It is not always the case that the full BIOS ROM is authenticated. Here is
some prior research that leveraged OEM customization of the boot splash to
exploit a vulnerability in the bitmap parser to implement a boot kit:
shawn wilson wrote:
I guess I should've said what my use case is:
I want a boot system that unlocks a partition where everything is
checked [...]
However, someone could replace
gpg with a version that logs to something.
OK, simply provide a Faraday cage to the user and instruct them to boot
On Wed, 29 May 2013, shawn wilson wrote:
This is sort of a trusting trust question. However, is there a way to
have gpg verify it has not been altered? Maybe by compiling it with an
internal key file and it asking for a password before decrypting
itself and then presenting some type of
I was not asked to keep this off list but removing attribution just in
case.
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 8:49 PM, shawn wilson ag4ve...@gmail.com wrote:
Thanks for all of the input. In the end I think I'm going to go with
the simplest solution (along the way, I found ima-linux and signelf).
Herewith my 2c:
- run static code analyzer against GPG source code (e.g. llvm's
scan-build). Verify GPG source code against keys provided after
downloading. (Of course is manual inspection also a possibility, but at
least for our team scan-build catches more errors than the humans
involved).
I guess I should've said what my use case is:
I want a boot system that unlocks a partition where everything is
checked to prevent an evil maid attack. I can sign / check everything
but the key and the integrity checker. However, someone could replace
gpg with a version that logs to something. I
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 11:02 AM, shawn wilson ag4ve...@gmail.com wrote:
I guess I should've said what my use case is:
I want a boot system that unlocks a partition where everything is
checked to prevent an evil maid attack. I can sign / check everything
but the key and the integrity checker.
