territory. I'd argue that users on the Silk Road (sellers especially) are, in fact, authenticated over very informal separate secure channels. One "secure channel" is that of the Silk Road website itself. By being on the website, it lends some creden

Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

2013-07-12 Thread William Yager
There are plenty of ways to design an apparently random number generator so that you can predict the output (exactly or approximately) without causing any obvious flaws in the pseudorandom output stream. Even the smallest bias can significantly reduce security. This could be a critical failure, and

Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

2013-07-12 Thread William Yager
n software, GPG, SSH, every other web browser I'm using, and pretty much every crypto appliance on my machine. I'd rather have a rickety shed built on solid ground than a castle built on quicksand. On Jul 12, 2013, at 11:32 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > William Yager writes: >

Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random

2013-08-19 Thread William Yager
On Aug 19, 2013, at 7:46 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > You can get them for as little as $50 in the form of USB-key media players > running Android. Or if you really insist on doing the whole thing yourself, > get something like an EA-XPR-003 ($29 in single-unit quantities from Digikey, > http://ww

Re: [cryptography] no-keyring public

2013-08-24 Thread William Yager
On Aug 24, 2013, at 11:30 AM, Krisztián Pintér wrote: > we can do that. how about this? stretch the password with some KDF, derive a > seed to a PRNG, and use the PRNG to create the the key pair. if the algorithm > is fixed, it will end up with the same keypair every time. voila, no-keyring >