So, the Tor Project Incorporated just censored 1000+ independent nodes
off of the legacy tor network, and TPI is so cowardly they can't even
mention the name of and link to the competing project on their blog.
Wherein, the woke socialists at TPI also attempted to take a
swipe at how Free-Market Vol
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/07/new-attack-on-tor-can-deanonymize-hidden-services-with-surprising-accuracy/
https://news.mit.edu/2015/tor-vulnerability-0729
These attacks were known to the non-TOP-SECRET public
research groups at least 8 years ago. Tor Project Inc refused t
The hypocrite anti-freespeech frauds at Tor Project Incorporated
have deleted frontend mailman links to the Tor-Talk Archives and
shutdown the tor-talk mailing list claiming that it was "unused".
However any search for "tor-talk" on this list will prove that
that's a straight up fucking LIE.
The TR
> Tor design has stayed 25 years old, while threats advanced light years, yet
> Tor Project Incorporated chooses silence refusing to even publicly
> speculating on design weakness in such wide public needed and vocal manner
> so as to inform warn users of some real issues.
"Tor Stinks -- NSA, vul
On 4/6/23, efc@swisscows.email wrote:
> On Thu, 6 Apr 2023, grarpamp wrote:
>> On 4/5/23, efc@swisscows.email wrote:
>>> So you wouldn't say that Tor is good since it is the least worst way for
>>> people to browse?
>>
>> Users getting jailed or murdered by the State's traffic
>> analysis and syb
silence can be anything (discourage, censorship, user error, disruption, bugs)
re tor: nym is the new tor? yes/no?
On Thu, 6 Apr 2023, grarpamp wrote:
On 4/5/23, efc@swisscows.email wrote:
So you wouldn't say that Tor is good since it is the least worst way for
people to browse?
Users getting jailed or murdered by the State's traffic
analysis and sybil systems is for them perhaps the worst
way to die.
On 4/5/23, efc@swisscows.email wrote:
> So you wouldn't say that Tor is good since it is the least worst way for
> people to browse?
Users getting jailed or murdered by the State's traffic
analysis and sybil systems is for them perhaps the worst
way to die. Does voting for least worst politicians
So you wouldn't say that Tor is good since it is the least worst way for
people to browse?
It is definitely not perfect but perhaps it could generate more noise in
which to bury the few signals that are out there?
On Wed, 5 Apr 2023, grarpamp wrote:
"Download Tor Browser to experience real
"Download Tor Browser to experience real private browsing without
tracking, surveillance, or censorship. -- Tor Project Homepage, April 2023"
The Tor Project Incorporated is flat out lying and
has been putting its users at risk since decade+.
"Tor Stinks -- NSA, vulns known since before 2012"
On 3/1/23, professor rat wrote:
> Since our AI reinforcements from the future just arrived
A lot of those are general purpose, not universal solutions.
> they should have Tor sorted by Xmas.
But you can rest assured that the specific problem of "tor"
has already been sorted by algo and ASIC in
/2
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.02265.pdf
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.07285v1.pdf
These two papers are over five years old.
Tor Project Incorporated knew about them and their classes of attacks
and refused to tell their users about them and the risks to their safety.
Tor Project Incorporated also re
Tor Project Incorporated has for decades still refused to openly,
loudly, publicly, and routinely acknowledge and tell its users the
flaws and problems that people on this list have been saying for
many years, and have been censorbanned off Tor channels for
speaking the embarassing facts about Tor.
https://www.techdirt.com/2014/10/06/documents-released-silk-road-case-add-more-evidence-to-parallel-construction-theory/
https://nusenu.medium.com/is-kax17-performing-de-anonymization-attacks-against-tor-users-42e566defce8
https://www.courtlistener.com/?q=%22tor%22%20%22foreign%20law%20enforcement%
Back in the days people were used to using mixmaster etc, whereas
others migrated to then-modern p2p systems like i2p [and the word on
the digital street was that "real" anonymous people had custom built
onions that propagated through compromised systems -- and one saw a
lot of those, and there wer
> "Tor Stinks -- NSA, known since before 2012"
Tor Project: Still Infested With Many Conflicts Of Interest, and with
many problems that have been outlined for decade, not weeks,
that Tor Project and its minions still put users at risk by refusing to mention,
not least because it wouldn't be good
"Arti 1.0.0 is released: Our Rust Tor implementation
is ready for production use. -- Tor Project Inc"
Doesn't matter what language you write it in,
or what bells and whistles you add to it and advertise,
tor's fundamental underlying design and operations
are still subject to traffic analysis (incl
The NSA actively targets projects like Tor, to reduce and coopt their
effectiveness.
