[cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-06-30 Thread Danilo Gligoroski
This was expected. As Skype definitely ruined its reputation as free end-to-end application for secure communication, other products are taking their chances. "Agencies showing sudden interest in encrypted comm" --- http://gcn.com/blogs/cybereye/2013/06/agencies-sudden-interest-encrypted-com m.as

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-06-30 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-06-30 5:13 PM, Danilo Gligoroski wrote: This was expected. As Skype definitely ruined its reputation as free end-to-end application for secure communication, other products are taking their chances. "Agencies showing sudden interest in encrypted comm" --- http://gcn.com/blogs/cybereye/20

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-06-30 Thread Guido Witmond
On 30-06-13 09:44, James A. Donald wrote: > On 2013-06-30 5:13 PM, Danilo Gligoroski wrote: >> This was expected. >> As Skype definitely ruined its reputation as free end-to-end >> application for >> secure communication, other products are taking their chances. >> >> "Agencies showing sudden inter

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-06-30 Thread Jon Callas
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Jun 30, 2013, at 12:44 AM, James A. Donald wrote: > Silent Circle expects end users to manage their own keys, which is of course > the only way for end users to be genuinely secure. Everything else is snake > oil, or rapidly turns into snake oi

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-06-30 Thread Nadim Kobeissi
On 2013-06-30, at 3:44 AM, James A. Donald wrote: > On 2013-06-30 5:13 PM, Danilo Gligoroski wrote: >> This was expected. >> As Skype definitely ruined its reputation as free end-to-end application for >> secure communication, other products are taking their chances. >> >> "Agencies showing sud

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-06-30 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-07-01 8:55 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: On 2013-06-30, at 3:44 AM, James A. Donald wrote: On 2013-06-30 5:13 PM, Danilo Gligoroski wrote: This was expected. As Skype definitely ruined its reputation as free end-to-end application for secure communication, other products are taking their

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-06-30 Thread Nadim Kobeissi
On 2013-06-30, at 7:36 PM, James A. Donald wrote: > On 2013-07-01 8:55 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: >> On 2013-06-30, at 3:44 AM, James A. Donald >> wrote: >> >> >>> On 2013-06-30 5:13 PM, Danilo Gligoroski wrote: >>> This was expected. As Skype definitely ruined its reputation as fr

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-07-01 Thread Guido Witmond
> >> if ever we managed to provide an interface where users successfully managed >> their own keys without screwing up. >> The only answer is to take key management out of the users' hands. And do it automatically as part of the work flow. Guido. __

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-07-01 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Mon, Jul 01, 2013 at 01:31:51PM +0200, Guido Witmond wrote: > The only answer is to take key management out of the users' hands. And > do it automatically as part of the work flow. You need at least a Big Fat Warning when the new fingerprint differs from the cached one, and it's not just expir

Re: [cryptography] post-PRISM boom in secure communications (WAS skype backdoor confirmation)

2013-07-01 Thread Nico Williams
On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 9:05 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Mon, Jul 01, 2013 at 01:31:51PM +0200, Guido Witmond wrote: > >> The only answer is to take key management out of the users' hands. And >> do it automatically as part of the work flow. > > You need at least a Big Fat Warning when the new fing