Appelbaum wrote about and cited this in his thesis.
>
It would be no surprise if spy agency workers were employed in Tor. It is
no surprise if they are also employed in other anonymity, privacy,
security, and sof
"Communication in a world of pervasive surveillance ... 2.8.1 –
Sabotage ... The NSA estimated in 2011 that they performed around one
thousand attacks against VPN sessions per hour and NSA projected it
would soon be performing one hundred thousand such attacks in parallel
per hour. It is reasonable
https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html
https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/categories/19-Tor
Tuesday, 21 December 2021
Back in 2020, I wrote nine blog entries about Tor that covered a wide
range of vulnerabilities. Many of them were well-known to
> https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running-hundreds-of-malicious-tor-relays/
> A mysterious threat actor is running hundreds of malicious Tor relays...
Gizmodo: Someone Is Running Hundreds of Malicious Servers on the Tor
Network and Might Be De-Anonymizing Users.
https://gizmod
https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running-hundreds-of-malicious-tor-relays/
A mysterious threat actor is running hundreds of malicious Tor relays...
If you knew how many nodes have been both removed since years,
and how many are still running and coming every day, you would
sh
>> Thing is, I don't trust Claudia to get it right (we have a history... ).
history?
‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Saturday, October 16, 2021 1:34 PM, Peter Fairbrother
wrote:
> On 16/10/2021 10:12, Stefan Claas wrote:
>
> > On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 10:24 AM Peter Fairbrother pe...@ts
On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 3:34 PM Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> I had a look at the whitepaper - Claudia has outdone herself in
> describing a system which could maybe work - but, and I quote, "The
> specific algorithms and implementation details of each part of the
> system will be fleshed out in sep
On 10/16/21, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> except an observer can see when you are sending real
> traffic, somewhere within the burst. And maybe correlate that with some
> other network i/o
No, all a network tap can see is that you are moving
encrypted packets, they can't see inside them as to
chaff
On 16/10/2021 10:12, Stefan Claas wrote:
On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 10:24 AM Peter Fairbrother wrote:
Though there's no such thing as 100% anonymity, security, etc...
there are certainly different comparative magnitudes of it available
today, and higher ones are probably quite achievable with som
On 16/10/2021 12:00, grarpamp wrote:
On 10/16/21, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
Except the increased bandwidth cost. And if you have to have padding
between each node, or on each link, that becomes very expensive.
...
[whatever FUD's/month]
Again, no, users have already bought whatever speed they
On 10/16/21, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> Except the increased bandwidth cost. And if you have to have padding
> between each node, or on each link, that becomes very expensive.
> ...
> [whatever FUD's/month]
Again, no, users have already bought whatever speed they like from their ISP,
they can't s
On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 10:24 AM Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> > Though there's no such thing as 100% anonymity, security, etc...
> > there are certainly different comparative magnitudes of it available
> > today, and higher ones are probably quite achievable with some
> > work on new alternative mo
On 16/10/2021 06:45, grarpamp wrote:
On 10/15/21, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
Nothing about a base layer of chaff prevents
"low-latency browsing" as an application.
Except the increased bandwidth cost. And if you have to have padding
between each node, or on each link, that becomes very expe
On 15/10/2021 18:03, coderman wrote:
‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Friday, October 15, 2021 12:09 AM,
PrivacyArms wrote:
To clarify my question: Is there an anonymous network (GPA)
for secure/private messaging better than Tor?
privacy loves company, so the unpleasant answer to your
On 15/10/2021 19:24, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 wrote:
Is that so? Cause if A and B are connected through a 'high speed' fully
padded link, they can replace the 'chaff' with their data at will and with very
'low latency'...
And no anonymity whatsoever.
Peter Fairbrother
On 10/15/21, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> perhaps I should have said low-latency browsing.
Defining what the end user application is, is required
if you want to design a net to carry it.
If the subject is about tor's feature as currently implemented,
the application scope is therefore narrow, one o
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‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Friday, October 15, 2021 12:09 AM,
PrivacyArms wrote:
> To clarify my question: Is there an anonymous network (GPA)
> for secure/private messaging better than Tor?
privacy loves company, so the unpleasant answ
On 15/10/2021 11:07, grarpamp wrote:
Anonymity is hard, and low-latency anonymity is almost impossible.
People keep throwing this "low latency" term around as if it's
some kind of distinction, a proven generality, lesser capable to
anonymity, than any other particular "latency" level. This is b
> Anonymity is hard, and low-latency anonymity is almost impossible.
People keep throwing this "low latency" term around as if it's
some kind of distinction, a proven generality, lesser capable to
anonymity, than any other particular "latency" level. This is bogus.
Latency is just a timing measure
On 15/10/2021 01:09, PrivacyArms wrote:
To clarify my question: Is there an anonymous network (GPA) for secure/private
messaging better than Tor?
Regarding the other question: What can criminals can do to stay anonymous which
is outside the law (hacking/stealing computers/wifi), more?
Anonym
1) Is there a better way for anonymous communication than Tor?
2) Is there a global adversary resistant mixnet?
3) Someone mentioned the fact, that criminals have better ways of hiding than
Tor? What methods do you had in mind?
‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Tuesday, October 12, 2021 2:50
> Tor uses some kind of limited padding,
Tor Project Inc added netflow padding after someone
started posting on netflow, general TA, and Sybil problems.
Then TPI censored, banned, and booted them out after
they kept publicly posting about TA and other insidious and
inconvenient problems such as Sy
On 11/10/2021 04:59, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 wrote:
On Mon, 11 Oct 2021 03:18:15 +
PrivacyArms wrote:
Thanks. I will read the linked paper, but Tor uses connection padding. Maybe
your information is out of date?
Nah. Tor uses some kind of limited padding,
It's designed so that route
> but if you threat model is nation state,
> you've got bigger problems ... :P~
The threat model of the State is Freedom,
you've got to deliver that big problem to them.
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Hash: SHA512
‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Friday, October 8, 2021 8:05 AM, Stefan Claas
wrote:
> the assumed number of malicious nodes is much higher.
> Then you do not include the assumed number of honest, but
> compromised nodes.
*this* is the
On 10/10/21, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 wrote:
> On Sun, 10 Oct 2021 14:47:56 -0400
> Karl wrote:
>
>
>> But please don't use anything less. Your web browsing is private, and it
>> is appropriate that somebody should need to have probable cause and work
>> hard to monitor and log it.
>
>
> don
On Sun, Oct 10, 2021, 2:03 AM Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> On 10/10/2021 [offlist] wrote:
> > If the US is compromised by 100%, Tor would not work at all, right?
>
> For providing reliable anonymity against the US and UK government
> agencies in the form of the NSA and GCHQ, yes, Tor is completely
> TorProject is censoring? I was not aware of that fact.
Of course you're not aware, that's how censors work [1],
they shitcan the messages so no subscribers can see them.
Go look at all the messages that appear here but never
made it to their lists. They're cowards from the truth
because their pa
On 10/10/2021 [offlist] wrote:
> If the US is compromised by 100%, Tor would not work at all, right?
For providing reliable anonymity against the US and UK government
agencies in the form of the NSA and GCHQ, yes, Tor is completely useless.
Against a lesser adversary, well there are many other
On 09/10/2021 22:17, PrivacyArms wrote:
What I want to know is the percentage risk of x malicious nodes to deanonymize
a user by controlling the full circuit.
there isn't a simple answer, but you can work out a lower bound like this:
First, note that the actual nodes do not need to be dishone
What I want to know is the percentage risk of x malicious nodes to deanonymize
a user by controlling the full circuit.
‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Friday, October 8, 2021 7:35 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> > How can I calculate how much impact X honest Tor relays have?
> > Is it better to calcu
Hi,
IIRC the assumed number of malicious nodes is much higher.
Then you do not include the assumed number of honest, but
compromised nodes.
How much would your equation help Tor users, in different
locations, if ISPs would hand over to third parties who is
using Tor with port 9050 and 9051, so th
> How can I calculate how much impact X honest Tor relays have?
> Is it better to calculate with bandwidth consumed (250Gbps), despite the
> number of relays (~7000)?
>
> Basically, I want to get the mathematical equation to this statement:
> I run X Tor relays at Y Mb/s each and by doing so I secu
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